Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
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This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup …
Startup guard added to block accidental execution of development snapshotNo vulnerability fix, cryptographic change, or trust-boundary modification present
This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.6. The release notes explicitly state it contains 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank a researcher for responsible disclosure. The actual code…
Vendor release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesNew default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` mitigates unconfirmed-input double-spend risk during splicingRelease notes credit @erickcestari for responsible disclosures
This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed spli…
New default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` to prevent double-spend of unconfirmed splice inputsLimit on remote splice inputs/outputs (10) to bound CPFP costForce-close now selects a commitment whose funding tx is known to bitcoind, re-evaluated per block and splice spend events
This commit fixes a security gap in Eclair's Lightning node software. A peer could repeatedly get free channel funding ('liquidity') by backing out of payments meant to cover the fees right before the funding transaction was signed. Previo…
Fixes a logic flaw allowing repeated unpaid liquidity feesAdds peer suspicion flagging tied to funding txidExpands state handling for asynchronous LiquidityPurchaseAborted events
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.5 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes published release checksums, and adds a blank release-notes template. It also adds a startup guard that refuses…
No vulnerability signals presentStartup guard added to block accidental use of development snapshot
This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.5. The release notes state it is a patch release containing 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank two people for responsible disclosures. The ac…
Release notes explicitly describe 'security hardening fixes' and warn that 'some of these issues can be exploited by malicious nodes'Two independent researchers are credited for responsible disclosuresRemoval of an 'unsafe startup' guard indicates the prior development snapshot was considered unsafe and this release is meant to be safe to run
This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction…
Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction dataTaproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possiblePotential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout
This fix closes a denial-of-service bug in Eclair's Lightning onion routing. A remote sender could craft a malformed per-hop payload length that, when converted from a large number to a normal integer, wrapped around to a negative or tiny …
Integer overflow / truncation from Long to IntNegative length bypasses upper-bound checkException escapes Try block causing DoS
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.4 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes the published checksums for the 0.14.4 release, and adds a placeholder release-notes file for the next version.…
No security-relevant code changesAdded explicit unsafe-startup guard to prevent accidental use of development snapshotNo references to CVEs, advisories, or security issues in commit message or diff
This commit is the official release marker for Eclair v0.14.4. The release notes included in the commit describe it as a security-hardening patch release with fixes for multiple issues, some of which can be exploited by malicious nodes. Th…
Release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesHTTP API now rejects Origin-header requests to mitigate browser-based CSRF against basic-authenticated endpointsSeed file length validation added (commit a07fff5)
This commit fixes a security bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a malicious peer could trick the node into permanently giving up on publishing its own commitment or penalty transactions. By publishing and then double-spending a conflic…
The commit message explicitly describes theft risk: "This lets them steal HTLCs by publishing their commitment later"Attack vector involves a malicious peer withholding tx_signatures and double-spending a splice inputFix changes abandonment logic for local commit anchor preconditions
This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When the node received a duplicate command to settle a payment (fulfill or fail), it would mistakenly delete the still-pending settlement from its database…
Loss of pending HTLC settlement state on disconnect/reconnectUpstream HTLC timeout risk for relayed fulfilled downstream HTLCsDuplicate/conflicting command handling caused premature DB acknowledgement
This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later …
Funds-locking bug in channel close logicHTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spendIncorrect re-force-close trigger condition
This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the v…
Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transactionAdds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delayAdds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input
This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair processes encrypted routing instructions (onion packets) for Lightning payments. A malicious sender could craft a packet that claimed its inner payload was longer than the packet itself. The old code e…
Unchecked length field from attacker-controlled onion packet used for slicingException thrown outside Try block, bypassing expected error handlingRelayer crash could leave HTLC un-failed
This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Non…
nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flowprivate nonce removed from in-memory store after single usemanual recovery command affected, not hot path
This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Bitcoin Lightning node where, if the node crashed while creating its secret seed file, it could leave an empty file behind. On the next restart, Eclair would silently use that empty seed to generate all…
Use of weak/predictable cryptographic seed for key derivationMissing input validation on security-critical seed fileNon-atomic file write creating corrupt/empty secret material
This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…
Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…
Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…
Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.
AI review queuedBack to dev (#3424)by Fabrice Drouin · c96c3d44 · Oct 28, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin
Back to dev (#3424)
After release 0.14.6
36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup guard that refuses to run the development snapshot unless a special override flag is set. There is no security vulnerability being fixed here; the change is meant to prevent users from accidentally running unfinished development code.
