Keystone 3 firmware

This commit fixes a user-interface bug in the Bitcoin-only multi-sig wallet screens of the Keystone 3 hardware wallet firmware. If a user entered the wrong device-unlock password while the lock screen was shown over these multi-sig views, the lock screen would get stuck showing 'Verifying' instead of returning to the password entry and showing the failed-attempt count. The fix makes the wrong-password result update the lock screen, matching the correct-password path. It is a denial-of-usability issue, not a theft-of-funds vulnerability.

This commit is a routine font update for the Keystone 3 hardware wallet firmware. It adds, removes, and reorders Chinese, Japanese, and Korean font glyphs (for example adding characters meaning 'weak' and 'rights') and updates the corresponding translation data file. There is no code logic change and no security-relevant behavior.

This commit is a routine update of the on-device font files for multiple languages (Chinese, German, Spanish, Japanese, Korean, Russian). It adds a few new characters, tweaks some glyph bitmaps, and adjusts the generated font metadata to match newer LVGL version conventions. There is nothing in the changes that affects security, cryptography, wallet logic, or user data handling.

This commit is a routine user-interface update for the Lace wallet integration. It moves the Lace wallet icon into the 'Bitcoin Wallets' submenu, removes a separate Lace entry that previously showed both Bitcoin and Cardano support, and now lists Lace only under Cardano. There is no security-relevant change in the diff.

This commit adds support for a new cryptocurrency wallet called 'Lace' to the Keystone hardware wallet firmware. It includes a new icon, a new entry in the wallet list, and logic to recognize Lace as a Cardano (ADA) and Bitcoin (BTC) wallet. There is no indication of a security fix or vulnerability.

This commit is a routine feature patch for the Keystone 3 hardware wallet. It resumes adding the device's firmware version into Zcash wallet connection data, and it fixes two simulator-only bugs: a keyboard crash when a text box is destroyed and a timing mismatch in how background tasks are run during desktop testing. There is no direct evidence in the commit that these changes fix an active security vulnerability, and the commit message describes them as ordinary development work.

This commit is a small code cleanup in the Zcash part of the Keystone hardware wallet firmware. It changes how the code checks for duplicate 'rk' values across Orchard and Ironwood shielded transaction actions. The old code used chained iterators and cloned them repeatedly; the new code collects the actions into a vector first and then uses nested loops. The behavior appears unchanged: it still rejects duplicate rk values with the same error message. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a security bug.

This commit only updates comments and documentation to make clear which firmware version number is sent over the wire for Zcash signing. It does not change any code behavior, so it is not a security fix and does not introduce a vulnerability.

This commit adds the firmware version number to Zcash batch signing responses. It is a feature/documentation change, not a security fix or vulnerability. The version was already included in single-transaction responses; now it is also included in batch responses so wallets can identify which firmware version produced the signatures.

This commit only changes the firmware version numbers in a header file (from 12.4.9 beta 2 to 12.5.0 beta 1). It does not modify any executable code, fix any bug, or change any security behavior. There is no security relevance visible in the diff.

This commit is a performance and user-experience improvement for Zcash batch transactions on the Keystone 3 hardware wallet. It speeds up processing of multiple Zcash PCZTs by caching decoded viewing keys and spend-authorization keys across the batch, instead of re-deriving them for every transaction. It also adds a loading hint telling users that batch processing may take a few minutes. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability being fixed; the changes appear to be a refactor with added tests and UI feedback.

This commit refactors how Keystone's Zcash batch signing feature handles large batches. It replaces an older message envelope with a new format that uses the upstream Zcash PCZT batch signer, adds a 512 KiB total size cap, raises the maximum PCZT count from 35 to 50, and returns only compact signatures instead of full signed PCZT data. It also updates several Zcash Rust dependencies from a fork to upstream releases and tightens some digest helpers to handle missing optional fields safely. The changes are framed as a feature improvement and hardening, not as a fix for a known active vulnerability.

