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This is a documentation-only edit. It corrects a misleading comment in the code that wrongly claimed all fee estimates returned to LDK are forced to be at least 253 satoshis per 1000 weight units. The new comment clarifies that this minimu…
This change fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing logic. During a splice, one side can broadcast the new funding transaction as soon as it has the other side's signatures. Previously, if that transaction confirmed on-chain before the…
State-machine inconsistency in channel funding lifecycleMissing chain-source watch for in-flight splice funding transactionPotential failure to send splice_locked after splice confirms during signature exchange
This change fixes how Lightning nodes calculate the financial risk from tiny ('dust') HTLCs when the current on-chain fee rate is higher than the node's own local fee estimate. Previously, the code only considered a buffered fee rate when …
Incorrect fee exposure accounting for dust HTLCsPotential to accept HTLCs whose commitment/HTLC-success fees exceed their value under current feerateEconomic griefing / forced-channel-closure cost manipulation
This is a one-line code cleanup in a test file. It replaces a cloned array literal with a slice reference to silence a Rust compiler lint. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no functional behavior change.
This is a one-line change in a test file to satisfy a Rust linter warning. It replaces a needless clone of a funding transaction with a reference-based slice construction. There is no functional change, no user-facing behavior change, and …
This commit is a test-only fix for a broken continuous integration (CI) build. It updates a test mock to match a new function signature and rewrites an existing test to use three nodes instead of two so the test scenario remains valid unde…
This change fixes a Lightning channel bug where a malicious peer could renegotiate the closing transaction fee while the local node was still waiting for its own signer to produce the final signature. If allowed, the local node might combi…
State-machine guard expansion to prevent fee renegotiation while a closing signature is pendingRisk of combining mismatched signatures across different closing feesRegression test demonstrates malicious peer renegotiation attempt and expected warning rejection
This change fixes a wallet bug in rust-lightning where a UTXO could be selected for a Lightning funding transaction, then rejected because its previous transaction was too large to fit in a Lightning peer message. Previously, that rejectio…
API change to CoinSelectionSource::select_confirmed_utxos adding max_input_prevtx_serialized_lenWalletSync filters UTXOs by prevtx serialized length before selectionFundingBuilder enforces Lightning tx_add_input message-size limit at selection time
This commit hardens LDK's BOLT 12 payment logic so it refuses to pay invoices containing very large unknown record types (4 billion and up). These records are legal under the Lightning spec, but LDK doesn't understand them, so the change t…
Defensive refusal to pay invoices with unknown high-numbered TLV recordsReuses existing UnknownRequiredFeatures failure path instead of adding a new oneAdds explicit checks before payment state insertion and route construction
This commit fixes a backward-compatibility bug in LDK's BOLT 12 invoice parser. A previous change had capped the range of 'experimental' TLV record types at 4 billion, but the Lightning spec imposes no upper bound. As a result, invoices cr…
Backward-compatibility regression in deserialization of persisted channel monitorsDenial-of-service via unreadable monitor blocking all channel monitoringSpec compliance fix: TLV record types have no upper bound
This change fixes a security issue where a signed text message could be crafted so that its prefixed form looks exactly like a Lightning 'node_announcement' gossip message. Because both use the same double-SHA256 hash and the same signing …
Signature replay / message confusion between signed messages and gossip announcementsForged `node_announcement` signatures via chosen-prefix message constructionNew validation rejects prefixed messages that deserialize as `UnsignedNodeAnnouncement`
This change fixes a corner case in how the Lightning node tries to claim multiple pending HTLCs (small Bitcoin payments locked in a channel) when the wallet cannot fund a single large batch transaction. Previously, if the multi-HTLC batch …
Funds-recovery robustness improvement: prevents premature abandonment of a single unbatched HTLCChange in error-handling arithmetic from checked_sub/saturating_sub with max(1)New unit tests covering both failed and successful singleton HTLC funding paths
This change prevents a Lightning node from accidentally overwriting an archived copy of a channel's security monitor with a brand-new one that happens to use the same identifier. In the old code, if a new channel reused the same identifier…
Data-loss prevention: stops archived ChannelMonitor from being overwritten by a later channel with the same keySafety guard added to both sync and async persistence pathsPersistence refusal surfaces as InProgress/UnrecoverableError rather than silent overwrite
