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High 78 Bitcoin

Check input claims against the committed script

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by kdmukai

68/100 · Adequate
Check input claims against the committed script

Re-deriving a claimed key proves our seed owns it, not that the input
spends with it. Each verified entry must now be a key the input's
committed script uses. Only the entries that pass are kept in
verified_input_derivation_paths. An entry that fails raises
PSBTInputOwnershipContradictionError.

Taproot rebuilds the address with the input's merkle root, the same
tweak embit signs with. A failing internal key claim raises the same
error when the input supplies its merkle root. It is dropped when a
taproot input omits the merkle root. A failing leaf key claim is
dropped. An input this seed can sign only through a script path holds
PSBTUnsupportedScriptPathError.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit hardens SeedSigner's PSBT parsing so that the device no longer trusts a transaction's claim that one of your keys controls an input. Before this change, a malicious or buggy wallet coordinator could attach one of your real public keys to an input that actually belongs to someone else, making the device think it was signing its own money when it was not. The fix rebuilds each input's spending script from the claimed key and compares it to the script the input commits to on the blockchain. If they do not match, the device now stops with a 'Likely an Attack!' warning instead of continuing. It also adds handling for newer Taproot script-path spends that SeedSigner does not yet support.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security hardening fix and include it in the next release. Users should upgrade to a version containing this commit before signing PSBTs from coordinators they do not fully trust. Wallet coordinators that construct PSBTs for SeedSigner should ensure all input bip32/taproot derivation claims correspond to keys actually present in the input's committed spending script, and should supply taproot_merkle_root when relevant.

Security signals we found

01

Fixes a trust boundary violation where key ownership was assumed from derivation alone

02

Adds explicit anti-spoofing check against committed scriptPubKey

03

Adds new attack-class exception: PSBTInputOwnershipContradictionError

04

Adds unsupported-feature exception for taproot script-path spends: PSBTUnsupportedScriptPathError

05

UI routes to DireWarningScreen for ownership contradiction

06

Extensive adversarial test cases added for planted true claims, decoy multisig claims, and taproot edge cases

Risk score

Why this scored 78/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 24/30
Exploitability 18/25
Stealth signal 12/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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