Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
53/100 average clarity
30Strong · 80–100
77Adequate · 60–79
108Thin · 40–59
70Opaque · 0–39
46security candidates with opaque commit messaging
This commit adds security checks to SeedSigner, an offline Bitcoin signing device, to prevent malicious or buggy wallet software from tricking users into sending change to derivation paths their wallet will never scan. It now verifies that…
New fatal error class PSBTChangeDerivationPathError for non-standard change derivation pathsNew fatal error class PSBTUnverifiableMixedInputBasePathsError for unverifiable mixed-base-path segwit v0 inputsChange output base path must match a verified input base path
This commit hardens SeedSigner's PSBT (Bitcoin transaction) parser so it no longer trusts a coordinator's claim that an input belongs to your seed. Before, the device only checked that your seed could derive the claimed key. Now it also re…
New attack-level exception: PSBTInputOwnershipContradictionError when an input claims the seed's key but the committed script does not use itInput ownership now verified by rebuilding the scriptPubKey from the claimed key rather than trusting PSBT bip32 derivationsTaproot key-path spends verified by re-applying the merkle-root tweak to the internal key and comparing to the committed output
This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small hardware wallet used to sign Bitcoin transactions. The bug could let a malicious transaction coordinator trick the device into accepting change money sent to a wallet path the user n…
New security check explicitly described as preventing a malicious coordinator from anchoring change to an unmonitored derivation pathNew exception class PSBTUnverifiableMixedInputBasePathsError with Warning-grade refusalUI flow now redirects to a blocking warning screen instead of allowing signing
This commit fixes a security check in SeedSigner, a small hardware-wallet-like device used to sign Bitcoin transactions. Previously, when deciding whether a change output's address was suspiciously far from the user's known addresses, the …
Fixes a window-widening attack against change-output verificationChange-output address index check now uses smallest input index instead of largestAdds hardened-input edge-case handling (window measured from 0)
This commit only adds a new test case to the project's test suite. It does not change any production code. The new test checks that the existing PSBT parser correctly rejects a specific kind of suspicious change output (one placed at a dee…
Adds defensive test coverage for PSBT change-output derivation-path validationRelates to preventing a coordinator with an account xpub from routing change to an unexpected deeper path
This commit adds a safety check to SeedSigner that refuses to sign a Bitcoin transaction if the change output is being sent to a derivation path the user's wallet is unlikely to scan. Before this change, an attacker could trick a user into…
New attack-level exception PSBTChangeDerivationPathError for change sent to an unscanned derivation pathNew warning WARNING__CHANGE_ADDRESS_INDEX_BEYOND_WINDOW for change address indices far past spent indicesNew UI screen PSBTUnexpectedChangeDerivationPathView with DireWarningScreen and forced discard
This commit is a code cleanup, not a security fix. It consolidates several warning screens shown before signing a Bitcoin transaction into a single reusable view. The warnings themselves—such as 'high fee' and 'no change'—still behave the …
Refactor only: no change to validation, cryptography, or signing logicUser-facing warning text and flow remain equivalentAdds unit tests covering high-fee, no-change, and combined warning sequences
This commit only reorganizes test code. It adds a helper function that replaces twelve nearly identical blocks of test setup code, with no changes to the actual wallet or signing logic that users rely on.
This commit only moves and rewrites documentation comments inside the code. It does not change how the program behaves, what it checks, or how it responds to malicious data. The logic for detecting and holding security findings in PSBT par…
This commit adds security checks to SeedSigner, a small offline Bitcoin signing device. Before the change, a malicious or buggy wallet coordinator could give the device a transaction where an input's hidden script did not match the public …
New validation logic compares supplied witness/redeem scripts against scriptPubKey hashesNew exception classes explicitly label script mismatch as an attack and missing/extraneous scripts as correctness problemsUI flow terminates signing before rendering transaction details when a script check fails
This commit simply adds Swahili as a new language option in the SeedSigner settings. It is a localization (translation) change with no security relevance.
