Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…
Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…
Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…
This commit closes a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) hole in Eclair's admin API. Before the change, a malicious web page visited by a node operator could silently submit authenticated API requests (for example, to send funds or close Lig…
New origin-check directive rejecting all requests with an Origin headerRemoval of CORS response headers from API responsesCSRF protection described in commit message and release notes
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.3 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder …
No security-relevant code changesNo vulnerability indicatorsNo bug fixes or patches
This commit adjusts build packaging settings to make compiled releases more reproducible across different computers. It sets consistent file permissions and line endings for packaged documentation and runtime files. There is no indication …
This is a large security patch for the Eclair Lightning node that fixes multiple ways an attacker could steal funds, burn money to miners, or lock funds forever. The fixes include: preventing force-closes with un-publishable splice transac…
Force-close uses latest publishable commitment to avoid unconfirmable splice commit txsClosing fee bounded by maxClosingFeerate when local node pays feesNew max-funding-feerate configuration caps funding/splice miner fees
This change expands when Eclair will allow password-based authentication to a Tor control port. Previously, only loopback addresses (the same machine) were considered safe enough for password auth. Now, private/site-local and link-local ne…
Relaxation of authentication-method restriction for Tor control portPassword authentication now permitted on site-local and link-local addressesOriginal code explicitly rejected password auth for non-loopback addresses
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.2 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder release-notes file, and del…
No security-relevant code changes indicating a vulnerabilityBoot.scala startup guard prevents accidental deployment of an unsafe development snapshotMaven trusted checksum verification is re-enabled, improving supply-chain/build integrity
This commit hardens Eclair's handling of the Lightning 'splicing' feature when a peer misbehaves. Splicing lets two nodes resize an open payment channel without closing it on-chain. The patch adds extra checks so that if a peer sends unexp…
Adds commitment-index consistency checks before completing splice/RBF funding attemptsRejects forbidden update messages while remote peer is quiescingRejects commit_sig during quiescence to prevent commitment-index desync
This commit adds a safety net to the Eclair Lightning node to limit how many incoming peer connections can sit unfinished before completing the cryptographic handshake. Previously, an attacker could open many TCP connections and leave them…
Resource-exhaustion mitigation: bounds unauthenticated incoming connections to prevent memory/file-descriptor/CPU exhaustionNew kill reason TooManyPendingConnections added to PeerConnection.KillReasonNew metrics incomingconnections.pending/evicted/rejected for monitoring abuse
This commit fixes three security issues in how Eclair connects to the Tor network and stores sensitive files. First, it changes the default Tor authentication from password to safecookie, and blocks password mode when the Tor control port …
Default authentication changed from password to safecookiePassword authentication rejected for remote Tor control portsTor cookie length validated to be exactly 32 bytes
This commit fixes a bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a peer could send a message containing both a correct standard signature and an incorrect partial signature. The old code would verify the correct signature but then store the inva…
Type-confusion between IndividualSignature and PartialSignatureWithNonce in channel messagesInvalid partial signature could be stored after valid individual signature was verifiedNew signatureFor helper enforces commitment-format-aware signature selection
This change makes the Eclair Lightning node force-close a payment channel if a peer tries to add a payment whose timeout value (cltv_expiry) is 500,000,000 or higher. Such large values are invalid according to the Lightning BOLT 2 specific…
BOLT 2 compliance check added for HTLC cltv_expiry >= 500,000,000Invalid cltv_expiry now triggers local error and channel force-closeOff-by-one fix in locktime threshold interpretation (<= changed to <)
This commit adds a new optional encrypted payload to Lightning payment fulfillment messages. It is a feature implementation, not a fix for an active vulnerability. The code does introduce a safety check: if a peer sends an oversized fulfil…
New cryptographic payload handling added to payment fulfillment pathSize limits and silent truncation applied to failure packets, fulfillment payloads, and attribution dataChannel force-close triggered on oversized peer fulfillment payload
This commit fixes five low-severity security or robustness issues in the Eclair Lightning node. It removes a risky type cast that could crash the node on corrupted channel data, forces encrypted cluster communication to prevent private dat…
