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This is a documentation-only edit. It corrects a misleading comment in the code that wrongly claimed all fee estimates returned to LDK are forced to be at least 253 satoshis per 1000 weight units. The new comment clarifies that this minimu…
This change fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing logic. During a splice, one side can broadcast the new funding transaction as soon as it has the other side's signatures. Previously, if that transaction confirmed on-chain before the…
State-machine inconsistency in channel funding lifecycleMissing chain-source watch for in-flight splice funding transactionPotential failure to send splice_locked after splice confirms during signature exchange
This change fixes how Lightning nodes calculate the financial risk from tiny ('dust') HTLCs when the current on-chain fee rate is higher than the node's own local fee estimate. Previously, the code only considered a buffered fee rate when …
Incorrect fee exposure accounting for dust HTLCsPotential to accept HTLCs whose commitment/HTLC-success fees exceed their value under current feerateEconomic griefing / forced-channel-closure cost manipulation
This is a one-line code cleanup in a test file. It replaces a cloned array literal with a slice reference to silence a Rust compiler lint. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no functional behavior change.
This is a one-line change in a test file to satisfy a Rust linter warning. It replaces a needless clone of a funding transaction with a reference-based slice construction. There is no functional change, no user-facing behavior change, and …
This commit is a test-only fix for a broken continuous integration (CI) build. It updates a test mock to match a new function signature and rewrites an existing test to use three nodes instead of two so the test scenario remains valid unde…
This change fixes a Lightning channel bug where a malicious peer could renegotiate the closing transaction fee while the local node was still waiting for its own signer to produce the final signature. If allowed, the local node might combi…
State-machine guard expansion to prevent fee renegotiation while a closing signature is pendingRisk of combining mismatched signatures across different closing feesRegression test demonstrates malicious peer renegotiation attempt and expected warning rejection
This change fixes a wallet bug in rust-lightning where a UTXO could be selected for a Lightning funding transaction, then rejected because its previous transaction was too large to fit in a Lightning peer message. Previously, that rejectio…
API change to CoinSelectionSource::select_confirmed_utxos adding max_input_prevtx_serialized_lenWalletSync filters UTXOs by prevtx serialized length before selectionFundingBuilder enforces Lightning tx_add_input message-size limit at selection time
This commit hardens LDK's BOLT 12 payment logic so it refuses to pay invoices containing very large unknown record types (4 billion and up). These records are legal under the Lightning spec, but LDK doesn't understand them, so the change t…
Defensive refusal to pay invoices with unknown high-numbered TLV recordsReuses existing UnknownRequiredFeatures failure path instead of adding a new oneAdds explicit checks before payment state insertion and route construction
This commit fixes a backward-compatibility bug in LDK's BOLT 12 invoice parser. A previous change had capped the range of 'experimental' TLV record types at 4 billion, but the Lightning spec imposes no upper bound. As a result, invoices cr…
Backward-compatibility regression in deserialization of persisted channel monitorsDenial-of-service via unreadable monitor blocking all channel monitoringSpec compliance fix: TLV record types have no upper bound
This change fixes a security issue where a signed text message could be crafted so that its prefixed form looks exactly like a Lightning 'node_announcement' gossip message. Because both use the same double-SHA256 hash and the same signing …
Signature replay / message confusion between signed messages and gossip announcementsForged `node_announcement` signatures via chosen-prefix message constructionNew validation rejects prefixed messages that deserialize as `UnsignedNodeAnnouncement`
This change fixes a corner case in how the Lightning node tries to claim multiple pending HTLCs (small Bitcoin payments locked in a channel) when the wallet cannot fund a single large batch transaction. Previously, if the multi-HTLC batch …
