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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

2330 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

228security candidates319second-pass queue1977AI analyses
99commits · 30 days
229commits · 60 days
709commits · 180 days
1578commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6579 seen10 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5147 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
628Strong · 80–100
1399Adequate · 60–79
272Thin · 40–59
31Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker331217581
daywalker9019315113471
Níckolas Goline961252376
Amperstrand322278
Rusty Russell96977961173
Sangbida Chaudhuri18537157167
Vincenzo Palazzo19714185
Lagrang3115679170
dovgopoly18016165
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1469110074
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 47 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

2e7a9f5aby Ken Sedgwick+9−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 66 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…

06ea9ba0by Ken Sedgwick+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: create bwatch tables before backfilling them

This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…

Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
ce2a6836by daywalker90+105−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 5 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

v26.12rc1

This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…

4002c4e9by Níckolas Goline+164−1110 files
No security note in commit
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: store payment failure details per groupid

This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…

Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
24082c6dby daywalker90+6−34 files
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-plugin: do not panic when the log writer task is gone

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…

panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
8661ffabby cdecker+29−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: explain hsmtool HTLC recovery

This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…

f90c140dby Sangbida Chaudhuri+85−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: make test_delpay_works deterministic

This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.

a224ca81by daywalker90+16−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: say that listtransactions gives blockheight 0 for a tx not in a block

This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…

bc281be3by Peter Neuroth+4−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

fixup! pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…

No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
02612ed5by Amartya Singh+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…

Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
42472816by daywalker90+14−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …

Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
42e268abby daywalker90+60−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …

5ebe365dby Amartya Singh+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
c6be4f71by Lagrang3+633−97 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
c87f5573by Andezion+22−11 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: fix crash on mutual close of an unconfirmed dual-funded channel

This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …

NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
555143beby Sangbida Chaudhuri+9−31 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-grpc: reject malformed request values instead of panicking

This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…

Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
b2703436by daywalker90+1558−12135 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 51 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

nix: drop protobuf again

This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…

a0459eeeby Peter Neuroth+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

make: check gRPC protos for breaking changes against the last release

This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…

db5fea70by daywalker90+43−84 files
No security note in commit
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Security candidatedoc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.by Ken Sedgwick · 2e7a9f5a · Nov 18, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 85 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

The VERSIONS section of lightning-downgrade(8) ended at v25.12. Add
v26.04, v26.06 and v26.12. Each goes back one release. The v26.12
tool also removes askrene impressions from the stored layers, because
v26.06 cannot read them.

The upgrade guide said that downgrades are not generally possible and
did not mention the tool. Name it there.

Changelog-None

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
update trustdocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

Security candidateMakefile: install lightning-downgrade.by Ken Sedgwick · 06ea9ba0 · Nov 18, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 66 · AdequateInformational 23Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

lightning-downgrade is built with the other tools but is not in
BIN_PROGRAMS, so "make install" does not copy it to bindir. The
release archives are made from that install, so they have the manual
page and not the program: a node upgraded from the release binaries
cannot go back without building the tool from source.

Add it to BIN_PROGRAMS, next to lightning-hsmtool. Install and
uninstall both work from that list.

Changelog-Fixed: Tools: `lightning-downgrade` is now installed by `make install` and included in the release archives.
Fixes: #9746

66/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
update trust
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contained the tool's manual page but not the tool itself, meaning users who installed from a release binary could not easily downgrade their node without compiling the tool from source. The patch adds the missing program to the install list so it ships with releases. There is no exploit or code flaw in the software's runtime behavior.

Security candidatewallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinputby daywalker90 · 42472816 · Nov 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 62Details
Commit message · daywalker90

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

Both commands took a user PSBT and appended to it without checking its
v2 modifiable flags, so libwally refused the change and lightningd
crashed:

```
lightningd: bitcoin/psbt.c:269: psbt_add_output: Assertion `wally_err == WALLY_OK' failed.
wallet/reservation.c:728 (json_addpsbtoutput)

lightningd: bitcoin/psbt.c:233: psbt_append_input: Assertion `wally_err == WALLY_OK' failed.
wallet/reservation.c:302 (psbt_using_utxos)
wallet/reservation.c:892 (json_addpsbtinput)
```

Check the flags up front and return an error instead.

