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Moderate 66 Bitcoin

Force-close again when a splice RBF sibling confirms (#3400)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by pm47

81/100 · Strong
Force-close again when a splice RBF sibling confirms (#3400)

Since #3376, when our peer withholds their tx_signatures for a splice, we
force-close using a previous commitment, and force-close again if that splice
confirms later. But when the unsigned transaction was an RBF attempt of a
splice, we force-closed using its RBF sibling, which has the same funding tx
index: when the RBF attempt confirmed, we didn't detect that it double-spent
the commit tx we published, and never force-closed again. Our funds stayed
locked until our peer published their commitment, and our HTLCs weren't
enforced on-chain.

We now force-close again whenever the confirmed splice transaction
double-spends the funding transaction of the commit tx we published.

Reported-By: @erickcestari
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later published a different version of that splice (an RBF attempt) which confirmed, Eclair failed to notice that the confirmed transaction had replaced the one used in the force-close. As a result, the node would not re-force-close with the correct commitment, leaving its funds stuck and its payment guarantees unenforced on-chain. The fix makes Eclair re-force-close whenever the confirmed splice transaction spends the same funds as the previously published commitment.

Recommended action

Apply the patch and run the new regression test. Operators should upgrade to a release containing this fix to avoid stuck funds and unenforced HTLCs when peers delay tx_signatures for splice RBF attempts.

Security signals we found

01

Funds-locking bug in channel close logic

02

HTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spend

03

Incorrect re-force-close trigger condition

04

RBF sibling splice not detected as double-spend

05

Regression test added for unsigned splice RBF force-close scenario

Risk score

Why this scored 66/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 22/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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