Funds-recovery robustness improvement: prevents premature abandonment of a single unbatched HTLCChange in error-handling arithmetic from checked_sub/saturating_sub with max(1)New unit tests covering both failed and successful singleton HTLC funding paths
This change prevents a Lightning node from accidentally overwriting an archived copy of a channel's security monitor with a brand-new one that happens to use the same identifier. In the old code, if a new channel reused the same identifier…
Data-loss prevention: stops archived ChannelMonitor from being overwritten by a later channel with the same keySafety guard added to both sync and async persistence pathsPersistence refusal surfaces as InProgress/UnrecoverableError rather than silent overwrite
This change fixes a place in the Lightning payment routing code where adding up fees could overflow the maximum number a computer can store in a 64-bit integer. Previously, the code assumed this could never happen and would crash (panic) i…
Integer overflow in fee computationPreviously unreachable!() panic path reachableMPP path merge could trigger overflow
This commit fixes a bug where a Lightning node could get stuck after restarting. If the node crashed or restarted while it was still saving the initial channel monitor to disk, and that save later finished in another process, the restarted…
Fixes a state-machine stall on node reload that could leave channels non-functionalRemoves an overstrict assertion that would panic on a legitimate post-reload stateAdds explicit detection of monitor persistence completed in a prior process
This change only updates documentation and code comments in the Lightning Dev Kit library. It clarifies that a particular key-derivation setting is fixed when a channel is first opened and is not changed by splicing. No code behavior was a…
This commit only changes documentation comments in two source files. It corrects the wording of how certain public keys are derived in the Lightning protocol and adds details about which witness script a signer must use when creating justi…
Documentation-only changeClarifies key derivation semantics for Lightning commitment transactionsClarifies justice transaction witness script requirements for signers
This change only adds documentation comments to a Rust struct. It does not modify any executable code, so it cannot by itself introduce or fix a security vulnerability. The new text warns developers that using TokioSpawner incorrectly can …
This commit hardens how Lightning Dev Kit handles custom signing modules. Previously, LDK relied on each custom signer to check that the other party's signatures on a holder commitment transaction were valid. The change adds a ready-made v…
New synchronous signature-verification helper for holder commitment transactionsTrait documentation now mandates verification before Ok(()) because LDK acts immediatelyInMemorySigner now validates that holder funding key belongs to signer before signature checks
This update fixes a corner case in the Lightning Dev Kit where a node could get confused if it received a 'channel_ready' message while still waiting for its own signer to produce the first commitment signature. The patch makes the node re…
State-machine confusion between funding_signed and channel_ready in async signer flowPremature channel_ready could advance counterparty_next_commitment_point before initial commitment is signedPatch closes channel rather than allowing inconsistent commitment state
Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.
Security candidateCorrect FeeEstimator docs on the 253 sat/kW lower boundby auto-pr-bot · ea2051fe · Nov 21, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Correct FeeEstimator docs on the 253 sat/kW lower bound
@matt asked in #5649:
> @auto-pr-bot please fix `FeeEstimator`'s documentation - while lightning > protocol things always use a feerate of at least 253, not everything does, > nor should everything now that feerates can be below 1.0 sat/vB. > `OutputSweeper`, notably, accepts a lower feerate.
The trait's docs claimed LDK always bounds the value returned by `get_est_sat_per_1000_weight` below by 253 sats/KW, but that bound is only applied where lightning protocol feerates are required, via the `LowerBoundedFeeEstimator` wrapper. Callers outside channel management use the estimate as-is; most notably `OutputSweeper` passes the value returned for `ConfirmationTarget::OutputSpendingFee` straight to the output spender, so implementations must not rely on LDK enforcing a minimum.
