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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

2330 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

228security candidates319second-pass queue1977AI analyses
99commits · 30 days
229commits · 60 days
709commits · 180 days
1578commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
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Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
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Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
628Strong · 80–100
1399Adequate · 60–79
272Thin · 40–59
31Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker331217581
daywalker9019315113471
Níckolas Goline961252376
Amperstrand322278
Rusty Russell96977961173
Sangbida Chaudhuri18537157167
Vincenzo Palazzo19714185
Lagrang3115679170
dovgopoly18016165
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1469110074
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 3 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

2e7a9f5aby Ken Sedgwick+9−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 66 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…

06ea9ba0by Ken Sedgwick+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: create bwatch tables before backfilling them

This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…

Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
ce2a6836by daywalker90+105−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 5 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

v26.12rc1

This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…

4002c4e9by Níckolas Goline+164−1110 files
No security note in commit
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: store payment failure details per groupid

This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…

Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
24082c6dby daywalker90+6−34 files
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-plugin: do not panic when the log writer task is gone

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…

panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
8661ffabby cdecker+29−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: explain hsmtool HTLC recovery

This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…

f90c140dby Sangbida Chaudhuri+85−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: make test_delpay_works deterministic

This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.

a224ca81by daywalker90+16−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: say that listtransactions gives blockheight 0 for a tx not in a block

This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…

bc281be3by Peter Neuroth+4−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

fixup! pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…

No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
02612ed5by Amartya Singh+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…

Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
42472816by daywalker90+14−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …

Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
42e268abby daywalker90+60−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …

5ebe365dby Amartya Singh+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
c6be4f71by Lagrang3+633−97 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
c87f5573by Andezion+22−11 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: fix crash on mutual close of an unconfirmed dual-funded channel

This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …

NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
555143beby Sangbida Chaudhuri+9−31 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-grpc: reject malformed request values instead of panicking

This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…

Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
b2703436by daywalker90+1558−12135 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 51 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

nix: drop protobuf again

This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…

a0459eeeby Peter Neuroth+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

make: check gRPC protos for breaking changes against the last release

This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…

db5fea70by daywalker90+43−84 files
No security note in commit
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Security candidatelightningd: check value overflow for forward amountsby Lagrang3 · 96f026ec · Aug 13, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 90 · StrongHigh 72Details
Commit message · Lagrang3

lightningd: check value overflow for forward amounts

Blinded paths encrypted_recipient_data payment_relay fee_proportional_millionths
is a 32 bit unsigned integer. We convert to 64 bits before doing arithmetic
operations to avoid integer overflow.

**BROKEN** lightningd: FATAL SIGNAL 8 (version v26.06-197-g8c42be3-modded)
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: common/daemon.c:46 (send_backtrace) 0x556ac0a6be39
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: common/daemon.c:83 (crashdump) 0x556ac0a6be76
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: ./signal/../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/libc_sigaction.c:0 ((null)) 0x7f9c98a31def
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: common/onion_decode.c:61 (ceil_div) 0x556ac0a7835d
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: common/onion_decode.c:122 (handle_blinded_forward) 0x556ac0a784c4
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: common/onion_decode.c:355 (onion_decode) 0x556ac0a78c39
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: lightningd/peer_htlcs.c:1548 (peer_accepted_htlc) 0x556ac0a087fa
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: lightningd/peer_htlcs.c:2648 (peer_got_revoke) 0x556ac0a09e25
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: lightningd/channel_control.c:1624 (channel_msg) 0x556ac09c3e11
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: lightningd/subd.c:562 (sd_msg_read) 0x556ac0a16e2e
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: ccan/ccan/io/io.c:60 (next_plan) 0x556ac0aa8fc1
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: ccan/ccan/io/io.c:422 (do_plan) 0x556ac0aa944c
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: ccan/ccan/io/io.c:439 (io_ready) 0x556ac0aa9505
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: ccan/ccan/io/poll.c:471 (io_loop) 0x556ac0aaaea3
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: lightningd/io_loop_with_timers.c:22 (io_loop_with_timers) 0x556ac09dea99
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: lightningd/lightningd.c:1518 (main) 0x556ac09e43f7
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 (__libc_start_call_main) 0x7f9c98a1bca7
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: ../csu/libc-start.c:360 (__libc_start_main_impl) 0x7f9c98a1bd64
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: (null):0 ((null)) 0x556ac09b3120
**BROKEN** lightningd: backtrace: (null):0 ((null)) 0xffffffffffffffff

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: guard for arithmetic operation overflow on onion message request for forward a payment through a blinded path

Reported-by: Vincenzo Palazzo (Bitcoin Security Council finding 2026-08-11)

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>

90/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetyparser or protocol path
AI analysis · High 72/100

This commit fixes a crash bug in Core Lightning's payment forwarding code. When processing a hidden (blinded) payment route, the node reads a fee rate from encrypted data. That fee rate is a 32-bit unsigned integer. The old code added it to 1,000,000 using 32-bit arithmetic, so a maliciously large fee rate could wrap around to a tiny value, causing a division-by-zero or other bad arithmetic that crashed the lightningd daemon with a fatal signal. The fix forces the addition to be done in 64-bit arithmetic, preventing the wraparound. The commit also adds tests showing how a crafted blinded path can trigger the issue.

