Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit pins the exact versions of Python testing tools used by the project's automated tests. Previously, the test setup allowed any newly released version of those tools to be installed automatically, which could introduce unexpected…
Supply-chain risk reduction for test/CI dependenciesPrevents unreviewed automatic upgrades of speculos and raggerNo change to firmware or published package code
This commit is a routine version bump from 2.5.1 to 2.6.0 in the Ledger Bitcoin app. It only updates the version number in the Makefile and the release date in the CHANGELOG. There are no code changes, no bug fixes, and no security-related…
This commit tightens how the Ledger Bitcoin app and its companion client libraries read PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) data. It adds checks that reject malformed or suspicious PSBTs: truncated fields, unexpected extra bytes af…
Hardened PSBT deserialization against truncation and trailing dataAdded duplicate-key detection in PSBT mapsRejected PSBTv2-only fields inside PSBTv0 to prevent locktime/field override attacks
This commit tightens input validation in the Python helper library that prepares Bitcoin transaction data for Ledger hardware wallets. It now rejects PSBT files that claim to be the older version 0 format but contain fields that only belon…
Input-validation hardening: stricter parsing of PSBT version 0 to reject v2-only key typesConsistency fix across clients: aligns Python client with HS and Rust client behaviorLocktime normalization during v0-to-v2 conversion to prevent per-input locktime from overriding transaction locktime
This commit updates a test helper file used to talk to a Bitcoin node during automated testing. The old helper could accidentally send the same command twice if the network connection hiccuped, which could cause a test-only action like sen…
Removed transparent retry of non-idempotent RPC requests after connection resetsTest helper could execute state-changing RPCs twice before the fixNew connection-per-call configuration mitigates idle-timeout disconnects without retry risk
This commit fixes the JavaScript PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) parser in Ledger's Bitcoin app so it now rejects malformed PSBTs that contain duplicate keys or extra trailing bytes. Previously, such malformed data could be acc…
BIP-174 non-compliance: duplicate keys and trailing data were previously acceptedState reuse bug: deserializing multiple PSBTs in the same instance could merge mapsInput validation gap in client-side PSBT parsing
This commit fixes the automated test harness, not the Ledger Bitcoin app itself. Previously, the test framework could silently pass even when the device completed a request without showing the expected on-screen review. The change makes te…
Test-hardening only: no firmware or runtime application code changedFixes false-negative test results where a request could succeed without expected UI reviewCorrects scope of navigation settings to avoid leaking across nested or subsequent calls
This commit fixes an arithmetic overflow bug in a test-only PSBT (Bitcoin transaction format) parser used in unit tests. The bug could let a crafted test input make the parser think a data length is huge, potentially confusing the mock dis…
Integer overflow/wrap-around in length calculationOut-of-bounds length derived from arithmetic on attacker-influenced offsetsUnit-test-only code path, not device firmware
This commit fixes a bug in the Ledger Bitcoin app's Rust client where a PSBT v0 (an older transaction format) could silently carry fields that only have meaning in PSBT v2. When converting v0 to v2, those fields could override values taken…
Input validation added for cross-format PSBT conversionPrevents v2-only fields from overriding unsigned-transaction-derived valuesBIP-370 compliance enforcement for PSBTv0
This commit fixes a bug in the Ledger Bitcoin app's JavaScript client library. When converting an older-style Bitcoin transaction file (PSBT version 0) into the newer PSBT version 2 format, the library previously ignored fields that are on…
Input validation fix: rejects malformed PSBTv0 containing v2-only fieldsPrevents silent override of transaction locktime during PSBTv0-to-v2 conversionAdds missing BIP-370 key type constants for required time/height locktime
This commit fixes a bug in how the Ledger Bitcoin app client parses PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) maps. Previously, if the same key appeared twice in a map, the parser silently kept the last value. A malicious or malformed PS…