Documentation-only change; no behavioural difference.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secure hardware boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a documentation-only edit. It corrects a misleading comment in the code that wrongly claimed all fee estimates returned to LDK are forced to be at least 253 satoshis per 1000 weight units. The new comment clarifies that this minimum only applies to Lightning protocol fee rates, not to all uses of the fee estimate. No code behavior changes.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Track splice confirmation while awaiting tx_signatures' (#5570)by Matt Corallo · ca778e61 · Nov 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 54Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Track splice confirmation while awaiting tx_signatures' (#5570)
from bot/5551-splice-never-locks-if-confirmed-7f1dca into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5570 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100
This change fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing logic. During a splice, one side can broadcast the new funding transaction as soon as it has the other side's signatures. Previously, if that transaction confirmed on-chain before the signature exchange completed, the node could fail to notice the confirmation, potentially leaving the channel stuck or sending splice_locked at the wrong time. The patch makes the node track the unconfirmed splice transaction too, so confirmations and reorgs are handled correctly even while signatures are still being exchanged.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Account for current HTLC fees in dust exposure' (#5690)by Matt Corallo · cc798f60 · Nov 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 63Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Account for current HTLC fees in dust exposure' (#5690)
from tankyleo/leo/2026-11-current-htlc-fee-exposure into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5690 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100
This change fixes how Lightning nodes calculate the financial risk from tiny ('dust') HTLCs when the current on-chain fee rate is higher than the node's own local fee estimate. Previously, the code only considered a buffered fee rate when deciding which HTLCs count as dust and how much extra fee exposure they create. The patch now checks both the actual current fee rate and the buffered fee rate, and uses the worse of the two when limiting how much can be sent. This prevents a node from accepting or sending HTLCs that look safe under a buffered estimate but are actually dust at the current fee rate, which could leave the node paying unexpectedly high commitment transaction fees relative to the HTLC value.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test' (#5689)by Matt Corallo · 03ca832f · Nov 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test' (#5689)
from bot/5664-linting-failing-f44275 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5689 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a one-line code cleanup in a test file. It replaces a cloned array literal with a slice reference to silence a Rust compiler lint. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no functional behavior change.
Security candidateReplace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload testby auto-pr-bot · 93e0129c · Nov 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test
Clippy 1.99 (via `-D warnings` in CI) rejects `[funding_tx.clone()]` inside `assert_eq!` under the `cloned_ref_to_slice_refs` lint: the macro takes its operands by reference, yielding a `&[funding_tx.clone()]` slice reference built from a needless clone.
@matt asked in #5664:
> @auto-pr-bot please fix CI:
Use `core::slice::from_ref(&funding_tx)` as clippy suggests, matching the pattern already used elsewhere in the test suite (e.g. blinded_payment_tests.rs, payment_tests.rs). This also drops the clone of the funding transaction; `funding_tx` is still owned and used later in the test.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a one-line change in a test file to satisfy a Rust linter warning. It replaces a needless clone of a funding transaction with a reference-based slice construction. There is no functional change, no user-facing behavior change, and no security relevance.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Fix CI: rebuild test coin-selection impl and rework reused-ID balance test' (#5684)by Matt Corallo · 17bac68a · Nov 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 12Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Fix CI: rebuild test coin-selection impl and rework reused-ID balance test' (#5684)
from bot/5682-ci-broken-5b8d6e into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5684 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100
This commit is a test-only fix for a broken continuous integration (CI) build. It updates a test mock to match a new function signature and rewrites an existing test to use three nodes instead of two so the test scenario remains valid under recent product changes. There is no change to production code, no vulnerability fix, and no security-relevant behavior change.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Guard pending closing signatures before channel_ready' (#5681)by Matt Corallo · a01273a2 · Nov 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongModerate 68Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Guard pending closing signatures before channel_ready' (#5681)
from auto-pr-bot/bot/388-guard-pending-closing-signatures-679e36 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5681 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100
This change fixes a Lightning channel bug where a malicious peer could renegotiate the closing transaction fee while the local node was still waiting for its own signer to produce the final signature. If allowed, the local node might combine its fresh signature for the new fee with a cached peer signature for the old fee, producing an invalid closing transaction and potentially preventing the channel from closing cleanly. The fix expands the guard that detects a pending closing signature to cover earlier channel states, so such renegotiation attempts are rejected with a warning.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Release wallet UTXOs when FundingBuilder rejects a coin selection' (#5634)by Matt Corallo · 56054190 · Nov 19, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 48Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Release wallet UTXOs when FundingBuilder rejects a coin selection' (#5634)
from bot/5624-fundingbuilder-leaks-utxo-locks-419042 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5634 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 48/100
This change fixes a wallet bug in rust-lightning where a UTXO could be selected for a Lightning funding transaction, then rejected because its previous transaction was too large to fit in a Lightning peer message. Previously, that rejection could leave the UTXO locked or unavailable. The fix adds a size check during coin selection so oversized UTXOs are skipped before being selected, keeping them available for other uses. It also updates the public wallet API with a new parameter for this size limit.
