LDK
← All projectsLightning Dev Kit

rust-lightning

Composable Rust libraries for building Lightning wallets, nodes, and services.

BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

1924 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

300security candidates261second-pass queue1606AI analyses
175commits · 30 days
261commits · 60 days
636commits · 180 days
1314commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 6819 seen18 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6468 seen16 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 6128 seen8 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 561 seen3 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
704Strong · 80–100
856Adequate · 60–79
302Thin · 40–59
62Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Matt Corallo58679418876
Elias Rohrer15415153667
auto-pr-bot571823287
Jeffrey Czyz19645182169
Wilmer Paulino15945155169
Valentine Wallace15715145169
Leo Nash11613116162
Vincenzo Palazzo11311183
Joost Jager16324162069
elnosh401434059
shaavan22622069
wpaulino2059082
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 55 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Correct FeeEstimator docs on the 253 sat/kW lower bound

This is a documentation-only edit. It corrects a misleading comment in the code that wrongly claimed all fee estimates returned to LDK are forced to be at least 253 satoshis per 1000 weight units. The new comment clarifies that this minimu…

ea2051feby auto-pr-bot+9−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Track splice confirmation while awaiting tx_signatures' (#5570)

This change fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing logic. During a splice, one side can broadcast the new funding transaction as soon as it has the other side's signatures. Previously, if that transaction confirmed on-chain before the…

State-machine inconsistency in channel funding lifecycleMissing chain-source watch for in-flight splice funding transactionPotential failure to send splice_locked after splice confirms during signature exchange
ca778e61by Matt Corallo+245−32 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 63 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Account for current HTLC fees in dust exposure' (#5690)

This change fixes how Lightning nodes calculate the financial risk from tiny ('dust') HTLCs when the current on-chain fee rate is higher than the node's own local fee estimate. Previously, the code only considered a buffered fee rate when …

Incorrect fee exposure accounting for dust HTLCsPotential to accept HTLCs whose commitment/HTLC-success fees exceed their value under current feerateEconomic griefing / forced-channel-closure cost manipulation
cc798f60by Matt Corallo+108−382 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test' (#5689)

This is a one-line code cleanup in a test file. It replaces a cloned array literal with a slice reference to silence a Rust compiler lint. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no functional behavior change.

03ca832fby Matt Corallo+1−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test

This is a one-line change in a test file to satisfy a Rust linter warning. It replaces a needless clone of a funding transaction with a reference-based slice construction. There is no functional change, no user-facing behavior change, and …

93e0129cby auto-pr-bot+1−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Fix CI: rebuild test coin-selection impl and rework reused-ID balance test' (#5684)

This commit is a test-only fix for a broken continuous integration (CI) build. It updates a test mock to match a new function signature and rewrites an existing test to use three nodes instead of two so the test scenario remains valid unde…

17bac68aby Matt Corallo+26−202 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 68 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Guard pending closing signatures before channel_ready' (#5681)

This change fixes a Lightning channel bug where a malicious peer could renegotiate the closing transaction fee while the local node was still waiting for its own signer to produce the final signature. If allowed, the local node might combi…

State-machine guard expansion to prevent fee renegotiation while a closing signature is pendingRisk of combining mismatched signatures across different closing feesRegression test demonstrates malicious peer renegotiation attempt and expected warning rejection
a01273a2by Matt Corallo+169−21 file
No security note in commit
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Release wallet UTXOs when FundingBuilder rejects a coin selection' (#5634)

This change fixes a wallet bug in rust-lightning where a UTXO could be selected for a Lightning funding transaction, then rejected because its previous transaction was too large to fit in a Lightning peer message. Previously, that rejectio…

API change to CoinSelectionSource::select_confirmed_utxos adding max_input_prevtx_serialized_lenWalletSync filters UTXOs by prevtx serialized length before selectionFundingBuilder enforces Lightning tx_add_input message-size limit at selection time
56054190by Matt Corallo+148−155 files
No security note in commit
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Refuse to pay BOLT 12 invoices with records above experimental range

This commit hardens LDK's BOLT 12 payment logic so it refuses to pay invoices containing very large unknown record types (4 billion and up). These records are legal under the Lightning spec, but LDK doesn't understand them, so the change t…