Changelog-Fixed: JSON-RPC: `addpsbtoutput` and `addpsbtinput` no longer crash when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow modification.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 62/100

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 'modifiable' flags forbade such changes, the underlying library refused the operation and the lightning daemon crashed with an assertion failure. The patch now checks those flags beforehand and returns a clean error instead of crashing.

Security candidatetests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBTby daywalker90 · 42e268ab · Nov 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

A v2 PSBT without PSBT_GLOBAL_TX_MODIFIABLE (e.g. one signed by a
BIP-370 signer) makes libwally refuse new inputs and outputs, and both
commands then hit an assertion:

```
lightningd: bitcoin/psbt.c:269: psbt_add_output: Assertion `wally_err == WALLY_OK' failed.
wallet/reservation.c:728 (json_addpsbtoutput)

lightningd: bitcoin/psbt.c:233: psbt_append_input: Assertion `wally_err == WALLY_OK' failed.
wallet/reservation.c:302 (psbt_using_utxos)
wallet/reservation.c:892 (json_addpsbtinput)
```

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as expected to fail for now, so the underlying crash is not fixed in this commit. A remote or local user who can call these RPC commands with a crafted PSBT could cause the lightning daemon to abort.

Security candidatedualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signaturesby Lagrang3 · c6be4f71 · Oct 30, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 83 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · Lagrang3

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

Adding minimal verification of tx_signatures to get closer to the
specification on dual funded channels and splice. We check that the
witnesses are not empty and do a minimal standardness policy check. The
sighash flag must be set to SIGHASH_ALL.

Changelog-Fixed: dualopen and splicing: added tx_signatures verification according to BOLT-2

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying that they were non-empty, properly formatted, or using the required SIGHASH_ALL signature mode. It also ignored extra witness stacks that did not correspond to any input. The fix makes the node reject malformed or suspicious signatures, which helps prevent invalid or malicious transactions from being finalized and broadcast.

Security candidatechanneld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed spliceby Andezion · c87f5573 · Oct 29, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 54Details
Commit message · Andezion

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

abort_channels passed the last inflight to splice_abort() even once we
had sent tx_signatures for it, which failed the channel.

If a negotiation is in progress, that inflight is the splice it is
RBFing: abort the negotiation and keep the inflight. If we're quiescent
(after stfu_channels), tx_abort is still how we leave, and the inflight
is kept too. Otherwise there is nothing to abort, so don't send
tx_abort at all: BOLT 2 forbids it after tx_signatures, we're no longer
quiescent, and splice_abort() would throw away whatever the peer sends
while it waits for the ack.

Changelog-Fixed: abort_channels no longer fails the channel when a splice we already signed is pending.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts it, even after signatures were exchanged, which caused the channel to fail. Now the code checks whether there is an active splice negotiation or quiescent state, and if the splice is already signed it aborts only the negotiation while keeping the signed splice intact.

Security candidatemsggen: keep the generated proto wire format stableby daywalker90 · db31e286 · Oct 27, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 34Details
Commit message · daywalker90

msggen: keep the generated proto wire format stable

Every field number that msggen emits is recorded in .msggen.json
(grpc-wire-contract) together with its proto3 label and type. When a
JSON schema change later implies a different label or type for a number
that was already released, msggen keeps emitting the released one and
records the difference so the Rust conversions adapt the value instead
of changing the wire format. A change that cannot be bridged that way
aborts generation.