AI review queuedRefuse to pay BOLT 12 invoices with records above experimental rangeby auto-pr-bot · 2970372f · Nov 19, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 48Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Refuse to pay BOLT 12 invoices with records above experimental range
@matt asked in #5668:
It seems we shouldn't be rejecting TLVs over 4 billion at all, on the reading side, per the spec. This might require a minor spec change to the payer-proof spec, but that's okay. Still, just to be safe, let's refuse to pay (in the bolt12 flow) any invoices with TLVs above 4 billion, even if we happily deserialize them.
The previous commit made such invoices deserializable again, so a payee can once again send us an invoice containing records we don't understand. An odd record type requires comprehension to be honored, so refuse to initiate a BOLT 12 payment for an invoice containing a record at or above EXPERIMENTAL_INVOICE_TYPES_END, in every path that pays one: invoices received in reply to an invoice request or a refund (whether handled automatically or via send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice), pay_for_bolt12_invoice, and static invoices in the async payments flow.
The payment is failed with PaymentFailureReason::UnknownRequiredFeatures, like other invoices carrying records we don't understand, rather than introducing a new failure reason.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Low 48/100
This commit hardens LDK's BOLT 12 payment logic so it refuses to pay invoices containing very large unknown record types (4 billion and up). These records are legal under the Lightning spec, but LDK doesn't understand them, so the change treats them like unknown required features and aborts payment before funds move. It is a defensive safety fix, not a response to an active exploit.
AI review queuedRead invoice TLV records above the experimental rangeby auto-pr-bot · 9e28db58 · Nov 19, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 64Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Read invoice TLV records above the experimental range
@matt asked in #5668:
It seems we shouldn't be rejecting TLVs over 4 billion at all, on the reading side, per the spec. This might require a minor spec change to the payer-proof spec, but that's okay.
Commit 5747866a6 ("offers: add BOLT 12 payer proof primitives") narrowed EXPERIMENTAL_INVOICE_TYPES from 3_000_000_000.. to 3_000_000_000..4_000_000_000. The same parser also deserializes invoices LDK persisted itself, via HTLCSource::OutboundRoute's bolt12_invoice field, which ChannelMonitor::read reads for the HTLCs of holder commitments, so a monitor written by LDK 0.2 for a channel that paid an invoice whose payee appended an odd TLV record with a type above 4,000,000,000 fails to load with InvalidValue after upgrading. Since read_channel_monitors fails on the first unreadable monitor, none of the node's channels are watched until the operator intervenes.
