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Passport firmware

Firmware for Foundation Passport Bitcoin signing devices.

BitcoinHardware walletsNormal
Repository coverage

263 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

102security candidates79second-pass queue215AI analyses
42commits · 30 days
128commits · 60 days
194commits · 180 days
256commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 612 seen0 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 659 seen3 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 64 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 52 seen0 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

61/100 average clarity
16Strong · 80–100
116Adequate · 60–79
118Thin · 40–59
13Opaque · 0–39
4security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Jacksper13321424466
Matt Gleason841868351
Jack603454261
mjg-foundation693251269
Jean-Pierre De Jesus DIAZ828061
Ken Carpenter313048
QnA111060
dependabot[bot]505076
BitcoinQnA101045
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 56 minutes ago

Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-8696: remove the Security Check from onboarding

This commit removes the 'Security Check' step from the initial device setup (onboarding) for the Passport hardware wallet. To avoid breaking devices that were mid-setup during a firmware update, the old step is kept as a harmless pass-thro…

8d77ba38by Jack+153−124 files
No security note in commit
Low 37 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #753 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8680-fail-to-sign-dynamic-taproot-qr-message

This commit adds support for signing BIP-322 message requests that wallets like Sparrow send as a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction-like data format). It is a feature addition, not a reported vulnerability fix. The code includes careful validati…

New input parser for externally supplied PSBT data with explicit structural validationRejects non-Taproot BIP-322 requests and unsafe sighash typesBinds the user-reviewed message and address to the transaction being signed
5e98b6abby mjg-foundation+722−3011 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-8680: check derivation path length before indexing into it

This commit fixes a bug in the Passport hardware wallet's BIP-322 message signing code. Previously, when parsing a PSBT (a Bitcoin data format), the code could read past the end of an empty or too-short 'derivation path' field because it c…

Out-of-bounds read / index error on untrusted PSBT inputValidation order bug: first-byte check before length checkBIP-322 signing request parsing hardened
cec3925bby Matt Gleason+8−43 files
No security note in commit
Informational 22 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #754 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8681-passport-core-sign-taproot-messages-with

This commit changes how the Passport hardware wallet signs Bitcoin Taproot text messages. Previously it used SIGHASH_DEFAULT (the Taproot default), but now it uses SIGHASH_ALL. The change is for compatibility: the commit message says Sparr…

Change in cryptographic signature hash type (SIGHASH_DEFAULT -> SIGHASH_ALL)Comment explicitly references verifier compatibility and Sparrow wallet acceptanceUnit test asserts new signature encoding and verifies against an external test vector
87f43de1by mjg-foundation+22−172 files
No security note in commit
Low 41 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #752 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8674-passport-core-signing-flow-does-not-show-a-non

This commit adds on-screen warnings to the Passport hardware wallet when a user is reviewing a Bitcoin transaction that contains timelocks. Timelocks can prevent a transaction from confirming until a future date or until certain inputs hav…

UI warning for absolute time-based nLockTimeUI warning for BIP68 relative timelocks on version-2 transactionsHeight-based nLockTime intentionally not flagged to avoid false positives
5defe2c5by mjg-foundation+176−16 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 52 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-8674: warned about timelocks when reviewing a transaction

This commit adds on-screen warnings to the Passport hardware wallet when a Bitcoin transaction being reviewed includes a timelock that could delay confirmation. Before this change, a user could unknowingly sign a transaction that is blocke…

UI now warns users about transaction timelocks that delay confirmationPreviously undisclosed to the signer: absolute date locks and BIP68 relative locksHeight-based nLockTime intentionally not flagged to avoid warning fatigue
7cba5349by Jack+176−16 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #747 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8653-passport-core-recheck-the-firmware-image-while

This update tightens the firmware update process on the Passport hardware wallet. Previously, the device verified the firmware file once, then copied it to internal flash memory without re-checking. A malicious or tampered file swapped in …

Time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) hardening in firmware update pathNew digest parameter threaded from verification task to staging taskStaging task now re-hashes firmware image and compares against expected digest
3449381fby mjg-foundation+68−264 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #736 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8554-bootloader-setup-checks