AI review queuedSplicing robustness improvements (#3417)by pm47 · c07cc745 · Oct 27, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 88 · StrongHigh 72Details
Commit message · pm47
Splicing robustness improvements (#3417)
Make splicing more robust when splice transactions don't confirm:
- add `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` (enabled by default): splices only spend confirmed transactions, and we limit the number of inputs and outputs our peer can add - when force-closing, use a commitment whose funding transaction is known by our bitcoind, and re-evaluate it when blocks are found or splice transactions are published - when CPFP-ing our commit tx, take its unconfirmed funding transaction into account - claim the outputs of a previous remote commitment as soon as it confirms - warn against using `zero_fee_commitments` when splicing with untrusted peers
Note that `require-confirmed-inputs-for-dual-funding` doesn't apply to splices anymore.
* Add tests for splices with unconfirmed parents
We add a `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` setting (not used yet) and tests showing that we should: - require our peer's splice inputs to be confirmed - not splice on top of an unconfirmed splice transaction - limit the number of inputs and outputs our peer adds to a splice
* Only splice with confirmed parents
When `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` is set (the default), we now require our peer to only use confirmed inputs in splices, and we don't initiate a splice on top of an unconfirmed splice transaction (our peer already cannot). We also limit the number of inputs and outputs our peer can add to a splice transaction to 10.
Note that `require-confirmed-inputs-for-dual-funding` doesn't apply to splices anymore, only to channel creation.
* Require confirmed splice inputs in tests
We use the default value of `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` in tests. Our test wallet now considers the inputs it uses to fund transactions confirmed (this can be disabled to test unconfirmed inputs), and shares them with other test wallets so that our peer can verify them.
Tests that splice on top of unconfirmed splices now explicitly disable it: those scenarios can still happen with zero-conf, so we keep testing them.
* Add tests for force-close with unconfirmed splices
We add tests for the commitment we use when force-closing while splice transactions are unconfirmed. Our test wallet now considers the transactions it has published to be in its mempool.
* Force-close with a commitment whose funding tx can confirm
When force-closing while splice transactions are unconfirmed (without zero-conf), we now use the most recent commitment whose funding tx is known by our bitcoind (in its mempool or confirmed), or the most recent confirmed commitment otherwise. We re-evaluate it at every block and when a splice transaction spends a funding output, and force-close again using a different commitment if needed.
* Add test for anchor CPFP with an unconfirmed funding tx
When our commit tx spends an unconfirmed funding transaction, our anchor tx should also pay for that funding transaction to reach our target feerate.
* Pay for unconfirmed funding tx when CPFP-ing commit tx
Miners evaluate our anchor tx with all of its unconfirmed ancestors. When our commit tx spends an unconfirmed funding transaction (with zero-conf or splices), we now include the fees and weight of its unconfirmed ancestors when computing the fees our anchor tx must pay.
* Warn against zero_fee_commitments with splicing
With zero_fee_commitments, our commit tx is a v3 transaction, which cannot spend an unconfirmed v2 transaction such as a splice transaction (TRUC rules), so we cannot CPFP it. We document that this feature should not be used when splicing with untrusted peers.
* Add test for claiming htlcs of a previous remote commit
When our peer publishes its commit tx for a previous commitment, we should claim its outputs as soon as it confirms.
Existing tests that confirm a previous commit tx now use a height that is deep enough to directly test the min-depth handling.
* Claim previous remote commit outputs as soon as it confirms
When our peer publishes its commit tx for a previous commitment, we waited for min-depth before claiming its outputs. We now claim them as soon as it confirms, without forgetting our other commitments, which we only reset once it is deeply confirmed. We don't do it for revoked commit txs, whose outputs are delayed.
* Add test for published stale local commit tx
When we switch to a different commitment while force-closing (because the funding tx of our commit tx left our mempool), the commit tx we previously published may still confirm, since miners may still have it along with its parent splice transaction. We must then claim its outputs instead of treating it as a remote commit tx.