The spec places no upper bound on TLV record types, so parse the experimental range as open-ended again, as LDK 0.2 and earlier did. EXPERIMENTAL_INVOICE_TYPES_END keeps the 4,000,000,000 bound where it is still enforced: the payer-proof omitted-marker validation, which takes the bound from the payer-proof spec, and refusing to pay such invoices, added in the following commit.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100
This commit fixes a backward-compatibility bug in LDK's BOLT 12 invoice parser. A previous change had capped the range of 'experimental' TLV record types at 4 billion, but the Lightning spec imposes no upper bound. As a result, invoices created or stored by LDK 0.2 that contained odd experimental TLVs above 4 billion became unreadable after upgrading. Because these invoices are embedded in channel monitors, a single unreadable monitor could block all of a node's channels from being watched until the operator manually intervened. The patch reopens the parsing range while keeping the 4 billion limit only where it is still meaningful: payer-proof validation and refusing to pay such invoices.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Refuse to sign messages that collide with gossip serializations' (#5677)by Matt Corallo · ec40e097 · Nov 19, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 81 · StrongHigh 74Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Refuse to sign messages that collide with gossip serializations' (#5677)
from auto-pr-bot/bot/386-lightning-signed-mesages-can-be-43bc68 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5677 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · High 74/100
This change fixes a security issue where a signed text message could be crafted so that its prefixed form looks exactly like a Lightning 'node_announcement' gossip message. Because both use the same double-SHA256 hash and the same signing key, an attacker could take a legitimate node's signed message and replay it as a forged gossip announcement, potentially impersonating or misrepresenting that node on the network. The patch makes the signing function refuse to sign any message whose prefixed bytes form a valid node_announcement serialization, and updates the API to return a Result so callers can handle the refusal.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Retry a single HTLC before abandoning an unfundable batch' (#5406)by wpaulino · 643e8684 · Nov 19, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · wpaulino
Merge PR 'Retry a single HTLC before abandoning an unfundable batch' (#5406)
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 37/100
This change fixes a corner case in how the Lightning node tries to claim multiple pending HTLCs (small Bitcoin payments locked in a channel) when the wallet cannot fund a single large batch transaction. Previously, if the multi-HTLC batch was too expensive to fund, the code would shrink the batch and immediately give up when only one HTLC remained, abandoning that last HTLC instead of trying to claim it alone. The patch makes the code retry the final HTLC as a single transaction before giving up, so a user is less likely to lose funds due to an unclaimable HTLC.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Refuse to persist fresh monitors that alias archived monitors' (#5645)by Matt Corallo · 3c606c11 · Nov 18, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 54Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Refuse to persist fresh monitors that alias archived monitors' (#5645)
from bot/5631-prevent-monitors-from-aliasing-w-ff2601 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5645 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100
This change prevents a Lightning node from accidentally overwriting an archived copy of a channel's security monitor with a brand-new one that happens to use the same identifier. In the old code, if a new channel reused the same identifier as a previously closed and archived channel, the new monitor could be saved on top of the archived one. Later, when the new channel closed, its archived copy would overwrite the old archived copy, permanently destroying the historical record needed to detect cheating or recover funds. The fix makes the node refuse to save a new monitor when an archived one already exists under the same key, leaving the new channel 'stuck' instead of silently destroying data. This is a safety improvement rather than a remote-exploitable bug.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Handle fee multiplication overflow when merging MPP paths' (#5288)by Matt Corallo · 25f8a740 · Nov 18, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 86 · StrongModerate 52Details
from bot/5191-handle-fee-multiplication-overfl-b098ce into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5288 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100
This change fixes a place in the Lightning payment routing code where adding up fees could overflow the maximum number a computer can store in a 64-bit integer. Previously, the code assumed this could never happen and would crash (panic) if it did. The patch now detects the overflow, returns an error value, and safely skips or keeps the affected payment path instead of crashing. It also prevents a path from being left half-updated if the fee recalculation fails.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Resume channels stuck awaiting a completed monitor persistence on reload' (#5610)by Matt Corallo · 11815ed1 · Nov 18, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 43Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Resume channels stuck awaiting a completed monitor persistence on reload' (#5610)
from bot/5603-initial-monitor-persist-completi-cc6c58 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5610 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 43/100