This commit hardens how Passport's bootloader handles a sensitive factory key during initial device setup. Previously, the code trusted that erasing the key from SPI flash succeeded without checking, and it left a temporary copy of the key…

Sensitive key material (supply-chain validation key) is now explicitly zeroed from stack memory after useSPI flash erase of the SCV key is now verified by read-back instead of assumed successfulBootloader setup now aborts if the SCV key cannot be confirmed erased from SPI flash
ed62d448by mjg-foundation+245−55 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #735 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8555-update-restore-checks

This commit adds security checks when restoring a backup file to a Passport hardware wallet. Previously, multisig wallet configurations stored in a backup were restored without verifying that they actually belong to the seed being restored…

Validation of multisig backup records against restored seedDerivation verification for xpubs claiming backup root fingerprintDropping malformed records instead of failing entire restore
8dbae7e1by mjg-foundation+242−75 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #748 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8654-passport-core-bounded-text-building-in-the

This commit replaces unsafe string-copying functions in the Passport hardware wallet's bootloader with a bounded helper that prevents text fields from overflowing their buffers. The change is defensive: it stops malicious or malformed firm…

Replacement of strcpy/strcat with bounded append_text helperHandling of non-NUL-terminated firmware header text fieldsBuffer overflow mitigation in bootloader UI message construction
e2d735f0by mjg-foundation+89−222 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #732 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8545-native-taproot-key-signing

This commit adds a new, dedicated way for the Passport hardware wallet to sign Bitcoin Taproot transactions. It moves the cryptographic 'tweak' calculation from Python code into a Rust library and adds unit tests. There is nothing in the c…

5e3ed701by mjg-foundation+234−185 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #742 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8530-distinct-cosigners

This update to the Passport hardware wallet firmware adds a safety check when importing multi-signature wallet configurations. Previously, the same cosigner public key could be listed more than once under different fingerprints or address …

Adds duplicate-key detection during multisig wallet importCompares raw public-key x-coordinates rather than fingerprints or encoded xpub stringsPrevents a single key from being counted as multiple independent cosigners
92c68c63by mjg-foundation+69−03 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #739 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8559-psbt-file-errors

This update fixes a bug where the Passport hardware wallet could freeze (hang) when reading a malformed or unreadable PSBT transaction file from a microSD card. Now the device reports a clear error instead of getting stuck, so users know s…

Denial-of-service / UI hang on malformed input now returns an errorUnhandled exception path now caught and reported instead of leaving task unresolvedMissing microSD card case explicitly reported
6a461136by mjg-foundation+144−62 files
No security note in commit
Low 34 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #740 from Foundation-Devices/sft-4482-update-card-missing

This commit fixes a user-experience bug in the Passport hardware wallet's firmware update flow. Previously, if the user removed the microSD card while the device was reading a firmware update file, the process would crash with an unhandled…

Adds exception handling for a removable-media failure during a privileged operation (firmware update)Prevents unhandled CardMissingError from aborting the update flow abruptlyDoes not alter firmware signature, timestamp, or header validation logic
06ec8d6aby mjg-foundation+109−23 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #741 from Foundation-Devices/sft-737-multisig-match-n

This firmware update fixes a bug in how the Passport hardware wallet matches multisignature (multisig) wallets. Previously, when looking for a saved wallet that matches the cosigners in a transaction, the device only checked that the cosig…

Incorrect multisig wallet matching could lead to signing with the wrong wallet policySubset-only cosigner matching allowed a smaller wallet to be conflated with a larger oneFix adds N filter to wallet candidate enumeration
d2d30a58by mjg-foundation+59−23 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #746 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8260-evaluate-miniscript-no-compatible-path

This commit only changes the wording of an on-screen warning message shown to users when a Bitcoin transaction's timelock conditions are not yet met. It does not change any security logic, validation, or behavior. The old message said no s…

f6ab63ceby Jacksper13+5−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-8260: Update the policy no-compatible-path warning copy