Unsafe type cast removed from channel codecCluster mode now requires tls-tcp transportAPI error responses no longer include exception messages
This commit fixes a bug in the Eclair Lightning node where, after a restart, the node could be tricked into keeping the wrong incoming payments alive. An attacker could reuse the same payment identifier (payment_hash) from a legitimate in-…
Fixes a logic bug that could lead to forced channel closuresAttack vector: payment_hash reuse to pin unrelated HTLCsChanges identifier from payment_hash to unique (channel_id, htlc_id)
This commit only updates user documentation. It adds warnings that the Bitcoin node (bitcoind) should run on the same machine as Eclair, and if it runs remotely, operators must use a secure encrypted tunnel. No code was changed, so this pa…
Documentation-only changeNo code, configuration, or cryptographic modificationsDescribes pre-existing deployment risk rather than a new vulnerability
This commit fixes several bugs in Eclair's 'on-the-fly funding' feature, which lets a node open a Lightning channel and pay for it using future payment fees. The bugs could allow a malicious peer to make the node pay twice, lose money on f…
Double-payment vulnerability fixed: paymentAlreadyRelayed now checks commitment transactions in addition to pending local changes, preventing relay of already-cross-signed HTLCs after restart.Loss-of-funds vulnerability fixed: funded channels with unpaid future-HTLC fees are force-closed before upstream HTLCs are failed, avoiding a race where the peer fulfills a cross-signed downstream HTLC after we failed upstream.Upstream settlement gap fixed: preimages received after HTLC expiry are now relayed upstream, preventing the node from paying downstream without being paid upstream.
This commit tightens file and folder permissions for Eclair's sensitive data. It ensures that seed files (which protect the node's identity and Lightning channel funds) and the data directory are readable only by the owner on Linux/macOS s…
Hardening of seed file permissions to owner-only read/writeHardening of datadir and chaindir permissions to owner-onlyMigration path also re-permissions copied seed files
Add previous commitments to ChannelFundingConfirmed event (#3303)
Event stream subscribers could use this field to find extra information about previous states that could have been pruned from the current commitments.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 17/100
This commit adds an extra data field to an internal event notification so that subscribers can see information about older channel states that may have been removed from the current state. It is a small, informational change to an event object and does not appear to fix an active security bug.
We add metrics for liquidity ads (purchased amount and mining fee refund).
We refactor the interactive-tx metrics to record them *after* tx validation, instead of *before*. We also remove the input/output count for the "shared" case, since it's always 0 or 1.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds and reorganizes internal metrics (statistics counters and histograms) for monitoring liquidity advertisements and interactive Bitcoin transactions. It does not change how funds are handled, validated, or secured. The code that records metrics was moved to run after transaction validation instead of before, which is a safer ordering, but no vulnerability is being fixed.
Lower-priorityAdd metrics on interactive-tx inputs and outputs (#3300)by pm47 · 113d8fba · May 6, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47
Add metrics on interactive-tx inputs and outputs (#3300)
We track: - global input/output count by type and distribution of amounts - per-session input/output count by type
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new telemetry (metrics) to observe how many inputs and outputs are used in interactive Bitcoin transactions during Lightning channel funding or splicing. It records counts and amounts into monitoring histograms but does not change any transaction validation, cryptographic checks, or user-facing behavior. There is no security issue visible in the diff.
Security candidateFix flaky DER signature weight test (#3299)by Bastien Teinturier · 0f5d4b89 · May 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Fix flaky DER signature weight test (#3299)
This test was flaky because for the funding output, we provide two signatures, which means that we need twice the slack for the variable DER encoding length.
100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adjusts a flaky unit test that checks transaction weight estimates. It widens the allowed tolerance for variable-length ECDSA signatures when two signatures are involved instead of one. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no vulnerability.
AI review queuedUse official feature bit for `option_simple_taproot` (#3144)by Bastien Teinturier · 872cb663 · May 5, 2026 · 14 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Use official feature bit for `option_simple_taproot` (#3144)
Use the official feature bit and name for taproot channels and the corresponding channel types. Activate taproot channels support by default (without support for announcing such channels yet).