This pins down:

- A field released as optional stays optional, so 0/""/false is never
silently reinterpreted as "absent". Adding optional is allowed and
does not change the encoding.
- uint64 released fields that the schema now types as uint32 stay
uint64 on the wire and are range-checked in the Rust conversion.
- A double released field that the schema now types as an integer
stays double.
- A string released field that the schema now types as bytes/pubkey
stays a string and is hex-decoded/encoded in the conversion.
- Sat-denominated request fields (AmountSat/AmountSatOrAll) keep their
released number as a deprecated msat field and move the sat value to
a fresh *_sat field number. Setting both is rejected, and the old
msat field must hold a whole number of satoshis.
- Numbers that are no longer emitted are marked reserved.

The cln-rpc Rust types follow the schema as before; only the gRPC wire
format is frozen.

Changelog-Deprecated: cln-grpc only: deprecate amount fields for onchain methods, use *_sat fields instead. Old msat fields still work, but must be whole satoshis. Affected messages: AddpsbtoutputRequest, WithdrawRequest, FundpsbtRequest, UtxopsbtRequest, FundchannelRequest, FundchannelStartRequest, MultifundchannelDestinations, OpenchannelBumpRequest, and OpenchannelInitRequest

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit is a large, intentional change to the gRPC code generator used by Core Lightning. Its purpose is to keep the binary wire format of the project's gRPC API stable across future schema changes, so old clients and new servers can still talk to each other. It does this by recording every released field number and type, then adapting mismatches in generated Rust conversion code instead of changing the wire layout. The patch also deprecates several amount fields in on-chain RPCs and introduces new *_sat replacements. There is no obvious security bug in the diff, but the size and complexity of the generator changes create a real risk that future generated conversions could mishandle values, reject valid requests, or silently reinterpret amounts.

Security candidatedoc: refresh the release verification examples from v26.06.9by Níckolas Goline · 1112b47b · Oct 22, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

doc: refresh the release verification examples from v26.06.9

The gpg example showed 2020 signatures from keys that no longer sign
releases, and the sha256sum example listed v24.11 files. Replace both
with the output for v26.06.9, covering all three release manifests
(amd64 and source, arm64, armv7) and every file they list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationdocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only updates the user documentation that shows how to verify Core Lightning release files. It replaces outdated example filenames, GPG signatures, and SHA256 checksums with current ones for version v26.06.9. No program code was changed, and there is no security vulnerability in the commit itself.

Security candidatecontrib: refresh nGoline's signing keyby Níckolas Goline · 7a2375e9 · Oct 22, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

contrib: refresh nGoline's signing key

The signing subkey in the repo copy expired on 2026-06-30, so the
v26.06.9 signature could not be verified from it. Re-export the key
with the subkey extended to 2027-06-30.

Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply refreshes an expired PGP signing key stored in the repository so that future release signatures can be verified. It is a routine key update with no code or security vulnerability fix.

Security candidateconnectd: never block the io loop on DNS resolutionby cdecker · 71572cae · Oct 21, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 73 · AdequateHigh 71Details
Commit message · cdecker

connectd: never block the io loop on DNS resolution

Resolving a DNS address announced in a node_announcement used to call
getaddrinfo() directly, on connectd's single io thread. A slow or
unresponsive nameserver held up every peer on the machine for the
duration of the lookup: ~10s per query with glibc defaults, enough to
trip the 60s ping-liveness check and disconnect all peers.

getaddrinfo() now runs in a forked child which writes the results
back over a pipe; connectd reads the pipe from its io loop and
resumes the connect attempt from a loop callback, so the io thread
never waits on resolution. Keeping libc for the actual lookup
preserves /etc/hosts, search domains, systemd-resolved and
AI_ADDRCONFIG ordering exactly, and keeps DNS packet parsing out of
connectd itself.

A 30-second cap covers each lookup end to end (a wedged child is
killed), and at most ten resolvers run at once: a gossip-driven
reconnect storm queues the excess FIFO rather than forking without
bound. Before resolving, the child closes every fd it inherited: a
wedged child must not keep peer connections alive, nor pin EOF on
another lookup's pipe with its copy of that write end.