This change fixes a place in the Lightning payment routing code where adding up fees could overflow the maximum number a computer can store in a 64-bit integer. Previously, the code assumed this could never happen and would crash (panic) i…
Integer overflow in fee computationPreviously unreachable!() panic path reachableMPP path merge could trigger overflow
This commit fixes a bug where a Lightning node could get stuck after restarting. If the node crashed or restarted while it was still saving the initial channel monitor to disk, and that save later finished in another process, the restarted…
Fixes a state-machine stall on node reload that could leave channels non-functionalRemoves an overstrict assertion that would panic on a legitimate post-reload stateAdds explicit detection of monitor persistence completed in a prior process
This change only updates documentation and code comments in the Lightning Dev Kit library. It clarifies that a particular key-derivation setting is fixed when a channel is first opened and is not changed by splicing. No code behavior was a…
This commit only changes documentation comments in two source files. It corrects the wording of how certain public keys are derived in the Lightning protocol and adds details about which witness script a signer must use when creating justi…
Documentation-only changeClarifies key derivation semantics for Lightning commitment transactionsClarifies justice transaction witness script requirements for signers
This change only adds documentation comments to a Rust struct. It does not modify any executable code, so it cannot by itself introduce or fix a security vulnerability. The new text warns developers that using TokioSpawner incorrectly can …
This commit hardens how Lightning Dev Kit handles custom signing modules. Previously, LDK relied on each custom signer to check that the other party's signatures on a holder commitment transaction were valid. The change adds a ready-made v…
New synchronous signature-verification helper for holder commitment transactionsTrait documentation now mandates verification before Ok(()) because LDK acts immediatelyInMemorySigner now validates that holder funding key belongs to signer before signature checks
This update fixes a corner case in the Lightning Dev Kit where a node could get confused if it received a 'channel_ready' message while still waiting for its own signer to produce the first commitment signature. The patch makes the node re…
State-machine confusion between funding_signed and channel_ready in async signer flowPremature channel_ready could advance counterparty_next_commitment_point before initial commitment is signedPatch closes channel rather than allowing inconsistent commitment state
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Lower-priorityMerge PR 'Fix inverted staleness direction in monitor-reload comment' (#5701)by Matt Corallo · cc939f65 · Nov 22, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Fix inverted staleness direction in monitor-reload comment' (#5701)
from bot/5610-resume-channels-stuck-awaiting-a-ace0bb into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5701 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
merge-commit duplicate discount
Lower-priorityMerge PR 'Correct FeeEstimator docs on the 253 sat/kW lower bound' (#5702)by Matt Corallo · c1ad32e7 · Nov 21, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Correct FeeEstimator docs on the 253 sat/kW lower bound' (#5702)
from bot/5649-feeestimator-incorrectly-claims-d2fc4d into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5702 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
merge-commit duplicate discount
Security candidateCorrect FeeEstimator docs on the 253 sat/kW lower boundby auto-pr-bot · ea2051fe · Nov 21, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Correct FeeEstimator docs on the 253 sat/kW lower bound
@matt asked in #5649:
> @auto-pr-bot please fix `FeeEstimator`'s documentation - while lightning > protocol things always use a feerate of at least 253, not everything does, > nor should everything now that feerates can be below 1.0 sat/vB. > `OutputSweeper`, notably, accepts a lower feerate.
The trait's docs claimed LDK always bounds the value returned by `get_est_sat_per_1000_weight` below by 253 sats/KW, but that bound is only applied where lightning protocol feerates are required, via the `LowerBoundedFeeEstimator` wrapper. Callers outside channel management use the estimate as-is; most notably `OutputSweeper` passes the value returned for `ConfirmationTarget::OutputSpendingFee` straight to the output spender, so implementations must not rely on LDK enforcing a minimum.
Documentation-only change; no behavioural difference.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secure hardware boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a documentation-only edit. It corrects a misleading comment in the code that wrongly claimed all fee estimates returned to LDK are forced to be at least 253 satoshis per 1000 weight units. The new comment clarifies that this minimum only applies to Lightning protocol fee rates, not to all uses of the fee estimate. No code behavior changes.