Security candidatelightningd: don't return io logs from getlogby Níckolas Goline · 38fa7e2a · Aug 13, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 68 · AdequateModerate 62Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

lightningd: don't return io logs from getlog

The io level of the log book holds the raw JSON-RPC and plugin traffic,
which can contain secrets such as runes, and getlog returns the whole
log book to its caller. Refuse level=io there: io logging remains
available in the log file, via --log-level=io.

Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `getlog` no longer accepts `level=io`; io logs are only available in the log file (`--log-level=io`).
(cherry picked from commit e05c572fa3a921f85899bdf61bad68557386c824)

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Moderate 62/100

This commit fixes a security issue in Core Lightning's `getlog` JSON-RPC command. Previously, `getlog` could return 'io' level logs, which contain raw JSON-RPC and plugin traffic including secrets like authentication runes. Now `getlog` refuses to return io logs, keeping them only in local log files for users who explicitly enable them. This prevents a caller with RPC access from extracting sensitive secrets through the log command.

AI review queuedclnrest: restrict maximum size of request bodies to 2MiBby daywalker90 · 804b9df8 · Aug 12, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateHigh 74Details
Commit message · daywalker90

clnrest: restrict maximum size of request bodies to 2MiB

Changelog-Fixed: clnrest: an unauthenticated user could crash the node with a large request body; bodies are now capped at 2MiB.
(cherry picked from commit d5c2f6dbf1b7a54679b97d2a71015ad45443baf8)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · High 74/100

This update fixes a bug in Core Lightning's built-in REST plugin (clnrest). Before the fix, anyone on the network could send a very large request to the REST API without logging in, causing the node to crash. The patch now refuses bodies larger than 2 MB and returns an error instead of trying to read unlimited data.

Security candidatelightningd: don't allocate huge log entries on the stackby Vincenzo Palazzo · 6556f16d · Aug 12, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateHigh 76Details
Commit message · Vincenzo Palazzo

lightningd: don't allocate huge log entries on the stack

log_to_files() sized a stack VLA by the log string's length. Callers
can log attacker-controlled strings of arbitrary size - e.g. clnrest
logging unauthenticated request parameters on rune failure - so a
single ~10MB HTTP request overflowed the stack and crashed lightningd
(SIGSEGV).

Use a fixed 1kB stack buffer for normal entries and a heap allocation
for oversized ones.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: logging a very large message no longer crashes the node (stack overflow).

Reported-by: Vincenzo Palazzo (Bitcoin Security Council finding 2026-08-10)
(cherry picked from commit cc90f6b63da7a1ea9ea0b8276a96980dd2ed7496)

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagememory safety
AI analysis · High 76/100

This fix prevents a crash in Core Lightning's logging code. Previously, when the program wrote a log message, it reserved space on the stack based on the message's length. Because some logged text comes from outside sources (for example, unauthenticated web requests to the clnrest plugin), an attacker could send a very large request and cause the program to overflow its stack, crashing the node. The patch now uses a small fixed stack buffer for ordinary messages and switches to a heap allocation only when a message is unusually large.

AI review queuedconnectd: bound the SOCKS5 request hostname to the request bufferby Níckolas Goline · 10b7961b · Aug 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateHigh 73Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

connectd: bound the SOCKS5 request hostname to the request buffer

The SOCKS5 CONNECT request is built into a fixed 255-byte buffer, but a
domain-name request needs 7 + strlen(host) bytes and the host length was
never checked. A host longer than 248 bytes overran the buffer while the
request was assembled, corrupting the adjacent length field, which was then
used as the io_write() length and produced a large out-of-bounds read: the
proxy socket received connectd's heap instead of the request, and connectd
died. The host reaches this both from a proxied connect and from a gossiped
DNS address.

Size the buffer to hold the largest legal request (header plus a
maximum-length domain name), and refuse a hostname which still does not fit
rather than building a request we cannot represent. Truncating the host is
not an option: that is a connection to the wrong destination.

