Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This is a small bug-fix patch for Electrum's QML (mobile-style) graphical interface. The crash reporter was not correctly handling exceptions that come from Python's threading system, which could cause the crash reporter itself to misbehav…
Fixes incorrect exception argument handling in crash reporterPrevents potential secondary failure in error-reporting pathNo security boundary crossed; no input from untrusted source is processed
This commit fixes a bug in Electrum's mobile-style QML crash reporter. When an uncaught exception occurred inside a background thread, the crash reporter itself would break because it expected three pieces of information but received one b…
Crash reporter failure could hide or obscure real runtime errors in background threadsNo input validation, privilege boundary, or cryptographic issue presentFix improves diagnostic fidelity but does not close an attack vector
This commit changes how Electrum creates unsigned Bitcoin transactions when an existing 'base transaction' is provided. Previously, the wallet wrongly demanded spendable coins even when the caller supplied a base transaction that already c…
Relaxation of input-source preconditionAddition of consensus-level invariant assertion (at least one input)Addition of empty-input guard before PartialTransaction construction
This commit fixes a crash in Electrum's transaction builder. If a user had only one on-chain coin (UTXO) that was just enough to meet a reserve requirement, clicking 'Max' in the send tab would hit an internal assertion and fail instead of…
Denial-of-service-like crash path triggered by user action in normal wallet stateAssertion failure reachable through GUI send flowFix converts assertion crash into handled NotEnoughFunds exception
This is a routine maintenance commit that updates many of Electrum's software building blocks (dependencies) and raises the minimum required Python version from 3.10 to 3.11. It also refreshes the Linux distribution snapshots used to build…
Dependency version bumps for security-sensitive libraries (cryptography, cffi, libffi, sqlite)Removal of an embedded PGP public key and switch to hash verification for Windows Python installer downloadsBase image refresh from EOL/near-EOL Debian bullseye to bookworm for AppImage builds
This commit is a straightforward internal cleanup: it moves repeated checks like 'are we running on Windows?', 'are we on Android?', and 'are we inside an AppImage?' into a single new helper module called platform.py. The actual behavior o…
This commit is a straightforward internal cleanup: it moves repeated operating-system checks (Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, AppImage) into a single new helper module called platform.py and updates the rest of the code to use those helper…
This commit only changes the software version number from 4.8.3 to 4.8.4 in a single file. It contains no security-related changes, no bug fixes, and no functional code modifications.
This commit relaxes a wallet check when creating a new Bitcoin transaction. Previously, Electrum refused to create a transaction if the user had no spendable coins and no explicit inputs. The change allows creation to continue if a 'base t…
Relaxation of input/coin availability guardAddition of post-construction input count assertionPotential workflow: Replace-By-Fee (RBF) or transaction bumping using base_tx inputs
This commit is a code cleanup in Electrum's mobile-style QML wallet wizard. It replaces an older thread-based background scan for BIP39 seed accounts with a newer asyncio-based task approach, and makes the recovery dialog destroy itself wh…
Refactor of async task lifecycle and cancellation handlingDialog lifecycle cleanup with onClosed: destroy()Use of ignore_if_destroyed to avoid callbacks on destroyed QML objects
This commit is a code cleanup in Electrum's mobile-style QML wallet wizard. It replaces an extra background thread with a simpler asyncio-based callback for scanning BIP39 seed accounts. There is no indication this fixes a security bug; it…
This commit fixes a bug in Electrum's Qt 'Send' tab where selecting a contact from the autocomplete dropdown could briefly leave the wrong recipient active. Previously, the payment field was set to a display name like 'Alice <alice@example…
UI state desynchronization between displayed recipient and active PaymentIdentifierStale PaymentIdentifier usable for ~1 second after recipient text changesPay/Save/Max buttons enabled while recipient is being edited
This commit fixes a UI bug in Electrum's QML (mobile-style) interface where transaction and address labels could become stale or fail to update after editing. It replaces a fragile manual callback system with a proper event listener so the…
No security-relevant signals in diff: no privilege escalation, injection, cryptographic, or authentication changes.Fixes a UI consistency bug (stale labels) that could mislead users but does not enable direct exploitation.Adds event-listener lifecycle management (register/unregister on destroy) to prevent dangling callbacks and potential use-after-free patterns.
