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Low 45 Bitcoin

Only store txs spending our commit outputs (#3188)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Bastien Teinturier

81/100 · Strong
Only store txs spending our commit outputs (#3188)

Instead of storing every transaction spending the commit tx (which
potentially included remote anchor transactions, which we aren't
interested in), we explicitly store only the transactions that spend
outputs of the commit tx we're interested in. This is more verbose
than the previous code, but avoids unintended side-effects such as
storing remote transactions.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change tightens which Bitcoin transactions Eclair remembers after a Lightning channel closes. Previously, Eclair might have recorded remote 'anchor' transactions that spend the commitment transaction, even though those transactions don't belong to the node. Now it only records transactions that spend outputs the node actually cares about. The main risk is that storing the wrong transactions could have led to incorrect channel-state tracking, possibly affecting fee bumping or recovery logic, but the commit itself does not describe an active exploit or loss of funds.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-to-moderate hardening fix. Review whether previously stored remote anchor transactions in the irrevocablySpent map could have caused fee-bumping or channel-recovery issues in production, and consider whether a migration or cleanup of existing state is needed. No emergency action is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

Defensive hardening of transaction tracking logic

02

Removal of broad 'spends commit tx' filter in favor of explicit output-set membership

03

Prevention of storing remote/irrelevant anchor transactions in channel state

04

Potential prior state-corruption risk from tracking unintended transactions

Risk score

Why this scored 45/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 9/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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