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Eclair

Scala implementation of a Lightning Network node.

BitcoinLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

231 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

66security candidates48second-pass queue208AI analyses
4commits · 30 days
26commits · 60 days
80commits · 180 days
161commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 691 seen11 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 660 seen5 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 62 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 514 seen0 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

78/100 average clarity
143Strong · 80–100
54Adequate · 60–79
23Thin · 40–59
11Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
pm47451633876
Bastien Teinturier13332127581
Fabrice Drouin291424269
Thomas HUET16116075
rorp313069
Nishant Bansal212084
dependabot[bot]111081
ekzyis101058
Rusty Russell101081
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 18 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3424)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup …

Startup guard added to block accidental execution of development snapshotNo vulnerability fix, cryptographic change, or trust-boundary modification present
c96c3d44by Fabrice Drouin+73−57 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.6 release (#3420)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.6. The release notes explicitly state it contains 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank a researcher for responsible disclosure. The actual code…

Vendor release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesNew default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` mitigates unconfirmed-input double-spend risk during splicingRelease notes credit @erickcestari for responsible disclosures
50e046efby Fabrice Drouin+28−198 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 72 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Splicing robustness improvements (#3417)

This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed spli…

New default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` to prevent double-spend of unconfirmed splice inputsLimit on remote splice inputs/outputs (10) to bound CPFP costForce-close now selects a commitment whose funding tx is known to bitcoind, re-evaluated per block and splice spend events
c07cc745by pm47+518−6011 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Flag peers that leave liquidity fees unpaid (#3416)

This commit fixes a security gap in Eclair's Lightning node software. A peer could repeatedly get free channel funding ('liquidity') by backing out of payments meant to cover the fees right before the funding transaction was signed. Previo…

Fixes a logic flaw allowing repeated unpaid liquidity feesAdds peer suspicion flagging tied to funding txidExpands state handling for asynchronous LiquidityPurchaseAborted events
c5b9afc0by pm47+192−154 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3413)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.5 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes published release checksums, and adds a blank release-notes template. It also adds a startup guard that refuses…

No vulnerability signals presentStartup guard added to block accidental use of development snapshot
06716fceby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 67 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.5 release (#3412)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.5. The release notes state it is a patch release containing 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank two people for responsible disclosures. The ac…

Release notes explicitly describe 'security hardening fixes' and warn that 'some of these issues can be exploited by malicious nodes'Two independent researchers are credited for responsible disclosuresRemoval of an 'unsafe startup' guard indicates the prior development snapshot was considered unsafe and this release is meant to be safe to run
01384e93by Fabrice Drouin+14−268 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Check remote previous txOut against the blockchain (#3411)

This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction…

Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction dataTaproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possiblePotential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout
ae0927edby pm47+111−43 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 78 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths that overflow an `Int` (#3408)

This fix closes a denial-of-service bug in Eclair's Lightning onion routing. A remote sender could craft a malformed per-hop payload length that, when converted from a large number to a normal integer, wrapped around to a negative or tiny …

Integer overflow / truncation from Long to IntNegative length bypasses upper-bound checkException escapes Try block causing DoS
40279a1bby pm47+20−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3405)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.4 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes the published checksums for the 0.14.4 release, and adds a placeholder release-notes file for the next version.…

No security-relevant code changesAdded explicit unsafe-startup guard to prevent accidental use of development snapshotNo references to CVEs, advisories, or security issues in commit message or diff
c4910b7bby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
High 84 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.4 release (#3403)

This commit is the official release marker for Eclair v0.14.4. The release notes included in the commit describe it as a security-hardening patch release with fixes for multiple issues, some of which can be exploited by malicious nodes. Th…

Release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesHTTP API now rejects Origin-header requests to mitigate browser-based CSRF against basic-authenticated endpointsSeed file length validation added (commit a07fff5)
e1c212c4by Fabrice Drouin+90−8210 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Retry publishing txs evicted by unconfirmed conflicts (#3397)

This commit fixes a security bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a malicious peer could trick the node into permanently giving up on publishing its own commitment or penalty transactions. By publishing and then double-spending a conflic…