* Handle our stale local commit tx in CLOSING
When force-closing, we may switch to a different commitment if the funding tx of our commit tx isn't known by our bitcoind anymore. The commit tx we previously published may still confirm though: we now recognize it as one of our local commit txs and force-close again with its commitment, instead of handling it as a remote commit tx, which would lead to ERR_INFORMATION_LEAK or to a bogus revoked commit.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · High 72/100
This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed splice transactions: by double-spending inputs to make the splice invalid, by adding so many inputs/outputs that the honest node can't afford to speed it up (CPFP), or by publishing an old commitment while a splice is stuck. The changes add a new default-on setting that requires splice inputs to be confirmed, limit how many inputs/outputs a peer can add, make force-closing pick a commitment whose funding transaction is actually known to the node's own Bitcoin Core, include unconfirmed ancestors when paying to speed up a commitment, and claim outputs from an old remote commitment as soon as it confirms. The commit message explicitly warns that using zero-fee commitments with splicing and untrusted peers can lead to loss of funds.
AI review queuedBack to dev (#3379)by Fabrice Drouin · bafcf3b6 · Sep 14, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin
Back to dev (#3379)
After the v0.14.3 release.
36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.3 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder release-notes document, and deliberately prevents accidental startup of the new development snapshot by throwing an error unless a special override flag is set. There is no security vulnerability in this commit.
Tor: allow password auth on private networks (#3375)
This is a follow-up to #3354: we allow using a password on private networks. It is useful in cluster deployments.
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: broader security terminologysecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 38/100
This change expands when Eclair will allow password-based authentication to a Tor control port. Previously, only loopback addresses (the same machine) were considered safe enough for password auth. Now, private/site-local and link-local networks are also treated as local, so password auth is permitted there too. This is intentional for cluster deployments, but it slightly relaxes a security boundary around how Eclair talks to Tor.
AI review queuedBack to dev (#3371)by Bastien Teinturier · 39c5cb27 · Aug 26, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Back to dev (#3371)
After the v0.14.2 release.
36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.2 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder release-notes file, and deliberately prevents the new development snapshot from starting in production by throwing an error unless a special override flag is set. There is no security vulnerability here; the change is a safety guard, not a flaw.
AI review queuedForce-close on invalid HTLC `cltv_expiry` (#3367)by Bastien Teinturier · b7ebefdb · Aug 26, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Force-close on invalid HTLC `cltv_expiry` (#3367)
Bolt 2 specifies that if tje sending node sets `cltv_expiry` to greater or equal to 500000000, we should send a warning and close the connection or send an error and fail the channel. We never implemented that, which was fine because we already rejected large `cltv_expiry` before that threshold (without force-closing), but it's better to explicitly force close if our peer is sending such invalid values.
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100
This change makes the Eclair Lightning node force-close a payment channel if a peer tries to add a payment whose timeout value (cltv_expiry) is 500,000,000 or higher. Such large values are invalid according to the Lightning BOLT 2 specification because they would be interpreted as a Unix timestamp rather than a Bitcoin block height, which could confuse the node and lead to incorrect fund-locking behavior. Previously Eclair rejected these values without force-closing; now it explicitly closes the channel as the spec recommends.
AI review queuedFix a batch of low-severity issues (#3355)by Bastien Teinturier · 06e0ff71 · Aug 19, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 52Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Fix a batch of low-severity issues (#3355)
* Remove explicit cast in channel codec
We used an explicit cast in our channel codec: this is safe for data that we created ourselves, but would throw an exception if our data is corrupted. It's trivial to be safe by removing the cast.
* Require `tls-tcp` when using cluster mode
We require that encryption is used between the front and backend nodes in cluster mode, otherwise private data would be exposed. This protects node from messing up their deployment configuration without realizing it.
* Remove exception details from failed RPCs
We don't return the exception message anymore for failed RPC calls, to avoid potentially leaking private information. This guarantees that only the node operator, with access to the logs, can see why RPC calls fail.
* Don't decode unknown onion message TLVs
We don't support any TLV for onion messages yet. Since onion messages can be spammy, we don't need to waste any ressources trying to decode unknown TLVs that we'll throw away anyway.
* Limit the number of onion messages self-hops
We only include ourselves multiple times in an onion message path when using dummy hops. If we're included too many times in a path, that's most likely a remote node messing with us: we just drop the message.
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: broader security terminologysecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100
This commit fixes five low-severity security or robustness issues in the Eclair Lightning node. It removes a risky type cast that could crash the node on corrupted channel data, forces encrypted cluster communication to prevent private data exposure, stops API error messages from leaking internal details, and makes onion message handling more resistant to spam by ignoring unknown data fields and limiting how many times a node can be inserted into a message path.
We improve the performance of the liquidity ads codec by ignoring unknown payment types, and simply checking whether the payment types we support are activated or not.