This commit fixes a bug in Electrum's mobile-style QML password dialog. If a user tapped the OK/confirm button while the dialog was already closing, the app could emit an extra 'password entered' signal. That extra signal triggered a crash…
Crash in authentication-related code path (AuthMixin)Duplicate signal emission during UI state transitionUser-interaction race condition (tap while dialog closing)
This commit is a performance fix for a wallet function that traces where a transaction's funds came from. It replaces a slow, repeatedly-recursive approach with a more efficient loop and removes an old cache. The change also fixes how the …
Performance fix for wallet history traversalAddress-reuse uncle detection logic changedCache removed in favor of iterative computation
This commit fixes a bug where Electrum wallets created with unusual, hand-crafted 'old-style' seed phrases could not be opened or used. These seeds decode to an odd number of hex characters, which the program previously rejected. The chang…
Input validation relaxed for legacy data (odd-length hex strings)New user-facing error path prevents seed display when mnemonic encoding is impossibleGUI exception handling narrowed: UserFacingException shown as str, other Exception as repr
This commit is a small follow-up cleanup. It translates several user-facing error messages into different languages and makes the Qt GUI handle one specific file-read/write error (StorageReadWriteError) more gracefully, showing a warning d…
Exception-handling path changed in GUIUser-facing error messages internationalizedNo changes to encryption, wallet parsing semantics, or permissions
This commit improves Electrum's error handling when a user tries to open a file that is not a valid Electrum wallet. Previously, if the file contained bytes that were not valid UTF-8 text, the program would crash with a confusing technical…
Error-handling hardeningUser-facing exception message improvedNo cryptographic or parsing logic changed
This is a small user-interface fix in Electrum's Qt desktop app. Previously, if the wallet file was on a read-only folder or an unplugged drive, the app treated the resulting StorageReadWriteError as an unexpected crash and sent a crash re…
No memory safety, cryptographic, or authorization changesException handling change only; no new attack surface introducedCrash-reporting no longer triggered for expected I/O failure scenarios
This commit is a small follow-up cleanup in Electrum's keystore code. It renames an internal helper function, makes the code accept certain unusual 'old' seed phrases that some users created by hand, improves an error message shown to user…
Refactoring of seed validation helperUser-facing error handling improvement in seed displayGrandfathering of non-standard old seed phrases
Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.
Security candidateMerge pull request #11111 from accumulator/qml_bip39recovery_task_refactorby Felix · 896a68d7 · Nov 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 17Details
Commit message · Felix
Merge pull request #11111 from accumulator/qml_bip39recovery_task_refactor
qml: refactor BIP39 account scan to asyncio tasks.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secret or key materialcryptography-sensitive pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 17/100
This commit is a code cleanup in Electrum's mobile-style QML wallet wizard. It replaces an older thread-based background scan for BIP39 seed accounts with a newer asyncio-based task approach, and makes the recovery dialog destroy itself when closed. There is no direct evidence in the diff of a security vulnerability being fixed.
Security candidateqml: refactor BIP39 account scan to asyncio tasks.by Sander van Grieken · 00ed883a · Nov 4, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 12Details
Commit message · Sander van Grieken
qml: refactor BIP39 account scan to asyncio tasks.
The thread around waiting on a Future was unnecessary, and can simply be done using the Future's done_callback.
This also allows better handling of the scan's lifecycle, e.g. when the wizard starts a scan, goes back a page, then next and scan again. The extra thread was more complex to clean up.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key materialcryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100
This commit is a code cleanup in Electrum's mobile-style QML wallet wizard. It replaces an extra background thread with a simpler asyncio-based callback for scanning BIP39 seed accounts. There is no indication this fixes a security bug; it appears to be a maintainability and lifecycle-handling improvement.
Security candidateqt: paytoedit: complete contacts to their key, not 'name <key>'by f321x · dd1b50fb · Nov 4, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 59Details
Commit message · f321x
qt: paytoedit: complete contacts to their key, not 'name <key>'
The contact completer lists 'name <key>', and QLineEdit put that text into the edit when an item was highlighted or chosen. That is not a payment identifier, so after 1s the edit timer set an invalid one. If the key of a chosen contact was still being resolved then, the result was dropped and the spinner never stopped.