The connect RPC resolved a host name the same way, with a blocking
getaddrinfo() in lightningd's main loop, and ignored --disable-dns.
It now hands the unresolved name to connectd as a DNS address, which
goes through the same asynchronous resolver and honours
--disable-dns (unless a proxy resolves names for us).

Reported-by: Vincenzo Palazzo
Changelog-Fixed: connectd: a stalling DNS name in a peer's announced address no longer freezes all peer traffic; resolution is now done asynchronously.
Changelog-Changed: `connect` with a host name now resolves it asynchronously in connectd, and fails with `--disable-dns`.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · High 71/100

This commit fixes a denial-of-service weakness in Core Lightning's connection daemon. Previously, when the node needed to look up a peer's internet address from a domain name, it did that lookup directly in its main networking thread. A slow or malicious DNS server could freeze all peer traffic for about 10 seconds per lookup, potentially disconnecting every peer. The fix moves DNS lookups into separate child processes and reads the results back without blocking the main loop. It also makes the `connect` RPC command use the same non-blocking path and respect the `--disable-dns` setting.

Security candidatetests: mock LSPS2 service charges the opening fee from its paramsby Peter Neuroth · d315f9f9 · Oct 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 95 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

tests: mock LSPS2 service charges the opening fee from its params

Until now the mock deducted a fixed `htlc.fee_msat` (default 0) and
did none of the fee checks bLIP-52 asks of an LSP. Compute the fee
instead:

- `lsps2.buy` with a `payment_size_msat` fails with 202 if the fee is
not below the payment size and with 203 if computing it overflows.
- In no-MPP+var-invoice mode the fee comes from the first HTLC, which
is failed with unknown_next_peer if it is outside the payment size
limits, if the fee overflows or if nothing would be left to forward.
- The honest deduction is the computed fee; `htlc.fee_msat` still
overrides it.

Failed HTLCs now record why they were failed.

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes test code. It updates a mock Lightning Service Provider (LSP) used in Core Lightning's test suite so that its simulated 'opening fee' follows the real bLIP-52 formula instead of being a hardcoded test value. No production wallet, node, or protocol code is touched, so it cannot directly affect real users or funds.

Security candidatetests: add configurable misbehavior to the mock LSPS2 serviceby Peter Neuroth · b323f375 · Oct 19, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 100 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

tests: add configurable misbehavior to the mock LSPS2 service

Each phase of the mock gets a table of named behaviors, each with its
own parameters, so that every attack in the security matrices is one
config entry:

- transport: drop, wrong_id, duplicate (optionally with a changed
second result), replace (send a raw payload), add_fields and error,
optionally limited to some methods.
- buy: the jit_channel_scid is a fixture too, next to
lsp_cltv_expiry_delta and client_trusts_lsp.
- open: never, or twice.
- htlc: deduct (per-part deduction and extra_fee, or no TLV),
forward_subset (fail the other parts) and deduct_again (charge the fee
again after the session).

lsps2-mock-send sends a message outside of any request and
lsps2-mock-open opens a zero-conf channel outside of any session.
Unknown behaviors and parameters, and missing required ones, are
rejected when the config is set.

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security language
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new testing capabilities to a mock LSPS2 service used in Core Lightning's test suite. It lets developers simulate misbehaving LSPs (e.g., dropping messages, sending wrong IDs, opening channels twice, deducting fees incorrectly) so they can verify that the real client handles those cases safely. The change does not alter production code, wallets, or node behavior, and it does not fix or introduce any real vulnerability.

