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SeedSigner

Stateless, air-gapped Bitcoin signing software for Raspberry Pi hardware.

BitcoinHardware walletsNormal
Repository coverage

285 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

214security candidates37second-pass queue278AI analyses
14commits · 30 days
52commits · 60 days
111commits · 180 days
230commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 6150 seen8 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 629 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 60 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 57 seen1 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

53/100 average clarity
30Strong · 80–100
77Adequate · 60–79
108Thin · 40–59
70Opaque · 0–39
46security candidates with opaque commit messaging
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Nick Klockenga413337769
kdmukai158114158348
okaybro282427068
newtonick181317049
PROWLERx15101010020
alvroble12711055
FazleRabbbiferdaus172868061
biel414037
SeedSigner111058
Chaitanya-Keyal111057
Kshitij111033
S1DDHEY111045
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 43 minutes ago

High 80 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #1073 from kdmukai/2026-10_psbt_change_path_rules

This commit adds security checks to SeedSigner, an offline Bitcoin signing device, to prevent malicious or buggy wallet software from tricking users into sending change to derivation paths their wallet will never scan. It now verifies that…

New fatal error class PSBTChangeDerivationPathError for non-standard change derivation pathsNew fatal error class PSBTUnverifiableMixedInputBasePathsError for unverifiable mixed-base-path segwit v0 inputsChange output base path must match a verified input base path
5f321768by Nick Klockenga+1863−1397 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 81 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #1060 from kdmukai/2026-10_psbt_input_claims

This commit hardens SeedSigner's PSBT (Bitcoin transaction) parser so it no longer trusts a coordinator's claim that an input belongs to your seed. Before, the device only checked that your seed could derive the claimed key. Now it also re…

New attack-level exception: PSBTInputOwnershipContradictionError when an input claims the seed's key but the committed script does not use itInput ownership now verified by rebuilding the scriptPubKey from the claimed key rather than trusting PSBT bip32 derivationsTaproot key-path spends verified by re-applying the merkle-root tweak to the internal key and comparing to the committed output
995ce5c6by Nick Klockenga+990−1406 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Reword the input claim checks' docstrings

This commit only rewrites comments and documentation strings in code and tests. No program logic, behavior, or security checks were changed.

081b1f40by kdmukai+13−155 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 69 AI analysisMessage 95 · Strong
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Refuse mixed base paths on single sig segwit v0

This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small hardware wallet used to sign Bitcoin transactions. The bug could let a malicious transaction coordinator trick the device into accepting change money sent to a wallet path the user n…

New security check explicitly described as preventing a malicious coordinator from anchoring change to an unmonitored derivation pathNew exception class PSBTUnverifiableMixedInputBasePathsError with Warning-grade refusalUI flow now redirects to a blocking warning screen instead of allowing signing
9130ac75by kdmukai+432−875 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Measure the change window from the smallest input index

This commit fixes a security check in SeedSigner, a small hardware-wallet-like device used to sign Bitcoin transactions. Previously, when deciding whether a change output's address was suspiciously far from the user's known addresses, the …

Fixes a window-widening attack against change-output verificationChange-output address index check now uses smallest input index instead of largestAdds hardened-input edge-case handling (window measured from 0)
512329beby kdmukai+57−102 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Test change at an extra level under the base path

This commit only adds a new test case to the project's test suite. It does not change any production code. The new test checks that the existing PSBT parser correctly rejects a specific kind of suspicious change output (one placed at a dee…

Adds defensive test coverage for PSBT change-output derivation-path validationRelates to preventing a coordinator with an account xpub from routing change to an unexpected deeper path
9c19e9d6by kdmukai+17−31 file
No security note in commit
High 81 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Check change derivation paths against the inputs

This commit adds a safety check to SeedSigner that refuses to sign a Bitcoin transaction if the change output is being sent to a derivation path the user's wallet is unlikely to scan. Before this change, an attacker could trick a user into…