Silent overwrite of duplicate PSBT map keys could create commitment mismatch between client and deviceTruncated PSBT maps were silently accepted due to exception swallowing in deserialization loopsTrailing data after PSBT maps was ignored, allowing reserialization to silently normalize malformed inputs
This commit fixes several bugs in Ledger's Bitcoin app. The most serious ones are: (1) a set of miniscript policy analyzer mistakes that could let the app accept Bitcoin wallet policies whose scripts are too large or too expensive to execu…
Miniscript cost/property analysis errors that could allow oversized/undercosted wallet policiesHost-driven infinite-loop / denial-of-service via zero-length GET_MORE_ELEMENTS responsesUI state inconsistency causing a security warning to be prematurely dismissed
This commit improves the Ledger Bitcoin app's MuSig2 multi-signature feature. It lets wallet software pre-generate public nonces before a transaction is known, adds an optional MUSIG2_SESSION_ID field so multiple signing sessions can be in…
New PSBT proprietary field parsing with length validation (1-32 bytes, empty rejected)Session ID now commits to wallet policy plus optional MUSIG2_SESSION_IDSession storage limit raised from 8 to 32 with LRU eviction
This commit is a small code cleanup in Ledger's Bitcoin app. It changes two local arrays from unsigned (uint16_t) to signed (int16_t) in functions that count operations and stack sizes for Bitcoin miniscript 'thresh' policies. The commit m…
Signed/unsigned type mismatch in sentinel handlingPotential latent integer interpretation bug in miniscript threshold policy analysisCode clarity improvement around invalid (dis)satisfaction markers
This commit fixes the Ledger Bitcoin app's internal checker for Miniscript wallet policies. The checker was incorrectly rejecting some valid Bitcoin spending policies as unsafe, and in a few places it was computing safety properties using …
Logic change in Miniscript policy analysisAlignment with upstream Bitcoin Core reference implementationRelaxation of overly strict non-malleability and timelock-mixing checks
This commit fixes a bug in how the Ledger Bitcoin app counts the number of Bitcoin script operations (ops) needed to spend certain wallet policies that use a 'miniscript andor' fragment. Because the count was wrong, the app could allow use…
Incorrect miniscript ops accounting for andor fragmentPolicy sanity check bypass leading to unspendable registered walletsReference alignment with Bitcoin Core implementation
This commit fixes a bug in how the Ledger Bitcoin app counts Bitcoin script operations ('ops') for two specific Miniscript fragments, 'l:' and 'u:'. Because the count was too low, the app could accept wallet policies that look valid but ar…
Undercounting of script operation budget leading to acceptance of unspendable policiesIncorrect handling of Miniscript wrapper dissatisfaction semanticsPolicy sanity check bypass via operation-count accounting flaw
This commit only updates documentation and the changelog. It explains a new optional PSBT field called MUSIG2_SESSION_ID that lets software wallets manage multiple MuSig2 signing sessions for the same wallet policy on a Ledger device. Ther…
This commit is a simple capacity increase, not a security fix. It raises the number of simultaneous MuSig2 signing sessions the Ledger Bitcoin app can keep in memory from 8 to 32, because users with multiple MuSig accounts or wallets that …
This commit improves the user experience and error handling for Ledger's Bitcoin app when using MuSig2 multi-signatures. Previously, if a required MuSig2 session was missing during the second round of signing, the device would only report …
UX-hardening: fail-fast before user approval instead of afterNew specific error code EC_SIGN_PSBT_MUSIG2_SESSION_NOT_FOUND for missing MuSig2 sessionsRefactored session storage lookup to support non-destructive existence check
Merge pull request #571 from LedgerHQ/musig-test-vectors
Add musig unit test vectors
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencecryptography-sensitive pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 44/100
This commit adds a safety check to a cryptographic helper used in Bitcoin Taproot/MuSig2 operations. The function now rejects x-coordinates that are equal to or larger than the prime number defining the secp256k1 curve, instead of potentially allowing them to be silently reduced. The commit also adds many unit tests, including official BIP-327 MuSig2 test vectors, to verify the implementation behaves correctly. The change is defensive and improves robustness against malformed public keys and nonces.
