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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #741 from Foundation-Devices/sft-737-multisig-match-n

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by mjg-foundation

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #741 from Foundation-Devices/sft-737-multisig-match-n

SFT-737: match multisig wallets on N as well as cosigners
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This firmware update fixes a bug in how the Passport hardware wallet matches multisignature (multisig) wallets. Previously, when looking for a saved wallet that matches the cosigners in a transaction, the device only checked that the cosigners overlapped. This meant a smaller wallet (for example, one needing 2 signatures out of 2 people) could be mistaken for a larger wallet (for example, 2 signatures out of 3 people) if the larger wallet contained the same people. The fix now also checks that the total number of cosigners (N) matches, so a smaller wallet is correctly treated as a separate wallet. The commit adds a test showing that a 2-of-2 wallet is no longer confused with a 2-of-3 wallet that shares two cosigners.

Recommended action

Review the change for completeness: ensure that all call sites of iter_wallets() and find_candidates() respect the new N parameter, and that user-facing import/registration flows also enforce N matching. Consider whether M-mismatch handling in has_similar() needs analogous tightening. Apply the firmware update to devices once validated.

Security signals we found

01

Incorrect multisig wallet matching could lead to signing with the wrong wallet policy

02

Subset-only cosigner matching allowed a smaller wallet to be conflated with a larger one

03

Fix adds N filter to wallet candidate enumeration

04

New regression test demonstrates the previously incorrect behavior

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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