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Moderate 62 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #735 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8555-update-restore-checks

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by mjg-foundation

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #735 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8555-update-restore-checks

SFT-8555: check multisig configs when restoring a backup
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds security checks when restoring a backup file to a Passport hardware wallet. Previously, multisig wallet configurations stored in a backup were restored without verifying that they actually belong to the seed being restored. The new code validates each multisig configuration: it checks that the structure is correct, that the keys are valid, and that any key claiming to belong to the restored seed really derives from it. Bad multisig records are now dropped instead of causing the entire restore to fail, so the seed is still recovered and the user can re-import a valid multisig config later. This prevents a malicious or corrupted backup from sneaking a fake multisig wallet onto the device.

Recommended action

Users should update to firmware containing this commit before restoring backups that include multisig configurations. Reviewers should verify that `validate_backup_multisig_records()` covers all deserialization edge cases and that the `derive_backup_node()` helper correctly handles hardened derivation paths without leaking sensitive material.

Security signals we found

01

Validation of multisig backup records against restored seed

02

Derivation verification for xpubs claiming backup root fingerprint

03

Dropping malformed records instead of failing entire restore

04

Parity with existing wallet_policy backup validation

05

New unit tests for attack scenarios (impostor key, wrong chain, reencoded duplicate, type confusion)

Risk score

Why this scored 62/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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