* Reject node_announcement with invalid liquidity TLV
If the liquidity ads TLVs is present but with empty fields, we fail to correctly re-encode it. We must reject it immediately instead.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 50/100
This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair handles 'liquidity ads' data embedded in Lightning node announcements. Previously, if a peer broadcast a node_announcement containing a liquidity-ads field with empty funding rates or empty payment types, the node could not re-encode the message correctly, which could cause it to relay or store invalid gossip. The patch now rejects such malformed announcements immediately. It also improves codec performance by storing the raw payment-type bitfield instead of eagerly decoding unknown payment types.
AI review queuedBack to dev (#3339)by Bastien Teinturier · ee7d9f6d · Jul 29, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Back to dev (#3339)
After the v0.14.1 release.
36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.1 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder release-notes file, and includes a safety guard that refuses to start the development snapshot unless a special override flag is set. There is no security vulnerability in the diff itself; the startup guard is an intentional protective measure, not an exploit.
If the first DB write of a channel fails, we want to abort the channel immediately, otherwise our state may be unusable. If for some reason we already have a channel (for example because of a partial restore from a DB backup), we want to avoid overwriting this state as well.
* Add global `channel_id`s collision resistance
We add a global, concurrent map that keeps track of every temporary and final `channel_id` being used. We always add to this map before creating channel actors or transitioning to a final `channel_id` (and thus before storing channel data in the DB).
We only remove from that map when a channel actor dies: no other channel can be associated with the corresponding temporary or final `channel_id` since the channel was created after registering the IDs.
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100
This commit hardens the Eclair Lightning node against two related problems when opening payment channels: it prevents the same channel ID from being reused by two different channels at the same time, and it aborts channel creation if the very first database write fails (for example because a channel with that ID already exists from a backup). Before this change, a colliding or partially-restored channel ID could cause one channel's state to overwrite another's, potentially leading to loss of funds or an inconsistent node state.
We previously rejected Bolt12 invoices when a reply path was provided in the onion message. This wasn't in the spec, and it could make sense to provide a specific reply path with an invoice in case the payer considers the invoice invalid and wants to send back an invoice_error to inform the recipient.
This created compatibility issues with LDK.
Fixes #3322
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 30/100
This commit loosens Eclair's validation of BOLT12 invoice onion messages so that invoices may now include a reply path. Previously, Eclair rejected invoices that carried a reply path, which caused compatibility problems with LDK nodes. The change is framed as an interoperability fix, not a security fix, and it tightens some related validation rules at the same time.
AI review queuedBack to dev (#3313)by Bastien Teinturier · 2dda7946 · May 21, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Back to dev (#3313)
After the 0.14.0 release.
36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.0 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across build files, creates a placeholder for future release notes, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, and adds an explicit safety guard that refuses to start the node unless a special override flag is set. There is no vulnerability fix or security flaw introduced in the diff itself.
AI review queuedUse official feature bit for `option_simple_taproot` (#3144)by Bastien Teinturier · 872cb663 · May 5, 2026 · 14 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Use official feature bit for `option_simple_taproot` (#3144)
Use the official feature bit and name for taproot channels and the corresponding channel types. Activate taproot channels support by default (without support for announcing such channels yet).
See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/995
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 37/100
This commit updates the Eclair Lightning node software to use the official protocol feature bit and name for a new kind of Bitcoin payment channel called 'taproot channels.' It turns taproot channel support on by default, but only for private (unannounced) channels, because the public-announcement rules are not finalized. The change is mostly a rename and feature-bit swap from an earlier experimental/staging version, plus adding guards so users cannot accidentally open a public taproot channel. It is a protocol-alignment change, not a fix for an active security bug.
There's a race condition between Bob and Carol's router states, which aren't updated exactly at the same time. Retrying the condition should fix this race condition.
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes a test file to make an integration test less flaky by retrying a condition until two nodes' routing data match. It does not modify production code, so it has no direct security impact on real Eclair users.
AI review queuedAdd fuzz tests for onion, route blinding and lightning message codecs (#3282)by Nishant Bansal · 0778eafa · Apr 13, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nishant Bansal
Add fuzz tests for onion, route blinding and lightning message codecs (#3282)
- Expand LightningMessageCodecs fuzz tests to cover all message types - Add fuzz tests for payment and message onion payload codecs - Add fuzz tests for route blinding codecs - Add fuzz tests for onion failure message codecs
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidenceparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new automated fuzz tests for Lightning Network message and onion-payload codecs. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a runtime vulnerability by itself. The tests are designed to catch crashes or inconsistent encoding/decoding in existing codec code by feeding them random bytes.
