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High 82 Bitcoin

Check remote previous txOut against the blockchain (#3411)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by pm47

81/100 · Strong
Check remote previous txOut against the blockchain (#3411)

When splicing taproot channels, our peer may only send the `txOut` of its inputs (amount and script) instead of the full previous transaction. Nothing checked that this `txOut` matched the actual output, so our peer could lie about it. Since taproot signatures commit to every spent output, we would sign a splice transaction that can never confirm and keep using it as our latest commitment, while our peer can publish its commitment for the previous funding output after upstream HTLCs have timed out, and steal HTLCs.

This also bypasses the restriction of splices to phoenix peers, which relies on phoenix only adding confirmed swap-in inputs: the swap-in script and confirmation checks used the claimed `txOut`.

We now fetch the previous transaction from our bitcoin node for every remote input that was sent without it, and abort if its output doesn't match.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction. Before this fix, Eclair trusted that summary without checking it against the actual blockchain. A dishonest peer could lie about the amount or script of its input, causing the splice transaction to be permanently unconfirmable. Because taproot signatures commit to the spent outputs, the victim would have already signed an invalid splice, while the attacker could later publish the old channel commitment and steal HTLCs (pending Lightning payments) after they time out. The fix fetches the real previous transaction from the user's own bitcoin node and aborts if the summary does not match.

Recommended action

Upgrade to a version containing this commit. Nodes running Eclair with taproot channel support should apply the patch promptly, as it closes a path for fund/HTLC loss via malicious peer input claims during splice.

Security signals we found

01

Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction data

02

Taproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possible

03

Potential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout

04

Bypass of confirmed-input restriction for Phoenix swap-in inputs

05

New exception InvalidPreviousTxOut added and tested

Risk score

Why this scored 82/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 28/30
Exploitability 18/25
Stealth signal 12/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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