The commit message explicitly describes theft risk: "This lets them steal HTLCs by publishing their commitment later"Attack vector involves a malicious peer withholding tx_signatures and double-spending a splice inputFix changes abandonment logic for local commit anchor preconditions
21f1bc8dby pm47+100−254 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Keep unsigned settlements when rejecting commands (#3401)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When the node received a duplicate command to settle a payment (fulfill or fail), it would mistakenly delete the still-pending settlement from its database…

Loss of pending HTLC settlement state on disconnect/reconnectUpstream HTLC timeout risk for relayed fulfilled downstream HTLCsDuplicate/conflicting command handling caused premature DB acknowledgement
7686dfadby pm47+38−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Force-close again when a splice RBF sibling confirms (#3400)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later …

Funds-locking bug in channel close logicHTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spendIncorrect re-force-close trigger condition
9a1ecc99by pm47+59−72 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Critical 89 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject unpublishable splices (#3396)

This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the v…

Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transactionAdds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delayAdds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input
af994180by pm47+235−35 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths exceeding packet (#3395)

This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair processes encrypted routing instructions (onion packets) for Lightning payments. A malicious sender could craft a packet that claimed its inner payload was longer than the packet itself. The old code e…

Unchecked length field from attacker-controlled onion packet used for slicingException thrown outside Try block, bypassing expected error handlingRelayer crash could leave HTLC un-failed
d3a146a0by pm47+16−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 53 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Remove `spendfromchanneladdress` nonce after one sig (#3392)

This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Non…

nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flowprivate nonce removed from in-memory store after single usemanual recovery command affected, not hot path
c89af115by pm47+1−11 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject seed files with an invalid length (#3389)

This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Bitcoin Lightning node where, if the node crashed while creating its secret seed file, it could leave an empty file behind. On the next restart, Eclair would silently use that empty seed to generate all…

Use of weak/predictable cryptographic seed for key derivationMissing input validation on security-critical seed fileNon-atomic file write creating corrupt/empty secret material
a07fff56by pm47+31−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Upgrade postgresql client from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12 (#3330)

This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…

Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
972dfe99by dependabot[bot]+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Use bitcoin-kmp 0.49 (depends on bitcoin-kmp 0.32.0 and secp256k1-kmp 0.24.0) (#3362)

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…

Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
6162e2aaby Fabrice Drouin+22−44 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Update build to improve release process (#3381)

This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…

c3e9f5d6by Fabrice Drouin+834−105 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-priorityRequire closed channels migration before starting (#3198)by Bastien Teinturier · 26d03507 · Oct 27, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 26Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Require closed channels migration before starting (#3198)

We require closed channels to be migrated to the closed channels table
introduced in #3170 before starting `eclair`. This ensures that we
will not lose channel data when removing support for non-anchor channels
in the next release.

Node operators will have to:

- run the v0.13.0 release to migrate their channel data to v5
- run the v0.13.1 release to migrate their closed channels

Afterwards, they'll be able to update to the (future) v0.14.x release
once all of their pre-anchor channels have been closed.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 26/100

This commit changes Eclair's database startup checks so that the node refuses to start unless the operator has already run the v0.13.0 and v0.13.1 releases to migrate channel data. The migration code that used to run automatically when Eclair started has been removed from the startup path and replaced with a hard requirement. This is a defensive, operational-safety change, not a remotely exploitable vulnerability fix. It prevents accidental data loss for operators who skip intermediate releases, but it does not patch a security bug that an attacker could abuse.

AI review queuedBack to dev (#3197)by Bastien Teinturier · ddf75bc6 · Oct 27, 2025 · 7 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Back to dev (#3197)

After the v0.13.1 release.

36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.13.1 to 0.14.0-SNAPSHOT, re-enables Maven trusted checksum verification for development builds, adds a placeholder release notes file, and intentionally prevents accidental production use of the new development snapshot by refusing to start unless a special override flag is set. There is no security vulnerability here.

Lower-priorityEclair v0.13.1 release (#3196)by Bastien Teinturier · 9830aa60 · Oct 27, 2025 · 12 filesMessage 53 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Eclair v0.13.1 release (#3196)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine version-bump release tag for Eclair v0.13.1. It updates version numbers in Maven project files, finalizes release notes, removes a temporary 'unsafe startup' guard that was only meant for pre-release development builds, and tightens some error messages about upgrade requirements. There is no security patch or vulnerability fix visible in the diff itself.