Highlighting or choosing a contact now puts its key into the edit. While the list is open nothing is looked up, so browsing it doesn't resolve every highlighted contact. The edit is read within 1s after the list is closed, or right away when a contact is chosen.
When the text is edited, the old payment identifier is dropped until the new one is set, so Pay, Save and Max are disabled meanwhile. Before, Pay could pay the previous recipient for up to 1s after a new one was typed.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
privacy or spend-authorization protocol
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100
This commit fixes a bug in Electrum's Qt 'Send' tab where selecting a contact from the autocomplete dropdown could briefly leave the wrong recipient active. Previously, the payment field was set to a display name like 'Alice <alice@example.com>' for up to about one second, and during that window the 'Pay' button could still use the previous recipient. The patch makes the field immediately switch to the actual payment identifier (e.g. alice@example.com), pauses lookups while the dropdown is open, and disables Pay/Save/Max while the recipient text is being edited. It also fixes a related UI spinner that could keep spinning forever.
Security candidateMerge "verify_sigs": adb: check sigs of is_mine txins of unconf txsby SomberNight · 90fe3082 · Oct 23, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 83 · StrongCritical 90Details
Commit message · SomberNight
Merge "verify_sigs": adb: check sigs of is_mine txins of unconf txs
verify signatures of wallet.is_mine inputs for mempool txs only
PR: SE#1 (first 3 commits)
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Critical 90/100
This commit fixes a security flaw in the Electrum Bitcoin wallet where a malicious server could silently replace a transaction the user just broadcast with a fake version that spent the user's coins. Because the wallet trusted server-provided transaction data without checking signatures on inputs that spend the user's own coins, it could be tricked into thinking the fake transaction was valid. The attacker could then lure the user into using RBF (Replace-By-Fee) to 'bump' the fake transaction, which actually signed and sent the user's funds to the attacker. The vendor reports two victim reports and at least one loss of funds. The fix makes the wallet verify signatures for any input that spends coins belonging to the user before accepting a transaction, and it holds back server-claimed 'mined' transactions until they are independently verified.
Security candidatetransaction: support all sighash types in legacy preimageby ThomasV · 0e546660 · Oct 21, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 83 · StrongLow 30Details
Commit message · ThomasV
transaction: support all sighash types in legacy preimage
serialize_preimage now supports NONE, SINGLE and ANYONECANPAY for legacy inputs. With strict=False, any sighash byte is accepted for non-taproot inputs, as in consensus; by default, undefined sighash bytes are rejected, as in mempool policy. verify_sig_for_txin takes the same parameter, and handles legacy SIGHASH_SINGLE without a corresponding output.
Tested against the legacy sighash vectors of Bitcoin Core.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
consensus or confidential-proof validationsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 30/100
This commit expands Electrum's transaction-signing code to correctly handle several Bitcoin 'sighash' modes that were previously unsupported for old-style (legacy) inputs. Sighash flags tell the network which parts of a transaction the signature covers. Before this change, legacy inputs using SIGHASH_NONE, SIGHASH_SINGLE, or SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY would fail. The patch also adds a 'strict' option: by default it rejects unusual sighash bytes (matching normal network policy), but with strict=False it accepts any byte the Bitcoin consensus rules allow. It includes tests that compare Electrum's output against Bitcoin Core's official sighash test vectors. There is no indication in the commit that this fixes an active security vulnerability; it appears to be a correctness and compatibility improvement.
Security candidateandroid build: don't reinstall ca-certificates from the pinned snapshotby f321x · 29ab18fb · Oct 21, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 93 · StrongInformational 21Details
Commit message · f321x
android build: don't reinstall ca-certificates from the pinned snapshot
In the other build containers (except for AppImage due to the stale image) we don't pin ca-certificates. In the Android build we indirectly pinned it by re-installing it after the apt.sources.list snapshot got installed. To not be affected by the revoked CA (https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/) we could either manually patch it out (similar to the AppImage) Dockerfile, or not pin the ca-authorities (and its transitive installs), as we alredy successfully do with the other images. Considering we trust debian the simpler solution seems to be not pinning it as long as no reproducibility issues appear.