This commit fixes how SeedSigner reads the extra data attached to OP_RETURN Bitcoin transaction outputs. Previously the code always assumed the data was introduced by OP_PUSHDATA1, which meant it would misread or crash on the more common d…
Fixes incorrect parsing of OP_RETURN data due to assumed push opcodeAdds robust handling for direct push, OP_PUSHDATA1/2/4, and OP_0-OP_16Introduces explicit malformed-script rejection instead of silent mis-parsing
This update makes SeedSigner refuse Bitcoin transaction files (PSBTs) where the outgoing amounts are larger than the incoming amounts. Before the fix, the device would have accepted such impossible transactions and shown the user a negativ…
Input validation: rejects PSBTs with mathematically impossible fee valuesUser-facing safeguard: prevents confusing negative fee from reaching transaction review screensNew exception class with clear semantics (PSBTNegativeFeeError)
This commit only updates a code comment to remove an outdated claim. The actual security check for negative fees remains unchanged, and a prior code change already verifies input amounts before outputs are parsed. There is no functional se…
This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small offline Bitcoin signing device. Previously, when a user scanned a transaction to sign, the device added up the input amounts exactly as a malicious or compromised computer/coordinato…
Fixes a fee-display manipulation vulnerability where a compromised coordinator could understate input amounts to hide excessive real feesAdds explicit verification of each input's amount against the prior transaction before totaling inputsRaises dedicated security exceptions (PSBTInputAmountVerificationError, PSBTMissingInputUtxoError) and blocks the signing flow
This commit only rewrites the explanatory text (docstrings) inside test code. No actual program logic, security checks, or test behavior changed. It is a documentation cleanup within tests.
This commit only changes test code. It tightens some Python assertions (using 'is False' instead of '== False') and expands one test to run across more test fixtures. There is no change to the actual wallet or PSBT parsing logic that users…
This commit only changes a test file. It removes a small helper method called parse() and replaces its calls with the same one-line PSBTParser constructor call written out directly. There is no change to the actual wallet/security code tha…
Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.
Security candidateMerge pull request #1073 from kdmukai/2026-10_psbt_change_path_rulesby Nick Klockenga · 5f321768 · Nov 13, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 78 · AdequateHigh 80Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga
Merge pull request #1073 from kdmukai/2026-10_psbt_change_path_rules
[security] Check change derivation paths against the inputs
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · High 80/100
This commit adds security checks to SeedSigner, an offline Bitcoin signing device, to prevent malicious or buggy wallet software from tricking users into sending change to derivation paths their wallet will never scan. It now verifies that change outputs return to the same wallet (base derivation path) the transaction spends from, use only standard receive/change branches, and use non-hardened address indexes. It also blocks single-signature segwit v0 transactions that spend from multiple accounts unless each input includes the full previous transaction, because without that data a coordinator could fake an input's ownership to justify sending change to a hidden path. Change at an unusually far address index is now flagged with a warning instead of being silently accepted.
Security candidateMerge pull request #1060 from kdmukai/2026-10_psbt_input_claimsby Nick Klockenga · 995ce5c6 · Nov 7, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 78 · AdequateHigh 81Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga
Merge pull request #1060 from kdmukai/2026-10_psbt_input_claims
[security] Check input claims against the input's committed script
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · High 81/100
This commit hardens SeedSigner's PSBT (Bitcoin transaction) parser so it no longer trusts a coordinator's claim that an input belongs to your seed. Before, the device only checked that your seed could derive the claimed key. Now it also rebuilds the input's actual locking script and verifies your key is really used there. This closes a path where a malicious or compromised coordinator could trick a user into signing a transaction by attaching one of the user's real keys to someone else's input, potentially making a spend look like self-spend or change. The patch also adds handling for unsupported derivation paths, taproot script-path spends, and a 'held findings' system so the most serious problem is reported first.
Wording only, no behavior change. The script path error, its Holds: entry, and its View now make the input the subject: an input only lets this seed sign through a script path spend. set_input_locking_script and three test docstrings use plainer phrasing for our keys, inputs, and utxos.