Security candidateLimit legacy multisig to 15 keys maximum, per consensus limitsby Salvatore Ingala · c43c3901 · Oct 12, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 85 · StrongModerate 58Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Limit legacy multisig to 15 keys maximum, per consensus limits
The redeem script would otherwise be bigger than 520 bytes, which is the consensus limit; therefore, such scripts are unspendable and funds sent to such addresses would be lost.
Therefore, we prevent registration altogether.
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
consensus or confidential-proof validationsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 58/100
This commit fixes a bug in Ledger's Bitcoin app where users could register a wallet policy for a legacy P2SH multisig with up to 16 public keys. Such a redeem script would be larger than the 520-byte Bitcoin consensus limit, making the coins unspendable and effectively lost. The patch caps legacy P2SH multisig at 15 keys and rejects anything larger during wallet registration. It does not affect SegWit P2WSH or nested sh(wsh(...)) wallets, which have different limits.
Merge pull request #552 from LedgerHQ/musig-pregen-nonces
Allow pregenerating nonces for future MuSig2 signing
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 37/100
This commit changes how the Ledger Bitcoin app prepares nonces for MuSig2 multi-signature transactions. Previously, the nonce derivation included transaction-specific data, so a wallet had to know the exact transaction before asking the device for nonces. Now the nonces depend only on the wallet policy and input/key indexes, allowing a wallet to pre-generate nonces on one transaction and later use them for a different transaction of the same wallet policy. The change is intentional and documented, but it narrows session identity to the wallet policy: only one pending signing session is allowed per wallet policy, and starting a new round 1 silently replaces the old one. The commit also adds a check that the pubnonce in the PSBT matches the one the device would recompute, so a replaced session fails cleanly in round 2.
BIP-322 v2.0.0 signed messages and proofs of reserves
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secret or key materialcryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This commit adds a new feature to the Ledger Bitcoin app: support for BIP-322 generic signed messages and proof-of-funds. It lets users sign messages and prove ownership of coins through a PSBT, with on-screen review. The change is a feature addition, not a documented security fix, but it touches sensitive signing code and introduces new validation rules that could affect app safety if implemented incorrectly.
As an optional but recommended check in BIP-340, verify that each produced Schnorr signature is valid before returning it, as a defense-in-depth measure to detect computational integrity failures during signing.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 47/100
This commit adds a safety check to the Ledger Bitcoin app: after creating a Schnorr signature, the app now immediately verifies that signature using the public key. If verification fails, the app aborts and returns an error instead of handing out a potentially malformed signature. This is a defense-in-depth measure against rare hardware or computation faults during signing, not a fix for a known exploitable bug.
Use BIP-340 synthetic nonces for Schnorr signatures
Instead of only relying on the TRNG, pass the randomness from the TRNG as aux_rand and use mode CX_RND_PROVIDED, which computes the synthetic nonce as per BIP-340 recommendations.
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
entropy or randomnesssigning boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100
This commit changes how the Ledger Bitcoin app creates Schnorr (BIP-340) signatures. Previously it relied entirely on the device's hardware random number generator (TRNG) for the signing nonce. Now it feeds TRNG output as auxiliary randomness into BIP-340's synthetic nonce derivation. This is a defensive hardening measure: even if the TRNG were to fail or produce weak values, the nonce still depends uniquely on the private key and message, reducing the risk that two signatures leak the secret key.
Security candidatePrevent registering policies with too many internal key expressionsby Salvatore Ingala · ba19c8d1 · Oct 8, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 45Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Prevent registering policies with too many internal key expressions
Signing would fail for wallet policies with more than MAX_INTERNAL_KEY_EXPRESSIONS internal key expressions, therefore it is better to avoiding their registration altogether.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 45/100
This commit adds a safety check in Ledger's Bitcoin app so that users cannot register wallet policies that the device would later be unable to sign for. Specifically, it rejects policies containing more than the supported number of internal key expressions. Previously, such policies could be registered but signing would fail later; now registration itself is blocked with a clear error code.
