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Eclair

Scala implementation of a Lightning Network node.

BitcoinLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

231 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

66security candidates48second-pass queue208AI analyses
4commits · 30 days
26commits · 60 days
80commits · 180 days
161commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 691 seen11 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 660 seen5 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 62 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 514 seen0 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

78/100 average clarity
143Strong · 80–100
54Adequate · 60–79
23Thin · 40–59
11Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
pm47451633876
Bastien Teinturier13332127581
Fabrice Drouin291424269
Thomas HUET16116075
rorp313069
Nishant Bansal212084
dependabot[bot]111081
ekzyis101058
Rusty Russell101081
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 10 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3424)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup …

Startup guard added to block accidental execution of development snapshotNo vulnerability fix, cryptographic change, or trust-boundary modification present
c96c3d44by Fabrice Drouin+73−57 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.6 release (#3420)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.6. The release notes explicitly state it contains 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank a researcher for responsible disclosure. The actual code…

Vendor release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesNew default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` mitigates unconfirmed-input double-spend risk during splicingRelease notes credit @erickcestari for responsible disclosures
50e046efby Fabrice Drouin+28−198 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 72 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Splicing robustness improvements (#3417)

This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed spli…

New default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` to prevent double-spend of unconfirmed splice inputsLimit on remote splice inputs/outputs (10) to bound CPFP costForce-close now selects a commitment whose funding tx is known to bitcoind, re-evaluated per block and splice spend events
c07cc745by pm47+518−6011 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Flag peers that leave liquidity fees unpaid (#3416)

This commit fixes a security gap in Eclair's Lightning node software. A peer could repeatedly get free channel funding ('liquidity') by backing out of payments meant to cover the fees right before the funding transaction was signed. Previo…

Fixes a logic flaw allowing repeated unpaid liquidity feesAdds peer suspicion flagging tied to funding txidExpands state handling for asynchronous LiquidityPurchaseAborted events
c5b9afc0by pm47+192−154 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3413)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.5 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes published release checksums, and adds a blank release-notes template. It also adds a startup guard that refuses…

No vulnerability signals presentStartup guard added to block accidental use of development snapshot
06716fceby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 67 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.5 release (#3412)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.5. The release notes state it is a patch release containing 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank two people for responsible disclosures. The ac…

Release notes explicitly describe 'security hardening fixes' and warn that 'some of these issues can be exploited by malicious nodes'Two independent researchers are credited for responsible disclosuresRemoval of an 'unsafe startup' guard indicates the prior development snapshot was considered unsafe and this release is meant to be safe to run
01384e93by Fabrice Drouin+14−268 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Check remote previous txOut against the blockchain (#3411)

This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction…

Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction dataTaproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possiblePotential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout
ae0927edby pm47+111−43 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 78 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths that overflow an `Int` (#3408)

This fix closes a denial-of-service bug in Eclair's Lightning onion routing. A remote sender could craft a malformed per-hop payload length that, when converted from a large number to a normal integer, wrapped around to a negative or tiny …

Integer overflow / truncation from Long to IntNegative length bypasses upper-bound checkException escapes Try block causing DoS
40279a1bby pm47+20−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3405)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.4 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes the published checksums for the 0.14.4 release, and adds a placeholder release-notes file for the next version.…

No security-relevant code changesAdded explicit unsafe-startup guard to prevent accidental use of development snapshotNo references to CVEs, advisories, or security issues in commit message or diff
c4910b7bby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
High 84 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.4 release (#3403)

This commit is the official release marker for Eclair v0.14.4. The release notes included in the commit describe it as a security-hardening patch release with fixes for multiple issues, some of which can be exploited by malicious nodes. Th…

Release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesHTTP API now rejects Origin-header requests to mitigate browser-based CSRF against basic-authenticated endpointsSeed file length validation added (commit a07fff5)
e1c212c4by Fabrice Drouin+90−8210 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Retry publishing txs evicted by unconfirmed conflicts (#3397)

