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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

2330 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

228security candidates319second-pass queue1977AI analyses
99commits · 30 days
229commits · 60 days
709commits · 180 days
1578commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6579 seen10 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5147 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
628Strong · 80–100
1399Adequate · 60–79
272Thin · 40–59
31Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker331217581
daywalker9019315113471
Níckolas Goline961252376
Amperstrand322278
Rusty Russell96977961173
Sangbida Chaudhuri18537157167
Vincenzo Palazzo19714185
Lagrang3115679170
dovgopoly18016165
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1469110074
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 34 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

2e7a9f5aby Ken Sedgwick+9−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 66 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…

06ea9ba0by Ken Sedgwick+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: create bwatch tables before backfilling them

This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…

Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
ce2a6836by daywalker90+105−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 5 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

v26.12rc1

This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…

4002c4e9by Níckolas Goline+164−1110 files
No security note in commit
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: store payment failure details per groupid

This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…

Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
24082c6dby daywalker90+6−34 files
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-plugin: do not panic when the log writer task is gone

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…

panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
8661ffabby cdecker+29−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: explain hsmtool HTLC recovery

This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…

f90c140dby Sangbida Chaudhuri+85−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: make test_delpay_works deterministic

This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.

a224ca81by daywalker90+16−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: say that listtransactions gives blockheight 0 for a tx not in a block

This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…

bc281be3by Peter Neuroth+4−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

fixup! pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…

No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
02612ed5by Amartya Singh+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…

Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
42472816by daywalker90+14−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …

Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
42e268abby daywalker90+60−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …

5ebe365dby Amartya Singh+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
c6be4f71by Lagrang3+633−97 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
c87f5573by Andezion+22−11 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: fix crash on mutual close of an unconfirmed dual-funded channel

This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …

NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
555143beby Sangbida Chaudhuri+9−31 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-grpc: reject malformed request values instead of panicking

This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…

Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
b2703436by daywalker90+1558−12135 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 51 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

nix: drop protobuf again

This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…

a0459eeeby Peter Neuroth+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

make: check gRPC protos for breaking changes against the last release

This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…

db5fea70by daywalker90+43−84 files
No security note in commit
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Security candidateglobal: remove unnecessary includes from headers.by Rusty Russell · f6a4e794 · Oct 22, 2025 · 212 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

global: remove unnecessary includes from headers.

Each header should only include the other headers it needs to compile;
`devtools/reduce-includes.sh */*.h` does this. The C files then need
additional includes if they don't compile.

And remove the entirely useless wire/onion_wire.h, which only serves to include wire/onion_wiregen.h.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a large but purely mechanical cleanup of C header file #include directives across the Core Lightning codebase. The goal is to make each header include only what it actually needs, and to add missing includes to the .c source files that now need them. It also deletes a tiny wrapper header that did nothing but include another generated header. There is no change to program logic, data handling, or security behavior.

Security candidatetests/fuzz: fix include order.by Rusty Russell · d8ee3a5e · Oct 22, 2025 · 7 filesMessage 70 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

tests/fuzz: fix include order.

Nobody ever runs `make check-includes` with fuzzing enabled.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

70/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencecryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only reorders #include lines in fuzz-test source files and adds minor indentation to two direct .c file includes. It is a coding-style/build-hygiene fix with no functional code changes and no security relevance.

Security candidateMakefile: run fuzzing corpora as normal unit tests in non-fuzzing mode.by Rusty Russell · 2adfdfd0 · Oct 22, 2025 · 15 filesMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

Makefile: run fuzzing corpora as normal unit tests in non-fuzzing mode.

This means we can make sure the compile and run in normal builds.

Side note: various tests call common_setup(), which means we called it
twice in unit testing mode, so we conditionalize those.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencecryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit changes the build system so that existing fuzz tests can also run as ordinary unit tests in normal (non-fuzzing) builds. It does not fix a bug, change runtime behavior of Core Lightning in production, or introduce any user-facing feature. It is purely a testing/CI infrastructure improvement.