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only rewrites comments and documentation strings in code and tests. No program logic, behavior, or security checks were changed.
Security candidateRefuse mixed base paths on single sig segwit v0by kdmukai · 9130ac75 · Nov 6, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 95 · StrongModerate 69Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Refuse mixed base paths on single sig segwit v0
Change may come back to the base path of any of our inputs, so each input's base path has to be genuine. A segwit v0 signature (BIP-143) commits to its own input's script and amount, not to the other inputs'. A coordinator can add a real utxo of its own whose witness_utxo falsely claims our key at a base path it chooses. Our signature on the genuine input is unchanged, the transaction still confirms, and the added input anchors change at a path the user's wallet never scans.
On p2wpkh and p2sh-p2wpkh, the inputs this seed signs must now share one base path unless each supplies a non_witness_utxo, which is checked against its txid. Otherwise the parse raises PSBTUnverifiableMixedInputBasePathsError, a Warning-grade refusal. Taproot signatures commit to every input's script and amount, and a legacy input must supply its previous transaction. Multisig change is checked against the full set of cosigners. The tests that spent from two base paths on p2wpkh now use the other script types.
Every base path comparison now goes through PSBTParser._get_base_path. A one-level slip in one of the separate slices it replaces passed the whole suite.
Held input findings are raised before this check too, since it reads the same input claims. parse()'s docstring now says a held finding waits only until a later check would rely on what it set aside.
Also rewords a few docstrings from this branch's earlier commits.
95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 69/100
This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small hardware wallet used to sign Bitcoin transactions. The bug could let a malicious transaction coordinator trick the device into accepting change money sent to a wallet path the user never monitors, potentially making funds appear lost. The fix refuses to sign certain single-signature SegWit v0 transactions when inputs come from different wallet paths and the full previous transaction data is missing. The commit message and code clearly describe the attack and the fix.
Security candidateMeasure the change window from the smallest input indexby kdmukai · 512329be · Nov 6, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 60Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Measure the change window from the smallest input index
The address index window was measured from the largest non-hardened address index among our inputs at the change's base path. An extra input at a far index, which a coordinator can add, then widened the window for every change output at that base path. Measured from the smallest index, an added input can only narrow it. When every matching input is at a hardened address index, the window is measured from 0.
An honest wallet spending an old utxo at a low index, with change far past it, now gets the distant address warning. The user can still continue.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100
This commit fixes a security check in SeedSigner, a small hardware-wallet-like device used to sign Bitcoin transactions. Previously, when deciding whether a change output's address was suspiciously far from the user's known addresses, the software measured from the largest input address index. A malicious transaction coordinator could add one extra input at a very high address index to widen the allowed window and sneak change into a distant, possibly attacker-controlled address without triggering a warning. The fix measures from the smallest input address index instead, so added high-index inputs can only narrow the window, not expand it. The commit also handles the edge case where all matching inputs use hardened (hidden) indices by measuring from zero.
Security candidateCheck change derivation paths against the inputsby kdmukai · 862ed41b · Oct 30, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 85 · StrongHigh 81Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Check change derivation paths against the inputs
An output is shown as change once our key is proven in its script, but its derivation path is still the psbt's claim. Change at a path the user's wallet never scans is ours yet lost to the coordinator. Change must now come back to the base path of one of our verified inputs, on the receive or change branch, at a non-hardened address index, with the path long enough to hold both. Other change raises PSBTChangeDerivationPathError, graded an attack. The same rules cover multisig outputs counted as spends because their cosigners differ from the inputs' or fail to resolve.
An address index more than CHANGE_ADDRESS_INDEX_WINDOW past the largest index our inputs spend from at that base path is flagged, not refused, since an active wallet can trip it. The change details screen marks the output and PSBTWarningView shows one distant address warning.
Held input findings are now raised before these rules and held output findings after them. An input set aside by a held finding leaves its base path out of the rules, while a held output is already a spend.