Defensive refusal to pay invoices with unknown high-numbered TLV recordsReuses existing UnknownRequiredFeatures failure path instead of adding a new oneAdds explicit checks before payment state insertion and route construction
2970372fby auto-pr-bot+106−177 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Read invoice TLV records above the experimental range

This commit fixes a backward-compatibility bug in LDK's BOLT 12 invoice parser. A previous change had capped the range of 'experimental' TLV record types at 4 billion, but the Lightning spec imposes no upper bound. As a result, invoices cr…

Backward-compatibility regression in deserialization of persisted channel monitorsDenial-of-service via unreadable monitor blocking all channel monitoringSpec compliance fix: TLV record types have no upper bound
9e28db58by auto-pr-bot+133−84 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Refuse to sign messages that collide with gossip serializations' (#5677)

This change fixes a security issue where a signed text message could be crafted so that its prefixed form looks exactly like a Lightning 'node_announcement' gossip message. Because both use the same double-SHA256 hash and the same signing …

Signature replay / message confusion between signed messages and gossip announcementsForged `node_announcement` signatures via chosen-prefix message constructionNew validation rejects prefixed messages that deserialize as `UnsignedNodeAnnouncement`
ec40e097by Matt Corallo+74−148 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 37 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Retry a single HTLC before abandoning an unfundable batch' (#5406)

This change fixes a corner case in how the Lightning node tries to claim multiple pending HTLCs (small Bitcoin payments locked in a channel) when the wallet cannot fund a single large batch transaction. Previously, if the multi-HTLC batch …

Funds-recovery robustness improvement: prevents premature abandonment of a single unbatched HTLCChange in error-handling arithmetic from checked_sub/saturating_sub with max(1)New unit tests covering both failed and successful singleton HTLC funding paths
643e8684by wpaulino+119−21 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Refuse to persist fresh monitors that alias archived monitors' (#5645)

This change prevents a Lightning node from accidentally overwriting an archived copy of a channel's security monitor with a brand-new one that happens to use the same identifier. In the old code, if a new channel reused the same identifier…

Data-loss prevention: stops archived ChannelMonitor from being overwritten by a later channel with the same keySafety guard added to both sync and async persistence pathsPersistence refusal surfaces as InProgress/UnrecoverableError rather than silent overwrite
3c606c11by Matt Corallo+298−332 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 52 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Handle fee multiplication overflow when merging MPP paths' (#5288)

This change fixes a place in the Lightning payment routing code where adding up fees could overflow the maximum number a computer can store in a 64-bit integer. Previously, the code assumed this could never happen and would crash (panic) i…

Integer overflow in fee computationPreviously unreachable!() panic path reachableMPP path merge could trigger overflow
25f8a740by Matt Corallo+42−171 file
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Resume channels stuck awaiting a completed monitor persistence on reload' (#5610)

This commit fixes a bug where a Lightning node could get stuck after restarting. If the node crashed or restarted while it was still saving the initial channel monitor to disk, and that save later finished in another process, the restarted…

Fixes a state-machine stall on node reload that could leave channels non-functionalRemoves an overstrict assertion that would panic on a legitimate post-reload stateAdds explicit detection of monitor persistence completed in a prior process
11815ed1by Matt Corallo+334−74 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Correct KeysManager docs on spliced channels' remote_key derivation' (#5609)

This change only updates documentation and code comments in the Lightning Dev Kit library. It clarifies that a particular key-derivation setting is fixed when a channel is first opened and is not changed by splicing. No code behavior was a…

83a4d243by Matt Corallo+17−91 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Fix DelayedPaymentKey/HtlcKey from_basepoint docs and document justice tx witness script' (#5596)

This commit only changes documentation comments in two source files. It corrects the wording of how certain public keys are derived in the Lightning protocol and adds details about which witness script a signer must use when creating justi…

Documentation-only changeClarifies key derivation semantics for Lightning commitment transactionsClarifies justice transaction witness script requirements for signers
2f832195by Matt Corallo+44−62 files
No security note in commit
Informational 19 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Document that TokioSpawner requires all of LDK in a tokio context' (#5621)

