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Low 36 Bitcoin

Stop sending `update_fee` for mobile wallets (#3186)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Bastien Teinturier

81/100 · Strong
Stop sending `update_fee` for mobile wallets (#3186)

We stop sending `update_fee` and set the feerate to `1 sat/byte` for
channels with mobile wallet users. This removes edge cases around
`update_fee` handling in tricky cases (splicing, shutdown, etc) while
still allowing channels to force-close thanks to package relay.

Note that mobile wallets that don't have an on-chain wallet to use
CPFP on the commit transaction may not be able to get their commit
tx confirmed, but that was already the case before that change since
the LSP decides the commit feerate. This will get better with v3 txs
and https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/zero-fee-commitments-for-mobile-wallets/1453
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change adjusts how Eclair sets on-chain fees for channels with mobile wallets (specifically Phoenix). Instead of repeatedly sending fee-update messages and using higher feerates, it now pins the commitment transaction feerate to 1 satoshi per byte and stops sending update_fee for those channels. The goal is to simplify fee handling during complex operations like splicing and shutdown, relying on Bitcoin's package relay to still allow force-closes to propagate. The commit notes a trade-off: mobile wallets without their own on-chain funds may struggle to confirm force-close transactions via CPFP, but that was already the case because the LSP (the node running Eclair) controlled the feerate anyway.

Recommended action

Review whether the 1 sat/byte floor is safe under all network conditions and mempool congestion scenarios, and confirm that package relay assumptions hold for the deployment's Bitcoin Core version and peer topology. Monitor for any edge cases during splicing, shutdown, or fee disagreements that the change is intended to avoid.

Security signals we found

01

Change in fee policy for mobile wallet channels

02

Pins commitment feerate to 1 sat/byte for specific commitment formats

03

Stops sending update_fee for mobile wallet channels

04

Relies on Bitcoin Core v28 1-parent-1-child package relay for commit tx propagation

05

Acknowledged residual risk: mobile wallets without on-chain funds cannot CPFP the commit tx

06

References future v3 transaction and zero-fee commitment improvements

Risk score

Why this scored 36/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 4/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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