If the test runs too quickly and the message is processed in less than 1 millisecond, there is a race condition since reading from the database excludes the upper timestamp bound (`timestamp < now`).
We also remove our usage of the `BETWEEN` keyword for postgres. The `BETWEEN` keyword is inclusive of both bounds, while we want to exclude the upper bound to allow pagination.
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit fixes a flaky automated test and, as a side effect, changes several PostgreSQL database queries to exclude the upper time bound instead of including it. The change is described by the author as a correctness fix for pagination, not a security fix. There is no direct evidence of an exploitable vulnerability.
We create a new set of actors that keep track of payment statistics across our peers and rank them to identify the top profit earners. Based on those statistics, the actors issue recommendations to:
- allocate more liquidity towards nodes that are generating revenue and may run out of liquidity in the next few days - reclaim liquidity from inactive channels - change our relay fees to optimize increases or decreases in outgoing flow and volume
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 34/100
This commit adds a new optional 'peer profit scoring' feature to the Eclair Lightning node. When enabled, it automatically tracks payment statistics, ranks peers by profitability, and can automatically open channels, close idle channels, and adjust relay fees. By default all automatic actions are disabled, so the change is primarily an operational automation feature rather than an immediate security patch or vulnerability. The main security consideration is that enabling the automatic actions gives the node software control over on-chain funds and channel pricing, which could in theory be abused or misconfigured, but the commit itself does not introduce a known exploit.
AI review queuedFix race condition in `Postman` causing flaky `OfferPayment` tests (#3270)by Bastien Teinturier · 8c5f39f4 · Mar 19, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongLow 33Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Fix race condition in `Postman` causing flaky `OfferPayment` tests (#3270)
The integration test "send blinded multi-part payment a->b->c (single channel a->b)" in `OfferPaymentSpec` fails intermittently. The root cause is a race condition in `Postman` where the subscription for an onion message reply is registered after the message is sent, allowing the reply to arrive and be silently dropped before the subscription exists.
In integration tests where all 3 nodes run on the same JVM, the onion message round-trip (Alice -> Bob -> Carol -> creates invoice -> Carol -> Bob -> Alice) can complete in just a few milliseconds - fast enough to beat the `Subscribe` message to the `Postman`'s mailbox.
This explains why the test is flaky: it usually works (round-trip slower than subscribe), but occasionally fails (round-trip faster than subscribe, reply dropped).
We simply move the subscription registration to *before* the message is sent to the network.
100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Low 33/100
This commit fixes a timing bug in Eclair's message-delivery component called Postman. When sending an onion message that expects a reply, the code used to register for the reply *after* sending the message. In fast local tests (and potentially fast real networks), the reply could arrive before the registration completed, causing the reply to be lost. The fix registers the subscription *before* sending the message. The commit describes this as a test flakiness issue, not a security vulnerability.
AI review queuedAdd bitcoin rpc call to check if an address belongs to our wallet (#3267)by Fabrice Drouin · a4d66adc · Mar 18, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 17Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin
Add bitcoin rpc call to check if an address belongs to our wallet (#3267)
We use the "ismine" property that is returned by the "getaddressinfo" RPC call.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 17/100
This commit adds a new helper function that lets Eclair ask Bitcoin Core whether a given bitcoin address belongs to the user's own wallet. It is a feature addition with no visible bug fix or security patch. There is no indication in the commit that it fixes a vulnerability.
AI review queuedImprove support for plugin-defined features (#3264)by Bastien Teinturier · a4f4abd9 · Mar 17, 2026 · 42 filesMessage 93 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Improve support for plugin-defined features (#3264)
We allow injecting non-official features via plugins, by extending the `CustomFeaturePlugin` trait. However, we previously added those features to a set of unknown features: we can do better and add them to the known features map, which provides pretty-printing in logs and simplifies debugging.
We also had an issue where `hasFeature` would always return `false` for plugin features, even when they were supported by both nodes, because we only looked at our `activated` features map which only contains official features.
We get rid of the `UnknownFeature` class entirely and keep the encoded feature bits after deserializing them. We take those feature bits into account in `hasFeature`, which fixes the issue.