This change only adds documentation comments to a Rust struct. It does not modify any executable code, so it cannot by itself introduce or fix a security vulnerability. The new text warns developers that using TokioSpawner incorrectly can …

Documentation-only changeNo code logic modifiedNo unsafe blocks added
6e555fa2by Matt Corallo+11−01 file
No security note in commit
High 70 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Make custom signers verify holder commitment sigs synchronously' (#5616)

This commit hardens how Lightning Dev Kit handles custom signing modules. Previously, LDK relied on each custom signer to check that the other party's signatures on a holder commitment transaction were valid. The change adds a ready-made v…

New synchronous signature-verification helper for holder commitment transactionsTrait documentation now mandates verification before Ok(()) because LDK acts immediatelyInMemorySigner now validates that holder funding key belongs to signer before signature checks
0e3b6d33by Matt Corallo+324−954 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Refuse channel_ready while the initial funding_signed is pending' (#5612)

This update fixes a corner case in the Lightning Dev Kit where a node could get confused if it received a 'channel_ready' message while still waiting for its own signer to produce the first commitment signature. The patch makes the node re…

State-machine confusion between funding_signed and channel_ready in async signer flowPremature channel_ready could advance counterparty_next_commitment_point before initial commitment is signedPatch closes channel rather than allowing inconsistent commitment state
d68d2235by Matt Corallo+101−12 files
No security note in commit
Repository ledger

Explore captured commits

Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.

Security candidateMerge PR 'Drop since-applied blocked monitor updates before the stale-channel check' (#5046)by Matt Corallo · 49ed7c35 · Oct 1, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 64Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'Drop since-applied blocked monitor updates before the stale-channel check' (#5046)

from drop-applied-blocked-mon-updates into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5046
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This patch fixes a bug in the Lightning Dev Kit's channel startup logic. Previously, if a user's ChannelManager state was older than their ChannelMonitor, the code would force-close the channel and incorrectly fail backwards (cancel) any HTLCs that were added in a monitor update that had already been applied. The fix drops those already-applied blocked updates before doing the stale check, so HTLCs the counterparty is already committed to are not wrongly canceled. This could have caused payment failures or loss of funds in edge cases involving stale backups.

Security candidateRevert "Pass entropy source when queueing monitor event"by Valentine Wallace · 8f793eb7 · Sep 30, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Valentine Wallace

Revert "Pass entropy source when queueing monitor event"

This reverts commit 6798ec9406e3f7dc7247e7423637c8d9ed98ace3.

We previously used the entropy source to generate random monitor event IDs, but
have since started generating the IDs deterministically.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
entropy or randomness
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit is a straightforward code cleanup: it removes an unused 'entropy source' argument that was previously passed around when creating monitor events. The project now generates those event IDs deterministically, so the randomness source is no longer needed. There is no indication this fixes a security bug; it is an API simplification and refactoring change.

Security candidateRevert "ChainMonitor::_entropy_source -> ::entropy_source"by Valentine Wallace · e0c0bcdd · Sep 30, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Valentine Wallace

Revert "ChainMonitor::_entropy_source -> ::entropy_source"

This reverts commit 721265b34802956e6c34f8b4f8c36b772a812044.

We previously used the entropy source to generate random monitor event IDs, but
have since started generating the IDs deterministically.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
entropy or randomness
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply renames a field inside the ChainMonitor struct from `entropy_source` back to `_entropy_source`. The leading underscore is a Rust convention meaning 'this field is intentionally unused.' The commit message explains the field is no longer needed for generating random monitor event IDs because those IDs are now created deterministically. The entropy source is still used in one peer-storage feature path, so it is kept in the struct but marked as mostly unused. There is no security bug being fixed here—this is a code cleanup/revert of a previous naming change.

Security candidateMerge PR 'Don't track refused monitor updates as pending' (#5030)by Matt Corallo · 47850384 · Sep 28, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 57Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'Don't track refused monitor updates as pending' (#5030)

from 2026-09-refused-upds-not-pending into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5030
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 57/100

This patch fixes a bookkeeping bug in rust-lightning's ChainMonitor. When a channel monitor refuses an update (for example, because the channel is already force-closing), the code used to still record that update as 'pending completion.' Because refused updates are never later marked complete, the pending entry could sit around indefinitely and potentially block follow-up completion actions such as marking a payment as claimed. The change only adds the update to the pending list when the monitor actually accepted it.