93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 21/100
This commit changes how the Android version of the Electrum Bitcoin wallet is built. Previously, the build process reinstalled a specific pinned (fixed) version of the list of trusted website certificates (ca-certificates). The commit removes that pinned reinstall so the Android build instead uses the normal up-to-date certificate list from Debian. The reason given is to avoid being stuck with a revoked/removed certificate authority (emudhra) that was included in the pinned snapshot. This is a build-hygiene change rather than a fix for an active attack on users.
Security candidateappimage build: distrust emSign ECC Root CA - G3 in build containerby f321x · 78fcc560 · Oct 21, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 86 · StrongModerate 62Details
Commit message · f321x
appimage build: distrust emSign ECC Root CA - G3 in build container
Its private key leaked (https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/). The appimage container installs ca-certificates from our pinned bullseye snapshot, and bullseye won't get a fixed ca-certificates as it is EOL. So deselect the root manually.
The wine and sdist containers are not affected: they get ca-certificates from the live debian repos (incl. -security), so freshly built images already have the fixed version.
Related https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/issues/10950
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
secret or key material
AI analysis · Moderate 62/100
Electrum's AppImage build process used a Debian 'bullseye' Linux container whose built-in list of trusted web security certificates still included a root certificate from eMudhra/emSign that had its private key leaked. Because the old Debian release no longer receives updates, Electrum manually removes that certificate from the build container so that future AppImage builds do not implicitly trust it. This is a supply-chain/build-hardening fix; it does not change the Electrum wallet application itself.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a one-line UI component rename in a QML dialog used by a Bitcoin wallet plugin. The change replaces a custom 'ButtonContainer' with a 'DialogButtonContainer'. There is no security-relevant content in the commit message, title, or diff, and no references suggest otherwise.
Merge pull request #10874 from spesmilo/plugin_zipfile
plugins: load zip plugins from the bytes whose signature was verified
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100
This commit hardens how Electrum loads third-party plugins. Previously, the app could authorize a plugin zip file, then later re-read that same file from disk to run it. An attacker who could replace the file in the brief gap (a 'time-of-check/time-of-use' or TOCTOU race) might get malicious code executed despite the signature check. The fix keeps the verified plugin bytes in memory and loads all code and icons from those bytes, so the file on disk can no longer be swapped in after approval. It also adds a plugin upgrade flow and new safety checks.
Merge pull request #11000 from f321x/bip32_index_with_whitespace
bip32: followup #10999: require child index to be ascii digits
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secret or key materialcryptography-sensitive pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 39/100
This commit tightens how Electrum parses BIP32 wallet derivation paths. Previously, the code used Python's built-in int() conversion, which accepts a wide variety of number-like strings, including whitespace, plus signs, underscores, and non-ASCII digits. The change now requires each path index to be plain ASCII digits only, optionally preceded by a minus sign for hardened derivation. This prevents subtle parsing surprises where a user or attacker could supply a path that looks valid but is interpreted differently than expected.
Merge pull request #10999 from MrKalipo/fix/bip32-strpath-index-range
bip32: reject str path child index >= 2**31
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secret or key materialcryptography-sensitive pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 49/100
This commit fixes a bug in how Electrum converts text-based Bitcoin wallet key paths (like "m/44'/0'/0'") into numeric form. Previously, typing an index of 2^31 or higher could silently be treated as a hardened key or could make the hardening marker (the apostrophe) meaningless. The fix now rejects such out-of-range indexes with a clear error. This is a correctness and safety improvement for a function that handles sensitive wallet derivation paths, but the commit itself does not describe a specific exploit or security incident.
convert_bip32_strpath_to_intpath only checked the *combined* value (index | hardened flag) against UINT32_MAX. As the hardened flag is the top bit, a literal index in [2**31, 2**32) passed the check and was silently interpreted as hardened: "m/2147483648" parsed to the same path as "m/0'", and for "m/2147483649'" the hardened marker was a no-op.
Reject any literal index >= 2**31 instead, and tell the user to use the hardened suffix. This matches other implementations (rust-bitcoin, bitcoinjs, BIP380 descriptor key paths) and makes the str->int->str round trip unambiguous.
Co-authored-by: f321x <f@f321x.com>
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key materialdefensive validationcryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 49/100
This commit fixes a bug in how Electrum parsed Bitcoin wallet derivation paths typed by users. A path like "m/2147483648" was silently treated the same as "m/0'" (a hardened key), and "m/2147483649'" lost its hardening marker. The patch now rejects any index of 2^31 or larger and tells the user to use the standard hardened suffix instead. This prevents confusion and makes path conversion unambiguous, but it is a correctness/hardening fix rather than a demonstrated remote exploit.