New attack-level exception PSBTChangeDerivationPathError for change sent to an unscanned derivation pathNew warning WARNING__CHANGE_ADDRESS_INDEX_BEYOND_WINDOW for change address indices far past spent indicesNew UI screen PSBTUnexpectedChangeDerivationPathView with DireWarningScreen and forced discard
862ed41bby kdmukai+1285−507 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 14 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Show the psbt's warnings through one View

This commit is a code cleanup, not a security fix. It consolidates several warning screens shown before signing a Bitcoin transaction into a single reusable view. The warnings themselves—such as 'high fee' and 'no change'—still behave the …

Refactor only: no change to validation, cryptography, or signing logicUser-facing warning text and flow remain equivalentAdds unit tests covering high-fee, no-change, and combined warning sequences
a8602100by kdmukai+163−784 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 95 · Strong
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Add a test helper to set an input's locking script

This commit only reorganizes test code. It adds a helper function that replaces twelve nearly identical blocks of test setup code, with no changes to the actual wallet or signing logic that users rely on.

b297c869by kdmukai+31−553 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Document held findings at the steps that hold them

This commit only moves and rewrites documentation comments inside the code. It does not change how the program behaves, what it checks, or how it responds to malicious data. The logic for detecting and holding security findings in PSBT par…

1ba3c6a1by kdmukai+37−232 files
No security note in commit
High 78 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #1047 from kdmukai/2026_09_psbt_input_scripts

This commit adds security checks to SeedSigner, a small offline Bitcoin signing device. Before the change, a malicious or buggy wallet coordinator could give the device a transaction where an input's hidden script did not match the public …

New validation logic compares supplied witness/redeem scripts against scriptPubKey hashesNew exception classes explicitly label script mismatch as an attack and missing/extraneous scripts as correctness problemsUI flow terminates signing before rendering transaction details when a script check fails
ada81cdeby Nick Klockenga+598−795 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 18 · Opaque
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Enable Swahili

This commit simply adds Swahili as a new language option in the SeedSigner settings. It is a routine localization change with no security relevance.

c255bf57by kdmukai+2−01 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #1042 from Chaitanya-Keyal/op-return-push-opcode

This commit fixes how SeedSigner reads the extra data attached to OP_RETURN Bitcoin transaction outputs. Previously the code always assumed the data was introduced by OP_PUSHDATA1, which meant it would misread or crash on the more common d…

Fixes incorrect parsing of OP_RETURN data due to assumed push opcodeAdds robust handling for direct push, OP_PUSHDATA1/2/4, and OP_0-OP_16Introduces explicit malformed-script rejection instead of silent mis-parsing
d8f7956fby Nick Klockenga+375−156 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #1041 from Chaitanya-Keyal/psbt-negative-fee

This update makes SeedSigner refuse Bitcoin transaction files (PSBTs) where the outgoing amounts are larger than the incoming amounts. Before the fix, the device would have accepted such impossible transactions and shown the user a negativ…

Input validation: rejects PSBTs with mathematically impossible fee valuesUser-facing safeguard: prevents confusing negative fee from reaching transaction review screensNew exception class with clear semantics (PSBTNegativeFeeError)
ebc1e11fby Nick Klockenga+105−65 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Drop the negative fee comment's claim that both totals are unverified

This commit only updates a code comment to remove an outdated claim. The actual security check for negative fees remains unchanged, and a prior code change already verifies input amounts before outputs are parsed. There is no functional se…

9994a04eby okaybro+3−41 file
No security note in commit
High 81 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Merge pull request #995 from newtonick/psbt-verify

This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small offline Bitcoin signing device. Previously, when a user scanned a transaction to sign, the device added up the input amounts exactly as a malicious or compromised computer/coordinato…

Fixes a fee-display manipulation vulnerability where a compromised coordinator could understate input amounts to hide excessive real feesAdds explicit verification of each input's amount against the prior transaction before totaling inputsRaises dedicated security exceptions (PSBTInputAmountVerificationError, PSBTMissingInputUtxoError) and blocks the signing flow
e92c4ea6by Nick Klockenga+508−346 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 60 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Trim the input-amount verification test docstrings