Security candidateMerge PR 'Persistent `MonitorEvent`s' (#4491)by wpaulino · 9a324e72 · Sep 25, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 76 · AdequateModerate 55Details
Commit message · wpaulino

Merge PR 'Persistent `MonitorEvent`s' (#4491)

from valentinewallace/2026-03-persistent-mon-evs into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4491

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 55/100

This commit makes on-chain 'MonitorEvent' notifications durable and replay-safe. Previously, if a node crashed after a ChannelMonitor persisted a block update but before the ChannelManager processed the resulting event, the event could be lost. That could cause a forwarding node to miss an HTLC preimage or timeout, potentially leading to stuck payments or loss of funds. The fix assigns each event a random ID, keeps unacknowledged events in the monitor, replays them after restart, and requires the ChannelManager to acknowledge them once processed. It also prevents monitors from being archived while they still have unacknowledged events.

Security candidateMerge PR 'Fix payment attribution edge cases and simplify claiming' (#5021)by Matt Corallo · ee7c61c2 · Sep 25, 2026 · 22 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 47Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'Fix payment attribution edge cases and simplify claiming' (#5021)

from fulfillment-prerequisites into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5021
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathboot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 47/100

This commit refactors how LDK nodes claim incoming Lightning payments. It replaces a separate 'claim with known custom TLVs' method with an options struct passed to the normal claim call, and fixes two edge cases in payment attribution data used for timing analysis: it caps failure-packet size to prevent oversized messages and ensures trampoline-style forwarded claims start fresh attribution rather than reusing downstream data. The changes are mostly defensive correctness fixes rather than an active vulnerability patch.

AI review queuedMerge PR 'release utxos from failed splices' (#4973)by jkczyz · 7220a6fd · Sep 25, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 47Details
Commit message · jkczyz

Merge PR 'release utxos from failed splices' (#4973)

from release-utxos into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4973
Reviewed-by: jkczyz <jkczyz@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 47/100

This change fixes a wallet bookkeeping problem in rust-lightning's built-in coin-selection wrappers. Previously, when a splice attempt failed or coin selection errored after picking UTXOs, those UTXOs stayed marked as 'reserved' in memory and could not be selected again, even though they were no longer actually being used. The patch adds a release_utxos method that callers must invoke when a funded transaction is discarded, and also releases UTXOs automatically if selection fails partway through. Without the fix, a user's wallet could appear to run out of spendable funds after failed splices or selection errors.

AI review queuedRestore `Wallet` UTXO locks when coin selection fails afterwardsby elnosh · 81afd9ca · Sep 25, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateLow 49Details
Commit message · elnosh

Restore `Wallet` UTXO locks when coin selection fails afterwards

`Wallet` locks the UTXOs it selects before fetching the change script
and the previous transactions from the `WalletSource`. If either of
those fails, the selection is discarded but the UTXOs stay locked.
Record the previous lock entry of every UTXO a selection locks and put
it back if the selection fails afterwards.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 49/100

This commit fixes a bug in the wallet's coin-selection code. When the wallet picked UTXOs to spend, it locked them immediately so they couldn't be reused. But if a later step—fetching the change address or the previous transaction—failed, the selection was thrown away while the UTXOs stayed locked. That could permanently or temporarily freeze funds that should have been spendable. The patch records each UTXO's prior lock state and restores it when the later step fails, and adds tests proving both newly locked and previously-locked UTXOs are handled correctly.

AI review queuedHold back HTLC monitor events while updates are in-flightby Valentine Wallace · 8c17c4a9 · Sep 23, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 57Details
Commit message · Valentine Wallace

Hold back HTLC monitor events while updates are in-flight

A ChannelMonitor applies a ChannelMonitorUpdate in-memory before the update
has been durably persisted, and may queue a MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent based on
the update's contents.

Acting on such an event before the update which generated it is persisted will
become unsafe when we begin generating monitor events for off-chain HTLC
failures: if we crash and lose the update that triggered the monitor event, we
lose the counterparty's revocation of the state containing the HTLC, yet we may
have already told the user that the payment failed.