Security candidateglobal: remove unnecessary includes from C files.by Rusty Russell · 6e5cb299 · Oct 22, 2025 · 177 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

global: remove unnecessary includes from C files.

Basically, `devtools/reduce-includes.sh */*.c`.

Build time from make clean (RUST=0) (includes building external libs):

Before:
real 0m38.944000-40.416000(40.1131+/-0.4)s
user 3m6.790000-17.159000(15.0571+/-2.8)s
sys 0m35.304000-37.336000(36.8942+/-0.57)s
After:
real 0m37.872000-39.974000(39.5466+/-0.59)s
user 3m1.211000-14.968000(12.4556+/-3.9)s
sys 0m35.008000-36.830000(36.4143+/-0.5)s

Build time after touch config.vars (RUST=0):

Before:
real 0m19.831000-21.862000(21.5528+/-0.58)s
user 2m15.361000-30.731000(28.4798+/-4.4)s
sys 0m21.056000-22.339000(22.0346+/-0.35)s

After:
real 0m18.384000-21.307000(20.8605+/-0.92)s
user 2m5.585000-26.843000(23.6017+/-6.7)s
sys 0m19.650000-22.003000(21.4943+/-0.69)s

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathauthentication pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine code cleanup: it removes unused C-language #include directives from many source files and adds a few that were needed but previously inherited indirectly. The stated goal is faster build times, and the diff shows no functional code changes. There is no security-relevant behavior change.

Security candidatemakefile: fix glob expansion for macOSby Sangbida Chaudhuri · ad0c7318 · Oct 22, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

makefile: fix glob expansion for macOS

when bash expands bitcoin/*.h, it returns the files in lexicographically sorted order by default this is not necessarily the case for macOS so it has be explicitly sorted. I get a fairly uninformative error like this:

make: *** [check-bitcoin-makefile] Error 1

The error is now more informative and does not error on a clean branch on macOS:

BITCOIN_HEADERS missing: bitcoin/signature.h bitcoin/tx_parts.h bitcoin/tx.h bitcoin/varint.h
make: *** [check-bitcoin-makefile] Error 1

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit fixes a build script check that was too strict on macOS. The Makefile check compares a manually maintained list of Bitcoin header files against files found on disk. On Linux, the shell lists files in sorted order, but macOS does not, causing the check to fail even when nothing is wrong. The patch makes the comparison order-independent and prints clearer error messages. It is a build tooling fix with no security relevance.

Security candidatetools: Read the correct default-key from gpgconfby ShahanaFarooqui · ea2f7607 · Oct 20, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 80 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · ShahanaFarooqui

tools: Read the correct default-key from gpgconf

Workflow error `gpg: using "4129A994AA7E9852" is thrown due to incorrect gpg parsing. Update the awk parsing logic to properly locate and extract the key fingerprint within the gpgconf --list-options output structure, ensuring automated signing uses the correct key.

Changelog-None.

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This is a one-line fix in the release build script. It changes how the script tells GnuPG which key to use when signing release checksum files. Previously the key fingerprint was accidentally passed as a filename argument to gpg, which caused a harmless workflow error and could have led to the wrong key being used for signing. The fix moves the fingerprint to the proper --default-key option so signing uses the intended key.

Security candidatebookkeeper: only read listchannelmoves 1000 entries at a time.by Rusty Russell · e522aedc · Oct 20, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 53Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

bookkeeper: only read listchannelmoves 1000 entries at a time.

If we read all of them, we might get 1.6M at once (after initial
migration). Then we submit a few hundred thousand simultaneous
requests to lightningd, and it gets upset, queueing them all on the
xpay command hook and running out of memory.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Changelog-Fixed: plugins: bookkeeper first invocation after migration from prior to 25.09 with very large databases will not crash.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
resource exhaustion
AI analysis · Moderate 53/100

This update fixes a bug in the bookkeeper plugin of Core Lightning. After a large database migration, the plugin could ask for too many records at once, flood the main lightningd process with hundreds of thousands of requests, and cause it to run out of memory and crash. The fix reads records in batches of 1,000 instead of all at once.

Security candidatepytest: fix flakes in feerates.by Rusty Russell · 992771bb · Oct 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 13Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: fix flakes in feerates.

