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Low 45 Bitcoin

Disconnect on overlapping splice RBF negotiation

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

78/100 · Adequate
Disconnect on overlapping splice RBF negotiation

An inbound `tx_init_rbf` cannot identify a separate negotiation while
another funding negotiation is active. Sending `tx_abort` would
ambiguously abort the active negotiation and exit quiescence while
retaining its protocol state.

Return `WarnAndDisconnect` instead, preserving an `AwaitingSignatures`
negotiation for resumption across the disconnect rather than treating
the duplicate request as an abort. Remove the now-unused
NegotiationInProgress abort reason and update the existing
simultaneous-RBF regression coverage accordingly.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change fixes a protocol edge case in Lightning splicing where receiving a second overlapping RBF (fee-bump) request during an active funding negotiation could accidentally abort the wrong negotiation. Instead of sending tx_abort, which would ambiguously cancel the ongoing negotiation, the node now disconnects with a warning and keeps the existing negotiation state so it can resume after reconnecting. This prevents a remote peer from potentially disrupting an in-progress splice/RBF by sending a conflicting request.

Recommended action

Review and merge. The change is defensive and improves protocol robustness. No immediate incident response is indicated, but operators should upgrade to avoid potential splice/RBF disruption by a malicious or buggy peer.

Security signals we found

01

Protocol-state ambiguity fixed: abort message no longer implicitly cancels wrong negotiation

02

Denial-of-service hardening: overlapping RBF cannot force premature abort of active splice/RBF

03

State preservation across disconnect for AwaitingSignatures negotiation

04

Regression test renamed and extended to cover reconnect/resume path

Risk score

Why this scored 45/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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