Thus, have the ChainMonitor hold back a monitor's HTLC events while it has any
in-flight updates, and document the same requirement on
Watch::release_pending_monitor_events. Other monitor events, e.g. channel
closures, are still released immediately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 57/100

This commit fixes a crash-recovery safety issue in the Lightning Dev Kit's channel monitor. Before the fix, the code could report a failed payment to the user based on a state change that had not yet been saved to disk. If the program crashed right after reporting the failure, it might restart without the counterparty's revocation that justified the failure, potentially leading to inconsistent payment state. The fix delays payment-failure notifications until the underlying state change has been durably saved.

Security candidateDon't track refused monitor updates as pendingby Valentine Wallace · ada0cb7a · Sep 18, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 68 · AdequateModerate 66Details
Commit message · Valentine Wallace

Don't track refused monitor updates as pending

When a monitor update is rejected by the monitor (e.g. a stale commitment
update applied after funding spend), it's possible that that update modified
the monitor's state. Therefore, the ChainMonitor will respond by persisting the
entire monitor and not persisting the individual rejected update.

However, prior to this patch, if the above whole-monitor-persist returned
InProgress, the monitor would erroneously track the rejected monitor update as
pending-persist, even though that update was never handed to the persister in
the first place, so implementations would never know to call
channel_monitor_updated with the rejected update's ID.

This dangling pending update can then block emission of
MonitorEvent::Completed, blocking ChannelManager's completion actions (e.g.
PaymentClaimed) until restart. In the case of payment forwards, if this bug
blocked the resumption of another channel, it could lead to an HTLC timing out
and a force close.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 66/100

This patch fixes a bookkeeping bug in rust-lightning's ChainMonitor. When a monitor update is rejected (for example, because the channel funding has already been spent), the code may persist the entire monitor instead of the individual update. If that full-monitor save was still in progress, the system incorrectly recorded the rejected update as 'pending completion.' Because the rejected update was never actually handed to the persister, it would never complete, leaving a dangling pending entry. That could stall important channel events, and in payment-forwarding scenarios could contribute to an HTLC timeout and a forced channel closure.

AI review queuedMerge PR 'tx-sync: Parallelize esplora status queries' (#4913)by Matt Corallo · c303f515 · Sep 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'tx-sync: Parallelize esplora status queries' (#4913)

from max/2026-08-20-upstream-parallelize-esplora into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4913
Reviewed-by: tnull <tnull@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit rewrites how a Lightning wallet talks to Esplora block-explorer servers so that many status checks happen in parallel instead of one at a time. It is a performance/refactoring change. There is no direct evidence in the commit that it fixes a security vulnerability, but it does add a small amount of new error-handling logic and changes timing/ordering assumptions that could affect correctness if the server returns inconsistent data.

AI review queuedMerge PR 'Skip Electrum creator transaction downloads' (#4992)by Matt Corallo · c36e50cb · Sep 14, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 30Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'Skip Electrum creator transaction downloads' (#4992)

from 2026-09-electrum-skip-creator-download into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4992
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 30/100

This change stops the Electrum-based transaction sync client from downloading the very transaction that created an output it is watching. Previously, the client could request that transaction from Electrum, even though a transaction can never spend its own output. This wasted bandwidth and could leak slightly more information to the Electrum server than necessary. The patch adds a simple skip and a test that verifies no such download happens.

AI review queuedMerge PR 'Use preferred sPK of watched txn in electrum, not rand ones' (#4867)by tnull · bfe5ca89 · Sep 14, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 44Details
Commit message · tnull

Merge PR 'Use preferred sPK of watched txn in electrum, not rand ones' (#4867)

from 2026-08-spk-electrum into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4867
Reviewed-by: tnull <tnull@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 44/100

This change improves how the Lightning Dev Kit's Electrum and Esplora transaction-sync clients track watched Bitcoin transactions. Previously, the code ignored the script pubkey (the 'address' associated with a transaction) supplied when registering a transaction, and instead picked an arbitrary output from the transaction when querying Electrum servers. The patch now records and prefers the script pubkey(s) the caller actually registered, falling back to an arbitrary non-OP_RETURN output only when needed. This makes the wallet more robust against Electrum servers that may not index certain script types (like OP_RETURN), and against callers that register a transaction with an incorrect script pubkey. It is a hardening fix rather than a clear-cut vulnerability patch, because the commit message and diff do not describe a specific exploitable bug.