Security candidatePrevent registration of policies with musigs we cannot fully signby Salvatore Ingala · 06569553 · Oct 8, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateLow 39Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Prevent registration of policies with musigs we cannot fully sign
In MuSig2 signing, the app only produces one partial signature per key expression that contains internal keys. Therefore, if a key expression contains several internal keys, it would not be possible to complete the full signing protocol.
It seems useless anyway to create such policies, so we just filter them out at registration time to make sure we don't let users register policies they would later be unable to sign for.
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 39/100
This commit adds a safety check in Ledger's Bitcoin app to stop users from registering wallet policies that contain a MuSig2 group with more than one Ledger-managed internal key. The app can only produce one partial signature per MuSig2 group, so such policies would be impossible to fully sign later. The change rejects the registration early with a clear error code, preventing users from accidentally creating a wallet they could not spend from.
Security candidateAdd unit tests for musig.c based on the BIP-327 test vectorsby Salvatore Ingala · d223be93 · Oct 7, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Add unit tests for musig.c based on the BIP-327 test vectors
Covers the key_sort, key_agg, nonce_agg, sign_verify (signing cases only) and tweak vectors that apply to the subset of BIP-327 implemented in the app. Key aggregation with tweaks is tested via musig_sign.
None of the official nonce_gen vectors match the restricted inputs supported by musig_nonce_gen (no sk, msg nor extra_in; aggpk always present), so its expected values are computed with nonce_gen_internal from the BIP-327 reference implementation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundaryfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new unit tests for an existing MuSig2 cryptographic implementation in a Ledger Bitcoin app. It does not change any production code, fix bugs, or alter behavior. The tests verify that the existing code produces the correct outputs for standard BIP-327 test vectors and rejects invalid inputs. There is no security vulnerability introduced here.
Security candidatecrypto_tr_lift_x: reject x-coordinates not smaller than pby Salvatore Ingala · c84e6725 · Oct 7, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 65 · AdequateLow 47Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
crypto_tr_lift_x: reject x-coordinates not smaller than p
BIP-327 requires rejecting such points, so this improves conformance.
65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 47/100
This commit tightens a cryptographic check in Ledger's Bitcoin app. A function that converts an x-coordinate into a point on the secp256k1 curve now rejects any x value that is equal to or larger than the curve's prime field size. Before, such values could be silently reduced modulo the prime, potentially producing a valid point that BIP-327 says must be rejected. The change improves standards conformance and removes a subtle way to feed the function an out-of-range input.
sign_psbt: review BIP-322 message signing requests as messages
A PSBT carrying the PSBT_GLOBAL_GENERIC_SIGNED_MESSAGE global field (0x09, BIP-322 v1.0.0+) is now recognized as a request to sign the BIP-322 to_sign virtual transaction, and reviewed on-screen as a message signature instead of the normal transaction signing UX.
The security checks per BIP-322 ensure that the signatures are bound to the intended message and can be utilized in the indended ways per BIP-322, but result in a non-spendable transaction, since all signatures are with SIGHASH_ALL/DEFAULT, and the first input spends a non-existing UTXO.
A structurally invalid PSBT carrying the field is rejected; however it is acceptable for the app to produce invalid signatures that would not pass full BIP-322 validation, as some of the checks require a full node anyway.
Timelocked BIP-322 signatures are not supported: the locktime and the sequence of the first input (the "age" of the signature) must be 0. The sequence of a proof-of-funds input has no meaning in BIP-322, so it may be 0 or any value with the BIP-68 disable flag set, including the final sequence implied by an omitted PSBT_IN_SEQUENCE. Any other value would be a relative timelock with version 2, and is rejected.
Warnings for missing non-witness utxos are still shown when they apply, in the case of proofs of funds. The first input spending the to_spend transaction is exempt, as it is validated per BIP-322.
The 'processing' screen is adapted to show "Loading message" and "Signing message" during signatures for BIP-322 PSBTs.