See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/995
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 37/100
This commit updates the Eclair Lightning node software to use the official protocol feature bit and name for a new kind of Bitcoin payment channel called 'taproot channels.' It turns taproot channel support on by default, but only for private (unannounced) channels, because the public-announcement rules are not finalized. The change is mostly a rename and feature-bit swap from an earlier experimental/staging version, plus adding guards so users cannot accidentally open a public taproot channel. It is a protocol-alignment change, not a fix for an active security bug.
Security candidateAdd support for the official splicing protocol (#2887)by Bastien Teinturier · 68b0096a · Apr 30, 2026 · 24 filesMessage 93 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Add support for the official splicing protocol (#2887)
We replace our experimental version of `splice_init`, `splice_ack` and `splice_locked` by their official version. If our peer is using the experimental feature bit, we convert our outgoing messages to use the experimental encoding and incoming messages to the official messages.
We also change the TLV fields added to `tx_add_input`, `tx_signatures` and `splice_locked` to match the spec version. We always write both the official and experimental TLV to updated nodes (because the experimental one is odd and will be ignored) but we drop the official TLV if our peer is using the experimental feature, because it won't understand the even TLV field.
We do the same thing for the `commit_sig` TLV. For peers who support the official splicing version, we insert the `start_batch` message before the batch of `commit_sig` messages.
This guarantees backwards-compatibility with peers who only support the experimental feature.
We introduce a `retransmit_flags` field to `my_current_funding_locked` and `next_funding` to ask our peer to retransmit `commitment_signed` or `announcement_signatures` if we're expecting them. With this change, we don't need to retransmit `splice_locked` on reconnection anymore to trigger the exchange of `announcement_signatures`. We don't need to retransmit it to let our peer know that we've seen enough confirmations for the splice either, since `my_current_funding_locked` implies that.
This allows us to completely remove retransmission of `splice_locked` on reconnection, and also get rid of the `your_last_funding_locked` TLV, which greatly simplifies the reconnection logic. We do keep them for backwards-compatibility with existing Phoenix users though, but we'll be able to clean it up once they have updated.
Note that this works with taproot channels since we will simply provide nonces in `channel_reestablish` when we need our peer to send announcement signatures (not supported yet since taproot channels are never announced).
We rollback using the `next_commitment_number` to let our peer know that we haven't received their `commit_sig` and instead use the retransmit flags added to the `next_funding` TLV, unless our peer is using the legacy splicing protocol.
93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathauthentication pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This commit adds official Lightning channel splicing support to Eclair and replaces an experimental protocol. It includes backwards-compatibility shims for older Phoenix wallets, changes how reconnection messages request retransmission of signatures, and renumbers some protocol feature bits. The changes are broad and touch consensus-critical wire protocol and channel state logic, so bugs could affect channel safety, but the commit itself is a feature implementation rather than a clear security fix.
More aggressive peer scorer idle channels management (#3295)
We previously lowered fees from idle channels only if our latest update was from more than 24 hours ago, and closed them if our latest update was more than 5 days ago and using our minimal fees.
The issue is that our channel update may have been refreshed without changing the relay fees, for example if our peer disconnected. We don't track when our relay fees reached the minimum amount, so we may have a recent channel update even though we reached our minimum relay fees weeks ago.
We use smaller durations for those thresholds to see if that helps reclaim liquidity more aggressively.
We also disable old peers revival by default. This feature is useful when feerates have been high for a while and funding was thus put on hold, but when feerates are frequently below our feerate threshold, this is wasting liquidity. It should be enabled after a high-fee period.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 24/100
This commit tweaks Eclair's automated liquidity-management logic so the node becomes more aggressive about lowering fees and closing channels that sit idle. It also turns off a feature that automatically re-funds old peers by default. The changes are operational/economic policy adjustments, not a fix for a software vulnerability that an attacker can exploit. There is a small operational risk that a node could close channels or lower fees more eagerly than before, but that is a business-logic trade-off rather than a security flaw.
Security candidateStore our closing_complete in the simple close session (#3289)by Fabrice Drouin · da7cd962 · Apr 21, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 96 · StrongLow 32Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin
Store our closing_complete in the simple close session (#3289)
In the simple close session, which is never persisted, we just need to remember our closing_complete and the partial signatures it contains, instead of keeping our musig2 nonces and generating our partial signatures a second time to build the final closing tx when we receive our peer's partial signatures. We also check our peer's partial signature and fail early if they're not valid, instead of building a fully sign closing tx and then verify that it is correct.
