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Low 31 Bitcoin

splice: Remove `batch_size` from `commitment_signed`

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Dusty Daemon

73/100 · Adequate
splice: Remove `batch_size` from `commitment_signed`

The new spec sends `batch_size` in `start_batch` and removes it from `commitment_signed` so we need to stop processing it in `commitment_signed`.

Since the tlv is now reduced to one element and that automagically turns it into a direct use TLV so we have to update the code everywhere it is referenced.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit updates Core Lightning's implementation of the Lightning Network splicing protocol to match a newer version of the specification. It removes a 'batch_size' field from the 'commitment_signed' message and moves that information to a different message ('start_batch'). The code changes are mostly mechanical: updating data structures, removing checks that used batch_size, and adjusting how messages are parsed and compared. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this fixes a security vulnerability; it appears to be a protocol compatibility/spec-compliance update.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine protocol update. Reviewers should verify that removing `batch_size` from `commitment_signed` and relying on the caller-supplied value in `handle_peer_commit_sig_batch` does not introduce state desynchronization between peers during batched splicing. No immediate security action is indicated by the available evidence.

Security signals we found

01

Protocol spec alignment: removes a field that has moved to another message in the updated specification

02

Reduced TLV complexity: nested splice_info struct collapsed to direct bitcoin_txid

03

Removed validation logic: batch_size consistency checks between bundled commitment_signed messages are deleted

04

No explicit security claim in commit message or diff

Risk score

Why this scored 31/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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