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Moderate 52 Bitcoin

Fix a batch of low-severity issues (#3355)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Bastien Teinturier

88/100 · Strong
Fix a batch of low-severity issues (#3355)

* Remove explicit cast in channel codec

We used an explicit cast in our channel codec: this is safe for data
that we created ourselves, but would throw an exception if our data is
corrupted. It's trivial to be safe by removing the cast.

* Require `tls-tcp` when using cluster mode

We require that encryption is used between the front and backend nodes
in cluster mode, otherwise private data would be exposed. This protects
node from messing up their deployment configuration without realizing
it.

* Remove exception details from failed RPCs

We don't return the exception message anymore for failed RPC calls, to
avoid potentially leaking private information. This guarantees that only
the node operator, with access to the logs, can see why RPC calls fail.

* Don't decode unknown onion message TLVs

We don't support any TLV for onion messages yet. Since onion messages
can be spammy, we don't need to waste any ressources trying to decode
unknown TLVs that we'll throw away anyway.

* Limit the number of onion messages self-hops

We only include ourselves multiple times in an onion message path when
using dummy hops. If we're included too many times in a path, that's
most likely a remote node messing with us: we just drop the message.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes five low-severity security or robustness issues in the Eclair Lightning node. It removes a risky type cast that could crash the node on corrupted channel data, forces encrypted cluster communication to prevent private data exposure, stops API error messages from leaking internal details, and makes onion message handling more resistant to spam by ignoring unknown data fields and limiting how many times a node can be inserted into a message path.

Recommended action

Review each fix for completeness: confirm the channel codec failure path is handled safely during channel restore; verify the tls-tcp requirement covers all cluster startup paths and does not break legitimate non-cluster deployments; ensure the generic API error message still supports client debugging; and consider whether the self-hop limit threshold is appropriate for expected onion message routing scenarios.

Security signals we found

01

Unsafe type cast removed from channel codec

02

Cluster mode now requires tls-tcp transport

03

API error responses no longer include exception messages

04

Unknown onion message TLVs are no longer decoded

05

Onion message self-hop count is bounded to mitigate abuse

Risk score

Why this scored 52/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 10/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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