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High 81 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #1060 from kdmukai/2026-10_psbt_input_claims

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Nick Klockenga

78/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #1060 from kdmukai/2026-10_psbt_input_claims

[security] Check input claims against the input's committed script
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit hardens SeedSigner's PSBT (Bitcoin transaction) parser so it no longer trusts a coordinator's claim that an input belongs to your seed. Before, the device only checked that your seed could derive the claimed key. Now it also rebuilds the input's actual locking script and verifies your key is really used there. This closes a path where a malicious or compromised coordinator could trick a user into signing a transaction by attaching one of the user's real keys to someone else's input, potentially making a spend look like self-spend or change. The patch also adds handling for unsupported derivation paths, taproot script-path spends, and a 'held findings' system so the most serious problem is reported first.

Recommended action

Reviewers should confirm that _input_spends_with_key covers all supported policy types and that no code path can bypass the new check. The multisig branch relies on _verify_input_scripts already tying the witness/redeem script to the scriptPubKey; verify that invariant holds. Also check that the held-finding ordering cannot be manipulated by an attacker to suppress a more serious finding, and that the new UI screens correctly block continuation.

Security signals we found

01

New attack-level exception: PSBTInputOwnershipContradictionError when an input claims the seed's key but the committed script does not use it

02

Input ownership now verified by rebuilding the scriptPubKey from the claimed key rather than trusting PSBT bip32 derivations

03

Taproot key-path spends verified by re-applying the merkle-root tweak to the internal key and comparing to the committed output

04

Unsupported derivation paths (master key, one-level input paths) now refused with PSBTUnsupportedDerivationPathError

05

Taproot script-path-only inputs now refused with PSBTUnsupportedScriptPathError

06

Held-finding mechanism ensures more serious output-side attacks are reported before milder input-side issues

07

Tests explicitly demonstrate a 'true claim planted on another party's input' being rejected

Risk score

Why this scored 81/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 24/30
Exploitability 18/25
Stealth signal 12/15
Affected reach 13/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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