AI review queuedMerge PR 'Serialize transient Event variants; move persist decision into ChannelManager' (#4791)by Matt Corallo · a0d4632e · Sep 11, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 33Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'Serialize transient Event variants; move persist decision into ChannelManager' (#4791)

from 4741-serialize-all-events into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4791
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 33/100

This commit changes how LDK stores pending event notifications. It adds serialization support for several event types that previously were not fully saved to disk, and introduces a helper method so the code can decide which events are worth keeping across restarts. The commit is a defensive correctness improvement: it makes event persistence more consistent and prevents stale or meaningless events from being replayed after a node restarts. It does not appear to fix an active exploit, but it removes a class of bugs where an event could be silently lost or mishandled around restarts.

Security candidateMerge PR 'Document that funding signing events can go stale' (#4960)by Matt Corallo · 26eecf2d · Sep 9, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'Document that funding signing events can go stale' (#4960)

from bot/4951-fundingtransactionreadyforsignin-fa0568 into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4960
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds documentation comments to two source files. It explains that certain funding-signing events can become stale if the underlying negotiation fails, and that callers may see specific harmless errors as a result. No code behavior was changed.

AI review queuedAdd `Wallet::release_utxos` to free UTXOs from abandoned transactionsby elnosh · 52ab13fd · Sep 8, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 58Details
Commit message · elnosh

Add `Wallet::release_utxos` to free UTXOs from abandoned transactions

`Wallet` reserves every UTXO it selects and, for selections made without
a `ClaimId` such as splice contributions, refuses to offer them to any
later selection. Since a reservation is never dropped, inputs from a
splice that failed to negotiate stayed reserved for the life of the
process, and repeated failures could leave no UTXOs available for anchor
or HTLC claims.

Add `release_utxos` to `Wallet` and `WalletSync` so users can free the
inputs reported in `Event::DiscardFunding`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 58/100

This commit fixes a design flaw in LDK's built-in wallet helper where coins selected for a splice-in (or other unclaimed funding) were permanently reserved in memory if the transaction was abandoned. Over repeated failed splices, all spendable coins could become locked, preventing the node from paying on-chain fees for time-critical Lightning transactions such as HTLC or anchor claims. The patch adds a new release_utxos method that callers must invoke using the inputs reported by Event::DiscardFunding.

Security candidateDrop the honggfuzz version pin from the CI fuzz jobby auto-pr-bot · 4a1635ef · Sep 8, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot

Drop the honggfuzz version pin from the CI fuzz job

The pin only ever existed because the job ran on our MSRV toolchain while
honggfuzz's own MSRV had moved past it, so each honggfuzz release broke
the job until someone picked an older version to install. With the job on
stable there is nothing left for the pin to guard: `cargo install
honggfuzz` and the `honggfuzz` 0.5 dependency the fuzz targets link
against both resolve to the current release, which is what we want to be
fuzzing with anyway.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Fixes #4968

Requested-by: @matt
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/4968#issuecomment-445091

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit removes a fixed-version pin for the honggfuzz fuzzing tool in a continuous-integration script. The project now uses the current release of honggfuzz instead of an older pinned version. There is no change to the actual Lightning protocol code, wallet logic, or any code that end users run in production.

AI review queuedRun the CI fuzz job on the stable toolchainby auto-pr-bot · 21c4ed2b · Sep 8, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 86 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot

Run the CI fuzz job on the stable toolchain

@matt asked:

> Failing to build this time.
>
> ```
> error: cannot install package `honggfuzz 0.5.62`, it requires rustc 1.85 or newer, while the currently active rustc version is 1.75.0
> `honggfuzz 0.5.61` supports rustc 1.70
> ```
>
> @auto-pr-bot please fix.

The `fuzz` job doesn't compile anything we ship, it builds the fuzz
targets against `honggfuzz` and then runs them. That the targets build on
our MSRV is checked by the `fuzz_sanity` job, which compiles both fuzz
crates with 1.75 on every push, so there is nothing the `fuzz` job adds
by using the MSRV toolchain itself.