This commit only rewrites the explanatory text (docstrings) inside test code. No actual program logic, security checks, or test behavior changed. It is a documentation cleanup within tests.

afb7305aby newtonick+17−261 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 60 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Tighten the input-amount test asserts and run the no-utxo test over every fixture

This commit only changes test code. It tightens some Python assertions (using 'is False' instead of '== False') and expands one test to run across more test fixtures. There is no change to the actual wallet or PSBT parsing logic that users…

222bf3d5by newtonick+12−91 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 60 · Adequate
SS SeedSignerSeedSigner BitcoinHardware wallets

Replace the parse() test helper with direct PSBTParser calls

This commit only changes a test file. It removes a small helper method called parse() and replaces its calls with the same one-line PSBTParser constructor call written out directly. There is no change to the actual wallet/security code tha…

a71b7b39by newtonick+11−131 file
No security note in commit
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Security candidateTrivial style change: more explicit conditional checkby kdmukai · 34fb1749 · Sep 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Trivial style change: more explicit conditional check

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a one-line style change that rewrites an empty-list check to be more explicit. It does not change what the program does, only how the code reads. There is no security relevance.

AI review queuedTrivial comment typo fixby kdmukai · 74cf6924 · Sep 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 28 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Trivial comment typo fix

28/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: opaque commit messagesecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit fixes a single typo in a comment inside a test file. It changes 'Prep the our modified psbt in embit' to 'Prep the modified psbt in embit'. There is no code, logic, or security change whatsoever.

Security candidateMerge pull request #722 from Chaitanya-Keyal/psbt-huge-fee-warningby Nick Klockenga · 088b144e · Sep 23, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga

Merge pull request #722 from Chaitanya-Keyal/psbt-huge-fee-warning

[Feature] Warning Screen for High Tx Fees

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds a new user-facing safety feature: a warning screen when a Bitcoin transaction's fee is unusually high compared to the amount being sent. It does not fix a bug or vulnerability; it helps users notice potentially costly mistakes before signing.

Security candidateSettle is_high_fee once in parse()by okaybro · 2195adfd · Sep 20, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 20Details
Commit message · okaybro

Settle is_high_fee once in parse()

Both PSBTOverviewView and PSBTMathView asked the parser whether the fee was
high, and the overview asked twice (once for the screen, once for routing).
Each call re-summed the outputs through psbt.tx, which rebuilds the whole
transaction on every access. The totals it depends on are all fixed by the end
of parse(), so compute it there once and store it as is_high_fee, the same way
the other totals are exposed. has_high_fee() stays as the computation itself.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit is a performance cleanup, not a security fix. It calculates the 'is this fee unusually high?' flag once during transaction parsing instead of recalculating it every time a screen asks. The actual fee-checking logic and warning behavior are unchanged, so users still see the same high-fee warnings. The change just makes the device respond faster and avoids redundant work.

Security candidateMerge pull request #1032 from kdmukai/psbt_output_ownershipby Nick Klockenga · b225ae77 · Sep 19, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 88 · StrongHigh 80Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga

Merge pull request #1032 from kdmukai/psbt_output_ownership

[security] Verify that change outputs actually pay this seed

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · High 80/100

This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small hardware-wallet-like device used to sign Bitcoin transactions. Previously, the software trusted the PSBT file's own claim about which 'change' outputs belong back to the user's wallet. A malicious or buggy PSBT could mark an external payment as the user's own change, tricking the user into approving a transaction that sends funds to an attacker. The patch now independently rebuilds each output's receiving address from the user's seed and compares it to what the PSBT actually commits to, rejecting the transaction if the two disagree. It also adds checks for contradictory or malformed derivation-path claims.

Security candidateCover every OP_RETURN push encoding in the parser testsby okaybro · 89c5241e · Sep 18, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongLow 41Details
Commit message · okaybro

Cover every OP_RETURN push encoding in the parser tests

Every existing OP_RETURN vector hand-built OP_PUSHDATA1, which is exactly the one
encoding the parser assumed, so the mis-slice never showed up. The regtest psbt
behind test_parse_op_return_content carries 2b 6a 4c 28 43 68 61 6e ... and the
screenshot generator concatenated OP_PUSHDATA1 by hand.