This creates a slightly weird asymmetry because our local features, which are created based on our `eclair.conf`, will not have this field set while features that are read from network messages or the DB will have this field set. A better architecture would be to remove the `activated` map entirely and directly wrap the feature bits, while providing helper functions to interact with features without having to directly read a `BitVector`. This is a larger refactoring though, because we'd need to add support for filtering `init` / `node` features using bitmasks, which isn't entirely trivial to handle and requires careful management of plugin features.
93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: broader security terminologysecond-pass: unusually broad changesecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This commit fixes a bug where Eclair did not correctly recognize custom features added by plugins when checking if another node supports them. Previously, plugin features were treated as 'unknown' and `hasFeature` always returned false for them, even when both nodes supported the same plugin feature. The change stores the raw feature bits after decoding and uses them in feature checks, while removing the old 'UnknownFeature' class. It is a correctness and compatibility improvement rather than a critical security patch, but it could affect whether nodes agree on required features during connection.
AI review queuedFix flaky onion message test (#3266)by Bastien Teinturier · 1543e7ca · Mar 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 98 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Fix flaky onion message test (#3266)
The "automatically connect to known nodes" test was flaky, because there is a race with our code that lazily removes node announcements from our DB after channels close (in `handleChannelSpent` in `Validation.scala`).
We now explicitly wait for gossip to ensure that we cannot run into this race condition, which should fix the flakyness during CI.
98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit fixes a flaky automated test in the Eclair Lightning node software. It adds a wait step so that test nodes have time to learn about network channels before the test proceeds. There is no security issue here—only a test reliability improvement.
AI review queuedReject offers with amount set to `0` (#3265)by Bastien Teinturier · 16ebf01a · Mar 17, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 76 · AdequateLow 28Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Reject offers with amount set to `0` (#3265)
This doesn't make any sense, the field should be omitted if any amount is acceptable: setting it to `0` is confusing.
See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1316
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 28/100
This commit tightens validation of Lightning Network 'offers' (a way for a merchant to publish a payment request). Previously, an offer could include an amount field set to zero, which the protocol designers consider invalid and confusing. The change makes Eclair reject such offers. The main risk is that an attacker or buggy peer could send a zero-amount offer and, before this patch, Eclair might have accepted or processed it in an unintended way. The commit itself is a straightforward validation fix and does not show an active exploit.
AI review queuedRemove support for zlib encoding for channel queries (#3263)by Bastien Teinturier · eef7c326 · Mar 11, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 28Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Remove support for zlib encoding for channel queries (#3263)
We removed support for sending compressed data when it was removed from the spec (see https://github.com/ACINQ/eclair/pull/2244). We meant to remove support for receiving compressed data as well as a follow-up, but it slipped for a long time! There's no reason to keep supporting it now.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 28/100
This commit removes the ability of the Eclair Lightning node to receive zlib-compressed channel-query data from peers. The Lightning protocol spec dropped zlib compression for these messages some time ago, and this change catches up by rejecting or ignoring compressed encodings. It is a hardening/cleanup change rather than a fix for an active vulnerability, though keeping a deprecated decompression path could in theory expose a node to memory or CPU issues if a peer sent malicious compressed data.
We add a `ChannelFundingCreated` event that is emitted when the funding transaction or a splice transaction has been signed and can now be published, either by us or by our peer (depending on who funds).
This can be handy to detect peers that are using black-listed inputs and immediately close the channel before it confirms and can be used.
66/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 20/100
This commit adds a new notification event called ChannelFundingCreated to the Eclair Lightning node. It tells external listeners when a channel funding or splice transaction has been signed and is ready to be published. The change is purely additive: it emits an event at existing points in the code and exposes it over the WebSocket API. It does not alter security-critical logic such as transaction signing, validation, or channel state transitions. The release notes explicitly say the event is handy for detecting peers that use black-listed inputs so operators can close the channel early, but that is a monitoring/operational use case, not a vulnerability fix.
We fix a few flaky tests in our channel FSM that test scenarios where errors are received while creating funding transactions. The issue was that we used a dummy wallet that could complete its call before our calls to `awaitCond(alice.stateName == WAIT_FOR_FUNDING_INTERNAL)`.
We use a new dummy on-chain wallet that never responds to transaction funding calls to allow tests to inject failure events.
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes test code. It fixes flaky automated tests in the Eclair Lightning node by introducing a fake wallet that never completes funding transactions, so tests can reliably simulate error events during channel funding. There is no change to production code and no security vulnerability is being fixed or introduced.