What it does add is a dependency on `honggfuzz` still supporting our
MSRV. It doesn't: 0.5.62 requires rustc 1.85, so the job can only install
progressively older releases of a tool we merely need to run, and each
`honggfuzz` MSRV bump breaks the job until someone moves the pin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Requested-by: @matt
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/4968

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencesecond-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit changes the Rust toolchain used in the continuous integration (CI) fuzzing job from a fixed older version (1.75) to the latest stable release. It is purely a build/test infrastructure change to fix a dependency compatibility issue with the honggfuzz fuzzing tool. It does not change any shipped code, user-facing behavior, or security-sensitive logic.

Security candidateExpose the dummy-hop tail constructor publiclyby auto-pr-bot · c5443353 · Sep 8, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot

Expose the dummy-hop tail constructor publicly

@matt asked on the diff:

> @auto-pr-bot this and the remining fns in this impl block shouldn't be
> crate-public.

@matt asked on the diff:

> @auto-pr-bot this should be public.

`BlindedPaymentPath::new_with_dummy_hops` is public, but the `DummyTlvs` it
takes could only be built by hand, leaving external callers to rederive the
per-hop constraint chaining themselves. Expose the constructor that does it,
and document what the returned upstream constraints are for.

The entropy source is only unused under `cfg(test)`, so name the parameter
rather than leaving an underscore-prefixed one in the public signature.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

Requested-by: @matt
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4501#issuecomment-445043
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4501#issuecomment-445044

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
entropy or randomnesssigning boundary
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit makes a previously internal helper function public so that outside developers can build dummy-hop tails for blinded payment paths without recreating the logic themselves. It is an API usability change, not a fix for a known security bug. The function's behavior is unchanged; only its visibility and documentation were updated.

Security candidateFail commitment sig verification without counterparty paramsby auto-pr-bot · de7ecc2f · Sep 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongModerate 54Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot

Fail commitment sig verification without counterparty params

@matt asked on the diff:

> @auto-pr-bot this example is adding nothing to public docs, please
> remove it.

@matt asked on the diff:

> Since this is now the "primary" error message we send to peers,
> @auto-pr-bot please change this to read "Received commitment sigs failed
> verification". Same for the version in `validate_commitment_signed`.

@matt asked on the diff:

> @auto-pr-bot just for extra belt-and-suspenders, can you add
> `debug_assert!(false);`, `log_error(...)` and a failure return if the
> `channel_transaction_parameters` is missing `counterparty_parameters`?
> Same for the similar code in `validate_commitment_signed`.

Verifying the counterparty's signatures on a holder commitment requires
their funding pubkey and selected contest delay, so with
`counterparty_parameters` unset we'd panic somewhere down in building the
commitment transaction. That should never happen, as we only accept
`commitment_signed` (initial or otherwise) once the counterparty's
parameters are known, but rather than risk a panic on a peer-driven path
we now log and close the channel. As on the other failure paths here, we
clear the funding outpoint for inbound channels first, so that we don't
broadcast a commitment for funding the counterparty may never publish.

Requested-by: @matt
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4885#issuecomment-444803
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4885#issuecomment-444937
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4885#issuecomment-444942

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validation
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100

This change adds a safety check in a Bitcoin Lightning Network library (LDK). Previously, if the software tried to verify a peer's commitment signature before it had learned the peer's channel parameters, it could crash with a panic. Now it logs an error and closes the channel gracefully instead. The commit message says this situation should never happen in normal operation, so this is defensive hardening against a potential peer-triggered crash.

Security candidateClarify the commitment validation failure messageby auto-pr-bot · 3284a006 · Sep 7, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 100 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot

Clarify the commitment validation failure message

@matt asked on the diff:

> @auto-pr-bot this example is adding nothing to public docs, please
> remove it.

@matt asked on the diff:

> Since this is now the "primary" error message we send to peers,
> @auto-pr-bot please change this to read "Received commitment sigs failed
> verification". Same for the version in `validate_commitment_signed`.