Add fixture helpers that build an OP_RETURN scriptPubKey with the minimal push by
default, and that can force a specific OP_PUSHDATA* so the non-minimal encodings
a coordinator is free to produce are testable too. Note in the helper that the
scriptPubKey and value have to be set on the OutputScope: PSBT.tx rebuilds the
transaction from the scopes on every access, so assigning through psbt.tx.vout[i]
is silently discarded and leaves a test asserting against the fixture it meant to
replace.

The new tests cover the direct-push/OP_PUSHDATA1 boundary at 75/76, OP_PUSHDATA2
and OP_PUSHDATA4, a non-minimal encoding, several pushes in one script, a bare
OP_RETURN, an empty scriptPubKey, a truncated length field, an over-long declared
length, and a leading opcode that is not a data push.

Co-authored-by: ruipereira1 <159703278+ruipereira1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: kwsantiago <44934418+kwsantiago@users.noreply.github.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 41/100

This commit adds tests for how SeedSigner reads small text messages embedded in Bitcoin transactions via OP_RETURN outputs. The tests reveal that the existing parser only handled one specific encoding (OP_PUSHDATA1) and would misread or slice incorrectly when Bitcoin Core used the more common direct-push encoding for short messages. The commit does not change the parser itself; it only expands test coverage and adds helper functions to build OP_RETURN outputs safely. Because the parser bug is demonstrated but not fixed here, the change is primarily a test-hardening patch.

Lower-priorityBuild the screenshot generator's OP_RETURN with a minimal pushby okaybro · 36fb9b35 · Sep 18, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · okaybro

Build the screenshot generator's OP_RETURN with a minimal push

The generator concatenated OP_PUSHDATA1 unconditionally, so its 49-byte payload
was encoded a way Bitcoin Core would never produce. Push directly at 75 bytes or
fewer and via OP_PUSHDATA1 above that, matching the parser. The rendered
screenshots are unchanged; the vector behind them is no longer wrong.

Co-authored-by: kwsantiago <44934418+kwsantiago@users.noreply.github.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Security candidateParse the OP_RETURN push opcode instead of assuming OP_PUSHDATA1by okaybro · 7ecc8d99 · Sep 18, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongModerate 63Details
Commit message · okaybro

Parse the OP_RETURN push opcode instead of assuming OP_PUSHDATA1

The payload was read at a fixed 3-byte offset, which only holds when the script
uses OP_PUSHDATA1. Opcodes 0x01-0x4b are themselves the byte count, and that is
the minimal encoding Bitcoin Core emits, so every payload of 75 bytes or fewer
lost its first byte:

scriptPubKey 6a 28 "Chancellor on the brink of third bailout"
parsed b'hancellor on the brink of third bailout'

PSBTOpReturnView is a pre-signing review screen, so the user approved a
transaction whose OP_RETURN content was displayed wrong. When the payload is not
human-readable it renders as hex, where a one byte shift is invisible.

Read the push opcode and slice to the declared length, in a static helper so the
loop stays readable. OP_PUSHDATA2 and OP_PUSHDATA4 are handled too: Bitcoin Core
v30 raised the default -datacarriersize to 100,000 bytes, and consensus never
limited OP_RETURN data at all, so a payload past what OP_PUSHDATA1 can describe
is no longer exotic.

Several pushes after OP_RETURN are legal and are concatenated; the user is being
shown the data the transaction commits to, and the push boundaries carry no
consensus meaning. Anything that is not a data push, or a push that overruns the
script, ends the walk and the remaining bytes are surfaced verbatim rather than
dropped.

Also reset op_return_data in _parse_outputs, which only ever set it in
__init__, and compare the first byte by slice so an empty scriptPubKey does not
raise IndexError.