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundarydefensive validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · High 81/100
This commit adds a safety check to SeedSigner that refuses to sign a Bitcoin transaction if the change output is being sent to a derivation path the user's wallet is unlikely to scan. Before this change, an attacker could trick a user into signing a transaction where the coins technically still belong to the user but are sent to an unusual path (for example, a different account, a non-standard branch, or a hardened address index), making them effectively lost or hard to recover. The update also warns the user if the change address index is unusually far ahead of the addresses being spent from. The commit includes new error screens, warnings, and extensive tests.
Security candidateShow the psbt's warnings through one Viewby kdmukai · a8602100 · Oct 30, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 14Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Show the psbt's warnings through one View
The high fee and no change warnings each had a View of their own, and the routing between them was spread across the overview and the high fee View, which had to know that the no change warning comes next. The parse now records its non-fatal findings in self.warnings, most serious first, and PSBTWarningView shows them one at a time, by index, before the transaction details. A new warning is then a constant and a branch in that View.
Drops PSBTUnsupportedScriptTypeWarningView. It was reached only when the parse left no policy, and a successful parse always sets one from its first input.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 14/100
This commit is a code cleanup, not a security fix. It consolidates several warning screens shown before signing a Bitcoin transaction into a single reusable view. The warnings themselves—such as 'high fee' and 'no change'—still behave the same way and still require the user to press Continue. Nothing in the commit changes how transactions are validated or signed.
Security candidateDocument held findings at the steps that hold themby kdmukai · 1ba3c6a1 · Oct 30, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 85 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Document held findings at the steps that hold them
parse()'s docstring listed every held finding, far from the code that holds each one. Each step that holds findings now ends its docstring with a Holds: list, and parse() keeps only the principle: a milder finding is held aside while the remaining checks run and is raised only if they find nothing more serious.
Holding is a side effect a caller cannot see, which is why it gets a list and the raises do not.
Drops the "see parse()" pointers to the held findings. An input whose claims are set aside is now described as left with no verified derivation paths rather than as "not ours".
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only moves and rewrites documentation comments inside the code. It does not change how the program behaves, what it checks, or how it responds to malicious data. The logic for detecting and holding security findings in PSBT parsing remains exactly the same; only the explanations are placed closer to the relevant code.
Security candidateMerge pull request #1047 from kdmukai/2026_09_psbt_input_scriptsby Nick Klockenga · ada81cde · Oct 29, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 88 · StrongHigh 78Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga
Merge pull request #1047 from kdmukai/2026_09_psbt_input_scripts
[security] Verify input scripts against the scriptPubKey they commit to
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · High 78/100
This commit adds security checks to SeedSigner, a small offline Bitcoin signing device. Before the change, a malicious or buggy wallet coordinator could give the device a transaction where an input's hidden script did not match the public address it claimed to spend from. That could trick the device into thinking a payment to an attacker's address was actually change coming back to the user. The patch now verifies that every input includes exactly the scripts it publicly commits to, and stops the signing flow with a warning if something is missing, wrong, or extra.
Merge pull request #1065 from kdmukai/2026-10_add_swahili
[l10n] Enable Swahili
58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply adds Swahili as a new language option in the SeedSigner settings. It is a localization (translation) change with no security relevance.
✓ Subject identifies a change! Too few words to establish purpose! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply adds Swahili as a new language option in the SeedSigner settings. It is a routine localization change with no security relevance.
Security candidateMerge pull request #1042 from Chaitanya-Keyal/op-return-push-opcodeby Nick Klockenga · d8f7956f · Oct 24, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 51Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga
Merge pull request #1042 from Chaitanya-Keyal/op-return-push-opcode
Parse the OP_RETURN push opcode instead of assuming OP_PUSHDATA1
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 51/100
This commit fixes how SeedSigner reads the extra data attached to OP_RETURN Bitcoin transaction outputs. Previously the code always assumed the data was introduced by OP_PUSHDATA1, which meant it would misread or crash on the more common direct-push encoding used for small payloads (75 bytes or fewer). The change teaches the parser to read the actual push opcode, handles larger OP_PUSHDATA2/OP_PUSHDATA4 payloads, and now rejects malformed scripts instead of silently misinterpreting them. It also adds a user-facing warning screen when this happens.