@matt asked on the diff:

> @auto-pr-bot just for extra belt-and-suspenders, can you add
> `debug_assert!(false);`, `log_error(...)` and a failure return if the
> `channel_transaction_parameters` is missing `counterparty_parameters`?
> Same for the similar code in `validate_commitment_signed`.

Now that no signature checking remains in channel, this error is what we
send our peer whenever the holder commitment they sent us fails to
validate - because their signatures don't verify, but also, e.g., because
the commitment has no outputs at all. Say so, rather than the vaguer
"Failed to validate our commitment", which reads as though the fault were
on our side.

Requested-by: @matt
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4885#issuecomment-444803
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4885#issuecomment-444937
Link: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4885#issuecomment-444942

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes the wording of an error message sent to peers when a commitment transaction fails validation. It replaces the vague phrase 'Failed to validate our commitment' with the clearer 'Received commitment failed validation'. No code logic, signature checks, or security behavior is altered. It is a documentation/clarity improvement, not a security fix.

AI review queuedMerge PR 'Move holder commit sig checks to `InMemorySigner`' (#4885)by Matt Corallo · 83f5ba55 · Sep 7, 2026 · 24 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 61Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'Move holder commit sig checks to `InMemorySigner`' (#4885)

from 2026-08-signer-validates-commits into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4885
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
defensive validationsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: unusually broad changesecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 61/100

This commit moves the checks that validate a counterparty's signatures on the holder's commitment and HTLC transactions out of the general channel code and into the signer module (InMemorySigner). Previously, these signature checks were done directly inside the channel state machine. Now, the signer itself is responsible for verifying those signatures. This is a security-relevant refactor: it makes the signer the authoritative place for validating signatures, which is important for users running LDK with external or hardware signers. The commit also adds tests that corrupt signatures to ensure invalid signatures are rejected. There is no direct evidence in the commit message or diff that this fixes a known exploitable vulnerability, but it strengthens the architecture so that custom signers cannot accidentally skip these checks.

Security candidateMerge PR 'Drop stale splice signature on disconnect' (#4954)by Matt Corallo · c9a77251 · Sep 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 86 · StrongLow 42Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'Drop stale splice signature on disconnect' (#4954)

from drop-stale-splice-sig-on-disconnect into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4954
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 42/100

This change fixes a Lightning channel splicing bug: when two peers temporarily disconnect during a splice, any half-finished signature the other side already sent is now discarded. Before the fix, that stale signature could be reused after reconnecting, which might let a peer apply an old splice state or confuse the channel re-establishment logic. The patch is small and adds a test showing the signature is dropped and no monitor update occurs at that point.

Security candidateDrop stale splice signature on disconnectby Wilmer Paulino · 71405b4b · Sep 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 58Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino

Drop stale splice signature on disconnect

An initial splice `commitment_signed` can be buffered while waiting for
the user to provide funding signatures. While this was dropped after a
node restart as it's only intended to be live & in-memory state, it was
not dropped after a disconnection. This could lead to a duplicate
message being received after the negotiation has already completed,
leading to a force close.

This was discovered by the `chanmon_consistency` fuzzer via:

06a4721e111911191119401119407019bd411a1f0d91401119111911194070bec111b70e5df11611ffffffffffffffff411f0aa97210b6ff21b6ff5ba2ffad10

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Moderate 58/100

This fix prevents a Lightning channel from being accidentally force-closed. During a splice (a way to resize a payment channel), one side's initial signature could be kept in memory after the peers disconnected. If the peers later reconnected and finished the splice, that old buffered signature could be processed again, triggering a safety shutdown (force close) of the channel. The patch now clears that buffered signature when the connection drops, just like it was already cleared on restart.

Security candidateMerge PR 'offers: rename matches_invoice_signing_pubkey to key_can_sign_invoice' (#4942)by Matt Corallo · a476cf92 · Aug 31, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Merge PR 'offers: rename matches_invoice_signing_pubkey to key_can_sign_invoice' (#4942)

from offer-key-can-sign-invoice into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4942
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit is a simple rename of a public function from `matches_invoice_signing_pubkey` to `key_can_sign_invoice`, plus matching updates to its documentation, callers, tests, and changelog. No behavior changed. It is not a security fix.