Sometimes we get a shorter signature than expected, and we're supposed
to disable the feerate tests in that case. But we didn't catch all the
cases where we make signatures.

```
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1901527Z ____________________________ test_peer_anchor_push _____________________________
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1902251Z [gw5] linux -- Python 3.10.18 /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/.venv/bin/python
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1902731Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1903045Z node_factory = <pyln.testing.utils.NodeFactory object at 0x7f17fdffd6f0>
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1903740Z bitcoind = <pyln.testing.utils.BitcoinD object at 0x7f17fdffe830>
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1904495Z executor = <concurrent.futures.thread.ThreadPoolExecutor object at 0x7f17fdffcbb0>
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1906158Z chainparams = {'bip173_prefix': 'bcrt', 'chain_hash': '06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f', 'elements': False, 'example_addr': 'bcrt1qeyyk6sl5pr49ycpqyckvmttus5ttj25pd0zpvg', ...}
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1907285Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1907600Z @unittest.skipIf(TEST_NETWORK != 'regtest', 'elementsd anchors not supportd')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1908344Z def test_peer_anchor_push(node_factory, bitcoind, executor, chainparams):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1909033Z """Test that we use anchor on peer's commit to CPFP tx"""
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1909853Z l1, l2, l3 = node_factory.line_graph(3, opts=[{},
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1910334Z {'min-emergency-msat': 546000,
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1910825Z 'dev-warn-on-overgrind': None,
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1911313Z 'broken_log': 'overgrind: short signature length'},
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1911662Z {'disconnect': ['-WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC'],
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1911976Z 'dev-warn-on-overgrind': None,
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1912304Z 'broken_log': 'overgrind: short signature length'}],
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1912790Z wait_for_announce=True)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1913041Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1913305Z # We splinter l2's funds so it's forced to use more than one UTXO to push.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914043Z fundsats = int(Millisatoshi(only_one(l2.rpc.listfunds()['outputs'])['amount_msat']).to_satoshi())
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914443Z OUTPUT_SAT = 10000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914647Z NUM_OUTPUTS = 10
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914903Z psbt = l2.rpc.fundpsbt("all", "1000perkw", 1000)['psbt']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1915520Z # Pay 5k sats in fees.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1916329Z psbt = l2.rpc.addpsbtoutput(fundsats - OUTPUT_SAT * NUM_OUTPUTS - 5000, psbt, destination=l3.rpc.newaddr()['bech32'])['psbt']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1917156Z for _ in range(NUM_OUTPUTS):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1917638Z psbt = l2.rpc.addpsbtoutput(OUTPUT_SAT, psbt)['psbt']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1918194Z l2.rpc.sendpsbt(l2.rpc.signpsbt(psbt)['signed_psbt'])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1918731Z bitcoind.generate_block(1, wait_for_mempool=1)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1919232Z sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l1, l2])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1919634Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1919847Z # Make sure all amounts are below OUTPUT_SAT sats!
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1920318Z assert [x for x in l2.rpc.listfunds()['outputs'] if x['amount_msat'] > Millisatoshi(str(OUTPUT_SAT) + "sat")] == []
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1920735Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1920957Z # Get HTLC stuck, so l2 has reason to push commitment tx.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1921244Z amt = 100_000_000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1921517Z sticky_inv = l3.rpc.invoice(amt, 'sticky', 'sticky')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1921842Z route = l1.rpc.getroute(l3.info['id'], amt, 1)['route']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1922277Z l1.rpc.sendpay(route, sticky_inv['payment_hash'], payment_secret=sticky_inv['payment_secret'])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1922751Z l3.daemon.wait_for_log('dev_disconnect: -WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923060Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923241Z # Make sure HTLC expiry is what we expect!
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923637Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log('Adding HTLC 0 amount=100000000msat cltv=119 gave CHANNEL_ERR_ADD_OK')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923998Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1924229Z # l3 drops to chain, but make sure it doesn't CPFP its own anchor.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1924685Z wait_for(lambda: only_one(l3.rpc.listpeerchannels(l2.info['id'])['channels'])['htlcs'] != [])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1925688Z closetx = l3.rpc.dev_sign_last_tx(l2.info['id'])['tx']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926132Z l3.stop()
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926337Z # We don't care about l1 any more, either
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926579Z l1.stop()