Fixes #963

Co-authored-by: ruipereira1 <159703278+ruipereira1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: kwsantiago <44934418+kwsantiago@users.noreply.github.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundaryconsensus or confidential-proof validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100

This commit fixes a bug in SeedSigner, a hardware wallet tool, where the OP_RETURN message shown to users before signing a transaction could be displayed incorrectly. The old code assumed every OP_RETURN payload started with a specific push opcode (OP_PUSHDATA1), so for shorter messages it accidentally cut off the first byte. Because the screen is shown before the user approves the signature, a misleading display could make someone approve a transaction whose embedded message is not what they saw. For non-human-readable payloads shown as hex, the error is invisible. The fix properly reads the push opcode and extracts the correct payload length.

Security candidateReject psbts whose outputs exceed their inputsby okaybro · 9b810ba9 · Sep 18, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 50Details
Commit message · okaybro

Reject psbts whose outputs exceed their inputs

embit computes the fee as inputs minus outputs and never looks at the sign of
the result, so a psbt that spends more than it funds parses cleanly and reaches
the review flow quoting a negative fee.

Raise PSBTNegativeFeeError as soon as the fee is known and route it to its own
warning. Malformed rather than hostile: no honest coordinator builds one and
the network would refuse to relay it, so it gets a plain warning, not the
attack framing. A zero fee is still accepted.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 50/100

This commit fixes a bug in SeedSigner where a malformed Bitcoin transaction file (PSBT) whose outputs spend more than its inputs could be loaded and shown to the user with a nonsensical negative fee. The fix rejects such PSBTs during parsing and shows the user a plain warning instead. It is treated as bad data, not an attack, because no honest tool creates these and the Bitcoin network would not relay them anyway.

Security candidateCount an unresolved output cosigner set as a mismatchby kdmukai · 45a5eabb · Sep 16, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongModerate 63Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Count an unresolved output cosigner set as a mismatch

The cosigner comparison skipped any output whose cosigners failed to
resolve, so the different-quorum case it exists for never fired on a
real psbt: coordinators write only the spending wallet's xpubs, and a
foreign cosigner's key then resolves against nothing. Once the inputs'
cosigners resolve, an output that differs or fails to resolve is
counted as a spend.

Keys now match xpubs by derivation alone rather than requiring the
claimed fingerprint to match first. The fingerprint is a label the
coordinator wrote; requiring it let one mislabeled cosigner turn
genuine change into a spend, and a key an xpub really derives is
proof enough on its own.

The different-quorum test now uses the wallet's own xpubs, the shape
every xpub-writing coordinator produces, and a second test keeps the
four-xpub variant.

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100

This commit fixes a bug in SeedSigner's PSBT parser that could misclassify a payment to a different multisig wallet as 'change' (money going back to the user's own wallet). The bug occurred when the output's cosigner list could not be resolved, because the comparison was skipped entirely. The fix now counts an unresolved or mismatched cosigner set as a spend instead of change. It also changes how keys are matched to xpubs: instead of first requiring the coordinator-provided fingerprint to match, it now trusts a matching derivation path and a proven derived key. This prevents a mislabeled fingerprint from turning a real change output into what looks like a spend.

Security candidateCompare cosigners before presuming multisig changeby kdmukai · ff133966 · Sep 12, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Compare cosigners before presuming multisig change

A multisig output whose committed script holds this seed's key can
still belong to a different wallet: a 2-of-3 over {p1,p2,p4} when the
inputs spend {p1,p2,p3}. When the psbt supplies global xpubs and fully
annotates the output, _get_cosigners resolves a cosigner list for the
inputs and one for the output, and lists that differ mean the output
pays a quorum other than the one being spent from. That output is now
counted as an external spend. It stays presumed change when the lists
match or when either side's cosigners are unresolved.

This is hygiene, not a security control. The global xpubs are optional
and unauthenticated, so a coordinator that omits them skips the check,
and a mismatch demotes rather than raises because a transfer into a
second multisig this seed belongs to is legitimate. No surveyed
coordinator produces the shape the check fires on: every one except
Bitcoin Core annotates only its own wallet's outputs, and Core, which
annotates any output a descriptor in its wallet file can solve, writes
no global xpubs at all. Settling which wallet a multisig output pays
still needs the user's own descriptor.