96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarynonce handlingsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 32/100
This commit changes how Eclair (a Bitcoin Lightning node) remembers its own closing signatures during a mutual channel close. Previously, the code re-generated signing nonces and re-signed closing transactions when the peer's signature arrived. Now it stores the original closing message and reuses its signatures. It also adds an early check that the peer's partial signature is valid before trying to build a final signed transaction. The change is a defensive correctness improvement rather than a clear fix for an active exploit.
We connect to bitcoind over ZMQ right after spawning all actors in the system, which can consume a lot of our available sockets/bandwidth. We increase the default timeout from 5 seconds to 30 seconds.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This commit increases the startup timeout from 5 to 30 seconds for Eclair's connections to Bitcoin's ZMQ notification service and its own TCP server port. It is a reliability/configuration fix, not a security patch. There is no indication it fixes a vulnerability or was triggered by a security report.
Add threshold for disabling `from_future_htlc` (#3293)
When funding a transaction using `from_future_htlc`, we are taking the risk that the remote node doesn't fulfill the corresponding HTLCs. If we detect that too many peers fail such HTLCs, this may indicate a bug on the wallet side, so we automatically disable `from_future_htlc` to limit our exposure.
We also ensure that nodes that already had one suspicious payment are blacklisted for other payments. This issue can happen when wallet users use multiple devices in unsupported scenarios.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 48/100
This commit adds a safety limit to a Lightning node feature called 'from_future_htlc,' which lets peers pay channel funding fees using HTLCs that haven't arrived yet. The change makes the node track how many distinct peers look suspicious (e.g., accept funding but then reject the future HTLCs), and once a threshold is reached, it stops allowing that funding method. It also lets operators keep specific nodes blacklisted when re-enabling the feature. This is a defensive hardening patch, not a fix for an active exploit in the code itself.
We add release notes about the peer scorer for node operators who like living on the bleeding edge. We also remove the workaround for the lack of DB data on restart.
We also add metrics to track rolling profit and payment volume.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds user-facing documentation for a new experimental feature and adds metrics that report profit and payment volume. It also removes a temporary workaround that delayed automated actions until enough historical data was available. There is no security-relevant code change visible in the diff.
There's a race condition between Bob and Carol's router states, which aren't updated exactly at the same time. Retrying the condition should fix this race condition.
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes a test file to make an integration test less flaky by retrying a condition until two nodes' routing data match. It does not modify production code, so it has no direct security impact on real Eclair users.
Don't load network graph twice on start-up (#3290)
We previously read the whole network graph from DB (channels and nodes) twice: once before starting any actor to verify that the DB has not been corrupted, and then again when initializing the `Router` actor.
We now keep the result of the first DB read instead of throwing it away and provide it as argument to the `Router`, which doesn't need to read from the DB on start-up anymore.
91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This commit is a performance and startup-time optimization for the Eclair Lightning node. It changes the startup sequence so the network graph (channels and nodes) is read from the database once instead of twice. The Router actor now receives the already-loaded data via a new Init message rather than loading it itself. There is no security vulnerability here; the change is purely about efficiency and code structure.
Don't try reconnecting automatically to mobile wallets (#3287)
It's useless as they will always have a different IP address, and they will be offline most of the time anyway. They will initiate connections either when the app is started or when they receive a push notification so we never need to initiate connections from the server side.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 31/100
This change stops Eclair lightning nodes from automatically trying to reconnect to mobile wallets. Mobile wallets change IP addresses frequently and are usually offline, so server-initiated reconnections are wasteful and can leak information about which channels belong to mobile users. The mobile wallet will reconnect on its own when it opens the app or gets a push notification. This is a hardening and privacy improvement, not a fix for an active exploit.
Lower-priorityAdd delays when reading past payment events for stats (#3288)by Bastien Teinturier · 1a88ebe1 · Apr 15, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 17Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Add delays when reading past payment events for stats (#3288)
When we restart, we load past payments events into the peer stats tracker to inform our scoring algorithm. We read them in chunks, but it can be quite expensive in terms of bandwidth. Since this is low priority and there are a lot of DB reads already happening when starting up, we add a large initial delay and a small-ish chunk delay.