Lower-priorityMore flexible mixing of clearnet addresses and tor proxy (#3054)by rorp · 701f2297 · Oct 27, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 27Details
Commit message · rorp

More flexible mixing of clearnet addresses and tor proxy (#3054)

We improve the connection logic when a proxy is configured, but Tor shouldn't
be used for IPv4 or IPv6 remote addresses.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 27/100

This commit changes how Eclair picks which network address to use when reconnecting to another Lightning node. It makes the choice more flexible when a Tor proxy is configured: instead of always preferring Tor when available, it now lets clearnet IPv4/IPv6 addresses be used directly when the proxy is set to only handle Tor. This is a configuration/logic improvement, not a clear-cut security fix or vulnerability.

Security candidateConfigure bitcoind test instances to use bech32m addresses (#3195)by Bastien Teinturier · 9771b2d8 · Oct 24, 2025 · 7 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Configure bitcoind test instances to use bech32m addresses (#3195)

When addres type or change type is not specified, bitcoind will
now start with addresstype=bech32m and changetype=bech32m.

We take this opportunity to fix feerate tests that failed because
of the following reasons:

- first of all, we had a bug where we didn't take into account the
anchor amount in our fee calculation, so we ended up always adding
`330 sats` to the on-chain fees we paid, which was hidden by our
tolerance interval, but started appearing with smaller p2tr inputs
- then we fix the remaining tests that need manual tweaking of the
utxos available in the test wallet, because they end up creating
transactions where we don't have a change output (and overpay fees
slightly, but not enough to make it worth adding a change output),
these tests simply needed to be tweaked to accomodate p2tr weights

Co-authored by @sstone

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin Core integration to use taproot (bech32m) addresses by default and fixes a fee-calculation bug where the anchor output amount was not being counted. The fee bug caused on-chain fees to be undercounted by 330 satoshis, which was previously hidden by test tolerances but surfaced when switching to smaller taproot inputs. The fix is in the ReplaceableTxFunder component, which funds transactions for force-closing Lightning channels. There is no evidence this was a remotely exploitable vulnerability; it is best characterized as a correctness/robustness fix that could lead to slightly overpaying on-chain fees.

Security candidateUpdate `bitcoin-lib` (#3193)by Bastien Teinturier · 7372a877 · Oct 24, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 58 · ThinInformational 22Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Update `bitcoin-lib` (#3193)

We update `bitcoin-lib` to v0.45, which changes our JNI bindings for
`secp256k1` and adds support for P2A outputs.

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 22/100

This commit simply bumps the project's `bitcoin-lib` dependency from version 0.44 to 0.45 and updates the corresponding cryptographic library checksums. The commit message says the new version changes how the app binds to the secp256k1 library and adds support for a new Bitcoin output type called P2A. There is no code change in this repository itself, and no security fix or vulnerability is mentioned.

Lower-priorityUpdate Bitcoin Core to v29.2 (#3190)by pm47 · 656a2fe6 · Oct 20, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Update Bitcoin Core to v29.2 (#3190)

Release note: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/release-notes/release-notes-29.2.md

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply updates the version of Bitcoin Core used by Eclair's automated tests from 29.1 to 29.2, along with the matching download URLs and SHA-256 checksums. It does not change Eclair's own production code or introduce any security vulnerability in Eclair. It is a routine dependency bump for the test suite.

Lower-priorityAvoid negative on-the-fly funding fee (#3189)by Bastien Teinturier · 711c52ab · Oct 15, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 88 · StrongLow 36Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Avoid negative on-the-fly funding fee (#3189)

Since we don't have access to channel params in the `Peer` actor, we
don't know the remote `htlc_minimum` when receiving a splice. This may
lead to cases where we later fail because we end up with a negative
funding fee, which doesn't make any sense.

To avoid those failures, we hard-code the `htlc_minimum` value used by
Phoenix (which is the only consumer of this protocol so far) and use
the max with our local `htlc_minimum`.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 36/100

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair's on-the-fly funding feature where a payment fee could be calculated as a negative number. The patch hard-codes a minimum HTLC value used by Phoenix and prevents the fee from dropping below zero. It is a defensive fix that avoids later validation failures rather than a clear exploitable vulnerability.

