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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Lagrang3

83/100 · Strong
dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

Adding minimal verification of tx_signatures to get closer to the
specification on dual funded channels and splice. We check that the
witnesses are not empty and do a minimal standardness policy check. The
sighash flag must be set to SIGHASH_ALL.

Changelog-Fixed: dualopen and splicing: added tx_signatures verification according to BOLT-2

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying that they were non-empty, properly formatted, or using the required SIGHASH_ALL signature mode. It also ignored extra witness stacks that did not correspond to any input. The fix makes the node reject malformed or suspicious signatures, which helps prevent invalid or malicious transactions from being finalized and broadcast.

Recommended action

Apply the patch and run the new unit tests. Review any custom channel-opening or splicing flows that may rely on the previous lenient witness handling. Monitor for peer-disconnection warnings mentioning bad witnesses or mismatched counts, which may indicate attempted abuse of the prior behavior.

Security signals we found

01

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness data

02

BOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signatures

03

Rejection of empty witness stacks

04

Rejection of non-SIGHASH_ALL signature flags

05

Rejection of non-standard witness shapes

06

Fix for previously ignored extra witness stacks

07

Addition of unit tests for security-critical validation

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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