Merge pull request #10972 from SomberNight/202609_qt_label_plaintext_by_default
qt/qml: labels to require opt-in to rich text
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathboot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100
This commit changes Electrum's user interface so that text labels default to plain text instead of rich text. Rich text (HTML-like formatting) can be abused if untrusted data is displayed, because it may allow attackers to inject clickable links, fake UI elements, or trigger bugs in the text-rendering engine. The patch makes rich text an opt-in choice for developers and explicitly marks trusted labels that need formatting. It also adds a runtime sanity check on Android and patches the Qt framework used in Android builds to make plain text the default at a lower level. This is a defensive hardening change rather than a fix for a specific known exploit.
Merge pull request #10982 from spesmilo/wizard_2fa_seed_redirect
wizard: redirect flow if a 2fa seed is entered for a standard wallet.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 29/100
This commit changes Electrum's wallet creation wizard so that if a user tries to restore a normal 'standard' wallet but pastes a seed phrase that actually belongs to a two-factor authentication (2FA) wallet, the wizard automatically redirects them into the correct 2FA wallet setup flow instead of rejecting the seed or creating a mismatched wallet. Previously, the wizard would treat 2FA seeds as invalid for standard wallets. The change also ensures the Qt GUI seed validator matches this new behavior. It is a usability fix that prevents user confusion and potential loss of access to funds, not a remote-exploitable vulnerability.
Add tests to cover the newly added standard restore to 2fa redirection.
70/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds and reorganizes automated test code for Electrum's wallet creation wizard. It does not change any production wallet logic, cryptography, or network handling. The tests verify that when a user tries to restore a 'standard' wallet but enters a seed phrase that actually belongs to a two-factor authentication (2FA) wallet, the wizard correctly redirects them to the 2FA setup flow. There is no security-relevant code change here.
Merge pull request #10988 from f321x/update_security_review_ci_model
ci: bump security review model to opus 5.5, detect downgrades
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
update trustmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit updates Electrum's internal CI (continuous integration) script that runs an automated security review using Anthropic's Claude Code tool. It changes the AI model version used for reviews from 'claude-opus-5' to 'claude-opus-5-5', switches the output format to a streaming JSON format, and adds detection and warning logic for cases where Claude Code silently falls back to a different (presumably weaker) model. There is no change to Electrum wallet code, cryptography, networking, or user-facing behavior.
Security candidateci: security review: warn if the model got downgradedby f321x · ace2ca7a · Sep 23, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 90 · StrongInformational 12Details
Commit message · f321x
ci: security review: warn if the model got downgraded
Use stream-json output to detect when Claude Code falls back to another model (e.g. after a cyber safeguards refusal), and show a warning in the CI log, as a GitHub Actions annotation, and in the PR comment.
90/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
update trust
AI analysis · Informational 12/100
This commit updates Electrum's own CI security-review script. It adds detection and warnings when the automated code reviewer (Claude Code) silently falls back to a different AI model, for example after a content-policy refusal. It does not change Electrum wallet code, network behavior, cryptography, or anything end users install. It is purely an internal CI/quality-assurance improvement.
Security candidatelightning: give LocalConfig and RemoteConfig the same fields.by ThomasV · 41ba9ce5 · Sep 21, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 27Details
Commit message · ThomasV
lightning: give LocalConfig and RemoteConfig the same fields.
Based on ab0cab8a1 in the 'peerbackups' branch. Both parties now have current_commitment_signature, current_htlc_signatures current and next per-commitment points. For REMOTE, our signatures are saved in sign_next_commitment.
Note that this creates a few extra disk writes per channel commitment. The missing fiedls are added in the same WalletDB upgrade as previous commit.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 27/100
This commit refactors how Electrum stores Lightning channel configuration data so that both sides of a channel (local and remote) use the same set of fields. It adds per-commitment points and signature fields to the shared base class, updates channel setup and state-transition code to populate them, and includes a database upgrade for existing wallets. The change appears to be a structural cleanup and preparation for future peer-backup functionality rather than a direct fix for an active security bug. There is no explicit vendor statement that this is a security patch, and no independent researcher is credited.