Not allowed during swap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Salvatore Ingala <6681844+bigspider@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationprivacy or spend-authorization protocolcryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This commit adds support for signing Bitcoin messages using the BIP-322 standard inside Ledger's Bitcoin app. Instead of reviewing these as regular money transfers, the device now shows them as message signatures. The change includes safety checks to make sure the signed data is a valid BIP-322 request, cannot be spent as a real transaction, and is tied to the exact message shown to the user. It also blocks this feature when the app is being used in a cryptocurrency swap.
ui_display_bip322_message_and_confirm() reviews a BIP-322 message signature: the account (optional), the address being proven, the total amount of the proven coins (proof-of-funds only), and the message, or its sha256 hash when it cannot be shown in full.
The GA_LOADING_MESSAGE and the new GA_SIGNING_MESSAGE processing screen texts are now declared in display.h, so that SIGN_PSBT can use them too.
Not used yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit adds a new on-screen review flow for BIP-322 message signatures in the Ledger Bitcoin app. It only displays information to the user and asks for confirmation; it does not change how signatures are computed or how data is validated. The code is marked 'Not used yet,' meaning the new function is not wired into any signing handler. There is no security issue visible in the change itself.
src/common/bip322.c implements the parts of BIP-322 that do not depend on how a signing request reaches the app:
- bip322_message_hash_init() starts the BIP0322-signed-message tagged hash of a message; - bip322_serialize_to_spend() and bip322_compute_to_spend_txid() build the to_spend virtual transaction for a message hash and a message_challenge (the scriptPubKey whose control is proven), and compute its txid. The to_sign transaction, which is the one that gets signed, spends its output 0.
Not used yet.
The unit tests check the message hash, the to_spend serialization and the txid computation against the test vectors published in BIP-322 (empty message and "Hello World" for the P2WPKH address used by the BIP). They only link src/common/bip322.c.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning boundaryfuzzing or regression evidencecryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit adds new, unused helper code for BIP-322 generic Bitcoin message signing. It only implements low-level building blocks (message hashing and a virtual transaction serializer) and includes unit tests that check the results against official BIP-322 test vectors. The code is not wired into any user-facing signing flow, so it cannot by itself change app behavior or expose user funds.
Merge pull request #570 from LedgerHQ/python_bip322
python client: first-class PSBT_GLOBAL_GENERIC_SIGNED_MESSAGE field
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning boundarysigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 21/100
This commit adds support in the Ledger Bitcoin app's Python client for a new PSBT global field called PSBT_GLOBAL_GENERIC_SIGNED_MESSAGE, defined by Bitcoin improvement proposal BIP-322. It lets a PSBT carry a signed message alongside transaction data. The change is a feature addition to serialization/deserialization code, with tests that check the field survives round-trips and that malformed inputs (duplicate keys, extra key data) are rejected. There is no indication in the commit that this fixes a security bug or is being released as a security patch.
test_utils: deduplicate the musig2 key aggregation helpers
test_utils/musig2.py had its own tapleaf_hash, musig key aggregation (unsorted_musig, musig, aggregate_musig_pubkey), derive_from_key_info and derive_plain_descriptor, behaving exactly as those in test_utils/wallet_policy.py once the latter learned about musig() for the BIP-322 tests; and txmaker.py kept a third copy of the BIP-328 chaincode.
Keep a single copy of each in wallet_policy.py, which musig2.py imports from (so they cannot live in musig2.py), with aggregate_musig_pubkey returning the (xpub, KeyAggContext) pair as in musig2.py, and BIP328_CHAINCODE shared with txmaker.py. musig2.py re-exports them, so its importers are unaffected.