The comparison sits after the ownership checks rather than at the
policy shape gate, so a psbt whose output cosigners fail to resolve
still faces every ownership check.

_get_cosigners' sorted() is what makes the two lists comparable: two of
the three multisig fixtures order the same wallet's keys differently on
the input and on its change output. Its docstring now separates what
is claim from what is checked and what the result does and does not
establish, its loop carries the procedure inline, and two early-outs
name the omitted-xpubs and omitted-derivations cases before the loop
(behaviour-neutral: both already raised from inside it). Tests pin the
sort, the different-quorum spend, and the no-xpubs presumed-change
fallback.

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryaccess controlseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit tightens how SeedSigner decides whether a multisig payment back to the user is real 'change' or actually a payment to a different wallet. Before, if an output contained the user's key and looked like the same kind of multisig (for example, 2-of-3), the app assumed it was change. Now, when the PSBT file includes enough extra public-key data, the app compares the list of cosigners on the inputs versus the output. If the cosigner lists differ, the output is treated as an external spend instead of change. The commit itself calls this 'hygiene, not a security control' because the extra data is optional and unauthenticated, so a malicious or uncooperative coordinator can still bypass the check by omitting it.

Security candidateRename is_change to is_presumed_changeby kdmukai · 321bf14d · Sep 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 58 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Rename is_change to is_presumed_change

The flag in _parse_outputs is set for two different strengths of
finding. For single sig our own key rebuilt the scriptPubKey, so the
output is provably ours. For multisig we have only shown that our key
sits in the committed script, and which wallet that script belongs to
is settled later, by the user's descriptor. Calling both "is_change"
gave the multisig case a certainty it does not have.

The process docstring is held to the same standard: it describes how
ownership is determined rather than how outputs are verified as change,
the verdict table reads "presumed change", and the multisig rebuild
bullet names the key-in-script step that the table row depends on.

No behavior change.

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only renames a variable from 'is_change' to 'is_presumed_change' and updates comments/docstrings to make it clearer that multisig outputs are only suspected—not proven—to belong to the user's wallet. The code logic is unchanged, so there is no security fix or behavior change.

Security candidateMatch policy types exactly and refuse an unsupported oneby kdmukai · a929b8b3 · Sep 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Match policy types exactly and refuse an unsupported one

The rebuild chain in _parse_outputs matched single sig and taproot by
substring ("pkh" in type, "p2tr" in type) and had no else. embit reports
a script type it does not recognize as None, and _get_policy passes that
through, so a psbt whose inputs and outputs were both unrecognized passed
the shape gate and died in the substring test with a bare TypeError. The
guard meant for an unhandled type sat inside the scriptPubKey match,
where an empty rebuild cannot arrive.

The arms now name their types exactly, matching _build_singlesig_script,
and the chain ends in a catch-all else that raises RuntimeError with the
unsupported type in the message. The unreachable inner guard is removed.
A test drives a p2pk psbt into the catch-all.

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a bug in how SeedSigner parses Bitcoin transaction outputs. Previously, the code guessed script types using partial string matches (like checking if 'pkh' appears anywhere in the type name) and had no fallback for unknown types. A specially crafted transaction using an unsupported script type could slip past the safety checks and crash the device with a confusing error, or potentially be misclassified as change. The patch now matches script types exactly and explicitly rejects any unsupported type with a clear error message.

Security candidateSet is_change only after each branch's own checksby kdmukai · 12c72391 · Sep 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Set is_change only after each branch's own checks

In _parse_outputs the flag was set True as soon as the rebuilt
scriptPubKey matched, and two multisig branches then turned it back
off. That made "change" the default inside the matched arm, so a branch
that forgot the flag would record change with nothing verified behind
it. Now each branch sets the flag only once its own checks have passed,
and an output that satisfies none of them stays an external spend.

