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Moderate 54 Bitcoin

Merge PR 'Track splice confirmation while awaiting tx_signatures' (#5570)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Matt Corallo

81/100 · Strong
Merge PR 'Track splice confirmation while awaiting tx_signatures' (#5570)

from bot/5551-splice-never-locks-if-confirmed-7f1dca into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5570
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing logic. During a splice, one side can broadcast the new funding transaction as soon as it has the other side's signatures. Previously, if that transaction confirmed on-chain before the signature exchange completed, the node could fail to notice the confirmation, potentially leaving the channel stuck or sending splice_locked at the wrong time. The patch makes the node track the unconfirmed splice transaction too, so confirmations and reorgs are handled correctly even while signatures are still being exchanged.

Recommended action

Treat as a bug-fix patch with moderate security relevance. Users running nodes that support splicing should upgrade to avoid channel-stuck or inconsistent-funding-edge cases. No immediate emergency response is indicated, but the fix should be included in the next maintenance release.

Security signals we found

01

State-machine inconsistency in channel funding lifecycle

02

Missing chain-source watch for in-flight splice funding transaction

03

Potential failure to send splice_locked after splice confirms during signature exchange

04

Reorg handling gap for unconfirmed splice candidate

05

Fix includes regression test covering confirmation-before-signatures and reorg-before-signatures scenarios

Risk score

Why this scored 54/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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