This commit fixes a security bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a malicious peer could trick the node into permanently giving up on publishing its own commitment or penalty transactions. By publishing and then double-spending a conflic…

The commit message explicitly describes theft risk: "This lets them steal HTLCs by publishing their commitment later"Attack vector involves a malicious peer withholding tx_signatures and double-spending a splice inputFix changes abandonment logic for local commit anchor preconditions
21f1bc8dby pm47+100−254 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Keep unsigned settlements when rejecting commands (#3401)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When the node received a duplicate command to settle a payment (fulfill or fail), it would mistakenly delete the still-pending settlement from its database…

Loss of pending HTLC settlement state on disconnect/reconnectUpstream HTLC timeout risk for relayed fulfilled downstream HTLCsDuplicate/conflicting command handling caused premature DB acknowledgement
7686dfadby pm47+38−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Force-close again when a splice RBF sibling confirms (#3400)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later …

Funds-locking bug in channel close logicHTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spendIncorrect re-force-close trigger condition
9a1ecc99by pm47+59−72 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Critical 89 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject unpublishable splices (#3396)

This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the v…

Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transactionAdds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delayAdds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input
af994180by pm47+235−35 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths exceeding packet (#3395)

This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair processes encrypted routing instructions (onion packets) for Lightning payments. A malicious sender could craft a packet that claimed its inner payload was longer than the packet itself. The old code e…

Unchecked length field from attacker-controlled onion packet used for slicingException thrown outside Try block, bypassing expected error handlingRelayer crash could leave HTLC un-failed
d3a146a0by pm47+16−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 53 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Remove `spendfromchanneladdress` nonce after one sig (#3392)

This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Non…

nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flowprivate nonce removed from in-memory store after single usemanual recovery command affected, not hot path
c89af115by pm47+1−11 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject seed files with an invalid length (#3389)

This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Bitcoin Lightning node where, if the node crashed while creating its secret seed file, it could leave an empty file behind. On the next restart, Eclair would silently use that empty seed to generate all…

Use of weak/predictable cryptographic seed for key derivationMissing input validation on security-critical seed fileNon-atomic file write creating corrupt/empty secret material
a07fff56by pm47+31−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Upgrade postgresql client from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12 (#3330)

This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…

Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
972dfe99by dependabot[bot]+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Use bitcoin-kmp 0.49 (depends on bitcoin-kmp 0.32.0 and secp256k1-kmp 0.24.0) (#3362)

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…

Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
6162e2aaby Fabrice Drouin+22−44 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Update build to improve release process (#3381)

This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…

c3e9f5d6by Fabrice Drouin+834−105 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-priorityStop storing channel errors in `AuditDb` (#3236)by Bastien Teinturier · 7137eac2 · Jan 6, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 98 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Stop storing channel errors in `AuditDb` (#3236)

We stop storing every `ChannelErrorOccured` event in the `AuditDb`.
This is very spammy because there are a lot of non-fatal events,
and they turned out to be unnecessary for auditing (they make more
sense in the logs for debugging).

Such events include for example notifying that we tried to relay a
payment to a channel that didn't have enough balance, or commands
sent to channels that are offline, closing or reconnecting.

Note that we stop creating the corresponding table, but we don't
delete old data: it is up to node operators to decide whether they
want to keep it or not. We still support migrating older databases
including data from this table.

We also remove tests from very old migrations (more than 2 years old)
which are spammy but not very interesting anymore.

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit removes a database table that was used to store routine, mostly non-serious channel error events. It is a cleanup change: the events are still logged to normal log files, but they are no longer written to the audit database. There is no indication this fixes a security vulnerability; it is described by the project as a way to reduce database noise and storage use.

Lower-priorityDon't rebroadcast announcements for spent channels (#3235)by Bastien Teinturier · c214b075 · Jan 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 93 · StrongLow 41Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Don't rebroadcast announcements for spent channels (#3235)

* Don't rebroadcast spent channels

We introduced a mechanism to keep spent channels in the `Router` until
the spending transaction has enough confirmations to avoid removing
spliced channels from our graph too eagerly. An unwanted side-effect
is that while we're waiting for confirmations, we may broadcast channel
announcements for these spent channels, which looks like spam to our
peers.