This commit only changes the wording of an on-screen warning message shown to users when a Bitcoin transaction cannot be signed because no spending path's time-lock conditions are currently satisfied. It does not change any security logic,…

e024471eby Jack+5−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 21 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #731 from Foundation-Devices/SFT-974-miniscript-ui-followup

This commit is a follow-up to the miniscript wallet-policy user interface. It mostly fixes UI wording, memory cleanup, and policy display logic. The only potentially security-relevant change is that wallet policy IDs are now computed with …

Incremental SHA-256 digest used for policy ID computationRemoval of explicit `validate(miniscript, context)` call before compilationNew default-name derivation from descriptor checksum
83d1d576by mjg-foundation+415−5312 files
No security note in commit
Low 32 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-974: unwrapped miniscript parsing recursion, added default policy

This firmware update changes how the Passport hardware wallet handles complex Bitcoin wallet policies. The main visible change is replacing a recursive parser walk with an iterative one, which prevents the device from crashing due to exces…

Recursion in miniscript parsing replaced with explicit stack to avoid RecursionError on deeply nested templatesPolicy validation path changed: explicit `validate()` call removed, safety now enforced via `compile_miniscript()` during registrationDefault empty policy name now auto-populated from descriptor checksum to avoid unnamed policies
96b2aa9fby Matt Gleason+160−216 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-974: improved miniscript UI, working on OOM issues

This commit is a routine feature and stability patch for the Passport hardware wallet's miniscript wallet-policy support. It improves on-screen descriptions of wallet policies, adds explicit memory cleanup (garbage collection) during polic…

Memory pressure mitigation via explicit garbage collection during policy operationsNew verify-address flow for registered wallet policiesUI clarity improvements for timelock and signer-role descriptions
cb7478a5by Matt Gleason+255−3210 files
No security note in commit
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Explore captured commits

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Security candidateExpand malformed SeedQR test coverageby Jack · 839b6f59 · Aug 10, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Jack

Expand malformed SeedQR test coverage

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds more test cases to an existing unit test file for SeedQR decoding. It does not change any production firmware code. The new tests check that the decoder correctly rejects additional malformed inputs, such as an empty string, an oversized string, and strings containing unusual Unicode digits. This is a routine hardening of test coverage, not a fix for a known security bug.

Security candidateValidate SeedQR payloads before word lookupby Jack · 58aa4984 · Aug 10, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 45 · ThinModerate 59Details
Commit message · Jack

Validate SeedQR payloads before word lookup

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
defensive validationseed or entropy path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit tightens how Passport firmware decodes SeedQR codes—QR codes that encode a wallet recovery phrase as numbers. Before the fix, the decoder would try to look up BIP-39 words using raw 4-digit indices before confirming the input was valid. The new code first checks that the payload length is a multiple of 4, that the number of words is a supported seed length, that every character is a digit, and that each index is within the valid BIP-39 word range. This prevents malformed or out-of-range SeedQR payloads from being partially processed or causing unexpected behavior during word lookup.

Security candidateMerge pull request #651 from Foundation-Devices/firmware-update-validation-hardeningby Jacksper13 · 2e96f0af · Jul 30, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 58 · ThinModerate 61Details
Commit message · Jacksper13

Merge pull request #651 from Foundation-Devices/firmware-update-validation-hardening

Harden firmware update validation

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
defensive validationboot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 61/100

This change tightens how Passport's bootloader validates a new firmware update. Previously, if the currently-running firmware failed validation, the bootloader would skip signature checks on the incoming update and jump straight to installing it. The patch moves the signature verification outside that 'only if current firmware is valid' branch, so the new firmware is always signature-checked before installation. It also moves a check about whether the current firmware was user-signed so it is computed earlier. In short: the bootloader now refuses to install unsigned updates even when the existing firmware looks broken.

Security candidatePreserve hardened firmware verification resultby Jack · a6efb276 · Jul 23, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinModerate 57Details
Commit message · Jack

Preserve hardened firmware verification result

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
defensive validationboot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 57/100

This bootloader patch changes how the result of a security check on the currently-running firmware is stored. Previously, the code immediately converted the secure verification result into a plain true/false boolean. Now it keeps the special secure result value intact and compares it directly later. This is a hardening fix: it reduces the chance that a subtle type-conversion bug or compiler optimization could let a failed firmware check be treated as a pass, which in turn could allow a malicious or corrupted firmware update to proceed.