Security candidateMerge pull request #1041 from Chaitanya-Keyal/psbt-negative-feeby Nick Klockenga · ebc1e11f · Oct 22, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 64Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga
Merge pull request #1041 from Chaitanya-Keyal/psbt-negative-fee
Reject psbts whose outputs exceed their inputs
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100
This update makes SeedSigner refuse Bitcoin transaction files (PSBTs) where the outgoing amounts are larger than the incoming amounts. Before the fix, the device would have accepted such impossible transactions and shown the user a negative 'fee,' which could confuse someone into signing a transaction that the Bitcoin network would never accept. The change adds a clear error, a user-facing warning, and tests to confirm the behavior.
Security candidateDrop the negative fee comment's claim that both totals are unverifiedby okaybro · 9994a04e · Oct 21, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · okaybro
Drop the negative fee comment's claim that both totals are unverified
_verify_input_amounts() now checks every input's amount before the outputs are parsed, so the input total is no longer just the coordinator's claim.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only updates a code comment to remove an outdated claim. The actual security check for negative fees remains unchanged, and a prior code change already verifies input amounts before outputs are parsed. There is no functional security change in this commit.
Security candidateMerge pull request #995 from newtonick/psbt-verifyby Nick Klockenga · e92c4ea6 · Oct 20, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 88 · StrongHigh 81Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga
Merge pull request #995 from newtonick/psbt-verify
[security] Verify PSBT input amounts before displaying the fee
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · High 81/100
This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small offline Bitcoin signing device. Previously, when a user scanned a transaction to sign, the device added up the input amounts exactly as a malicious or compromised computer/coordinator app told it to. That meant the 'fee' shown on the device's screen could be a lie: the coordinator could quietly claim inputs were much smaller than they really are, making an enormous real fee look tiny. The fix makes the device independently verify each input's amount against the previous transaction data (the 'non-witness UTXO') before showing the fee. If the numbers don't check out, it refuses to proceed and warns the user with a 'Likely an Attack!' screen.
Security candidateReplace the parse() test helper with direct PSBTParser callsby newtonick · a71b7b39 · Oct 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · newtonick
Replace the parse() test helper with direct PSBTParser calls
60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes a test file. It removes a small helper method called parse() and replaces its calls with the same one-line PSBTParser constructor call written out directly. There is no change to the actual wallet/security code that users run, so this cannot affect real-world security.
Security candidateTidy the comments at the end of _verify_input_amounts()by newtonick · 4dcdcfa8 · Oct 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · newtonick
Tidy the comments at the end of _verify_input_amounts()
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only rewords and moves code comments in a single Python function. No executable code, logic, or behavior was changed. It is a documentation-style cleanup with no security relevance.
Security candidateApply suggestion from @kdmukaiby Nick Klockenga · 698ae384 · Oct 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinLow 41Details
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 41/100
This commit tightens validation in a Bitcoin PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) parser. It now rejects PSBTs that contain an input with no UTXO data at all, because without that data the wallet cannot verify how much bitcoin that input is worth. Previously the code silently skipped such inputs, which could let a crafted PSBT understate the amount being spent or hide fee details from the user. The change is a defensive hardening fix, not a full security redesign.
Security candidateApply suggestion from @kdmukaiby Nick Klockenga · 9b608437 · Oct 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinModerate 57Details
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 57/100
This commit is a minor documentation/comment cleanup in the code that checks whether a Bitcoin transaction's claimed previous transaction data actually matches the real one. The code logic itself does not appear to change; only the explanatory comments are rewritten to be clearer about why a mismatch is treated as an attack. Because no actual code behavior changes, this is unlikely to be a security fix on its own, but it touches code that is security-relevant (preventing a malicious coordinator from lying about how much bitcoin is being spent).