We now filter out channels that have been spent for which we're waiting
for confirmations when sending out gossip.

* Notify front nodes immediately when channel is spent

Another side-effect of the splice change is that we didn't notify front
nodes that the channel was spent before it reached enough confirmations
so we kept sending channel gossip to our peers.

We now immediately notify the front nodes so that they stop sending this
channel to our peers.

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 41/100

This commit fixes a bug where Eclair would keep advertising Lightning channels that had already been spent (for example, as part of a splice operation) while waiting for the spending transaction to be confirmed. This caused the node to send stale or misleading routing information to its peers, which looks like network spam and could confuse other nodes' routing decisions. The fix filters those spent-but-pending channels out of gossip broadcasts and immediately tells front-end nodes to stop relaying them.

AI review queuedAccountable HTLCs (#3217)by Thomas HUET · e3fd1867 · Jan 5, 2026 · 68 filesMessage 58 · ThinLow 37Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET

Accountable HTLCs (#3217)

Add accountability signal for HTLCs, it replaces endorsement.
See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1280

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: unusually broad changesecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit replaces an older 'endorsement' anti-jamming signal with a new 'accountable' signal for Lightning HTLCs, following a draft specification update. It changes how invoices, payment onions, and channel messages carry and propagate this signal. Importantly, the release notes state the protections are not yet enforced: the node only collects data and logs what it would have rejected. The change is a protocol update and data-collection feature, not an active enforcement that directly blocks payments today.

Lower-priorityValidate Bolt 11 fallback addresses (#3232)by Bastien Teinturier · 1bc09764 · Jan 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 86 · StrongModerate 51Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Validate Bolt 11 fallback addresses (#3232)

Validate fallback addresses when decoding Bolt 11 invoices.
Note that we must remove an existing test that used invalid addresses.

Fixes #3135

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
defensive validation
AI analysis · Moderate 51/100

This change tightens validation of Bitcoin fallback addresses embedded in Lightning invoices (Bolt 11). Previously, Eclair would accept invoices containing fallback addresses that were malformed or invalid for the invoice's network. Now it rejects such invoices during decoding. This is a defensive correctness fix that prevents downstream bugs or confusion, but the commit itself does not describe a specific exploitable vulnerability.

Lower-priorityAdd `maxCltvExpiryDelta` parameter to `findRoute*` APIs (#3234)by Bastien Teinturier · 3b2bc570 · Jan 5, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add `maxCltvExpiryDelta` parameter to `findRoute*` APIs (#3234)

We add a parameter to `findroute` API variants to limit the total CLTV
expiry delta of the route(s) returned.

Fixes #2617

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit adds a new optional setting called maxCltvExpiryDelta to Eclair's route-finding APIs. It lets users tell the Lightning node not to return payment routes whose total time-lock delay exceeds a chosen limit. The change is a feature addition, not a fix for an active vulnerability, and it does not alter default behavior when the new parameter is omitted.

Lower-priorityfixup! Add API methods to spend funds sent to taproot channel addresses (#3220) (#3228)by pm47 · 288c5418 · Jan 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 58 · ThinLow 41Details
Commit message · pm47

fixup! Add API methods to spend funds sent to taproot channel addresses (#3220) (#3228)

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Low 41/100

This is a tiny one-line bugfix in Eclair's code for spending funds sent to Lightning channel addresses. The change corrects which Bitcoin script is checked to decide whether a channel uses the newer taproot format. Previously it checked the script of the destination address the user provided; now it checks the script of the actual output being spent from the funding transaction. Using the wrong script could cause the code to choose the wrong spending path or signature scheme, potentially making it impossible to recover funds sent to a taproot channel address or, in the worst case, constructing an invalid or insecure transaction. There is no claim in the commit that this is a security issue, and the fix is a follow-up to a recently added feature, so it likely fixes a functional bug rather than an active vulnerability.