Security candidatetests: fix races in test_channel_lease_unilat_closesby daywalker90 · d3e6bebe · Oct 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 95 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: fix races in test_channel_lease_unilat_closes

CI flaked with:

> assert l3blocks == 4032 - 6 - 2 - 1
E assert 4025 == (((4032 - 6) - 2) - 1)

l3's commitment used a blockheight 2 blocks behind the chain, because
l2 was stopped before l3 had saved a commitment with the new height.
A second run flaked with:

E pyln.client.lightning.RpcError: RPC call failed: method: fundchannel
... error: {'code': 301, 'message': 'Could not afford 506268sat using
all 0 available UTXOs: 506696sat short'}

l2 broadcast the l1 funding tx, but did not record its change output
until after the l2->l3 fundchannel with minconf=0 had already failed.

Wait for l3 to log the commitsig carrying the new blockheight before
stopping l2, and wait for l2 to see the funding change before the
minconf=0 fundchannel.

Changelog-None

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit fixes timing problems in a single automated test. It adds waits so the test nodes are fully synchronized before the test proceeds. There is no change to production code, no security bug, and no real-world attack possibility.

Security candidatedoc: fix references to manpages that don't existby mikeua · 33fda2d0 · Oct 13, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · mikeua

doc: fix references to manpages that don't exist

Several schema descriptions and see_also lists name manpages that are
never generated, so the links in the rendered docs are dead:

- lightningd-fetchinvoice(7) / lightningd-invoicerequest(7) ->
lightning-fetchinvoice(7) / lightning-invoicerequest(7)
- lightning-listsentpays(7) -> lightning-listsendpays(7)
- lightning-currencyrates(7) -> lightning-currencyrate(7)
- lightning-invoicerequests(7) -> lightning-invoicerequest(7)
- lightning-listbalances(7) and lightning-bkpr-listfunds(7) ->
lightning-bkpr-listbalances(7)

contrib/msggen/msggen/schema.json is updated to match.

Changelog-None

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
authentication path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only fixes broken documentation links. It corrects the names of referenced manual pages in JSON schema files so that generated documentation points to pages that actually exist. There are no code, configuration, or behavior changes, and no security implications.

Security candidatelsps-plugin: use lsps-types for the protocol typesby Peter Neuroth · 8ecf4b62 · Oct 11, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 24Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-plugin: use lsps-types for the protocol types

Replace the plugin's copies of the JSON-RPC, LSPS0 and LSPS2 protocol
types and of the opening fee computation with the ones from
lsps-types, so client and service share one implementation. The
plugin's proto modules re-export lsps-types for now; the imports are
switched in the next commit.

Service-only code stays in proto/lsps2.rs: the policy plugin API, the
datastore entry, JIT scid generation, the BOLT4 failure codes and the
HMAC promise. The HMAC check moves out of `OpeningFeeParams::validate`
into `verify_promise()`, which `lsps2.buy` calls before
`OpeningFeeParams::validate()`. The order of the checks and the error
codes are unchanged: bad promise or expired params -> 201, fee overflow
-> 203, fee not below the payment size -> 202.

Other adaptations, no behavior change:
- `into_request()` with a random id becomes an extension trait in the
plugin, so lsps-types does not need `rand` and `hex`.
- `ShortChannelId` is converted via u64 where it meets cln-rpc (the
`htlc_accepted` onion, the client's datastore record).
- `DateTime` is converted with `as_chrono()` where the plugin computes
with chrono values.

The one behavior change from switching is the promise character check
that lsps-types added in "lsps-types: restrict promise to printable
ASCII without JSON escapes".

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 24/100

This commit is a code cleanup in Core Lightning's LSPS (Lightning Service Provider Specification) plugin. It removes duplicated protocol type definitions and replaces them with a shared library called lsps-types. The only functional change mentioned is a stricter check on the 'promise' string, limiting it to printable ASCII characters without JSON escape characters. This is a hardening improvement, not an obvious vulnerability fix.

Security candidatelsps-types: test the opening fee computationby Peter Neuroth · 41df2752 · Oct 11, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: test the opening fee computation

Unit tests for the rounding boundaries (a product of k*10^6 gives a fee
of k, k*10^6+1 gives k+1), the min_fee_msat floor, and overflow of the
multiplication and of the `+ 999999` addition near u64::MAX. Property
tests compare the function against an independent u128 reference and
check that it is the ceiling of the proportional part.

bLIP-52 has no test vectors for the fee computation.