The Tree and TrDescriptorTemplate classes of musig2.py are left alone: its TrDescriptorTemplate has a different parser, and is used by the musig tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a code cleanup in the project's test utilities. It removes duplicated helper functions for MuSig2 key aggregation and moves them into a single shared file. There is no change to the actual Ledger Bitcoin app firmware or to how cryptographic operations are performed. It is purely a refactoring of test-only Python code.
python client: first-class PSBT_GLOBAL_GENERIC_SIGNED_MESSAGE field
Add PSBT.generic_signed_message, for the BIP-322 global field (0x09) that carries the message of a generic signed message request. It is parsed (rejecting duplicates and keydata) and serialized in both PSBT versions, and survives the v0/v2 conversions.
Covered by a pure-Python round-trip test in bitcoin_client/tests.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This commit adds support in Ledger's Python Bitcoin client for a new PSBT global field used by BIP-322 generic signed messages. It is a feature addition: parsing, serialization, and round-trip tests for the new field. There is no indication of a security bug being fixed or introduced.
Security candidateClear the sign_psbt state on every exit path of handler_sign_psbtby Salvatore Ingala · b0d662cb · Sep 25, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Clear the sign_psbt state on every exit path of handler_sign_psbt
Move the handler's body in an internal function, so that initialization and zeroing of any internal state used in the handler is guaranteed.
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100
This commit refactors the Bitcoin app's PSBT signing handler so that sensitive temporary data (keys, transaction details, signing state) is always wiped from the device's stack memory when the handler finishes, even if it exits early due to an error. Before the change, some early return paths could leave that data in memory. The patch itself does not claim to fix an active exploit, but it removes a class of information-disclosure risk.
Security candidateTest that the session is actually deleted once round 2 startsby Salvatore Ingala · 67735677 · Sep 25, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 83 · StrongModerate 63Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Test that the session is actually deleted once round 2 starts
The session must be deleted once round 2 starts, whether signing was successful or not.
This makes sure that musigsession_pop() actually deletes the session.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100
This commit adds a security test and a small code change for Ledger's Bitcoin app to make sure a secret signing session is wiped from memory once the second round of a MuSig2 multi-signature operation starts. The concern is that if the session were not deleted, an attacker could trick the device into reusing secret randomness (a 'nonce') for a different transaction, which can leak the private key. The patch zeroes out the signing state at the end of round 1 and adds tests proving the session is consumed whether round 2 succeeds or fails.
Security candidateMake the MuSig2 psbt_session_id independent of the transactionby Salvatore Ingala · ee152d11 · Sep 25, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 83 · StrongLow 26Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Make the MuSig2 psbt_session_id independent of the transaction
The psbt_session_id used to commit to the transaction hashes, making it impossible to pre-generate nonces for a future transaction.
Derive the id from the wallet policy alone: the hash of its descriptor template, and the root of the Merkle tree of its keys.
A client can now execute round 1 whenever it likes -- for example while the device happens to be connected -- and use the resulting pubnonces for whichever transaction it later builds. This works as long as its inputs sit at the same indexes, and the pubnonces are moved to the new PSBT in the right place and with the right key - which depend on the tweaked aggregate key, and therefore on the actual UTXOs spent in round 2.
The tradeoff is that at most one round-1 session can be pending per wallet policy, since a new round 1 replaces the session in storage.
New tests: - round 1 is executed on a transaction that spends a different UTXO, at a different (change, address_index), and pays a different output; round 2 for the actual transaction must succeed. - the same, for a musig() in a tapleaf: round 1 is executed on a transaction that spends a different UTXO and pays a different output. - round 1 for another policy with the same keys, executed between round 1 and round 2, must not affect round 2. This simulates a software wallet that pregenerates nonces before knowing the transaction. - a second round 1 for the same policy replaces the pending session: round 2 with the pubnonces of the first round 1 must fail.
The documentation in doc/musig.md is updated accordingly.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 26/100
This commit changes how the Ledger Bitcoin app identifies an in-progress MuSig2 multi-signature session. Previously, the session ID was tied to the specific transaction, so you could only start the signing process after the transaction was known. Now the session ID depends only on the wallet policy (the spending rules), allowing users to generate public nonces ahead of time for a later transaction. This is a deliberate feature change, not a fix for an active exploit. The trade-off is that only one pending session is allowed per wallet policy, and starting a new session overwrites the old one.