The two sites where the flag is set split by signature type, and each
carries the certainty it actually has: single sig is settled, because
our own key rebuilt the scriptPubKey; multisig is a presumption, because
our key in the committed script does not say which wallet that script
belongs to, and only the user's descriptor can. The reminder that
"change" means any output coming back to our seed moves to the line
where change_data is built, which is where the word takes that meaning.

No behavior change: the same outputs land in the same lists on every
fixture shape, and the suite is unchanged.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit fixes a logic bug in how SeedSigner decides whether a Bitcoin transaction output is 'change' coming back to the user's wallet. Previously, the code marked an output as change as soon as it looked like it paid to the user's seed, before fully checking the details. Two special cases (multisig wallets) then had to manually undo that mark. The danger was that any future code path that forgot to undo the mark could wrongly label an external payment as the user's own change, potentially tricking a user into approving a transaction that sends funds to an attacker. The patch moves the 'is_change = True' assignment so it only happens after each branch's specific safety checks have passed. The commit itself says there is no behavior change on current test fixtures, but it removes a risky default.

Security candidateVerify that change outputs actually pay this seedby kdmukai · bb2471a6 · Sep 5, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 78 · AdequateHigh 79Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Verify that change outputs actually pay this seed

An output counted as change when its policy matched the inputs' and its
rebuilt scriptPubKey matched what the output committed to. Neither step
established that the key involved was ours. The policy comparison
included cosigners resolved from the coordinator's own global xpubs, so
one misannotated fingerprint made an output stop matching and skip
verification altogether, and multisig never checked our key against the
committed script at all.

Outputs now compare on script shape alone, and every candidate proves
ownership: single sig by rebuilding from the claimed derivation path,
multisig by finding this seed's key in the committed script. Where the
psbt's account of an output contradicts what the output commits to, the
parse refuses rather than quietly reclassifying. A claim set too
malformed to answer that question, one populating both derivation path
maps or claiming more keys than its script uses, is refused as well.

change_data now carries the verified derivation path in place of the
coordinator's claimed fingerprints and paths, so the views no longer
re-derive trust from strings the parse has already settled.

Taproot mismatches stay exempt. A script tree tweaks the internal key,
so honest taproot change fails the rebuild too, and embit leaves
PSBT_OUT_TAP_TREE unparsed, which is what would tell the two apart.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · High 79/100

This commit fixes a security flaw in how SeedSigner decides whether a Bitcoin transaction's 'change' output really returns coins to the user's own wallet. Previously, the device trusted too much of what the transaction coordinator (or a malicious wallet app) claimed about output ownership, which could let an attacker trick the user into approving a payment that actually sends change to the attacker. The fix makes the device independently prove ownership of each change output using the seed's own keys, and it now rejects several kinds of contradictory or misleading PSBT annotations as attacks.

Security candidateMerge pull request #1027 from kdmukai/psbt_parser_docstringsby Nick Klockenga · 85cd9a02 · Sep 4, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga

Merge pull request #1027 from kdmukai/psbt_parser_docstrings

Clarify psbt_parser.py docstrings and comments; minor cleanup

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only rewrites comments and docstrings in one file and renames a local variable to avoid shadowing another name. No executable code behavior changes, so there is no security impact.

Security candidateDrop "scope" from the two ownership-claim summary linesby kdmukai · 8574c13f · Aug 30, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Drop "scope" from the two ownership-claim summary lines

"An output scope claims..." reads no better than "An output claims...".
The word is doing no work in a sentence about what the output says, and
the psbt-scope sense it borrows is not the one the reader needs there.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only rewords two documentation comments inside the code, removing the word 'scope' from error-class descriptions. No program logic, behavior, or security checks were changed.

Security candidateClarify psbt_parser.py docstrings and commentsby kdmukai · 0d374bc7 · Aug 29, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Clarify psbt_parser.py docstrings and comments

No behavior change. Corrects prose that had drifted from what the code
does, and addresses two local names for the same reason.