Security candidateConstrain Pillow tooling compatibilityby Jack · fd359a24 · Jul 23, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Jack

Constrain Pillow tooling compatibility

35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit tightens the allowed versions of a Python image-processing library called Pillow used only in developer tooling. It caps Pillow below version 13 and requires Python 3.10 or newer. There is no indication this fixes a security flaw in the firmware itself; it appears to be a build/maintenance compatibility change.

Security candidateHarden firmware update validationby Jack · b157473c · Jul 23, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueModerate 59Details
Commit message · Jack

Harden firmware update validation

35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
defensive validationboot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit changes how Passport's bootloader checks firmware updates. Previously, if the currently-running firmware failed validation, the bootloader would skip verifying the new update's signature and could install it anyway. Now the new firmware's signature is always verified before installation, even when the current firmware is invalid. This closes a path where a corrupted or attacker-controlled running firmware might be able to load an unsigned or wrongly-signed update.

Security candidateUpdate Pillow constraints for host toolingby Jack · b44793cc · Jul 23, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 45 · ThinLow 27Details
Commit message · Jack

Update Pillow constraints for host tooling

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Low 27/100

This commit updates the required version of the Python imaging library Pillow from 8.x to at least 12.3.0 in the project's host tooling configuration. Pillow 8.x is known to have publicly disclosed security vulnerabilities, so raising the minimum version is a defensive maintenance change. It does not by itself prove the firmware was exploitable, but it removes a risky dependency version from the development/build environment.

Security candidateSFT-6378: removed more branching from mnemonic decode processby Matt Gleason · d0edb18a · Jun 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinLow 47Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: removed more branching from mnemonic decode process

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Low 47/100

This commit tweaks the code that converts a user's BIP39 recovery phrase (mnemonic words) into secret bits inside a hardware wallet. The change removes an 'if' branch during word copying so the loop always writes to the same positions, regardless of how long each word is. The stated goal is to make the copy operation take the same amount of time and perform the same memory accesses for every word length, which can help defend against timing and power-analysis side-channel attacks that might otherwise leak information about the recovery phrase.

Security candidateSFT-7112: moved message signing subpath cleaning up in the process toby Matt Gleason · 33cfa39c · Jun 10, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 65 · AdequateLow 44Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-7112: moved message signing subpath cleaning up in the process to
prevent deriving address types from malformed paths, added comments and
spacing

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 44/100

This firmware update tightens how the Passport hardware wallet parses a message-signing command. Previously, the code figured out what kind of Bitcoin address to use from the user's key path before it had fully validated and cleaned up that path. The change moves validation and cleanup earlier, so the device no longer derives address types from a potentially malformed or unexpected path. In plain terms: it closes a window where a weird or tampered key path could confuse the wallet about which address type it is signing for.

Security candidateSFT-7112: handled signing the single-lign message format, fixed messageby Matt Gleason · 380dcc64 · Jun 8, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 50 · ThinLow 35Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-7112: handled signing the single-lign message format, fixed message
parser sensitivity to trailing newlines

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit fixes how Passport firmware reads health-check and sign-message data from microSD cards and QR codes. Previously, the code only accepted messages split into exactly 2 or 3 lines and treated trailing blank lines as errors. The update also accepts a compact 'signmessage <path> ascii:<text>' single-line format and ignores trailing newlines. The change is described as a format/parser fix, not as a security fix, but a stricter parser could in principle have rejected legitimate messages or accepted malformed ones.

Security candidateSFT-6378: refined more commentsby Matt Gleason · e58baa89 · May 29, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: refined more comments

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only rewrites two code comments in a BIP39 mnemonic parser to be shorter and clearer. It does not change any executable code, logic, or behavior. There is no security-relevant change.

