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Low 37 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #753 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8680-fail-to-sign-dynamic-taproot-qr-message

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by mjg-foundation

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #753 from Foundation-Devices/sft-8680-fail-to-sign-dynamic-taproot-qr-message

SFT-8680: sign BIP-322 message requests sent as a PSBT
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds support for signing BIP-322 message requests that wallets like Sparrow send as a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction-like data format). It is a feature addition, not a reported vulnerability fix. The code includes careful validation: it checks the message matches the transaction, the address is Taproot, the derivation path is correct, and the signature hash type is safe. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes an active security bug, but it does reduce the risk of a user being tricked into signing the wrong message or signing for the wrong address.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal feature/robustness update. Reviewers should verify the PSBT parser cannot be confused by duplicate keys, unknown global fields, or PSBTv2 markers, and that the signature insertion offset is always correct. Users on prior firmware should update if they need Sparrow-compatible BIP-322 signing.

Security signals we found

01

New input parser for externally supplied PSBT data with explicit structural validation

02

Rejects non-Taproot BIP-322 requests and unsafe sighash types

03

Binds the user-reviewed message and address to the transaction being signed

04

Adds tests for malformed, mismatched, and already-signed requests

05

Changes existing taproot simple signatures from SIGHASH_DEFAULT to SIGHASH_ALL for verifier compatibility

Risk score

Why this scored 37/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 6/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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