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Low 29 Bitcoin

SFT-4441: Update Rust dependencies.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jean-Pierre De Jesus DIAZ

45/100 · Thin
SFT-4441: Update Rust dependencies.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit updates several Rust library dependencies used in the Passport hardware wallet firmware and makes small code adjustments to match the new library versions. The most notable change is in the cryptographic signing code, where the code no longer wraps the data in a 'Message' object before creating a Schnorr signature. On its own, this looks like a routine compatibility update, but because it touches security-critical code (digital signatures), it warrants careful review to ensure the new calling pattern is safe and does not bypass any intended message-validation step.

Recommended action

Review the secp256k1 0.30 changelog and migration notes to confirm the API change is intentional and safe. Verify that every call site of `secp256k1_sign_schnorr` supplies a 32-byte digest and that the firmware's higher-level code still hashes/validates messages before reaching this function. Run the project's cryptographic test suite and, if available, fuzz or property-test the signing path. Treat this as a routine but security-relevant dependency update rather than an active vulnerability unless additional evidence emerges.

Security signals we found

01

Cryptographic signing API change: removal of Message wrapper in Schnorr signing path

02

Dependency version bumps for security-sensitive crates (secp256k1, bitcoin_hashes)

03

No explicit security advisory, CVE, or vendor security note present in commit or supplied references

04

No input-length or digest-validation checks visible in the changed signing function

Risk score

Why this scored 29/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 4/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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