doc: refresh the release verification examples from v26.06.9
What changed, and why it matters
This commit only updates the user documentation that shows how to verify Core Lightning release files. It replaces outdated example filenames, GPG signatures, and SHA256 checksums with current ones for version v26.06.9. No program code was changed, and there is no security vulnerability in the commit itself.
No security action required. Treat as a normal documentation update.
Security signals we found
No strong security signals were identified.
Evidence from the diff
The change is confined to doc/getting-started/advanced-setup/repro.md. It refreshes the release verification examples: gpg commands now reference SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9, SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9-arm64, and SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9-armv7; the example GPG output is updated to current signer keys and dates; the sha256sum example is updated to v26.06.9 filenames for amd64, arm64, and armv7. The documentation also adds a note about using –ignore-missing when not all files are downloaded. No source code, build scripts, or cryptographic logic were modified.
Changed components
doc/getting-started/advanced-setup/repro.mdInspect captured patch +62 / −20
### doc/getting-started/advanced-setup/repro.md
@@ -184,49 +184,91 @@ You can verify the reproducible build in two ways:
- Repeating the entire reproducible build, making sure from scratch that the binaries match. Just follow the instructions above for this.
- Verifying that the downloaded binaries match the hashes in `SHA256SUMS` and that the signatures in `SHA256SUMS.asc` are valid.
-Assuming you have downloaded the binaries, the manifest and the signatures into the same directory, you can verify the signatures with the following:
+Each release has one manifest per architecture: `SHA256SUMS-<version>` covers the amd64 binaries and the source zip, and `SHA256SUMS-<version>-arm64` and `SHA256SUMS-<version>-armv7` cover the ARM binaries. Each manifest's signatures are in a matching `.asc` file. Assuming you have downloaded the binaries, the manifests and the signatures into the same directory, you can verify the signatures with the following (using v26.06.9 as the example):
```shell
-gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc SHA256SUMS
+gpg --verify SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9.asc SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9
+gpg --verify SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9-arm64.asc SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9-arm64
+gpg --verify SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9-armv7.asc SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9-armv7
```
Pass both filenames explicitly. With a single argument `gpg` picks its verification mode from the packet structure of the `.asc` file: for a genuine detached signature it guesses the sibling `SHA256SUMS`, but for an inline (clear-signed or embedded) message it verifies only the payload carried inside the `.asc` itself. It never reads `SHA256SUMS` in that case, and although it prints `WARNING: not a detached signature; file 'SHA256SUMS' was NOT verified!`, it still exits with status 0 — so the warning is easy to miss by eye and invisible to any script that only checks the exit code. Naming the manifest as the second argument forces `gpg` to check the signatures against that exact file, and to fail outright if the `.asc` is not a detached signature over it.
And you should see a list of messages like the following:
```shell
-gpg: Signature made Fr 08 Mai 2020 07:46:38 CEST
-gpg: using RSA key 15EE8D6CAB0E7F0CF999BFCBD9200E6CD1ADB8F1
-gpg: Good signature from "Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>" [full]
-gpg: Signature made Fr 08 Mai 2020 12:30:10 CEST
-gpg: using RSA key B7C4BE81184FC203D52C35C51416D83DC4F0E86D
-gpg: Good signature from "Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>" [ultimate]
-gpg: Signature made Fr 08 Mai 2020 21:35:28 CEST
-gpg: using RSA key 30DE693AE0DE9E37B3E7EB6BBFF0F67810C1EED1
-gpg: Good signature from "Lisa Neigut <niftynei@gmail.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Tue Oct 6 20:44:46 2026 UTC
+gpg: using EDDSA key 4E4A142F8BD3C38A56B362ED578CAC08472545C5
+gpg: Good signature from "nGoline <n@ngoline.com>" [full]
+gpg: aka "Níckolas Goline <nickolas.goline+github@gmail.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Tue Oct 6 20:52:07 2026 UTC
+gpg: using EDDSA key 13054F60BEEB87D2B9C7D77DFAFE0D6665547AD6
+gpg: issuer "jaonoctus@protonmail.com"
+gpg: Good signature from "jaonoctus <jaonoctus@protonmail.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Tue Oct 6 20:13:09 2026 UTC
