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Moderate 66 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #581 from LedgerHQ/client-fixes

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Salvatore Ingala

68/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #581 from LedgerHQ/client-fixes

Miscellaneous client and test fixes
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens how the Ledger Bitcoin app and its companion client libraries read PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) data. It adds checks that reject malformed or suspicious PSBTs: truncated fields, unexpected extra bytes after the PSBT, duplicate keys inside PSBT maps, and PSBTv0 files that contain fields only allowed in PSBTv2. It also fixes a C-language integer-overflow check when parsing PSBT maps on the device. These changes are defensive hardening: they prevent the client/device from silently accepting a malformed or intentionally crafted PSBT that could later influence transaction details such as locktime.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-hardening fix and include it in the next release. Users and integrators should upgrade the Python/JS/Rust client libraries and the device app so that malformed PSBTs are rejected consistently. Wallets that build or convert PSBTs should verify their output still passes the stricter parser, especially PSBTv0 files and v0-to-v2 conversions.

Security signals we found

01

Hardened PSBT deserialization against truncation and trailing data

02

Added duplicate-key detection in PSBT maps

03

Rejected PSBTv2-only fields inside PSBTv0 to prevent locktime/field override attacks

04

Fixed C integer-overflow/wraparound bounds checks in psbt_parse.c

05

Cleared per-input required locktimes when converting PSBTv0 to v2 to preserve unsigned-tx locktime

06

Added regression tests for malformed/trailing/duplicate/v2-only PSBT cases

Risk score

Why this scored 66/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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