Docstrings and comments:
- The two ownership-claim exceptions state the condition each signals,
without speculating about how it arises.
- _get_seed_derivation_path drops the output-versus-input severity
split, which _verify_claimed_derivation_paths already states.
- The verified_*_derivation_paths comment says what an entry holds, and
no longer explains the None the positive statement already implies.
- parse() steps 1 and 2 name the per-key condition instead of "scopes".
- _parse_inputs gains a docstring covering the amount total and the
one-shared-policy requirement.
- The single-sig branch comment names the script types it covers.

Naming:
- _parse_multisig's `sc` parameter becomes `multisig_script`.
- A TODO marks _get_policy's local `script`, which shadows the embit
module imported at the top of the file.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only rewrites comments and docstrings in one file and renames a single function parameter for clarity. The commit message explicitly says 'No behavior change,' and the diff contains no changes to executable logic, control flow, or data handling. There is no security issue here.

Security candidateMerge pull request #1013 from kdmukai/psbt_parser_ownership_scanby Nick Klockenga · e4af6a7e · Aug 29, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 78 · AdequateHigh 78Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga

Merge pull request #1013 from kdmukai/psbt_parser_ownership_scan

[security] Reject PSBTs that falsely claim this seed's ownership

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · High 78/100

This commit hardens SeedSigner's PSBT (Bitcoin transaction) parser so it no longer trusts a transaction's claim that an output belongs to the user's wallet. Previously, a malicious or buggy transaction could mark a payment to an attacker's address as if it were change going back to the user, potentially tricking the user into approving a theft. The fix re-derives every claimed key from the actual seed and rejects the transaction if the claim does not hold up. It also rejects false claims on inputs and clearly tells the user when the wrong seed was selected.

Lower-priorityMerge pull request #1018 from kdmukai/hash_lock_dev_depsby Nick Klockenga · 8fe1933f · Aug 28, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga

Merge pull request #1018 from kdmukai/hash_lock_dev_deps

[security] Hash-lock the local dev pip requirements pins

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
documentation-only discountmerge-commit duplicate discount
Security candidateMerge pull request #1005 from kdmukai/psbt_parser_trust_vocabularyby Nick Klockenga · d70b322f · Aug 23, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga

Merge pull request #1005 from kdmukai/psbt_parser_trust_vocabulary

[refactor] PSBT parsing: rename `change_data`'s unverified fields to `claimed_*`

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a code cleanup that renames internal data fields from 'fingerprint' and 'derivation_path' to 'claimed_fingerprints' and 'claimed_derivation_paths'. It does not change how the software verifies Bitcoin transaction data or how it protects users. The rename is meant to make it clearer to programmers that these values come from an external, untrusted source and should not be trusted until independently verified. The actual security logic is unchanged.

Security candidateImprove comment accuracyby kdmukai · c7eacfbd · Aug 22, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 28 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Improve comment accuracy

28/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only rewrites comments and docstrings in a single Python file to make them more accurate. No code logic, behavior, or security properties were changed.

Security candidatePluralize change_data's claimed keysby kdmukai · 4f00d32f · Aug 22, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Pluralize change_data's claimed keys

claimed_fingerprints and claimed_derivation_paths each hold a list
(one entry per cosigner), so the singular key names misread at their
call sites. Also drop a commented-out debugging print.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply renames two internal data keys from singular to plural (e.g., 'claimed_fingerprint' becomes 'claimed_fingerprints') because they actually hold lists of values. It also removes a commented-out debug print line. There is no change to program logic, no bug fix, and no security relevance.

Security candidateImprove comment accuracyby kdmukai · 622a9fed · Aug 22, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 28 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · kdmukai

Improve comment accuracy

28/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes a comment in the source code to make it more accurate. It does not modify any actual code behavior, so it has no security impact on its own.

Lower-priorityMerge pull request #1011 from kdmukai/pin_l10n_requirementsby Nick Klockenga · fa35c350 · Aug 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga

Merge pull request #1011 from kdmukai/pin_l10n_requirements

[security] Hash-lock the l10n requirements pins

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
documentation-only discountmerge-commit duplicate discount