With the default values, all past events should be loaded ~20 minutes after starting up, and the first run of the scoring algorithm happens 1 hour after starting up, so this should work well.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 17/100
This commit is a performance and reliability improvement, not a security fix. It adds configurable delays when a restarted Eclair node reloads past payment events into its peer statistics tracker. Previously these database reads happened immediately and in rapid succession, which could strain the database during startup. Now the first batch waits 10 minutes and subsequent batches wait 10 seconds between reads. There is no indication this change addresses a vulnerability or is security-critical.
It fixes compatibility issues with alpine (which uses musl and not glibc), and is easier to maintain. Note that this makes the image about 190 Mb bigger.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit changes the Docker base image from Alpine Linux to Ubuntu Noble. The stated reason is to fix compatibility problems because Alpine uses a different C library (musl) than the one the Java build expects (glibc). It is a routine build/maintenance change, not a security patch. The image becomes larger, but there is no direct evidence in the commit of a vulnerability being fixed.
AI review queuedAdd fuzz tests for onion, route blinding and lightning message codecs (#3282)by Nishant Bansal · 0778eafa · Apr 13, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nishant Bansal
Add fuzz tests for onion, route blinding and lightning message codecs (#3282)
- Expand LightningMessageCodecs fuzz tests to cover all message types - Add fuzz tests for payment and message onion payload codecs - Add fuzz tests for route blinding codecs - Add fuzz tests for onion failure message codecs
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidenceparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new automated fuzz tests for Lightning Network message and onion-payload codecs. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a runtime vulnerability by itself. The tests are designed to catch crashes or inconsistent encoding/decoding in existing codec code by feeding them random bytes.
If the test runs too quickly and the message is processed in less than 1 millisecond, there is a race condition since reading from the database excludes the upper timestamp bound (`timestamp < now`).
We also remove our usage of the `BETWEEN` keyword for postgres. The `BETWEEN` keyword is inclusive of both bounds, while we want to exclude the upper bound to allow pagination.
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit fixes a flaky automated test and, as a side effect, changes several PostgreSQL database queries to exclude the upper time bound instead of including it. The change is described by the author as a correctness fix for pagination, not a security fix. There is no direct evidence of an exploitable vulnerability.
Lower-priorityAdd fee field to `findroute` full format response (#3283)by rorp · 9314fe99 · Apr 8, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · rorp
Add fee field to `findroute` full format response (#3283)
This can be helpful when analysis routes find by path-finding.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply adds a new 'fee' field to the JSON response of Eclair's route-finding API. It is a user-facing informational improvement and does not change any security-sensitive behavior, access controls, or payment logic.
``` A node receiving a ping message: - if num_pong_bytes is less than 65532: - MUST respond by sending a pong message, with byteslen equal to num_pong_bytes. - otherwise (num_pong_bytes is not less than 65532): - MUST ignore the ping. ```
These reply-less pings are used to insert cover traffic to thwart network-level traffic analysis. We wanted to allow them in #3278 but we missed this ping flood protection that needed to be updated.
We also had an off-by-one in the maximum pong length that is now fixed.
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 51/100
This commit fixes two related bugs in how Eclair handles Lightning network 'ping' messages. First, it corrects an off-by-one error so pings asking for a 65532-byte reply are now ignored (matching the BOLT1 spec), instead of being answered. Second, it stops treating these 'reply-less' pings as a flood attack, so they no longer count toward the pending-ping limit that disconnects peers. The practical effect is that legitimate cover-traffic pings no longer risk getting a peer disconnected, and the protocol boundary now matches the specification.
Security candidateAdd backwards-compatible parts of the official splicing protocol (#3261)by Bastien Teinturier · 129df369 · Apr 3, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 86 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Add backwards-compatible parts of the official splicing protocol (#3261)
* Add `funding_txid` to `commit_sig`
In https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1160 we add a TLV field to `commit_sig` messages to let the receiver know to which `funding_txid` this signature applies. This is more resilient than relying on the order of the `commit_sig` messages in the batch. This is an odd TLV, so we can start writing it right now without creating compatibility issues.