This commit fixes a bug where a Lightning node could get stuck after restarting. If the node crashed or restarted while it was still saving the initial channel monitor to disk, and that save later finished in another process, the restarted node would not realize the save was done. As a result, it would never broadcast the funding transaction or resume the channel, leaving funds temporarily inaccessible and the channel unusable. The fix makes the node check on reload whether the monitor persistence actually completed and, if so, resume the channel normally.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Correct KeysManager docs on spliced channels' remote_key derivation' (#5609)by Matt Corallo · 83a4d243 · Nov 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
from bot/5606-keysmanager-docs-still-say-splic-5df634 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5609 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This change only updates documentation and code comments in the Lightning Dev Kit library. It clarifies that a particular key-derivation setting is fixed when a channel is first opened and is not changed by splicing. No code behavior was altered, so there is no security vulnerability or fix here.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Fix DelayedPaymentKey/HtlcKey from_basepoint docs and document justice tx witness script' (#5596)by Matt Corallo · 2f832195 · Nov 17, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
from auto-pr-bot/bot/272-wrong-basepoint-in-delayedpaymen-236086 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5596 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes documentation comments in two source files. It corrects the wording of how certain public keys are derived in the Lightning protocol and adds details about which witness script a signer must use when creating justice (penalty) transactions. No code logic, function signatures, or behavior were modified.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Document that TokioSpawner requires all of LDK in a tokio context' (#5621)by Matt Corallo · 6e555fa2 · Nov 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Document that TokioSpawner requires all of LDK in a tokio context' (#5621)
from bot/5614-stashed-reads-let-any-peer-panic-d94a61 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5621 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
This change only adds documentation comments to a Rust struct. It does not modify any executable code, so it cannot by itself introduce or fix a security vulnerability. The new text warns developers that using TokioSpawner incorrectly can cause their program to panic (crash) if LDK runs outside a Tokio runtime. It is a documentation-only clarification, not a code patch.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Make custom signers verify holder commitment sigs synchronously' (#5616)by Matt Corallo · 0e3b6d33 · Nov 17, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 91 · StrongHigh 70Details
from bot/5611-funding-tx-broadcast-on-invalid-c2b5de into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5616 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · High 70/100
This commit hardens how Lightning Dev Kit handles custom signing modules. Previously, LDK relied on each custom signer to check that the other party's signatures on a holder commitment transaction were valid. The change adds a ready-made verification helper and updates the documentation to make clear that signers must do this check synchronously before returning success, because LDK may immediately broadcast the funding transaction or use the commitment on force-close. It also makes LDK's built-in signer verify that the holder funding key in the channel parameters actually belongs to it before trusting signatures. The commit is defensive: it reduces the chance that a buggy or malicious custom signer accidentally accepts invalid signatures and lets LDK act on them.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Refuse channel_ready while the initial funding_signed is pending' (#5612)by Matt Corallo · d68d2235 · Nov 17, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 64Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Refuse channel_ready while the initial funding_signed is pending' (#5612)
from auto-pr-bot/bot/268-channel_ready-before-async-fundi-11838c into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5612 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100
This update fixes a corner case in the Lightning Dev Kit where a node could get confused if it received a 'channel_ready' message while still waiting for its own signer to produce the first commitment signature. The patch makes the node reject such premature messages and close the channel safely, preventing the counterparty's commitment point from advancing underneath an unsigned initial commitment.
from bot/5244-reject-overflowing-legacy-paymen-748c1f into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5316 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
memory safetymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 44/100
This change fixes a spot where two payment amounts could be added together without checking for integer overflow. In Rust, adding two large u64 numbers can wrap around to a tiny value, which could make a forwarded payment look incorrectly small. The patch now rejects the data if the addition overflows. This is a defensive fix in event deserialization/serialization logic.
Allow monitor_pending_channel_ready on resumed outbound channels
Resuming a channel whose initial monitor persistence completed while the node was down can race with chain sync: if the funding transaction was broadcast before the node went down and confirmed to the required depth while it was down, syncing the chain marks the still-paused channel's channel_ready as pending. monitor_updating_restored then hit an assertion that an outbound, non-zero-conf channel can never have monitor_pending_channel_ready set, turning a stuck channel into a panic at every startup - nothing is persisted before the panic, so the node could never come back up.