Merge pull request #10974 from SomberNight/202609_nostr_psbt_xpub
plugins: psbt_nostr: document design choice for using xpub as nsec
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds a long code comment explaining a design choice in Electrum's PSBT-over-Nostr plugin. It does not change any program behavior. The comment documents that the plugin derives each cosigner's Nostr secret key from their Bitcoin extended public key (xpub), which means every cosigner can also compute every other cosigner's secret key. The developers explicitly call this an accepted tradeoff because the only shared cryptographic material among cosigners is the xpubs, and the Nostr keys are only used to exchange proposed transaction drafts (PSBTs). No vulnerability is introduced or fixed by this change.
Security candidateadd_info_from_network: do not swallow exceptionsby ThomasV · 3f67b21b · Sep 18, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 80 · StrongModerate 61Details
Commit message · ThomasV
add_info_from_network: do not swallow exceptions
An attacker can provide a witness_utxo whose value disagrees with the real previous transaction. That would raise PSBTInputConsistencyFailure, which is swallowed because it is not a NetworkException.
This would lead us to sign a tx with the wrong input amount. (no fund loss: the tx is invalid under BIP143)
80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 61/100
Electrum's transaction builder had a bug where it would ignore certain consistency errors when fetching extra transaction data from the network. A malicious or misbehaving server could supply a wrong input amount, and Electrum would silently continue and sign the transaction with that wrong amount. The resulting transaction would be invalid and not accepted by the Bitcoin network, so no funds could be lost, but it could cause confusion, failed payments, or be used to probe wallet behavior.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Low 37/100
This commit makes the Electrum desktop wallet explicitly tell its Qt GUI widgets to interpret certain text as rich HTML-like text, rather than leaving it on the automatic/default setting. In recent Qt versions, the default behavior changed so that labels with link tags or HTML may no longer render as clickable rich text unless the application opts in. The patch is defensive: it ensures user-facing labels (help text, warnings, update notices, transaction details, seed warnings, etc.) continue to display formatted text and clickable links correctly. There is no direct evidence in the diff of an exploitable vulnerability being fixed; it reads more like a compatibility/adjustment change after a Qt behavior change. One label was also converted from HTML line breaks to plain-text line breaks, which slightly reduces HTML parsing exposure.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 11/100
This commit adds explicit 'RichText' formatting markers to several user-interface text labels in Electrum's QML (mobile-style) GUI. Previously these labels may have implicitly rendered HTML-like tags. The change is a cleanup/adaptation to newer Qt behavior and does not, on its own, introduce a security vulnerability. It is not a fix for a known exploit, but it touches code that handles rich text rendering, which can be security-relevant if untrusted strings are later inserted.
Merge pull request #10958 from SomberNight/202609_deps
build: update some dependencies
58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
This commit is a routine dependency update for the Electrum Bitcoin wallet. It bumps versions of Python, OpenSSL, secp256k1, and various Python packages used in builds and runtime. The commit itself does not fix any known security bug in Electrum's own code, nor does the project describe it as a security update. Dependency updates can indirectly improve security by including upstream bug fixes, but without specific vulnerability information we cannot say this patch is itself a security fix.
Merge pull request #10933 from SomberNight/202609_crandom_prep
prep crandom.py: trivial refactor to centralise our RNG code
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
entropy or randomnesscryptography-sensitive pathseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 20/100
This commit is a cleanup change: it creates a single helper module for random-number generation and replaces scattered calls to os.urandom, secrets.token_bytes, and an old randrange helper with the new helpers. The new helpers still use the same Python standard-library secure random sources (os.urandom and secrets.randbelow), so the change does not introduce a security weakness. It is preparation work for a future improvement, not a fix for an active vulnerability.
Merge pull request #10888 from spesmilo/lnchannel_funding_height_downgrade
lnchannel: do not remove funded channel once funding tx is confirmed
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
update trustmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100
This patch fixes a bug in Electrum's Lightning channel handling where a malicious or misbehaving server could trick the wallet into deleting a funded channel by claiming the funding transaction was no longer confirmed. The fix makes the wallet remember that a funding transaction was once mined and refuse to downgrade that status to 'unconfirmed,' preventing accidental loss of access to funds stored in the channel.