Lower-priorityMerge PR 'Fix over-estimate of path max contribution with >= 100% fees' (#5696)by Matt Corallo · 98af38c9 · Nov 21, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Fix over-estimate of path max contribution with >= 100% fees' (#5696)
from auto-pr-bot/bot/127-proportional-fee-100-can-hit-deb-071fd9 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5696 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
merge-commit duplicate discount
Lower-priorityMerge PR 'Persist LiquidityManager during final shutdown' (#5409)by jkczyz · 58ae707d · Nov 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · jkczyz
Merge PR 'Persist LiquidityManager during final shutdown' (#5409)
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
merge-commit duplicate discount
Lower-priorityMerge PR 'Read channels of any supported type on reload regardless of config' (#5687)by Matt Corallo · 03fa0482 · Nov 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Read channels of any supported type on reload regardless of config' (#5687)
from bot/5643-channelmanager-read-fails-on-cha-52b54e into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5687 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
merge-commit duplicate discount
Lower-priorityMerge PR 'Read BOLT 12 invoice TLVs above 4 billion; refuse to pay them' (#5683)by Matt Corallo · d9895e10 · Nov 20, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
merge-commit duplicate discount
Security candidateMerge PR 'Track splice confirmation while awaiting tx_signatures' (#5570)by Matt Corallo · ca778e61 · Nov 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 54Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Track splice confirmation while awaiting tx_signatures' (#5570)
from bot/5551-splice-never-locks-if-confirmed-7f1dca into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5570 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100
This change fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing logic. During a splice, one side can broadcast the new funding transaction as soon as it has the other side's signatures. Previously, if that transaction confirmed on-chain before the signature exchange completed, the node could fail to notice the confirmation, potentially leaving the channel stuck or sending splice_locked at the wrong time. The patch makes the node track the unconfirmed splice transaction too, so confirmations and reorgs are handled correctly even while signatures are still being exchanged.
Lower-priorityMerge PR 'Durably quarantine gapped monitor updates on restore' (#5658)by Matt Corallo · 4e0c2026 · Nov 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Durably quarantine gapped monitor updates on restore' (#5658)
from bot/5632-durably-quarantine-gapped-update-93064e into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5658 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
merge-commit duplicate discount
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Account for current HTLC fees in dust exposure' (#5690)by Matt Corallo · cc798f60 · Nov 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 63Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Account for current HTLC fees in dust exposure' (#5690)
from tankyleo/leo/2026-11-current-htlc-fee-exposure into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5690 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100
This change fixes how Lightning nodes calculate the financial risk from tiny ('dust') HTLCs when the current on-chain fee rate is higher than the node's own local fee estimate. Previously, the code only considered a buffered fee rate when deciding which HTLCs count as dust and how much extra fee exposure they create. The patch now checks both the actual current fee rate and the buffered fee rate, and uses the worse of the two when limiting how much can be sent. This prevents a node from accepting or sending HTLCs that look safe under a buffered estimate but are actually dust at the current fee rate, which could leave the node paying unexpectedly high commitment transaction fees relative to the HTLC value.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test' (#5689)by Matt Corallo · 03ca832f · Nov 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test' (#5689)
from bot/5664-linting-failing-f44275 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5689 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a one-line code cleanup in a test file. It replaces a cloned array literal with a slice reference to silence a Rust compiler lint. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no functional behavior change.
Security candidateReplace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload testby auto-pr-bot · 93e0129c · Nov 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test
Clippy 1.99 (via `-D warnings` in CI) rejects `[funding_tx.clone()]` inside `assert_eq!` under the `cloned_ref_to_slice_refs` lint: the macro takes its operands by reference, yielding a `&[funding_tx.clone()]` slice reference built from a needless clone.
@matt asked in #5664:
> @auto-pr-bot please fix CI:
Use `core::slice::from_ref(&funding_tx)` as clippy suggests, matching the pattern already used elsewhere in the test suite (e.g. blinded_payment_tests.rs, payment_tests.rs). This also drops the clone of the funding transaction; `funding_tx` is still owned and used later in the test.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a one-line change in a test file to satisfy a Rust linter warning. It replaces a needless clone of a funding transaction with a reference-based slice construction. There is no functional change, no user-facing behavior change, and no security relevance.
Lower-priorityMerge PR 'Fixes to skimmed fee accounting' (#5688)by Matt Corallo · fa58e250 · Nov 20, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Fixes to skimmed fee accounting' (#5688)
from tankyleo/leo/skimmed-fee-accounting into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5688 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
merge-commit duplicate discount
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Fix CI: rebuild test coin-selection impl and rework reused-ID balance test' (#5684)by Matt Corallo · 17bac68a · Nov 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 12Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Fix CI: rebuild test coin-selection impl and rework reused-ID balance test' (#5684)
from bot/5682-ci-broken-5b8d6e into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5684 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100
This commit is a test-only fix for a broken continuous integration (CI) build. It updates a test mock to match a new function signature and rewrites an existing test to use three nodes instead of two so the test scenario remains valid under recent product changes. There is no change to production code, no vulnerability fix, and no security-relevant behavior change.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Guard pending closing signatures before channel_ready' (#5681)by Matt Corallo · a01273a2 · Nov 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongModerate 68Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Guard pending closing signatures before channel_ready' (#5681)
from auto-pr-bot/bot/388-guard-pending-closing-signatures-679e36 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5681 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100
This change fixes a Lightning channel bug where a malicious peer could renegotiate the closing transaction fee while the local node was still waiting for its own signer to produce the final signature. If allowed, the local node might combine its fresh signature for the new fee with a cached peer signature for the old fee, producing an invalid closing transaction and potentially preventing the channel from closing cleanly. The fix expands the guard that detects a pending closing signature to cover earlier channel states, so such renegotiation attempts are rejected with a warning.