Lower-priorityOnly store txs spending our commit outputs (#3188)by Bastien Teinturier · 0baddd91 · Oct 15, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongLow 45Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Only store txs spending our commit outputs (#3188)

Instead of storing every transaction spending the commit tx (which
potentially included remote anchor transactions, which we aren't
interested in), we explicitly store only the transactions that spend
outputs of the commit tx we're interested in. This is more verbose
than the previous code, but avoids unintended side-effects such as
storing remote transactions.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 45/100

This change tightens which Bitcoin transactions Eclair remembers after a Lightning channel closes. Previously, Eclair might have recorded remote 'anchor' transactions that spend the commitment transaction, even though those transactions don't belong to the node. Now it only records transactions that spend outputs the node actually cares about. The main risk is that storing the wrong transactions could have led to incorrect channel-state tracking, possibly affecting fee bumping or recovery logic, but the commit itself does not describe an active exploit or loss of funds.

Lower-priorityDon't store anchor transaction in channel data (#3187)by Bastien Teinturier · 409c7c17 · Oct 15, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 23Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Don't store anchor transaction in channel data (#3187)

We don't need to store the anchor transaction in our channel data when
closing a channel: this isn't used anywhere and unnecessarily uses
space in our DB.

Also, once the commit tx is confirmed, we don't need to watch the
anchor output again on restarts.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit removes the storage of Bitcoin 'anchor' transactions inside Lightning channel state and stops re-watching those anchor outputs after the commitment transaction is confirmed. The stated goal is to save database space and avoid redundant work. The change also tweaks how the code decides whether a transaction is 'relevant' to a closing channel, explicitly excluding anchor outputs from being treated as spending the commitment transaction. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes an active security bug, but it does reduce the surface area for state-mismatch and watch-related edge cases during channel closes.

Lower-prioritySplit MPP by maximizing expected delivered amount (#2792)by Thomas HUET · 51a144c8 · Oct 14, 2025 · 16 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET

Split MPP by maximizing expected delivered amount (#2792)

As suggested by @renepickhardt in https://github.com/ACINQ/eclair/pull/2785

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit changes how the Eclair Lightning node splits a single large payment across multiple routes. It adds a new optional strategy that tries to maximize the expected amount that actually gets delivered, and refactors the existing random and full-capacity strategies. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a security vulnerability; it reads as a routing/performance improvement.

Security candidateUse bitcoin-lib 0.44 (#3185)by Fabrice Drouin · 32082666 · Oct 13, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 53 · ThinLow 36Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Use bitcoin-lib 0.44 (#3185)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 36/100

This commit simply updates the project's dependency on ACINQ's bitcoin-lib library from version 0.43.2 to 0.44, along with matching updates to related cryptographic libraries (secp256k1-kmp) and their checksums. The change itself is a routine version bump in the build file. There is no direct code change shown, and the commit message does not say this is a security fix. Because we have no release notes or changelog for bitcoin-lib 0.44, we cannot tell from this diff alone whether the new version fixes a security issue or introduces one. It is a dependency change that could affect how the Lightning node handles Bitcoin transactions and signatures, so it deserves review, but the diff does not prove any vulnerability.

AI review queuedCreate fresh shutdown nonce on reconnection (#3184)by Bastien Teinturier · d1863f94 · Oct 8, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 93 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Create fresh shutdown nonce on reconnection (#3184)

When we disconnect after sending `shutdown`, we must re-send `shutdown`.
When using taproot, we must generate a fresh nonce and store the private
nonce locally, otherwise we won't be able to create our `closing_sig`.

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Lightning node that occurs when a channel is closing using the newer Taproot channel type and the connection drops after a shutdown message was sent. On reconnection, the node must resend shutdown, but it was reusing an old cryptographic nonce. For Taproot, each shutdown needs a fresh nonce, and the node must keep the matching private nonce to later sign the closing transaction. Without the fix, the node could be unable to produce its closing signature after reconnecting, potentially stalling or complicating mutual channel closure.

AI review queuedNits (#3183)by pm47 · cc75b135 · Sep 30, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 26 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Nits (#3183)

26/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! Too few words to establish purpose! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: opaque commit messagesecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit contains two tiny cleanups: it fixes the order of flags in a shell command example in build documentation, and removes decorative ASCII table borders from a code comment describing the layout of an encrypted failure message. Neither change alters program behavior or fixes a security issue.