Security candidateVerify the pubnonce in the PSBT during round 2 of MuSig2by Salvatore Ingala · 79b60da9 · Sep 25, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Verify the pubnonce in the PSBT during round 2 of MuSig2
doc/musig.md (following BIP-327) prescribes that round 2 verifies that the pubnonce contained in the psbt matches the one synthetically recomputed, but the check was missing.
Without this check, the signer would produce an (invalid) partial signature, and other cosigners would identify this signer as the disruptive one.
Added the check, and a test to validate that the signer fails as expected if provided with a mismatching pubnonce at the beginning of Round 2.
This check also replaces the guarantee that used to come from having the transaction in the psbt_session_id: rather than approximating "same transaction", it directly verifies "these are the nonces of the session I am about to use", which is the property that actually matters.
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100
This commit fixes a missing safety check in the Ledger Bitcoin app when using the MuSig2 multi-signature protocol. During round 2 of signing, the app now verifies that the public nonce in the PSBT (the data file used to coordinate signing) matches the nonce the device itself generated earlier. Without this check, the device could produce a partial signature that doesn't match what other signers expect, making the final combined signature invalid and causing other participants to blame this device as the 'disruptive signer.' The fix prevents that by failing cleanly instead of producing a bad signature.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · High 76/100
This commit fixes how the Ledger Bitcoin app decides the 'lock time' for a transaction when signing a PSBTv2. Previously, the app always used the global fallback lock time and ignored per-input required lock times. That meant a wallet or attacker could set hidden per-input lock-time requirements that the device would not actually enforce, while still producing a valid-looking signature. The change makes the app derive the lock time correctly per the BIP-370 standard, using each input's required height or time lock time when present, and rejecting the PSBT when inputs disagree. This is a correctness fix for a security-critical signing rule.
Security candidateExtract a single helper for MuSig2 nonce derivationby Salvatore Ingala · ebbf6108 · Sep 25, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 13Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Extract a single helper for MuSig2 nonce derivation
The code was repeated essentially verbatim in both rounds.
65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
nonce handlingsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 13/100
This commit is a simple code cleanup: it pulls out duplicated code for generating MuSig2 cryptographic nonces into a single helper function, then uses that helper in two places where the same logic previously appeared. There is no change to security behavior, no bug fix, and no disclosed vulnerability.
Security candidateAdd the MuSig2 nonce pre-generation changes to the changelogby Salvatore Ingala · 90ed47a0 · Sep 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Add the MuSig2 nonce pre-generation changes to the changelog
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
nonce handlingdocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only updates the changelog text. It documents a design change in the MuSig2 multi-signature feature: the random public nonces used during signing are no longer tied to a specific transaction, which lets them be generated ahead of time. It also notes a breaking behavior that only one signing session can be pending per wallet policy. There is no code change, no bug fix, and no security patch in this commit itself.
fuzzing: Update manifest and seed corpus generation
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidenceseed or entropy path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100
This commit only updates the fuzzing test harness: it adds a new source file to the fuzzing manifest and expands the seed corpus generator with test cases for BIP-370 lock-time handling. There are no changes to the actual application code that runs on the Ledger device, so this commit does not fix or introduce a security vulnerability by itself.
Security candidateAdd functional tests for the BIP-370 lock time derivationby Salvatore Ingala · ab7131cb · Sep 22, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 12Details
Commit message · Salvatore Ingala
Add functional tests for the BIP-370 lock time derivation
Since the signed locktime is never displayed, the tests use an indirect method to verify that the app is computing the correct value: recomputing the sighash with an independent Python implementation, and verifying if the produced Schnorr signature passes for that message.
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100
This commit only adds new automated tests for how the Ledger Bitcoin app chooses a transaction's lock time when signing a PSBTv2. It does not change the app's actual signing code. The tests verify that the app derives the expected lock time and rejects malformed or contradictory inputs. There is no security patch here.