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926739Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926941Z # We put l3's tx in the mempool, but won't mine it.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1927316Z bitcoind.rpc.sendrawtransaction(closetx)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1927754Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1928139Z # We aim for feerate ~3750, so this won't mine l3's unilateral close.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1928991Z # HTLC's going to time out at block 120 (we give one block grace)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1929527Z for block in range(110, 120):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1929989Z bitcoind.generate_block(1, needfeerate=5000)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1930510Z assert bitcoind.rpc.getblockcount() == block
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1931014Z sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l2])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1931715Z assert only_one(l2.rpc.listpeerchannels(l3.info['id'])['channels'])['state'] == 'CHANNELD_NORMAL'
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1932368Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1932642Z # Drops to chain
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1933030Z bitcoind.generate_block(1, needfeerate=5000)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1933824Z wait_for(lambda: only_one(l2.rpc.listpeerchannels(l3.info['id'])['channels'])['state'] == 'AWAITING_UNILATERAL')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1934522Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1935254Z # But, l3's tx already there, and identical feerate will not RBF.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1935839Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log("rejecting replacement")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1936357Z wait_for(lambda: len(bitcoind.rpc.getrawmempool()) == 2)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1936801Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1937127Z # As blocks pass, we will use anchor to boost l3's tx.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1937666Z for block, feerate in zip(range(120, 124), (12000, 13000, 14000, 15000)):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1938560Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log(fr"Worth fee [0-9]*sat for remote commit tx to get 100000000msat at block 125 \(\+{125 - block}\) at feerate {feerate}perkw")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1939369Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log("sendrawtx exit 0")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1939902Z # Check feerate for entire package (commitment tx + anchor) is ~ correct
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1940473Z details = bitcoind.rpc.getrawmempool(True).values()
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1940920Z print(f"mempool = {details}")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1941347Z total_weight = sum([d['weight'] for d in details])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1941903Z total_fees = sum([float(d['fees']['base']) * 100_000_000 for d in details])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1942467Z total_feerate_perkw = total_fees / total_weight * 1000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1942972Z > check_feerate([l3, l2], total_feerate_perkw, feerate)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1943279Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1943411Z tests/test_closing.py:4064:
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1943813Z _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1944170Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1944685Z nodes = [<fixtures.LightningNode object at 0x7f17fdf684f0>, <fixtures.LightningNode object at 0x7f17fdf6af50>]
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1945708Z actual_feerate = 13005.66942869603, expected_feerate = 13000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946091Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946247Z def check_feerate(nodes, actual_feerate, expected_feerate):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946558Z # Feerate can't be lower.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946870Z assert actual_feerate > expected_feerate - 2
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1947365Z if actual_feerate >= expected_feerate + 2:
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1947830Z if any([did_short_sig(n) for n in nodes]):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1948239Z return
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1948589Z # Use assert as it shows the actual values on failure
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1949043Z > assert actual_feerate < expected_feerate + 2
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1949489Z E AssertionError
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1949704Z
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 13/100

This change only adds extra test-only logging to catch abnormally short cryptographic signatures during automated testing. It does not alter how signatures are created, verified, or used in real transactions, so it is not a security fix and does not affect normal users.

Security candidatebump minimum python to 3.9.2 and downgrade coincurveby Alex Myers · 8a0e473e · Oct 10, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Alex Myers

bump minimum python to 3.9.2 and downgrade coincurve

This allows compatibility with python 3.14.0 which coincurve 21.0.0 did
not support. The next coincurve release should restore compatibility.

Fixes: #8591

Changelog-changed: pyln-testing requires python>=3.9.2

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
update trust
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit adjusts Python package versions so the project's testing tools install correctly on the newly released Python 3.14. It lowers the required 'coincurve' library from version 21.0.0 to 20.0.0 and raises the minimum Python version from 3.9 to 3.9.2. The change is framed by the developer as a compatibility fix, not a security fix. There is no direct evidence in the commit that it repairs a vulnerability.

Security candidatedualopend: handle ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES from peer.by Rusty Russell · 89bce951 · Oct 1, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

dualopend: handle ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES from peer.

This can happen if we haven't transitioned to channeld yet, but logic is simply to hand
it to lightningd, exactly as channeld does.