Adds proptest as a dev-dependency.

Changelog-None

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetyfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds unit tests and property-based tests for an existing fee-calculation function. It does not change the function's behavior, fix a bug, or alter any production code paths. There is no security issue introduced or resolved by this change.

Security candidatelsps-types: add LSPS2 messages and opening fee paramsby Peter Neuroth · fee9b0e7 · Oct 11, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: add LSPS2 messages and opening fee params

Move the LSPS2 messages, `OpeningFeeParams`, `Promise` and
`compute_opening_fee` from plugins/lsps-plugin/src/proto/lsps2.rs into
lsps-types. Promise and fee computation are unchanged here; they are
reworked in their own commits.

`OpeningFeeParams::validate` in the plugin mixed the LSP's HMAC promise
check with the checks every LSP must do. Only the latter move: the
promise format is the LSP's own business and stays with the service.
`validate(now, payment_size)` keeps the order and error mapping of the
plugin (expired -> 201, fee overflow -> 203, fee >= payment size ->
202) and takes `now` from the caller. The unused `receivable` argument
is dropped. New are `check_limits()` for min <= max payment size,
`is_expired_at()`, `check_payment_size()` and `opening_fee()`.

Also add the `unrecognized_or_stale_token` (200) error code from
bLIP-52, which was missing.

Service-only types (policy plugin API, datastore entry, JIT scid
generation, BOLT4 failure codes) stay in the plugin.

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine code reorganization for the Core Lightning project. It moves data structures and helper functions related to the LSPS2 (Just-In-Time channel) protocol from one internal plugin file into a shared library module. It also adds validation helpers and one missing error code. There is no indication this fixes or introduces a security vulnerability; it is a structural refactor with tests.

Security candidatereprobuild: cross-compile armv7 tarballsby Níckolas Goline · b09099be · Oct 6, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 83 · StrongInformational 14Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

reprobuild: cross-compile armv7 tarballs

armv7 cannot build natively like arm64: cln-grpc's build script takes
protoc from protoc-bin-vendored, which ships no armv7 binary, so the build
panics there.

Add tools/repro-build.armv7.sh, which cross-compiles instead. It runs in
the amd64 cl-repro-<dist> image, adds armhf from ports.ubuntu.com (same
release pocket, updates and security still disabled), and pins the
arm-linux-gnueabihf toolchain and armhf libraries the same way the other
scripts pin theirs. The Rust plugins build for
armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf.

The build runs a few armv7 programs (configure tests,
tools/headerversions), so the host needs qemu-arm registered with
binfmt_misc.

bin-Ubuntu-<dist>-armv7 runs the amd64 image with REPRO_ARCH=armv7, and
the tarball lands in release-armv7/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 14/100

This commit adds a new build script and updates Dockerfiles so that Core Lightning release tarballs can be produced for 32-bit ARM (armv7) devices. It is purely a build-system/infrastructure change for cross-compilation and does not alter any wallet, networking, or cryptographic code. There is no indication it fixes or introduces a security vulnerability.

Security candidateCI: never replace files already on the releaseby Níckolas Goline · f918c23f · Oct 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 97 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

CI: never replace files already on the release

The release job uploaded release/* with action-gh-release, which replaces
any asset of the same name. Re-running it after the release captains had
added their signatures to SHA256SUMS-<version>.asc replaced that file with
one carrying only the CI signature, so users verifying the release found
the maintainers' signatures gone.

Upload with tools/publish-release-assets.sh instead:

- files the release does not have yet are uploaded;
- files it already has must be identical, otherwise the job stops before
touching anything (the builds disagree, and nothing should be signed);
- an .asc it already has gets our signature appended, after normalising
the armor so gpg reads every block; one that already carries our
signature is left alone, so re-runs are harmless.