This commit adds a new compact review screen for batches of Zcash 'migration' transactions (moving funds from the Orchard pool to the newer Ironwood pool). It also fixes a small user-experience issue: the device will no longer auto-lock while a long batch of transactions is loading or being signed. The change is a feature addition with defensive checks, not a fix for an active security bug.

This commit fixes a security hygiene issue in the Keystone hardware wallet's Zcash signing code. Previously, secret 'spend authorizing keys' were cached in ordinary memory and could remain there after use. The patch adds explicit memory scrubbing (zeroization) when keys are replaced or no longer needed, reducing the chance that an attacker with physical or debug access could recover leftover secret key material.

This commit removes a compile-time feature flag called NU6.3 from the Zcash code in the Keystone hardware wallet firmware. Previously, Ironwood (a newer Zcash shielded pool) and v6 transaction support were only compiled when the 'zcash_unstable="nu6.3"' flag was set. The change makes that code always compile and run, effectively enabling Ironwood/v6 support by default. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a security vulnerability; it appears to be a cleanup that promotes experimental code to stable. However, enabling new consensus code paths always carries some risk that previously-unreachable bugs or parsing differences could now affect real transactions.

This commit only reformats existing Zcash PCZT code—adjusting line breaks, indentation, and whitespace. No logic, behavior, or security checks were changed.

This commit only removes explanatory comments from three Zcash test files. No code behavior, logic, or security checks were changed. It is a documentation cleanup inside test code and has no security relevance.

This commit only rewords a code comment in a Zcash test file. No program logic, behavior, or security properties changed. It is a documentation-only edit.

This commit only updates a code comment in a Zcash test file. It corrects an outdated explanation about why an anchor value can be removed during signing. No code behavior was changed, and there is no security issue present in the diff.

This commit updates the Zcash PCZT (Partially Created Zcash Transaction) library stack to a newer upstream test revision. It is a maintenance/dependency bump that adapts the firmware's code to new library APIs, adds error handling around serialization, and adjusts how Orchard/Ironwood transaction fields are handled for transaction signing. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a known security vulnerability; it appears to be a routine dependency repin to keep up with an upstream test stack.

This commit adds a new, more efficient way to sign Zcash shielded transactions on Keystone hardware wallets. Instead of parsing and serializing the transaction multiple times, it parses once, signs in memory, and verifies signatures before returning the result. The change also preserves the checked/verified transaction data through the signing process rather than discarding it. There is no clear security bug being fixed; it appears to be a hardening and performance improvement for the Zcash cypherpunk feature.

This commit only adds text to two changelog files describing a new firmware version (2.5.0). It does not change any executable code, configuration, or security controls. The changelog mentions improvements to dice-roll entropy validation and unlock passcode verification, but no actual code changes are present in this commit, so it cannot introduce or fix a vulnerability on its own.

This commit fixes a security gap in the Keystone hardware wallet's Zcash transaction handling. The older 'legacy' code path was only designed to inspect and sign transparent (non-private) Zcash transactions, but its safety check only blocked the newest V6 and Ironwood transaction types. A version 5 transaction containing hidden Sapling or Orchard transfers could slip past the check. The wallet would then validate and sign only the visible transparent portion, while silently ignoring the shielded part. That could let a malicious or buggy app trick a user into approving a transaction that also moves funds privately. The patch now rejects any transaction containing Sapling or Orchard shielded data in the legacy path, forcing it to use the newer 'cypherpunk' path that understands those formats.

This is a code cleanup change with no security impact. It replaces free-form text labels like "Orchard" and "Ironwood" with a fixed enum type when checking, parsing, and signing Zcash shielded transaction bundles. The actual behavior and error messages stay the same; only the internal code structure is improved.

This commit adds support for a new Zcash transaction format called Ironwood PCZT to the Keystone hardware wallet firmware. It also hardens the wallet against several real attack scenarios: legacy code paths now refuse to handle the new format (instead of mis-processing it), a bug where an attacker could make a payment to themselves look like the user's own change is now blocked, and malformed transaction bundles with contradictory value sums are rejected. The changes are mostly defensive and include many new regression tests.