```
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8951627Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z DEBUG 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-dualopend-chan#1: peer_out WIRE_WARNING
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8952126Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z **BROKEN** 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-dualopend-chan#1: Unexpected message WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8952521Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z INFO 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-dualopend-chan#1: Peer connection lost
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8953124Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z INFO 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-chan#1: Peer transient failure in DUALOPEND_AWAITING_LOCKIN: dualopend: Owning subdaemon dualopend died (62208)
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This patch fixes a bug where Core Lightning's dual-funding channel opener (dualopend) would crash with a 'BROKEN' error if a peer sent ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES messages before the channel had fully transitioned to the normal channel daemon. The fix simply forwards those messages to the main lightningd process, just as the regular channel daemon already does. Without the patch, a peer could cause transient connection failures and daemon restarts during channel setup.

Security candidateRefactor Dockerfile, Add TODOsby Claudio Raimondi · 13c5db51 · Sep 28, 2025 · 40 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 17Details
Commit message · Claudio Raimondi

Refactor Dockerfile, Add TODOs

all these changelogs only apply to the Docker image.

Changelog-Added: added verification of GPG keys for the bitcoin and litecoin tarballs.
Changelog-Fixed: fixed compilation on all target architectures; each had their own bugs (poetry, missing packages...).
Changelog-Fixed: fixed cargo cross compilation. it was mistakenly using QEMU before.
Changelog-Fixed: fixed CPU compatibility bug described in issue 8456
Changelog-Changed: improve build time by 8.8x
Changelog-Changed: improve image size by 2.07x

more detailed changelog can be found on the PR: https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/pull/8429

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
defensive validationauthentication path
AI analysis · Informational 17/100

This commit is a large refactor of the Docker build files for Core Lightning. It mainly improves how Docker images are built, adds verification of downloaded Bitcoin and Litecoin binaries using GPG signatures, fixes cross-compilation issues, and updates build documentation. There is no obvious security vulnerability introduced by the changes; in fact, adding GPG verification is a security improvement. However, the commit removes the use of `tini` as the container init process and switches the entrypoint directly to a shell script, which is a minor operational change. The commit does not appear to fix or introduce a serious security bug in the Core Lightning software itself.

Security candidatefuzz-tests: fix overflow of u32 in `fuzz-close-tx`by Chandra Pratap · 20e252b5 · Sep 15, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Chandra Pratap

fuzz-tests: fix overflow of u32 in `fuzz-close-tx`

Changelog-None: The value WALLY_SATOSHI_PER_BTC * WALLY_BTC_MAX
is equal to 2.1e15, which is much higher than the maximum capacity
of a u32, which is 4.29e9.

Hence, use a u64 to store this value instead.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetyfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit fixes a variable type bug in a fuzz test, not in the main Core Lightning software. A fuzz test is an automated testing tool that feeds random data to a program to find crashes. The bug was that a calculation used a 32-bit integer (u32) to hold a value far larger than it can represent, causing an overflow. The fix changes the variable type to a 64-bit integer (u64). Because this is only in a test file, it does not directly affect real Lightning nodes or user funds.

Security candidatedoc: rc1 build-release instructions.by Rusty Russell · f920c1e7 · Sep 10, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

doc: rc1 build-release instructions.

Signing `--without-zip` will not work. You will end up with a empty SHA256SUMS file.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a one-line documentation fix in the release checklist. It removes the `--without-zip` flag from an example command because using that flag would produce an empty SHA256SUMS file. There is no code change and no security vulnerability.

Security candidatecontrib: add Madeline's signing key.by Rusty Russell · bc753a2f · Sep 2, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

contrib: add Madeline's signing key.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply adds a new PGP public key file for a person named Madeline to the project's contributor key directory. It is a routine administrative change with no code modifications and no direct security impact.

