Monero GUI

This change adjusts how the Monero GUI wallet stores and passes login credentials for remote daemon connections. Previously, daemon username/password and 'trusted daemon' status were kept as persistent properties on the wallet object and reused across connections. The patch scopes those credentials to each individual connection instead, passing them as parameters when initializing a connection rather than storing them on the wallet. This reduces the risk that credentials or trust settings from one remote node could accidentally be reused for a different node later.

This commit changes how the Monero GUI wallet stores and uses login credentials for remote nodes (servers that help the wallet talk to the Monero network). Previously, the wallet kept daemon username/password as persistent wallet-level settings. Now those credentials are passed fresh each time a connection is initialized, so they are scoped to that specific connection instead of lingering on the wallet object. This is a defensive cleanup that reduces the risk of credentials being reused for the wrong node or leaking across connections, but the commit message does not frame it as a security fix.

This change fixes a privacy leak in the Monero GUI wallet's update checker. Previously, when the wallet checked for updates and downloaded the signed list of official file hashes, it did not route that request through the user's configured proxy. This could expose the user's real IP address to the update server and any network observer, even if the user had set a proxy for other wallet traffic. The patch now passes the configured proxy address through to the update check so those hash downloads also go through the proxy.

This commit removes the 'Sign (offline)' button for hardware wallets in the Monero GUI wallet. The change prevents users from attempting an unsupported operation that could lead to failed or unsafe transactions when using a Ledger/Trezor-like device. The issue was reported by zkao using a tool from zkSecurity, suggesting it was found during a security review, but the commit message does not explain the exact attack or failure scenario.

This is a user-interface bug fix in the Monero wallet's Receive page. When a user switched between accounts, the page could show a label and QR code from one account while the displayed address belonged to another account, because the selected list row was not updated to match the new account. The fix makes sure the selected row and displayed address/label stay in sync. It is a consistency bug, not a cryptographic or network vulnerability.

This commit is a large merge of pull request #4192 into the Monero GUI repository. The actual code change within that PR is a single, minor user-interface fix by contributor SNeedlewoods to prevent text overlap in certain languages. The rest of the diff is the initial population of the repository with the full Monero GUI source tree, build files, translations, images, and CI workflows. There is no security-relevant code change here.

This commit is a routine code cleanup that swaps out old Qt programming interfaces for their newer replacements. It does not fix a security bug and does not introduce any obvious security weakness. The changes are purely about keeping the code compatible with newer versions of the Qt toolkit.

This tiny change stops a software-update notification window from appearing while the user is entering their hardware wallet passphrase. The most likely real-world effect is avoiding a confusing or annoying overlap of two popups, not a serious security flaw. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes an exploitable vulnerability.

This change tightens how the Monero GUI's build containers fetch the Qt user-interface library. Previously, the build scripts downloaded Qt using only a version tag (like 'v5.15.19-lts-lgpl'), which could silently point to different code if Qt's maintainers ever moved or re-created that tag. Now the scripts reset the downloaded Qt source to a specific, fixed commit hash, so every release build uses the exact same Qt code. This is a supply-chain hardening fix: it prevents a malicious or accidental tag change from slipping modified Qt code into Monero's official wallets.

This update fixes a security flaw in the Monero GUI wallet's export feature. When users exported their transaction history to a CSV file, the wallet stripped quote marks from transaction notes and address labels but did nothing else. If an attacker tricked a user into sending a payment with a specially crafted note beginning with =, +, -, or @, that note could become a spreadsheet formula. When the victim later exported and opened the CSV in Excel or similar software, the formula could run, potentially stealing data or running commands. The fix prefixes risky fields with a single quote so spreadsheets treat them as plain text.

This commit fixes a bug where user-controlled text was being displayed as rich text in several places in the Monero wallet app. Rich text can include hidden instructions, fake links, or misleading formatting. The most important case is the transaction note, which can be supplied by someone sending you a payment request, so an attacker could potentially use it to trick you. The fix escapes that text so it is shown as plain characters rather than interpreted as formatting or code.

This change updates the Monero GUI wallet so that users can no longer create offline transaction files when a long payment ID is involved. Long payment IDs are an older, privacy-weaker way to label a Monero payment. The patch also refactors the send/offline-tx enable logic into clearer conditions. The direct security risk is modest: it mainly prevents users from accidentally using an obsolete, less-private feature in a specific workflow, rather than fixing an active exploit or remote code flaw.