+gpg: using EDDSA key 8A079421A871D0B1083511937AB4802ED5A639F3
+gpg: Good signature from "daywalker90 <daywalker990@gmx.de>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Wed Oct 7 08:21:38 2026 UTC
+gpg: using EDDSA key C491580878207F03C3B966F9B4088CD4608A7CA1
+gpg: Good signature from "Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Wed Oct 7 13:49:21 2026 UTC
+gpg: using RSA key 616C52F99D0612B2A151B1074129A994AA7E9852
+gpg: Good signature from "Core Lightning (CLN) <cln@blockstream.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Tue Oct 6 19:43:33 2026 UTC
+gpg: using EDDSA key 4E4A142F8BD3C38A56B362ED578CAC08472545C5
+gpg: Good signature from "nGoline <n@ngoline.com>" [full]
+gpg: aka "Níckolas Goline <nickolas.goline+github@gmail.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Tue Oct 6 21:51:11 2026 UTC
+gpg: using EDDSA key 13054F60BEEB87D2B9C7D77DFAFE0D6665547AD6
+gpg: issuer "jaonoctus@protonmail.com"
+gpg: Good signature from "jaonoctus <jaonoctus@protonmail.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Wed Oct 7 01:31:17 2026 UTC
+gpg: using RSA key 1A371C2C30645FAA91AA6B7DB643E61284221961
+gpg: Good signature from "Sangbida Chaudhuri <sangbidac@gmail.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Wed Oct 7 13:49:22 2026 UTC
+gpg: using RSA key 616C52F99D0612B2A151B1074129A994AA7E9852
+gpg: Good signature from "Core Lightning (CLN) <cln@blockstream.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Tue Oct 6 21:26:43 2026 UTC
+gpg: using EDDSA key 4E4A142F8BD3C38A56B362ED578CAC08472545C5
+gpg: Good signature from "nGoline <n@ngoline.com>" [full]
+gpg: aka "Níckolas Goline <nickolas.goline+github@gmail.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Tue Oct 6 20:52:35 2026 UTC
+gpg: using EDDSA key 13054F60BEEB87D2B9C7D77DFAFE0D6665547AD6
+gpg: issuer "jaonoctus@protonmail.com"
+gpg: Good signature from "jaonoctus <jaonoctus@protonmail.com>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Tue Oct 6 20:38:44 2026 UTC
+gpg: using EDDSA key 8A079421A871D0B1083511937AB4802ED5A639F3
+gpg: Good signature from "daywalker90 <daywalker990@gmx.de>" [full]
+gpg: Signature made Wed Oct 7 13:49:23 2026 UTC
+gpg: using RSA key 616C52F99D0612B2A151B1074129A994AA7E9852
+gpg: Good signature from "Core Lightning (CLN) <cln@blockstream.com>" [full]
```
If there are any issues `gpg` will print `Bad signature`, it might be because the signatures in `SHA256SUMS.asc` do not match the `SHA256SUMS` file, and could be the result of a filename change. Do not continue using the binaries, and contact the maintainers, if this is not the case, a failure here means that the verification failed.
Next we verify that the binaries match the ones in the manifest:
```shell
-sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
+sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9 SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9-arm64 SHA256SUMS-v26.06.9-armv7
```
Producing output similar to the following:
```shell
-sha256sum: clightning-v24.11-Fedora-35-amd64.tar.gz: No such file or directory
-clightning-v24.11-Fedora-35-amd64.tar.gz: FAILED open or read
-clightning-v24.11-Ubuntu-22.04.tar.xz: OK
-clightning-v24.11-Ubuntu-24.04.tar.xz: OK
-clightning-v24.11-Ubuntu-26.04.tar.xz: OK
-clightning-v24.11.zip: OK
-sha256sum: WARNING: 1 listed file could not be read
+clightning-v26.06.9-Fedora-40-amd64.tar.gz: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9-Ubuntu-22.04-amd64.tar.xz: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9-Ubuntu-24.04-amd64.tar.xz: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9-Ubuntu-26.04-amd64.tar.xz: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9.zip: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9-Ubuntu-22.04-arm64.tar.xz: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9-Ubuntu-24.04-arm64.tar.xz: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9-Ubuntu-26.04-arm64.tar.xz: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9-Ubuntu-22.04-armv7.tar.xz: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9-Ubuntu-24.04-armv7.tar.xz: OK
+clightning-v26.06.9-Ubuntu-26.04-armv7.tar.xz: OK
```
-Notice that the two files we downloaded are marked as `OK`, but we're missing one file. If you didn't download that file this is to be expected, and is nothing to worry about. A failure to verify the hash would give a warning like the following:
+Each file should be marked as `OK`. If you only downloaded some of the files, add `--ignore-missing` to skip the ones you don't have. A failure to verify the hash would give a warning like the following:
```shell
sha256sum: WARNING: 1 computed checksum did NOT matchWhy this scored 15/100
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