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High 81 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #995 from newtonick/psbt-verify

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Nick Klockenga

88/100 · Strong
Merge pull request #995 from newtonick/psbt-verify

[security] Verify PSBT input amounts before displaying the fee
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small offline Bitcoin signing device. Previously, when a user scanned a transaction to sign, the device added up the input amounts exactly as a malicious or compromised computer/coordinator app told it to. That meant the 'fee' shown on the device's screen could be a lie: the coordinator could quietly claim inputs were much smaller than they really are, making an enormous real fee look tiny. The fix makes the device independently verify each input's amount against the previous transaction data (the 'non-witness UTXO') before showing the fee. If the numbers don't check out, it refuses to proceed and warns the user with a 'Likely an Attack!' screen.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security fix and include it in the next release. Users should upgrade before signing any PSBTs produced by coordinators they do not fully trust. Wallet/coordinator compatibility should be checked, especially for legacy inputs that may now need to provide non_witness_utxo.

Security signals we found

01

Fixes a fee-display manipulation vulnerability where a compromised coordinator could understate input amounts to hide excessive real fees

02

Adds explicit verification of each input's amount against the prior transaction before totaling inputs

03

Raises dedicated security exceptions (PSBTInputAmountVerificationError, PSBTMissingInputUtxoError) and blocks the signing flow

04

References CVE-2020-14199 and BIP-143/BIP-341 sighash amount-commitment behavior in code comments

05

Includes comprehensive regression tests for tampered and missing input data across all supported script types

Risk score

Why this scored 81/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 25/30
Exploitability 18/25
Stealth signal 12/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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