Security candidateReword the PSBTInputAmountVerificationError, parse() and _get_script_type() docstringsby newtonick · efc92cac · Oct 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · newtonick
Reword the PSBTInputAmountVerificationError, parse() and _get_script_type() docstrings
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only rewrites comments and docstrings in a single Python file. No code logic, function behavior, or security checks were changed. It makes documentation more precise about when a PSBT input amount is considered unverified or suspicious, but the underlying behavior remains the same.
Security candidateReword PSBTMissingInputUtxoView text based on feedbackby newtonick · 5bfbe0b2 · Oct 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · newtonick
Reword PSBTMissingInputUtxoView text based on feedback
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes the wording of an on-screen error message shown to users when a transaction is missing information about one of its inputs. It does not alter any security logic, transaction validation, or code behavior. The old message said the transaction 'left out the amount,' and the new message says it is 'missing required data.' This is a user-experience wording improvement based on feedback, not a security fix.
Security candidateRemove the psbt_parser reset from the input verification failure handlerby newtonick · 67e049ef · Oct 17, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 60 · AdequateInformational 24Details
Commit message · newtonick
Remove the psbt_parser reset from the input verification failure handler
60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 24/100
This commit removes a safety cleanup that wiped out an internal PSBT parser when the device detected it couldn't verify the bitcoin amounts in a transaction. The change itself is small, but it eliminates a defensive guard that prevented a stale parser from being reused. The accompanying test that documented this defensive behavior was also deleted. The commit message does not explain why removing the cleanup is safe, so the security relevance is unclear from the diff alone.
Security candidateRestructure _verify_input_amounts() around non_witness_utxo and reword its commentsby newtonick · 00ee7714 · Oct 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 12Details
Commit message · newtonick
Restructure _verify_input_amounts() around non_witness_utxo and reword its comments
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100
This commit rewrites the comments and reorders the logic inside a Bitcoin transaction-checking routine. It does not change what the code actually checks or rejects; it only makes the existing checks easier to read and understand. There is no new vulnerability introduced and no security bug fixed.
A claim of ours at the empty path (the master key), on an input or an output, or at a one-level path on an input, is held as PSBTUnsupportedDerivationPathError. No wallet writes an entry at these paths, though embit would sign an input built on the master key. The check runs after the claim loops, so a forged claim in the same input or output is still the one reported.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 66/100
This update hardens a Bitcoin signing device (SeedSigner) against trick transactions. Previously, a malicious or broken PSBT file could claim that the user's master key or an unusually short key path should be used to sign a payment. The device would have accepted that path and could have signed something the user did not expect. Now the software rejects such PSBTs with a clear warning and discards the transaction. The change is defensive: it does not fix a known theft, but it closes a risky edge case where the wrong key could be used.
Security candidateCheck input claims against the committed scriptby kdmukai · e2ad442e · Oct 16, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 68 · AdequateHigh 78Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Check input claims against the committed script
Re-deriving a claimed key proves our seed owns it, not that the input spends with it. Each verified entry must now be a key the input's committed script uses. Only the entries that pass are kept in verified_input_derivation_paths. An entry that fails raises PSBTInputOwnershipContradictionError.
Taproot rebuilds the address with the input's merkle root, the same tweak embit signs with. A failing internal key claim raises the same error when the input supplies its merkle root. It is dropped when a taproot input omits the merkle root. A failing leaf key claim is dropped. An input this seed can sign only through a script path holds PSBTUnsupportedScriptPathError.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · High 78/100
This commit hardens SeedSigner's PSBT parsing so that the device no longer trusts a transaction's claim that one of your keys controls an input. Before this change, a malicious or buggy wallet coordinator could attach one of your real public keys to an input that actually belongs to someone else, making the device think it was signing its own money when it was not. The fix rebuilds each input's spending script from the claimed key and compares it to the script the input commits to on the blockchain. If they do not match, the device now stops with a 'Likely an Attack!' warning instead of continuing. It also adds handling for newer Taproot script-path spends that SeedSigner does not yet support.