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Informational 20 Bitcoin

Add `ChannelFundingCreated` event (#3256)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Bastien Teinturier

66/100 · Adequate
Add `ChannelFundingCreated` event (#3256)

We add a `ChannelFundingCreated` event that is emitted when the funding
transaction or a splice transaction has been signed and can now be
published, either by us or by our peer (depending on who funds).

This can be handy to detect peers that are using black-listed inputs and
immediately close the channel before it confirms and can be used.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new notification event called ChannelFundingCreated to the Eclair Lightning node. It tells external listeners when a channel funding or splice transaction has been signed and is ready to be published. The change is purely additive: it emits an event at existing points in the code and exposes it over the WebSocket API. It does not alter security-critical logic such as transaction signing, validation, or channel state transitions. The release notes explicitly say the event is handy for detecting peers that use black-listed inputs so operators can close the channel early, but that is a monitoring/operational use case, not a vulnerability fix.

Recommended action

No security action required. Treat as a normal feature addition. Operators who want to detect black-listed inputs can subscribe to the new channel-funding-created WebSocket event and implement their own closure policy.

Security signals we found

01

New event emission only; no change to validation or signing logic

02

Event data is already internally available at the publish sites

03

Release notes describe operational monitoring use case (black-listed inputs), not a security bug

04

Minor pattern-match simplification in dual-funding abort path with no observable behavior change

Risk score

Why this scored 20/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 1/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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