We also slightly refactor existing code to make it easier to introduce a backwards-compat layer when migrating to the official splicing. We also increase the default number of RBF attempts allowed.
* Insert a `start_batch` message during splices
In https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1160, we introduce a message to let our peer know how many `commit_sig` messages they will receive and treat them as a batch. This replaces our previous version that did something similar, but by adding a batch TLV in every `commit_sig` message we send.
We currently do both: we keep inserting the experimental batch TLV, and we start by sending a `start_batch` message (with the same information). Since it is an odd message (127), it should be safely ignored if our peer doesn't understand it.
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This commit updates the Eclair Lightning node software to support a new, backwards-compatible draft of the official Bitcoin Lightning 'splicing' protocol. It adds a funding transaction identifier to commitment signatures and introduces a 'start_batch' message so peers know when multiple signatures belong together. It also keeps the older experimental batching mechanism for compatibility with older Phoenix wallets. The changes are primarily a protocol upgrade and compatibility shim, not a clear security fix, though they reduce ambiguity about which signature applies to which funding transaction during splices.
Lower-priorityFollow BOLT1 handling for "no reply" pings: ignore, don't warn. (#3278)by Rusty Russell · 6336d80c · Apr 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell
Follow BOLT1 handling for "no reply" pings: ignore, don't warn. (#3278)
These "oversize ping replies" are how we ask for no replies, such as when we're sending dummy traffic. From the rationale:
This allows a convenient cutoff for `num_pong_bytes` to indicate that no reply should be sent.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Co-authored-by: t-bast <bastien@acinq.fr>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This change updates how Eclair handles oversized ping messages from other Lightning nodes. Previously, Eclair would log a warning and send a 'Warning' message back. Now it silently ignores them. This aligns with the Lightning protocol spec (BOLT 1), which says large ping requests are a legitimate way to ask for no reply, often used for cover traffic. The old behavior was not a security vulnerability, but it was slightly noisy and could be used to generate warning logs or messages.
Add a fuzzing module based on Jazzer to allow fuzzing parts of eclair. This commit includes fuzz tests for codecs to be used as examples. It is a separate module (minimal interaction with the other modules). We include helper scripts to run many fuzz tests in parallel or generate reports.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencecryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit adds a new testing-only module that uses a fuzzing tool called Jazzer to automatically throw random data at Eclair's Lightning message parsers. It does not change any production code, network behavior, or security logic. It is purely a defensive testing improvement.
Lower-priorityInitialize peer stats with past events (#3272)by Bastien Teinturier · a05f5830 · Mar 31, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 88 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Initialize peer stats with past events (#3272)
We initialize peer statistics by reading past events from the `AuditDb`. We read events in chunks to avoid overloading the DB or the RAM. We only return peer statistics to callers once we've finished reading past data from the DB.
Note that on-chain statistics need to be computed whenever statistics are requested, because they require merging data from two distincts events (transaction published and transaction confirmed), which requires keeping state between those events and thus requires the DB (because the node may restart after publishing a transaction and before it confirms).
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit changes how Eclair tracks peer statistics. Previously, after a restart, the node would start collecting statistics from scratch and wait for new events before making automated decisions. Now it loads up to 7 days of past payment and on-chain events from the database in chunks, and only returns complete statistics once that initial load is done. It also refreshes on-chain fee data from the database whenever statistics are requested, so fees from transactions confirmed while the node was offline are not missed. This is a correctness/operational improvement, not a security fix.
We more aggressively reclaim liquidity from idle channels. We start by identifying channels where the liquidity doesn't seem to be moving in either direction. Then we lower our relay fees until we reach our minimum configured value. Once we've reached that minimum fee, if the payment volume doesn't increase, we eventually close those channels (but we always keep one channel with those peers, we only close the redundant channels).
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This commit adds an automated housekeeping feature to Eclair lightning nodes. It identifies channels where funds sit idle for a long time, lowers the routing fees on those channels to try to attract more payments, and eventually closes redundant idle channels if traffic still doesn't pick up. This is a normal business-logic change, not a security fix or vulnerability.