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Moderate 54 Bitcoin

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Andezion

85/100 · Strong
channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

abort_channels passed the last inflight to splice_abort() even once we
had sent tx_signatures for it, which failed the channel.

If a negotiation is in progress, that inflight is the splice it is
RBFing: abort the negotiation and keep the inflight. If we're quiescent
(after stfu_channels), tx_abort is still how we leave, and the inflight
is kept too. Otherwise there is nothing to abort, so don't send
tx_abort at all: BOLT 2 forbids it after tx_signatures, we're no longer
quiescent, and splice_abort() would throw away whatever the peer sends
while it waits for the ack.

Changelog-Fixed: abort_channels no longer fails the channel when a splice we already signed is pending.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts it, even after signatures were exchanged, which caused the channel to fail. Now the code checks whether there is an active splice negotiation or quiescent state, and if the splice is already signed it aborts only the negotiation while keeping the signed splice intact.

Recommended action

Treat as a recommended stability and protocol-compliance patch. Node operators running versions with splice support should upgrade to avoid accidental channel failures when using abort_channels during or after a signed splice. No immediate emergency response is indicated, but the fix should be included in the next maintenance release.

Security signals we found

01

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channel

02

Protocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbids

03

State-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle

04

No explicit memory safety, cryptographic, or remote-exploitation signal

Risk score

Why this scored 54/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 7/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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