Lower-priorityAdd `zero-conf` test tag for Phoenix taproot tests (#3181)by Bastien Teinturier · 56a3acdf · Sep 30, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add `zero-conf` test tag for Phoenix taproot tests (#3181)

We ensure that tests using the Phoenix taproot commitment format
correctly pass on feature branches without conflicts.

Co-authored-by: pm47 <pm.padiou@gmail.com>

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes test code. It adds a 'zero-conf' test tag and adjusts assertions so that Phoenix taproot channel tests correctly exercise zero-confirmation funding scenarios. There is no change to production code, so it cannot directly affect live users or funds.

Security candidateAdd `DATA_CLOSED` class when active channel is closed (#3170)by Bastien Teinturier · 16a309e4 · Sep 30, 2025 · 26 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 29Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add `DATA_CLOSED` class when active channel is closed (#3170)

We introduce a `DATA_CLOSED` class with minimal information about a
past channel that has been fully closed. This will let us deprecate
legacy channels without having backwards-compatibility issues with
very old closed channels inside our DB.

When channels have never been properly opened or used, we don't
bother storing them in our DB, as it would open the door to DoS
attacks.

We create a dedicated table to store `DATA_CLOSED`. We migrate the
existing DB and remove the foreign key constraint on `htlc_infos`.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 29/100

This commit refactors how Eclair stores closed Lightning channels. Instead of keeping all closed channel data in the same table as active channels, it moves them to a dedicated table with only essential summary information. The main stated security benefit is preventing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by not storing channels that were never properly opened or used. It also removes a database foreign-key constraint and changes the API response format for closed channels. The commit is primarily a data-model and migration change, not a fix for an active vulnerability.

Security candidateUpdate `bitcoin-lib` (#3179)by Bastien Teinturier · 2b39bf62 · Sep 30, 2025 · 20 filesMessage 58 · ThinLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Update `bitcoin-lib` (#3179)

And simplify musig2 nonce using Scala classes.

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
nonce handlingcryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit updates Eclair's underlying bitcoin-lib dependency from version 0.41 to 0.43.2 and adjusts Eclair's code to match the new library's API. The changes are mostly mechanical: switching how Musig2 nonces and Taproot script trees are represented, removing Kotlin-to-Scala conversion helpers, and updating Maven checksums. There is no explicit mention of a security fix in the commit message or diff, and no independent security advisory was supplied. The update could include upstream security fixes, but that is speculation based on the version bump, not direct evidence in this commit.

Lower-priorityDeduplicate closing balance during mutual close (#3182)by Bastien Teinturier · d04ed3dc · Sep 29, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Deduplicate closing balance during mutual close (#3182)

When a mutual close transaction is published or recently confirmed, we
don't include the corresponding channel in our off-chain balance to
avoid counting it twice (which would resolve itself after confirmations
but is misleading).

There are degenerate cases where the channel will actually end up being
force-closed, even though we started with a mutual close, but that will
be very infrequent and will resolve itself after confirmations.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit fixes an accounting display bug in Eclair's balance reporting. When a mutual close transaction has been published or recently confirmed, the same funds could be counted both as 'closing' balance and as regular off-chain balance for a short time. The patch makes the off-chain balance exclude the channel in that situation, so the total shown to the user is not temporarily doubled. It does not move, lose, or expose any funds; it only changes how balances are reported.

Lower-prioritySmaller default value for `peer-connection.max-no-channels` (#3180)by Bastien Teinturier · 90778ca4 · Sep 25, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongModerate 54Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Smaller default value for `peer-connection.max-no-channels` (#3180)

We previously allowed 250 parallel incoming connections from nodes with
whom we don't have any channels yet. While this makes sense for wallet
providers, this is too large for standard routing nodes and exposes them
to more DoS risk. We reduce the default value to 64 instead, which can
of course be overridden by node operators in their `eclair.conf`.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100

This commit lowers a default setting that controls how many incoming connections Eclair will accept from strangers who have no payment channel with the node. The old default of 250 could let someone open a large number of connections to a routing node and waste its resources, a form of denial-of-service. The new default of 64 reduces that exposure while still allowing node operators to change the value if they need more for wallet-style services.

