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Moderate 53 Bitcoin

Remove `spendfromchanneladdress` nonce after one sig (#3392)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by pm47

98/100 · Strong
Remove `spendfromchanneladdress` nonce after one sig (#3392)

Nonces must not be re-used. Although `spendfromchanneladdress` is a
manual recovery operation, there is no reason why we keep the nonce
after the first signature.

Fixes https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/35.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Nonces must never be reused in this signature scheme, because reuse can leak the private key. The change removes the nonce from the map immediately after it is used, so it cannot be reused accidentally or maliciously in a later signature.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-to-moderate security hardening fix. Users who have already used `spendfromchanneladdress` with partial signatures should ensure no nonce was reused in practice and rotate any affected channel funding keys if reuse is suspected. Upgrade to the patched version for the hardening benefit.

Security signals we found

01

nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flow

02

private nonce removed from in-memory store after single use

03

manual recovery command affected, not hot path

04

commit message explicitly frames change as a security/correctness fix

Risk score

Why this scored 53/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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