Security candidateSFT-6378: improved commentsby Matt Gleason · 42cad0d8 · May 28, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: improved comments

35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only rewrites comments in a source file that handles BIP39 seed phrases. No code logic, buffer sizes, or function behavior were changed. It is a documentation-only cleanup and does not affect security.

Security candidateSFT-6378: responded to more feedback, needs testing and evaluationby Matt Gleason · 42f95ed8 · May 25, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateModerate 63Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: responded to more feedback, needs testing and evaluation

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100

This commit hardens the code that converts a user's BIP39 recovery phrase (seed words) into secret bits. It fixes a bug where 8-character words were wrongly rejected, makes the loop length independent of the number of words to reduce timing clues, adds bounds checks to prevent reading past the end of the input buffer, and clears sensitive buffers before returning on error. The changes are defensive and reduce side-channel and out-of-bounds risks, but the commit message frames them as feedback responses needing testing, so it is not a finished security fix.

Security candidateSFT-6378: made more parts of mnemonic parsing and fetching constant timeby Matt Gleason · 5a0cc5ed · May 24, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 50 · ThinModerate 59Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: made more parts of mnemonic parsing and fetching constant time

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
constant-time or timing behaviorcryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit hardens the code that converts a user's BIP-39 seed phrase into secret data. It removes timing and loop-behavior clues that an attacker with physical access might measure to learn how many words the phrase has, how long each word is, or where word boundaries fall. The change is defensive: it makes the parsing routine run in constant time and on a fixed-size buffer, reducing side-channel leakage. There is no claim in the commit that an actual exploit exists.

Security candidateSFT-6378: first pass at anti-sidechannel round 2, needs testing and evaluationby Matt Gleason · 2c7dc29f · May 19, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 75 · AdequateLow 49Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: first pass at anti-sidechannel round 2, needs testing and
evaluation

75/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Low 49/100

This commit is a defensive hardening change for the BIP-39 seed-word handling code in the Passport hardware wallet firmware. It restructures how the English word list is stored so that a constant-time word comparison function can safely read every entry without accidentally touching memory past the end of a short word. It also removes noisy timing-test thresholds that could fail on shared CI machines and keeps only a stricter statistical correlation check. The change is explicitly described by the developer as an early 'first pass' that still needs testing and evaluation, so it is not a finished security fix.

Security candidateEnforce MSG_SIGNING_MAX_LENGTH on microSD message signingby Jack · a6dfc59f · May 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongModerate 63Details
Commit message · Jack

Enforce MSG_SIGNING_MAX_LENGTH on microSD message signing

Restores the file-size cap that the deleted SignTextFileFlow used to
provide before its consolidation in #636. Gated on normal_signing so
health-check files (with their own implicit length constraints) are
unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100

This commit fixes a missing safety limit in the Passport hardware wallet's microSD message-signing feature. Previously, a user could accidentally or maliciously be asked to sign an extremely large file from the microSD card, which could strain memory, cause crashes, or be used in a denial-of-service-style attack. The change restores a maximum file-size check that existed in older code but was lost when two code paths were merged. Health-check files are exempt because they already have their own built-in size limits.

Security candidatePass expected_address through QR message signing pathby Jack · 80fda3a1 · May 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · Jack

Pass expected_address through QR message signing path

Mirrors the WYSIWYG-signing assertion that microSD signing already has
(added in #636). Keeps self.address raw (used as expected_address) and
uses a local display_address for stylization in the preview.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit fixes a consistency issue in the QR-code message-signing flow of the Passport hardware wallet. Previously, when signing a message via QR code, the wallet did not pass the user-confirmed address down to the signing code as an explicit 'expected address' check. The microSD signing path already had this safety check. After the change, the raw, verified address is passed through and used to confirm the signature is for the correct address, while a stylized version is still shown on screen. This reduces the risk that a tricked or confused user signs a message with the wrong address.

Security candidateSFT-3834: fixed return type for quitting message signingby Matt Gleason · 3f29f056 · May 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 19Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-3834: fixed return type for quitting message signing

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit fixes a minor return-value bug in the Passport hardware wallet's health-check flow. When the user cancels message signing, the flow now returns 'None' instead of 'False'. This is a correctness fix that likely prevents a downstream caller from misinterpreting a user cancellation as a failed health check. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this is exploitable for theft, bypass, or denial of service.