Security candidateUse bitcoin-lib 0.46 (taproot tweak refactor) (#3225)by Fabrice Drouin · 53747cc5 · Dec 18, 2025 · 12 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 27Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Use bitcoin-lib 0.46 (taproot tweak refactor) (#3225)

* Use bitcoin-lib 0.46 (taproot tweak refactor)

* Update eclair-core/src/main/scala/fr/acinq/eclair/transactions/Transactions.scala

Co-authored-by: Bastien Teinturier <31281497+t-bast@users.noreply.github.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 27/100

This commit updates Eclair to use a newer version of its underlying Bitcoin library (bitcoin-lib 0.46). The main change is a code refactor in how Taproot addresses and scripts are created: instead of passing an optional script tree, callers now explicitly choose between a 'key path' tweak (for simple key-spending) or a 'script path' tweak (for script-spending). The commit also updates related cryptographic checksums and test code. There is no direct evidence in the commit message or diff that this fixes a known security vulnerability; it appears to be a routine dependency and API refactor.

Lower-priorityDon't scan the blockchain for spent external channels (#3226)by Bastien Teinturier · 36822bb6 · Dec 17, 2025 · 8 filesMessage 93 · StrongLow 30Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Don't scan the blockchain for spent external channels (#3226)

When an external channel is spent, we don't immediately remove it from
our network graph in case the spending transaction is a splice (see
https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1270 for more details).

A side-effect of this change, introduced in #2936, is that when we
start watching a channel after receiving its `channel_announcement`,
we will scan the blockchain if it is actually already spent. This can
be expensive if peers send us `channel_announcement`s for channels
that have been spent a long time ago since `bitcoind` doesn't provide
an index for spending transactions. It is also misleading, because if
we give up after scanning X blocks of the blockchain, we will create
a log line saying that funds are at risk: they're never at risk since
those are not our channels.

This commit fixes this issue by only checking whether the channel is
already spent by a confirmed transaction or not when setting the watch
(which is an inexpensive and efficient RPC call to `bitcoind`), without
scanning the blockchain to find the spending transaction. If it is
already spent, we immediately remove it from our network graph, even
if the spending transaction was actually a splice. This is fine, since
that channel will be re-added to our graph whenever we receive the
`channel_announcement` for the splice. In the worst case, we will simply
not route through an actually available channels for a few blocks while
its splice transaction is confirming.

Co-authored-by: pm47 <pm.padiou@gmail.com>

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 30/100

This commit fixes a performance and usability bug in the Eclair Lightning node. When the node learned about an old public channel that had already been closed, it would wastefully scan the entire Bitcoin blockchain looking for the closing transaction, which could be very slow and produced scary 'funds at risk' log messages even though no user funds were actually in danger. The fix makes the node simply check whether the channel output is already gone and, if so, remove the channel from its routing map without hunting for the closing transaction.

Lower-priorityAllow remote `dust_limit_satoshis` up to 5000 sats (#3227)by Bastien Teinturier · 5aea5142 · Dec 17, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Allow remote `dust_limit_satoshis` up to 5000 sats (#3227)

Set allow remote `dust_limit_satoshis` up to 5000 sats, which means that
HTLC outputs should be claimable at feerates lower than `25 sat/kw`.

Given that our default `dust-tolerance` is set to 50 000 sats, this
allows at least 10 pending dust HTLCs before we start failing dust HTLCs
back instead of relaying them.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit lowers the maximum dust-limit Eclair will accept from a remote Lightning peer from 10,000 satoshis to 5,000 satoshis. Dust limits determine which tiny channel outputs can be created on-chain. The change is framed as a defensive tightening: with Eclair's default dust tolerance of 50,000 sats, it still allows at least 10 tiny HTLCs to be pending before the node stops relaying them. The commit message itself describes the change in security-relevant terms (preventing uneconomical on-chain HTLC claims), but the diff is a single configuration value change and does not fix an obvious, exploitable bug.

