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Critical 90 Bitcoin

Merge "verify_sigs": adb: check sigs of is_mine txins of unconf txs

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by SomberNight

83/100 · Strong
Merge "verify_sigs": adb: check sigs of is_mine txins of unconf txs

verify signatures of wallet.is_mine inputs for mempool txs only

PR: SE#1 (first 3 commits)
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a security flaw in the Electrum Bitcoin wallet where a malicious server could silently replace a transaction the user just broadcast with a fake version that spent the user's coins. Because the wallet trusted server-provided transaction data without checking signatures on inputs that spend the user's own coins, it could be tricked into thinking the fake transaction was valid. The attacker could then lure the user into using RBF (Replace-By-Fee) to 'bump' the fake transaction, which actually signed and sent the user's funds to the attacker. The vendor reports two victim reports and at least one loss of funds. The fix makes the wallet verify signatures for any input that spends coins belonging to the user before accepting a transaction, and it holds back server-claimed 'mined' transactions until they are independently verified.

Recommended action

Upgrade all Electrum clients to version 4.8.3 or later immediately. Server operators and users should treat any pre-4.8.3 wallet as vulnerable to malicious-server transaction substitution. Review any RBF/bump transactions initiated shortly after broadcasting on older versions for unexpected destinations.

Security signals we found

01

Vendor advisory explicitly identifies this commit as the fix for an actively exploited high-severity vulnerability

02

New signature-verification path for wallet-owned inputs in unconfirmed transactions

03

Addition of InvalidTxSignature exception and rejection/removal logic

04

Held-tx mechanism to defer acceptance of server-claimed mined transactions until SPV verification

05

Watchtower explicitly disables verification because it lacks private keys

06

Tests demonstrate rejection of conflicting transactions with same txid but different witness

07

Tests verify multisig signature ordering is enforced

Risk score

Why this scored 90/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 28/30
Exploitability 22/25
Stealth signal 13/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 10/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Primary-source trail

Evidence and disclosure record

Verified links used to place this patch in context. External claims remain attributed to their publishers.

Vendor advisory · Primary

Malicious server can replace a just-broadcast tx and try to trick user into RBF-ing it

Electrum's primary advisory confirms active exploitation, two victim reports, and one loss of funds. Versions before 4.8.3 are affected. The vendor rates the issue High and identifies this commit as the fix.

Release notes

Electrum 4.8.3 critical security release and disclosure

Official Electrum announcement urging every user to upgrade to 4.8.3 and linking the public vulnerability disclosure.

Human-validated context

Community notes

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