Lower-priorityEncode InvoiceError as a bare BOLT 12 TLV streamby auto-pr-bot · 20d0c926 · Nov 19, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 86 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Encode InvoiceError as a bare BOLT 12 TLV stream
BOLT 4 defines the value of the `onionmsg_tlv` type 68 record as `tlv_invoice_error`, a bare TLV stream whose end is delimited by the record's own length, which the onion message payload already writes around it. LDK instead wrote a `BigSize` length in front of the stream, so `invoice_error` messages could not be exchanged with implementations following the spec: an error received from another implementation failed to decode and was dropped, leaving the payment to expire instead of failing immediately as rejected, and every error LDK sent was rejected by spec-compliant readers.
@jkczyz asked:
> LDK writes and reads BOLT 12 `invoice_error` messages with an extra > `BigSize` length in front of the TLV stream, so it cannot exchange > them with implementations that follow the spec. No funds or channel > state are affected. A payment that the recipient declined fails later > and with a less specific reason, and the recipient's error text is > lost. > > ## Fix > > In `lightning/src/offers/invoice_error.rs`: > > - `InvoiceError::write`: write the bare TLV stream, using > `encode_tlv_stream!` in place of `write_tlv_fields!`. > - `InvoiceError::read`: read the bare TLV stream to the end of the > reader, using `_init_and_read_tlv_stream!` in place of > `_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!`. > - Do not keep a fallback that reads the length-prefixed form. > `InvoiceError` is only ever sent in onion messages and is never > persisted, so nothing stored depends on it. Between a fixed node > and an older LDK node an `invoice_error` is ignored in both > directions, which is the behavior LDK has today with every other > implementation, and a fallback in the reader could only help one of > those two directions. > - Tests: `fails_parsing_invoice_error_without_message` and > `fails_parsing_invoice_error_without_field` build their input with > `write_tlv_fields!` and need to build a bare stream. Add a test > with fixed bytes, such as the BOLT 12 row of the table above, > checking both that those bytes parse and that > `InvoiceError::from_string("out of stock".to_string())` encodes to > exactly those bytes, so the encoding is checked against the spec > and not only against LDK's own writer. > - Add a `pending_changelog` entry noting that an `invoice_error` > exchanged with earlier LDK versions is ignored in both directions, > so a declined payment between mixed versions fails by expiry.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Release wallet UTXOs when FundingBuilder rejects a coin selection' (#5634)by Matt Corallo · 56054190 · Nov 19, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 48Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Release wallet UTXOs when FundingBuilder rejects a coin selection' (#5634)
from bot/5624-fundingbuilder-leaks-utxo-locks-419042 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5634 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 48/100
This change fixes a wallet bug in rust-lightning where a UTXO could be selected for a Lightning funding transaction, then rejected because its previous transaction was too large to fit in a Lightning peer message. Previously, that rejection could leave the UTXO locked or unavailable. The fix adds a size check during coin selection so oversized UTXOs are skipped before being selected, keeping them available for other uses. It also updates the public wallet API with a new parameter for this size limit.
AI review queuedRefuse to pay BOLT 12 invoices with records above experimental rangeby auto-pr-bot · 2970372f · Nov 19, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 48Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Refuse to pay BOLT 12 invoices with records above experimental range
@matt asked in #5668:
It seems we shouldn't be rejecting TLVs over 4 billion at all, on the reading side, per the spec. This might require a minor spec change to the payer-proof spec, but that's okay. Still, just to be safe, let's refuse to pay (in the bolt12 flow) any invoices with TLVs above 4 billion, even if we happily deserialize them.
The previous commit made such invoices deserializable again, so a payee can once again send us an invoice containing records we don't understand. An odd record type requires comprehension to be honored, so refuse to initiate a BOLT 12 payment for an invoice containing a record at or above EXPERIMENTAL_INVOICE_TYPES_END, in every path that pays one: invoices received in reply to an invoice request or a refund (whether handled automatically or via send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice), pay_for_bolt12_invoice, and static invoices in the async payments flow.