Security candidatepytest: test coinmoves in the case of unexpected fulfill.by Rusty Russell · 397fdd9e · Aug 19, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: test coinmoves in the case of unexpected fulfill.

This happens if l1 doesn't get a signature, so it doesn't consider
the fulfill complete, but l2 does (and thus credits l1).

This is a trivial test, but will matter should we later correctly
account for channelmoves when onchain: in that case it will actually
hard to tell, in general, what HTLC(s) were fulfilled.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds a new test case to the project's test suite. It simulates a scenario where one side of a Lightning payment channel believes an HTLC was fulfilled while the other side does not, then verifies that the internal accounting records (called 'coinmoves') are produced correctly. There is no change to production code, no fix, and no vulnerability being patched.

Security candidatecommon: set errno=0 before calling strto{l,ul,ull}by Matt Whitlock · ea2feccb · Aug 15, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateLow 35Details
Commit message · Matt Whitlock

common: set errno=0 before calling strto{l,ul,ull}

The strto{l,ul,ull} functions do not set errno upon a successful return, so a
successful return from a maximally valued input could be misinterpreted as an
overflow error if errno happened already to be set to ERANGE before the call.
To guard against this edge case, always set errno to zero before calling these
functions if checking errno afterward.

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit fixes a subtle programming bug in how Core Lightning converts text strings to numbers. Functions like strtoull only set an error flag (errno) when a value is too large, but they leave it unchanged on success. If some earlier code had already set that flag to 'overflow,' a later successful conversion of the largest possible number could be wrongly rejected as an overflow. The patch clears the error flag before each conversion so the check afterward is reliable. The practical security impact is limited because the bug only triggers when a prior operation happens to leave that specific error flag set, and the affected conversions are mostly for amounts, route hints, and JSON parsing rather than cryptographic checks.

Security candidatelightningd: fix race with crossover pings.by Rusty Russell · 5f544038 · Aug 14, 2025 · 8 filesMessage 68 · AdequateLow 37Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

lightningd: fix race with crossover pings.

We cannot use subd_req() here: replies will come out of order, and the
we should not simply assign the reponses in FIFO order.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: don't get confused with parallel ping commands.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
authentication path
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's handling of multiple ping commands sent at the same time. Previously, if two ping commands were issued in parallel, the replies could arrive out of order and be matched to the wrong command, potentially causing incorrect responses or confusion in the node. The fix adds a unique request ID to each ping so replies can be correctly paired with their original commands.

Security candidatesplice: Add `start_batch` and an internal wire typeby Dusty Daemon · 07f4bc39 · Aug 14, 2025 · 11 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 23Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Add `start_batch` and an internal wire type

We add `start_batch` to match t-bast’s splicing spec and we add a new internal wire type `WIRE_PROTOCOL_BATCH_ELEMENT` using the type number 0

Changelog-Added: support for `start_batch`

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit adds support for two new Lightning protocol messages used in splicing: `start_batch` and an internal-only `protocol_batch_element`. The code mostly ignores or routes these messages; it does not appear to fix a security bug. The change is a feature addition matching a draft specification, with no clear security relevance in the diff itself.

Security candidatesplice: Remove `batch_size` from `commitment_signed`by Dusty Daemon · e755be0c · Aug 14, 2025 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 31Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Remove `batch_size` from `commitment_signed`

The new spec sends `batch_size` in `start_batch` and removes it from `commitment_signed` so we need to stop processing it in `commitment_signed`.

Since the tlv is now reduced to one element and that automagically turns it into a direct use TLV so we have to update the code everywhere it is referenced.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Low 31/100

This commit updates Core Lightning's implementation of the Lightning Network splicing protocol to match a newer version of the specification. It removes a 'batch_size' field from the 'commitment_signed' message and moves that information to a different message ('start_batch'). The code changes are mostly mechanical: updating data structures, removing checks that used batch_size, and adjusting how messages are parsed and compared. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this fixes a security vulnerability; it appears to be a protocol compatibility/spec-compliance update.