After a reload from a ChannelManager serialized before the broadcast, LDK did broadcast the funding transaction (in the prior process), so the funding can legitimately have confirmed; drop the assertion and just send channel_ready. Adds a test which confirms the funding transaction to the required depth between the reload and the first background-event processing, matching the startup ordering that hits the removed assertion.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 50/100
This commit fixes a bug where a Lightning node could crash in a loop every time it started up. The crash happened when a channel's funding transaction had already confirmed while the node was offline, but the node still had old saved state. The old code wrongly assumed this situation was impossible and panicked. The fix removes that incorrect assumption and lets the node resume the channel normally. It is a denial-of-service/availability bug, not a theft-of-funds bug, and it can only be triggered by the node's own saved state and normal blockchain activity.
Security candidateMerge PR 'Avoid overflow in closing fee limit calculation' (#5284)by Matt Corallo · dc3f8eda · Nov 16, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 86 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Avoid overflow in closing fee limit calculation' (#5284)
from bot/5185-prevent-peer-triggered-overflow-081f9f into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5284 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100
This patch fixes an integer overflow in the code that calculates the maximum acceptable fee when negotiating a Lightning channel closing transaction. A malicious or buggy peer could potentially supply values that cause the arithmetic to overflow, leading to an incorrect fee limit. The fix uses Rust's saturating addition so the result cannot wrap around. This is a defensive hardening change in a single calculation.
Security candidateResume channels awaiting a completed monitor persistence on loadby auto-pr-bot · dc81ecb8 · Nov 16, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 53Details
Commit message · auto-pr-bot
Resume channels awaiting a completed monitor persistence on load
A channel serialized with MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS was only resumed on load through its tracked in-flight ChannelMonitorUpdates, but the initial ChannelMonitor write (from funding_created/funding_signed) is never tracked as one, and blocked updates the monitor already applied are dropped at load. A channel whose monitor persistence completed after the last ChannelManager write was therefore loaded with the flag set and nothing to ever clear it, leaving it stuck: as funder the funding transaction was never broadcast and channel_ready was never sent for confirmed funding, as acceptor channel_ready was never sent for the peer's confirmed funding. This state is reached with deferred monitor writes (where the background processor writes the ChannelManager before flushing the new monitor) or a Persist that returns InProgress for new channels, whenever the node goes down between the monitor write and the next ChannelManager write.
If a channel is still awaiting a monitor update on load, the monitor is present, and it has nothing in-flight or blocked, the persistence it was waiting on must have completed since we were last serialized, so queue a MonitorUpdatesComplete background event at the monitor's latest update_id, the same way completed in-flight updates are handled. Channels with blocked updates still go through AttemptUnblockMonitorUpdates and those with in-flight updates through the existing replay logic, so the new branch is exclusive with both.
Adds test_outbound_reload_with_completed_init_mon, mirroring the existing test_outbound_reload_without_init_mon but handing the monitor back on reload, and extends test_event_replay_causing_monitor_replay, which exercised the blocked-update variant of the same gap: the channel is now resumed on startup, so it expects the PaymentPathSuccessful produced by the resume and verifies a payment can be sent afterwards.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 53/100
This commit fixes a bug in the Lightning Dev Kit where a newly-created channel could get permanently stuck after a restart. If the channel's first monitor save finished after the last ChannelManager save, the channel would reload believing it was still waiting for that save, but nothing would ever clear the wait. As a result, the funding transaction was never broadcast and the channel could never become usable. The fix detects this situation on load and resumes the channel automatically. It is a reliability/availability bug, not a direct theft-of-funds vulnerability, because the channel simply fails to open rather than funds being stolen.
AI review queuedMerge PR 'Drop ben and joost from the assign-reviewer pool' (#5498)by Matt Corallo · 6ac2db21 · Nov 16, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Merge PR 'Drop ben and joost from the assign-reviewer pool' (#5498)
from bot/5449-drop-stale-reviewers-from-the-as-5e7903 into main
Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5498 Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discountsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply updates an automated workflow that picks who gets asked to review new pull requests. It removes five people from the reviewer rotation and keeps four others. There is no code change to the actual Lightning software and no security relevance.