Security candidateIdentify failing node by its index (#3224)by Thomas HUET · 856e236f · Dec 15, 2025 · 16 filesMessage 76 · AdequateLow 35Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET

Identify failing node by its index (#3224)

When a HTLC is failed remotely, the failing node was previously identified by its node id.
However this is not enough if the same node appears multiple times in the payment route, for instance for circular rebalancing.
We now identify the failing node using its index in the payment route.

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit fixes a routing bug in the Eclair Lightning node. When a payment failed somewhere along the path, the software used to identify the failing node only by its public key. That caused confusion when the same node appeared more than once in a route (for example, in circular rebalancing payments), because the wrong occurrence could be blamed. The fix adds the failing node's position (index) in the route so the correct hop is identified. This is a correctness/reliability improvement rather than a direct theft-of-funds vulnerability, but misidentifying the failing hop could lead to poor routing decisions, unnecessary retries, or incorrect blacklisting of channels/nodes.

Lower-priorityUnwatch previous funding tx after splice (#3218)by Bastien Teinturier · 0318fb78 · Dec 15, 2025 · 4 filesMessage 76 · AdequateLow 25Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Unwatch previous funding tx after splice (#3218)

After a splice transaction confirms, we don't need to keep watching the
previous funding output: it has been irrevocably spent and needlessly
consumes resources in the `Watcher` actor.

Those watches are cleaned up when the `Channel` actor dies, which does
not happen if the channel isn't closed and the `Peer` actor is kept
alive while disconnected.

Whenever we receive a new block, we log the number of watches we have.
This lets us detect whether we're missing some clean-up of old watches
in edge cases.

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 25/100

This commit fixes a resource cleanup issue in the Eclair Lightning node. After a channel is upgraded via a 'splice' transaction, the old funding transaction output is permanently spent. Previously, Eclair kept watching that old output indefinitely if the channel stayed open and the peer stayed disconnected, wasting memory and processing power in the blockchain watcher. The change explicitly tells the watcher to stop watching those old, already-spent outputs. It also adds logging so operators can spot similar leftover watches. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this was exploitable to steal funds or attack other nodes; it appears to be a performance and robustness improvement.

Lower-priorityAdd API methods to spend funds sent to taproot channel addresses (#3220)by Fabrice Drouin · 38dc4072 · Dec 4, 2025 · 4 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 11Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Add API methods to spend funds sent to taproot channel addresses (#3220)

Add API methods to spend funds sent to taproot channel addresses

This PR adds new API calls that extend spendFromChannelAddress* calls to taproot channels.

---------

Co-authored-by: pm47 <pm.padiou@gmail.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 11/100

This commit adds new API methods to let users spend funds that were accidentally sent to taproot-style Lightning channel addresses. It extends existing recovery tools to support a newer address format. There is no indication in the commit that this fixes a security vulnerability; it appears to be a feature addition.

Lower-priorityFix links to 'Reaching The Ground With Lightning' (#3219)by ekzyis · e1775eeb · Dec 4, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 58 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · ekzyis

Fix links to 'Reaching The Ground With Lightning' (#3219)

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only updates two broken documentation links in markdown files. It does not change any program code, configuration, or security behavior. There is no security issue.

Lower-priorityMonitor the internal state of `ReputationRecorder` (#3216)by Bastien Teinturier · a87963b1 · Nov 19, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 17Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Monitor the internal state of `ReputationRecorder` (#3216)

It is quite hard to reason about the internal state of this actor, and
it tracks every pending HTLC. If for some reason we're not removing
HTLCs correctly, this would create a memory leak.

We log the number of pending HTLCs every 5 minutes to help detect if
clean-up is correctly implemented.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 17/100

This commit adds a periodic log message to an internal bookkeeping actor so developers can spot if pending payment records are piling up unexpectedly. It does not fix a known bug or change how payments are processed; it is purely an observability/monitoring improvement.

