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Informational 21 Bitcoin

android build: don't reinstall ca-certificates from the pinned snapshot

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by f321x

93/100 · Strong
android build: don't reinstall ca-certificates from the pinned snapshot

In the other build containers (except for AppImage due to the stale image)
we don't pin ca-certificates.
In the Android build we indirectly pinned it by re-installing it
after the apt.sources.list snapshot got installed.
To not be affected by the revoked CA (https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/)
we could either manually patch it out (similar to the AppImage)
Dockerfile, or not pin the ca-authorities (and its transitive installs),
as we alredy successfully do with the other images.
Considering we trust debian the simpler solution seems to be
not pinning it as long as no reproducibility issues appear.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Android version of the Electrum Bitcoin wallet is built. Previously, the build process reinstalled a specific pinned (fixed) version of the list of trusted website certificates (ca-certificates). The commit removes that pinned reinstall so the Android build instead uses the normal up-to-date certificate list from Debian. The reason given is to avoid being stuck with a revoked/removed certificate authority (emudhra) that was included in the pinned snapshot. This is a build-hygiene change rather than a fix for an active attack on users.

Recommended action

Review the Android reproducible build to confirm it still produces identical outputs without pinning ca-certificates, and verify the resulting image no longer trusts the revoked emudhra CA. Consider documenting the build-trust assumption that Debian's current ca-certificates package is acceptable. No urgent end-user action is indicated.

Security signals we found

01

Build-time certificate trust store change

02

Removal of pinned CA bundle reinstall

03

Reference to revoked CA (emudhra)

04

No runtime code change in wallet application

05

No cryptographic or consensus code modified

Risk score

Why this scored 21/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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