Security candidateSFT-3834: added verify step for microsd message signing, fixed export format for sparrow parsingby Matt Gleason · 18e80883 · May 6, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 75 · AdequateLow 34Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-3834: added verify step for microsd message signing, fixed export
format for sparrow parsing

75/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This firmware update fixes two issues in the Passport hardware wallet's message-signing feature. First, it adds a user confirmation screen when signing a message from a microSD card in normal (non-health-check) mode, so the user can see the message and the address that will sign it before approving. Second, it corrects the exported message signature text format so wallet software like Sparrow can parse it properly. Previously, the signature block used generic BEGIN/END SIGNATURE labels instead of blockchain-specific ones, which could cause import failures.

Security candidateSFT-5768: fixed lint and removed view_text parameter since it was never usedby Matt Gleason · 1c1729af · Mar 4, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-5768: fixed lint and removed view_text parameter since it was never
used

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine code cleanup. It removes an unused 'view_text' parameter from a warning screen and fixes a minor text linting issue. There is no security-relevant change.

Security candidateSFT-5768: improved seed word view warningby Matt Gleason · 252b58eb · Mar 4, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-5768: improved seed word view warning

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit changes the on-screen warnings shown to users before they view their wallet recovery seed words. It adds clearer anti-scam language and an extra confirmation step, but does not change how seed words are stored, generated, or protected. There is no security vulnerability in the code change itself.

Security candidateSFT-4300: added list icon for address explorerby Matt Gleason · 936c1917 · Mar 2, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-4300: added list icon for address explorer

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine user-interface polish change. It adds a new list-style icon for the 'Explore Addresses' menu item in the Passport hardware wallet firmware, replacing the previous verify-address icon. It also makes two minor build-script tweaks (changing the Python interpreter path from /usr/bin/python3 to /usr/bin/env python3) and adds a missing copyright header to one image file. There is no security-relevant change.

Security candidateSFT-6378: Fix mnemonic_to_bits() and ct_word_eq() to be constant time.by Ken Carpenter · f8311ca7 · Feb 26, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 50 · ThinModerate 60Details
Commit message · Ken Carpenter

SFT-6378: Fix mnemonic_to_bits() and ct_word_eq() to be constant time.

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
constant-time or timing behaviorcryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a timing side-channel weakness in the code that converts a BIP-39 recovery phrase (a list of words) back into the secret digital bits. Before the fix, the code stopped searching the word list as soon as it found a match and used a normal string comparison, so an attacker measuring tiny time differences might learn which words were entered. The new version always scans the entire word list and compares words in constant time, making the process take the same amount of time regardless of the phrase. A new test checks that timing does not vary with the word positions.

Security candidateSFT-6727: fixed dangling pointer warning for stack dummiesby Matt Gleason · 19a74faa · Feb 24, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 50 · ThinInformational 18Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6727: fixed dangling pointer warning for stack dummies

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit suppresses a compiler warning about using the address of a short-lived local variable to track the top of the program's stack. The underlying code behavior is unchanged; only the warning is silenced. There is no direct security fix here, though the pattern itself is a known, long-standing MicroPython idiom for estimating stack usage.

Security candidateSFT-4441: Update Rust dependencies.by Jean-Pierre De Jesus DIAZ · efd6bdb3 · Feb 23, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 45 · ThinLow 29Details
Commit message · Jean-Pierre De Jesus DIAZ

SFT-4441: Update Rust dependencies.

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Low 29/100

This commit updates several Rust library dependencies used in the Passport hardware wallet firmware and makes small code adjustments to match the new library versions. The most notable change is in the cryptographic signing code, where the code no longer wraps the data in a 'Message' object before creating a Schnorr signature. On its own, this looks like a routine compatibility update, but because it touches security-critical code (digital signatures), it warrants careful review to ensure the new calling pattern is safe and does not bypass any intended message-validation step.