The payment is failed with PaymentFailureReason::UnknownRequiredFeatures, like other invoices carrying records we don't understand, rather than introducing a new failure reason.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Low 48/100
This commit hardens LDK's BOLT 12 payment logic so it refuses to pay invoices containing very large unknown record types (4 billion and up). These records are legal under the Lightning spec, but LDK doesn't understand them, so the change treats them like unknown required features and aborts payment before funds move. It is a defensive safety fix, not a response to an active exploit.
AI review queuedRead invoice TLV records above the experimental rangeby auto-pr-bot · 9e28db58 · Nov 19, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 64Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Read invoice TLV records above the experimental range
@matt asked in #5668:
It seems we shouldn't be rejecting TLVs over 4 billion at all, on the reading side, per the spec. This might require a minor spec change to the payer-proof spec, but that's okay.
Commit 5747866a6 ("offers: add BOLT 12 payer proof primitives") narrowed EXPERIMENTAL_INVOICE_TYPES from 3_000_000_000.. to 3_000_000_000..4_000_000_000. The same parser also deserializes invoices LDK persisted itself, via HTLCSource::OutboundRoute's bolt12_invoice field, which ChannelMonitor::read reads for the HTLCs of holder commitments, so a monitor written by LDK 0.2 for a channel that paid an invoice whose payee appended an odd TLV record with a type above 4,000,000,000 fails to load with InvalidValue after upgrading. Since read_channel_monitors fails on the first unreadable monitor, none of the node's channels are watched until the operator intervenes.
The spec places no upper bound on TLV record types, so parse the experimental range as open-ended again, as LDK 0.2 and earlier did. EXPERIMENTAL_INVOICE_TYPES_END keeps the 4,000,000,000 bound where it is still enforced: the payer-proof omitted-marker validation, which takes the bound from the payer-proof spec, and refusing to pay such invoices, added in the following commit.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100
This commit fixes a backward-compatibility bug in LDK's BOLT 12 invoice parser. A previous change had capped the range of 'experimental' TLV record types at 4 billion, but the Lightning spec imposes no upper bound. As a result, invoices created or stored by LDK 0.2 that contained odd experimental TLVs above 4 billion became unreadable after upgrading. Because these invoices are embedded in channel monitors, a single unreadable monitor could block all of a node's channels from being watched until the operator manually intervened. The patch reopens the parsing range while keeping the 4 billion limit only where it is still meaningful: payer-proof validation and refusing to pay such invoices.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Refuse to sign messages that collide with gossip serializations' (#5677)by Matt Corallo · ec40e097 · Nov 19, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 81 · StrongHigh 74Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Refuse to sign messages that collide with gossip serializations' (#5677)
from auto-pr-bot/bot/386-lightning-signed-mesages-can-be-43bc68 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5677 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · High 74/100
This change fixes a security issue where a signed text message could be crafted so that its prefixed form looks exactly like a Lightning 'node_announcement' gossip message. Because both use the same double-SHA256 hash and the same signing key, an attacker could take a legitimate node's signed message and replay it as a forged gossip announcement, potentially impersonating or misrepresenting that node on the network. The patch makes the signing function refuse to sign any message whose prefixed bytes form a valid node_announcement serialization, and updates the API to return a Result so callers can handle the refusal.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Retry a single HTLC before abandoning an unfundable batch' (#5406)by wpaulino · 643e8684 · Nov 19, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · wpaulino
Merge PR 'Retry a single HTLC before abandoning an unfundable batch' (#5406)
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 37/100
This change fixes a corner case in how the Lightning node tries to claim multiple pending HTLCs (small Bitcoin payments locked in a channel) when the wallet cannot fund a single large batch transaction. Previously, if the multi-HTLC batch was too expensive to fund, the code would shrink the batch and immediately give up when only one HTLC remained, abandoning that last HTLC instead of trying to claim it alone. The patch makes the code retry the final HTLC as a single transaction before giving up, so a user is less likely to lose funds due to an unclaimable HTLC.
Lower-priorityMerge PR 'Promote confirmed splice funding when the channel closes before splice_locked' (#5569)by wpaulino · 456fe59a · Nov 19, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · wpaulino
Merge PR 'Promote confirmed splice funding when the channel closes before splice_locked' (#5569)
from bot/5552-no-discardfunding-for-rbf-splice-e3d9b5 into main