The draft release is created with gh when it does not exist yet, with the
same title and pre-release flag as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

97/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a release-pipeline bug where re-running the automated release job could accidentally wipe out human maintainers' cryptographic signatures from the release's checksum file. Before the fix, the CI tool replaced any existing file with the same name, so if release captains had already added their GPG signatures to SHA256SUMS-<version>.asc, a re-run would overwrite it with a version signed only by the CI bot. Users who later checked the signatures would see only one signature and could not verify that multiple maintainers had approved the release. The fix introduces a new script that only adds missing files, refuses to change files that differ, and appends the CI signature to existing signature files instead of replacing them.

Security candidatelightningd: use a splice's HTLC sigs once we move onto its commitmentby jaonoctus · a34027c2 · Oct 5, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 85 · StrongModerate 68Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

lightningd: use a splice's HTLC sigs once we move onto its commitment

update_channel_from_inflight() moves channel->last_tx onto a splice's
commitment, both when the splice locks and when we adopt a splice which
confirmed before splice_locked because its output got spent. But
channel->last_htlc_sigs stayed the peer's signatures for the pre-splice
commitment until the next commitment update, or a restart, replaced them.

If that commitment is the one we close with first, onchaind gets
signatures which can't spend its HTLC outputs, so our HTLC-timeout
transactions are invalid and we can't get those HTLCs back. That's the
case in a report of a lost balance after a close on an unlocked splice:

the close broadcasts our inflight commitment (it spends the splice
funding output, because the splice had confirmed but never locked
in)
lightningd still treats the pre-splice output as the channel
funding, so onchaind is started with the pre-splice funding,
balance, and commitment

The sigs go with the commitment, so switch them in the same place:
wallet_htlcsigs_confirm_inflight() now returns the sigs it makes current,
and update_channel_from_inflight() calls it for a splice instead of
handle_peer_splice_locked() doing so on the side.

Reported-by: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>
Changelog-Fixed: splicing: closing with a splice's commitment before any later commitment update can now time out or claim the HTLCs on it.
Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit 275086a9b8eb36abe0dbb7499d7e5425a77e32ed)

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100

This fix repairs a bug in Core Lightning's splicing feature. When a channel was moved onto a new 'splice' commitment transaction, the old HTLC (multi-hop payment) signatures were still being used. If the channel later closed using that new splice commitment, the stored signatures could not actually spend the HTLC outputs, meaning the node could lose money it was owed. The patch makes sure the correct HTLC signatures are kept and used whenever the channel switches to a splice commitment.

Security candidatechanneld: tell lightningd the HTLC sigs for a splice's first commitmentby jaonoctus · 61ab88e5 · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 64Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

channeld: tell lightningd the HTLC sigs for a splice's first commitment

Every commitment the peer signs comes with its signatures for our HTLC
transactions, and lightningd stores them so onchaind can spend the HTLC
outputs if we close with that commitment. For a splice, got_commitsig
stores them for each inflight on every later commitment update, but the
inflight's first commitment, signed during the splice negotiation itself,
goes to lightningd in channeld_update_inflight, which only carried the
commitment and its signature. So any HTLC already pending when the splice
was negotiated had no signature stored for the splice's commitment.

That matters once the channel moves onto that commitment: after
splice_locked, wallet_htlcsigs_confirm_inflight() promotes the inflight's
stored sigs, which then lack those HTLCs, and the same goes for a close on
a splice which confirmed before splice_locked.

Add them to channeld_update_inflight, sent whenever it carries a new
commitment, and have lightningd replace that inflight's stored sigs with
them. channeld_update_inflight could be resent with the commitment
lightningd already had when the user signs the splice; that now sends no
commitment, so it can't replace those sigs with nothing.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit ebf69a8e6ba29560584060304bfe4a1e2b75dd52)

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This patch fixes a bug in Core Lightning's channel splicing feature. When a Bitcoin Lightning channel is being spliced (a fancy way of resizing the channel while it stays open), the software was forgetting to save the peer's signatures for any pending HTLC payments on the very first version of the new commitment transaction. If the channel later closed using that commitment, the node might not be able to claim its funds from those pending payments on the blockchain, potentially leading to loss of money. The fix makes sure those signatures are passed along and stored in the wallet database.