Lower-priorityUpdate default configuration for revoked HTLC clean-up (#3212)by Bastien Teinturier · fa7e2ee3 · Nov 18, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 28Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Update default configuration for revoked HTLC clean-up (#3212)

The default configuration for removing old rows containing revoked HTLC
data after a channel close was too slow and inadequate for most nodes.
We update it to use smaller batches without a much shorter interval.

Thanks @DerEwige for providing data about their experiments.

Fixes #3211

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 28/100

This commit changes default settings and timing logic for a database cleanup task that removes old Lightning channel data after channels close. The old defaults deleted very large chunks very infrequently, which could slow down or stress busy nodes. The new defaults use smaller, more frequent deletions and avoid stacking up cleanup jobs when the database is already busy. There is no direct security vulnerability being patched; it is a performance and operational-stability improvement.

Lower-priorityAllow high remote `dust_limit_satoshis` (#3215)by Bastien Teinturier · f6a5a3ca · Nov 17, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongLow 33Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Allow high remote `dust_limit_satoshis` (#3215)

Now that we only accept anchor output channels and beyong, we should
let our peers use high `dust_limit_satoshis` values to ensure that the
transaction outputs are economically spendable.

We can't yet raise our `dust_limit_satoshis`: we must first accept high
values, and in the next release (and once other implementations support
it as well), then we'll be able to increase our default value.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 33/100

This commit raises the maximum dust limit Eclair will accept from remote Lightning peers from 600 to 10,000 satoshis. Dust limits determine the smallest transaction output a channel will create. The change is framed as a forward-compatibility and economic-spendability improvement for newer 'anchor output' channels, not as a security fix. It does not change Eclair's own dust limit (still 546 satoshis).

Security candidateUpdate `bitcoin-lib` (#3213)by Bastien Teinturier · df75ed5a · Nov 12, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 43 · ThinInformational 12Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Update `bitcoin-lib` (#3213)

To add support for P2A PSBTs.

43/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarycryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This is a routine dependency update for Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning node. It bumps the internal 'bitcoin-lib' library from version 0.45 to 0.45.1 and its related 'bitcoin-kmp-jvm' component from 0.28.0 to 0.28.1. The commit message says the purpose is to add support for 'P2A PSBTs' (a new Bitcoin transaction format feature). The change only updates version numbers and recorded checksums; no application code is modified in this commit. There is no mention of a security fix, bug, or vulnerability.

Security candidateUse 73 bytes der-encoded signatures in weight estimation (#3210)by Bastien Teinturier · bfe34ab1 · Nov 5, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Use 73 bytes der-encoded signatures in weight estimation (#3210)

While 73 bytes der-encoded signatures aren't standard (they're only
possible with high-S signatures), miners could accept such signatures.

Most of our tests use 72 bytes der-encoded signatures because we will
never generate 73 bytes der-encoded signatures ourselves. But it's more
safe to use a 73 bytes signature in our weight estimation because:

- it's what the BOLTs recommend
- it's what other implementations use (e.g. LDK) which means they may
reject our interactive-tx attempts by thinking we're under-paying
fees

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit adjusts how Eclair estimates the 'weight' (a measure of transaction size used to calculate Bitcoin mining fees) for funding inputs in Lightning channel transactions. It increases the assumed signature size from 72 to 73 bytes, matching what the Lightning specification recommends and what other implementations like LDK use. The change is defensive: it helps prevent Eclair's interactive transaction proposals from being rejected by peers who think Eclair is under-paying fees, and it avoids edge cases where miners might accept a slightly larger signature than Eclair accounted for.

Security candidateAllow aborting liquidity purchases after signing (#3206)by Bastien Teinturier · 5e1a4882 · Nov 5, 2025 · 6 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 47Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Allow aborting liquidity purchases after signing (#3206)

When a liquidity purchase is signed, we eagerly add it to our DB before
receiving the remote `interactive-tx` signatures. If we reach that step,
our peer should always finalize the signing steps, so we didn't bother
handling the case where they would instead send `tx_abort`. When that
happened, we kept the upstream HTLCs pending until they got close to
their expiry, at which point we failed them.

