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Low 37 Bitcoin

Change RBF feerate bump rule to match BIP125 (#3298)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Bastien Teinturier

81/100 · Strong
Change RBF feerate bump rule to match BIP125 (#3298)

The 25/24 multiplicative feerate bump for `tx_init_rbf` can produce
increments too small for Bitcoin Core to relay the replacement
transaction under BIP125's minimum relay fee policy (default
`incrementalRelayFee` of 0.1 sat/vB since Bitcoin Core v30.0). Add a
minimum additive increment of 25 sat/kw alongside the existing
multiplicative rule, using whichever produces a higher feerate.

See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1327
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes how Eclair increases transaction fees when replacing a funding transaction via RBF (Replace-By-Fee). Previously, Eclair only required the new fee rate to be 25/24 (about 4.17%) higher than the old one. Under recent Bitcoin Core defaults, that small bump can be too low for the network to accept the replacement. The fix adds a minimum flat bump of 25 sat/kw and uses whichever is larger. This is a protocol correctness / liveness fix rather than a theft-of-funds bug, but it can prevent channel funding from getting stuck.

Recommended action

Treat as a recommended protocol-compliance update. Nodes running interactive funding (splicing/RBF) should upgrade to avoid stuck replacement transactions. No immediate emergency response is warranted because funds are not directly at risk, but operators should monitor for failed RBF rounds on older versions.

Security signals we found

01

RBF fee-bump rule updated to satisfy Bitcoin Core relay policy

02

BOLT 2 spec alignment via minimum additive fee increment

03

Potential liveness issue: replacement transactions could be rejected by the network

04

No input validation, signature, or key-handling changes observed

Risk score

Why this scored 37/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 6/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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