Security candidatecontrib: add jaonoctus's public keyby jaonoctus · 9ba88c5d · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

contrib: add jaonoctus's public key

Commit 41278b4ef ("contrib: add jaonoctus's signing key") added
jaonoctus's fingerprint to the "Signatures For Releases" table in
SECURITY.md and the security-policy doc, but did not add the armored
public key under contrib/keys/ as was done for the other signers.

Add it, so release signatures can be verified against the key shipped
in the tree. The primary key fingerprint is
7B69 6A61 6F73 1337 520B 8A19 D8F3 1505 B581 D617, matching the
table entry.

Changelog-None
Signed-off-by: jaonoctus <jaonoctus@protonmail.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply adds a public PGP key file for a release signer named jaonoctus. It is a housekeeping change to make the key available in the repository so people can verify release signatures. There is no code change, no vulnerability, and no security risk.

Security candidatecommon: ignore proof-only fields when checking omitted markersby Vincenzo Palazzo · 53ad856f · Sep 30, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 60Details
Commit message · Vincenzo Palazzo

common: ignore proof-only fields when checking omitted markers

find_included_marker_predecessor treated every non-signature field as an
invoice TLV. next_marker() of the signature range is 1000000000, so a
proof whose only omitted marker was 1000000000 passed with no type-239
field. Skip 1001..999999999, same as next_field_check.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a validation bug in Core Lightning's handling of BOLT12 payer proofs. A payer proof is a cryptographic receipt that helps verify a payment. The bug allowed a malformed proof—one missing a required type-239 field—to be accepted as valid if it only contained a special 'omitted marker' value of 1,000,000,000. This happened because the code mistakenly treated certain proof-only fields as if they were regular invoice fields when checking whether a marker was legitimate. The fix makes the validator ignore those proof-only fields during that check, matching what another part of the code already did. A new test confirms the invalid proof is now rejected.

Security candidatedocs: lease fields are u16by daywalker90 · ca3ec513 · Sep 22, 2026 · 10 filesMessage 80 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · daywalker90

docs: lease fields are u16

The lease rate fields are u16 on the wire (wire/peer_wire.csv:215-217)
and in the structs they are serialized from (common/json_stream.c:
671). The funder plugin range-checks its request values into u16
(plugins/funder.c:1354-1355).

Type these as u16 in funderupdate (lease_fee_basis, funding_weight,
channel_fee_max_proportional_thousandths), in listnodes
option_will_fund, and in listpeerchannels, where to_self_delay and
max_accepted_htlcs are u16 as well (lightningd/peer_control.c emits
them from u16 members).

Changelog-Changed: cln-rpc: funderupdate and listnodes lease fields, and listpeerchannels max_accepted_htlcs, our_to_self_delay and their_to_self_delay are u16.

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit is a cleanup of data-type documentation and API definitions. It changes several numeric fields from being labeled as 32-bit unsigned integers to 16-bit unsigned integers, matching what the underlying code already used on the wire and in memory. It also removes an unused field called 'next_step' from the public API. There is no direct security vulnerability here, but it reduces the chance that future developers or API consumers will be confused about valid value ranges.

Security candidatecontrib: add jaonoctus's signing keyby jaonoctus · 41278b4e · Sep 21, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

contrib: add jaonoctus's signing key

Add jaonoctus's PGP fingerprint to the "Signatures For Releases" table
in both SECURITY.md and the security-policy doc, which are kept in sync.

Changelog-None

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply adds a new person's PGP public-key fingerprint to the list of trusted release signers in two documentation files. It does not change any code, fix any bug, or alter any security behavior of the software itself.