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Critical 89 Bitcoin

Reject unpublishable splices (#3396)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by pm47

78/100 · Adequate
Reject unpublishable splices (#3396)

Collection of fixes to prevent a malicious peer to make us sign a splice tx that cannot be published.

* Reject interactive txs with a future lock time

Our peer chooses the lock time of interactive transactions (in open_channel2,
splice_init and tx_init_rbf) and we didn't check it. With a lock time far in
the future, the transaction cannot be published: for a splice, we would then
force-close with a commitment that can never confirm, while our peer can
still publish its commitment for the previous funding output, which lets
them steal HTLCs.

We now reject lock times that are more than a few blocks ahead of our current
block height, to allow for small differences in block height with our peer.

* Reject interactive-tx inputs with relative lock times

Our peer chooses the nSequence of the inputs it adds, including the shared
input when it is the splice initiator. We only rejected values that disable
RBF, so our peer could use a relative lock time (BIP 68) to prevent us from
publishing the transaction for up to 65535 blocks: for a splice, we would
then force-close with a commitment that cannot confirm, while our peer can
still publish its commitment for the previous funding output.

We now reject inputs that enable a relative lock time.

* Check signed splice feerate when we don't contribute

We only checked the feerate of the signed interactive transaction when both
peers contributed to it. When we didn't contribute to a splice, our peer
could provide large witnesses for its inputs and make the feerate of the
signed transaction much lower than the target, potentially below the relay
minimum: we would then force-close with a commitment that cannot confirm,
while our peer can still publish its commitment for the previous funding
output.

A splice transaction funds our latest commitment, so we now check its
feerate even when we don't contribute to it.

* Reject non-standard witnesses in tx_signatures

We only checked that our peer's witnesses were valid, using standard script
flags, but not that they satisfied Bitcoin Core's witness standardness rules
(P2WSH stack and script sizes, taproot annex, tapscript stack items) or that
the signed transaction didn't exceed the standard weight. Our peer could thus
make us store a valid splice transaction that cannot be relayed: we would then
force-close with a commitment that cannot confirm, while our peer can still
publish its commitment for the previous funding output.

We now reject such tx_signatures, as required by BOLT 2.

---------

Closes https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/62
Closes https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/91
Closes https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/400
Closes https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/265

Reported-By: [project-loupe](https://github.com/project-loupe)
Reported-By: @erickcestari
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the victim's latest commitment transaction depends on that splice transaction confirming, the victim would be unable to recover their funds through a normal force-close, while the attacker could still broadcast an older commitment and steal HTLCs (pending routed payments). The fixes reject future lock times, relative time locks on inputs, non-standard witnesses, and too-low feerates when the victim does not contribute to the splice.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security patch and include it in the next release. Operators running nodes that accept splice-in/splice-out or RBF should upgrade promptly. Review any channels where a splice was attempted but rejected around the time of upgrade, and consider monitoring for peers that previously sent future lockTimes, relative nSequences, or non-standard witnesses.

Security signals we found

01

Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transaction

02

Adds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delay

03

Adds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input

04

Adds witness standardness and standard weight checks before accepting tx_signatures

05

Extends feerate validation to splices where local node contributes nothing

06

Closes four audit issues from project-loupe/audit-eclair

07

Adds unit tests covering each new restriction

Risk score

Why this scored 89/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 28/30
Exploitability 22/25
Stealth signal 12/15
Affected reach 13/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
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