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Informational 23 Bitcoin

splice: Add `start_batch` and an internal wire type

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Dusty Daemon

73/100 · Adequate
splice: Add `start_batch` and an internal wire type

We add `start_batch` to match t-bast’s splicing spec and we add a new internal wire type `WIRE_PROTOCOL_BATCH_ELEMENT` using the type number 0

Changelog-Added: support for `start_batch`
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds support for two new Lightning protocol messages used in splicing: `start_batch` and an internal-only `protocol_batch_element`. The code mostly ignores or routes these messages; it does not appear to fix a security bug. The change is a feature addition matching a draft specification, with no clear security relevance in the diff itself.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine feature commit. Reviewers should verify that `WIRE_PROTOCOL_BATCH_ELEMENT` type 0 cannot be injected by untrusted peers, and that `start_batch` fields are properly validated when full splicing batch logic is later implemented. No immediate security action required.

Security signals we found

01

New peer wire message type with type number 0 (`protocol_batch_element`) added; type 0 is reserved/internal and could conflict with future protocol allocations if mishandled.

02

Messages are accepted/ignored without validation of sender, channel state, or batch parameters, which is consistent with a stub implementation but increases attack surface.

03

No changelog or commit message indicates a security fix; framed as a feature addition.

04

No explicit bounds or malformed-message handling added for the new `batch_size` or `element_size` fields.

Risk score

Why this scored 23/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 4/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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