We've seen cases where seemingly non-malicious mobile wallets abort
that kind of liquidity purchases after a disconnection. It is harmful
for an honest sender to keep the HTLCs pending, so we now immediately
fail them in that case.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 47/100

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When a user tried to buy extra spending capacity (a 'liquidity purchase') and the remote peer backed out after the local node had already signed, Eclair kept the related incoming payments stuck in limbo until they nearly expired. The patch makes Eclair immediately fail those stuck payments when the peer aborts, which is fairer to honest senders and avoids unnecessary delays. It is a correctness/availability improvement rather than a direct theft-of-funds vulnerability.

Lower-priorityCheck that relay fees are nonnegative (#3209)by Thomas HUET · ff1ce1fe · Nov 5, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 53 · ThinModerate 54Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET

Check that relay fees are nonnegative (#3209)

Fixes #3204

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100

This commit adds a server-side check to make sure users cannot set negative Lightning Network routing fees through the API. Previously, the API accepted negative values for base and proportional relay fees, which could cause a node to pay others when forwarding payments or create confusing, loss-inducing channel policies. The fix rejects such inputs with a validation error.

AI review queuedAdd `CommitSigBatch` codec (#3205)by Bastien Teinturier · 235e95df · Nov 3, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 66 · AdequateInformational 21Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add `CommitSigBatch` codec (#3205)

While we send `commit_sig` messages individually on the wire, we need
a codec for the batch object when using the cluster mode, when peer
connection actors live on remote machines.

66/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 21/100

This commit adds a new internal-only message format called CommitSigBatch so that Eclair nodes running in cluster mode can send groups of commit_sig messages between internal machines. It is not a change to the public Lightning network protocol; peers still receive commit_sig messages one at a time. The change is a straightforward codec addition with a matching unit test.

Lower-priorityEnable detailed monitoring for singleton actors (#3200)by pm47 · a014211b · Oct 31, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Enable detailed monitoring for singleton actors (#3200)

This allows tracking the `mailbox-size` for those actors, while existing group-level monitoring only tracks `time-in-mailbox`.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine observability/monitoring change. It renames a few internal actor identifiers (for example from 'zmqblock' to 'zmq-block') and adds a Kamon monitoring configuration so that specific singleton actors report their mailbox size. There is no security fix or vulnerability present in the diff.

Lower-priorityAdd more logs around `commit_sig` (#3202)by Bastien Teinturier · 767bae8b · Oct 31, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add more logs around `commit_sig` (#3202)

We have a few force-close caused by invalid commit_sig messages. This
may happen when multiple devices are used in parallel, but some reports
don't seem to be using multiple devices.

Unfortunately, we didn't log the details of the commit tx we're building
in every case. Also, we only logged details of our local commit tx after
validating the remote `commit_sig`, which means we cannot troubleshoot
the case where we reject that remote `commit_sig`.

We now log details of the commit tx construction in every scenario,
which should allow detecting discrepancies between the local and remote
states.

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds extra logging messages around Lightning channel commitment signatures. It does not change any security logic, validation rules, or cryptographic checks. The goal is to make debugging easier when a peer's signature is rejected, which can sometimes lead to a channel force-close. There is no vulnerability being fixed here.

Security candidateNits (#3203)by pm47 · 7ef3c4b2 · Oct 31, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 26 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Nits (#3203)

26/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! Too few words to establish purpose! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a small cleanup pull request titled 'Nits'. It fixes a typo in documentation, corrects a log message to show the right commitment format name, changes a debug log to info level for transaction signing, adds structured logging context for authenticated peer connections, and removes an outdated ASCII diagram comment. None of these changes affect security.

AI review queuedAdd more tolerance in tests (#3199)by pm47 · 6dd9f769 · Oct 29, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Add more tolerance in tests (#3199)

DER encoding size can vary by +- 3 bytes, not +- 2.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only widens the allowed margin in a test assertion about DER-encoded ECDSA signature sizes, from plus/minus 2 bytes to plus/minus 3 bytes. It is a test-only change and does not alter production code, transaction validation, or cryptographic handling.