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Low 39 Bitcoin

Prevent registration of policies with musigs we cannot fully sign

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Salvatore Ingala

78/100 · Adequate
Prevent registration of policies with musigs we cannot fully sign

In MuSig2 signing, the app only produces one partial signature per
key expression that contains internal keys. Therefore, if a key
expression contains several internal keys, it would not be possible
to complete the full signing protocol.

It seems useless anyway to create such policies, so we just filter
them out at registration time to make sure we don't let users
register policies they would later be unable to sign for.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a safety check in Ledger's Bitcoin app to stop users from registering wallet policies that contain a MuSig2 group with more than one Ledger-managed internal key. The app can only produce one partial signature per MuSig2 group, so such policies would be impossible to fully sign later. The change rejects the registration early with a clear error code, preventing users from accidentally creating a wallet they could not spend from.

Recommended action

No immediate action required for users. This is a hardening change. Developers should ensure the new validation is also applied to any other code paths that parse or accept wallet policies, and consider whether similar restrictions are needed for signing-time policy acceptance.

Security signals we found

01

New error code for unsupported MuSig2 configuration

02

Registration-time policy validation added

03

Test cases explicitly exercise the rejected MuSig2 multi-internal-key case

Risk score

Why this scored 39/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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