Security candidatesplice: Change abort rules to sent sigsby Dusty Daemon · dd1e183b · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateLow 43Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Change abort rules to sent sigs

Previous behavior was to fail on abort when we have signatures in the inflight — change this behavior to fail on abort if we have sent our peer our signatures.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 43/100

This commit tightens the conditions under which Core Lightning's channel daemon will abort a splice operation. Previously, the daemon treated a splice as unabortable if any signatures existed in the 'inflight' (pending) channel state. Now it only blocks abort if this specific node has actually sent its signatures to the peer. The change is one line and appears aimed at preventing a node from backing out of a splice after it has already committed to it cryptographically, which could otherwise let a malicious or buggy peer exploit inconsistent state.

Security candidatesplice: Even if the psbt’s “match” the sig data may varyby Dusty Daemon · 122dae10 · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 52Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Even if the psbt’s “match” the sig data may vary

Since the signature data may vary, we must copy the new psbt into splicing->current_psbt.

This never occured during normal operation, but when doing a cross splice there may be vital signature(s) in the psbt that came from another splice that get dropped without this step.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100

This change fixes a bug in Core Lightning's channel-splicing code. During a splice, two versions of a Bitcoin transaction structure (a PSBT) might look identical in their main transaction data but differ in their attached signatures. Previously, the code would skip copying the new PSBT if the main transaction hadn't changed, which could discard signatures from a related splice. The fix always copies the latest PSBT so signatures are preserved. The commit describes this as a bug that could affect 'cross splice' scenarios, but it does not label it as a security vulnerability.

Security candidatesplice: Sign shared output earlyby Dusty Daemon · e3e08135 · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateLow 31Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Sign shared output early

When doing a multi channel splice, we need to break the deadlock by signing the shared output early (even though it is not sent to the peer until later).

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 31/100

This change adjusts how Core Lightning handles 'splicing' (a way to resize a Lightning channel's on-chain funding). When a user splices multiple channels at the same time, the software now signs a shared piece of the transaction earlier than before, so it can build a complete signatures message for all peers. The commit describes this as fixing a deadlock, not as a security vulnerability. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this is exploitable by an attacker.

Security candidatesplice: Add field to DB to track if we’ve sent sigsby Dusty Daemon · a8ff8ce7 · Aug 13, 2025 · 12 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 24Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Add field to DB to track if we’ve sent sigs

We used to use a check on the active psbt to see if our splice signature was in it — but now we need to generate the signature early.

So we have to add a field tracking if we’ve sent it and add it to the database, wire protocols, and inflight objects.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 24/100

This commit adds a new bookkeeping flag, 'i_sent_sigs', to track whether a splice signature has already been sent. It changes how the node decides that question: previously it inspected the active PSBT, but now it records the fact explicitly in memory, wire messages, and the wallet database. The change is described as a refactor to support generating splice signatures earlier. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability, but any mismatch in this flag could in principle cause a node to send signatures twice, omit them, or resume a splice incorrectly after a restart.

Security candidatepsbt: don’t accumlate 0 lenth widtness databy Dusty Daemon · a5a71f3b · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinLow 32Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

psbt: don’t accumlate 0 lenth widtness data

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 32/100

This commit fixes a small bug in how Core Lightning builds Bitcoin witness data from a PSBT. Previously, when a witness item had a declared length of zero, the code would still try to copy data from a pointer that could be NULL. The fix skips the copy when the length is zero and adds an assertion that the pointer is valid when length is non-zero. This is a defensive correctness fix; it likely prevents a potential NULL-pointer read or undefined behavior rather than an obvious remote exploit.

Security candidatesplice: Add details to log messageby Dusty Daemon · 87ae3559 · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 16Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Add details to log message

Make the failure reason more clear by adding more information to the signature failure message.

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 16/100

This change only improves an error message shown when a splicing (channel funding update) negotiation fails because the remote peer did not send enough signatures. It adds a count of how many remote inputs need signatures and how many signature bundles were actually received. There is no code behavior change that fixes or introduces a vulnerability; it is purely a diagnostic/logging improvement.