AI review queuedFix encoding of channel type TLV in splice_init/splice_ack (#3178)by Fabrice Drouin · 5b4368a6 · Sep 23, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 45Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Fix encoding of channel type TLV in splice_init/splice_ack (#3178)

Fix encoding of channel type TLV in splice_init/splice_ack

The channel type codec that we use is a "TLV field codec", wrapping it in a tlvField() codec was wrong
and messed up the encoding.

Co-authored-by: Bastien Teinturier <31281497+t-bast@users.noreply.github.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 45/100

This commit fixes a wire-encoding bug in Eclair's Lightning splicing messages. The channel type field was being wrapped twice, which produced an incorrect byte layout. The fix removes the extra wrapper so the messages encode and decode correctly. It is a protocol-compatibility bug rather than a direct theft-of-funds vulnerability, but it could cause peers to reject or misinterpret splice messages.

Lower-priorityAdd "phoenix zero reserve" feature bit (#3176)by Fabrice Drouin · ad8b2e3b · Sep 23, 2025 · 6 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Add "phoenix zero reserve" feature bit (#3176)

* Add PhoenixZeroReserve feature bit

Add a feature bit for zero-reserve channel. It is used by phoenix wallets and different from the feature bit proposed in https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1140.

* Simplify SimpleTaprootChannelsPhoenix channel type

It does not make sense to have versions with/without scid-alias and zero-conf.

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit adds a new Lightning protocol feature bit called 'phoenix_zero_reserve' and simplifies how Eclair handles a Phoenix-specific taproot channel type. It is a feature addition and refactoring change, not a fix for a known security bug. There is no evidence in the commit or supplied references that this resolves an active vulnerability.

AI review queuedReject offers with some fields present but empty (#3175)by Thomas HUET · abe2cc9c · Sep 22, 2025 · 6 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 52Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET

Reject offers with some fields present but empty (#3175)

Offers or invoices where the fields `offer_chains`, `offer_paths`, `invoice_paths`, `invoice_blindedpay` are present but empty are considered invalid.
While the spec does not necessarily rejects them explicitly, they can't be paid.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100

This commit tightens validation of Bitcoin Lightning 'Bolt 12' offers and invoices. Previously, an offer or invoice could include certain list fields (such as payment paths or supported chains) that were technically present but contained zero entries. The code now rejects these empty-but-present fields during parsing. The change prevents malformed or unpayable offers/invoices from being accepted, which could otherwise confuse wallets, break routing, or be used to probe implementations.

Lower-priorityRemove `PaymentWeightRatios` from the routing config (#3171)by Thomas HUET · fa1b0eef · Sep 19, 2025 · 12 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET

Remove `PaymentWeightRatios` from the routing config (#3171)

The new weights based on success probability estimates have proven superior to the old `PaymentWeightRatios`. Removing `PaymentWeightRatios` makes the configuration simpler.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit removes an older, less effective way of choosing Lightning payment routes (called PaymentWeightRatios) and switches the code to use a newer route-scoring system based on estimated success probability. It is a routine cleanup/refactoring change, not a security fix. There is no evidence in the commit message or diff of a vulnerability being patched.

Security candidateKill the connection if a peer sends multiple ping requests in parallel (#3172)by pm47 · 08a1fc66 · Sep 19, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 64Details
Commit message · pm47

Kill the connection if a peer sends multiple ping requests in parallel (#3172)

We keep track of the number of pings that we have not yet sent a pong for. If there is more than 1, our peer is malicious and we close the connection.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This update makes Eclair disconnect a Lightning peer if it sends more than one ping message before getting a reply. The goal is to stop a 'ping flood' attack, where a malicious peer could overwhelm the node with many ping requests and possibly cause it to run out of memory or become unresponsive. The change is defensive and includes a test showing the connection is closed when two pings arrive back-to-back.

Lower-priorityAlways count local CLTV delta in route finding (#3174)by Thomas HUET · 9f00ebf9 · Sep 18, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 49Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET

Always count local CLTV delta in route finding (#3174)

When paying from our node, we don't pay the fee for the local channel but we still "pay" its CLTV delta.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 49/100

This change fixes how Eclair counts time-lock delays when finding payment routes through the Lightning network. Previously, when calculating a route starting from the user's own node, the software ignored the delay on the first local channel. This could lead to choosing routes that look cheaper or faster but actually require longer lock-up times than expected, potentially causing payments to fail or funds to be locked longer than the user intended. The fix now always includes that first-channel delay in route calculations.