Changelog-Fixed: connectd: a proxied connection to a very long hostname (including a gossiped DNS address) could crash the node.
(cherry picked from commit 04ca809936794de47943951b9d116d9fd1ea1844)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · High 73/100

This update fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Tor/proxy connection code. When the node tried to connect through a SOCKS5 proxy to a hostname longer than 248 characters, it wrote past the end of a small fixed buffer. That corrupted the recorded message length, causing the proxy to be sent random data from the program's memory and crashing the node. The fix enlarges the buffer to the legal maximum and rejects hostnames that are still too long instead of overflowing.

AI review queuedcommon: treat a reorged close output as csv-lockedby cdecker · 9d0c1d49 · Aug 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 85 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · cdecker

common: treat a reorged close output as csv-locked

If, during a run of CLN, a close gets confirmed, its outputs are added
to the wallet. If then the close is reorged out, i.e., it loses its
confirmation, using it in this inconsistent state, can cause a crash,
due to a derefence on the confirmation height which is unset.

Changelog-Fixed: wallet: Addressed a crash when attempting to spend a previously confirmed but reorged out close transaction output.
(cherry picked from commit 4c078a0e61c8eea7ec3549c71688808dcfe479f0)

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: broader security terminologysecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This update fixes a crash in Core Lightning's wallet. If a channel-closing transaction had been confirmed and then a blockchain reorganization removed that confirmation, the wallet could try to spend the output while its confirmation height was missing. That led to a null-pointer crash. The fix treats such outputs as still time-locked so they are not spent until re-confirmed.

AI review queuedonchaind: Close a racy onchain resolutionby cdecker · faf8fa84 · Aug 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 57Details
Commit message · cdecker

onchaind: Close a racy onchain resolution

Upon timing out an upstream incoming HTLC, we were setting the
resolution to be ignored, since the funds will presumably be returned
to the peer, not us. However, since the HTLC timeout and the internal
resolution do not line up perfectly, due to the security margin, there
is a chance for a late preimage coming in, resolving the HTLC in the
other direction, i.e., we now own it. If that resolution comes in
after we have internally marked the output as ignored, we would not
clean up our prior decision, leaving the HTLC stranded, but
recoverable.

This just ensures that we clear our internal resolution too, when the
downstream preimage comes in, so that we can use the preimage to grab
the funds in the HTLC.

Changelog-Fixed: onchaind: Fixed a race between preimage return from downstream to upstream

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 57/100

This fix addresses a timing bug in Core Lightning's on-chain dispute handler. When a payment hash preimage arrives late from a downstream peer, the software could have already marked the related funds as 'ignored' because the upstream timeout had passed. The old code stopped processing once it saw an existing resolution, leaving the funds stuck. The fix clears the prior 'ignored' resolution so the late preimage can still be used to claim the funds. It is a recoverable race condition, not a direct theft of funds, but it could delay or complicate recovery of HTLC funds during on-chain settlement.

AI review queuedlightningd: handle amountless invoices in the onchain payment checkby Níckolas Goline · f818385d · Aug 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 69Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

lightningd: handle amountless invoices in the onchain payment check

invoice_check_onchain_payment() compared the received amount against
*details->msat, which is NULL when the invoice was created with
amount_msat="any":

FATAL SIGNAL 11
backtrace: lightningd/invoice.c:971 (invoice_check_onchain_payment)
backtrace: lightningd/chaintopology.c:84 (filter_block_txs)
backtrace: lightningd/chaintopology.c:1020 (add_tip)
backtrace: lightningd/chaintopology.c:1117 (get_new_block)

The HTLC path already checks this; do the same onchain, where an
amountless invoice likewise accepts any amount.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: crash when an onchain payment arrived for the fallback address of an invoice created with amount_msat="any".
(cherry picked from commit 6d025a3dab76ec5380474b2a8065c48aec309f33)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 69/100

This fix repairs a crash in Core Lightning's invoice handling. When someone paid the on-chain fallback address of an invoice that accepted 'any' amount, the software dereferenced a NULL pointer and died with a fatal signal (segmentation fault). The patch simply skips the amount comparison when no specific amount was set, matching the behavior already used for regular Lightning payments.

Security candidateCCAN: update to post-kimi audit.by Rusty Russell · 38bdfc41 · Aug 10, 2026 · 135 filesMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 61Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

CCAN: update to post-kimi audit.

Lots of changes, so I've summarized the individual upstream commits.

May alter (fix!) CLN behavior:

* 6b4e62ec tal/path: path_simplify() ".." handling
* 4ceeef2b io: don't busy-spin with exclusive conn + pending always plan
* 64822afc io: listener fds O_NONBLOCK
* b02c1147, 2f04573d, 42486358 pipecmd: _exit, pre-fork fd leak, EINTR
* f7062e12, 6da9c78d fdpass: reject-path fd leak, errno sign
* 339b359a breakpoint: blocked-SIGTRAP + fork staleness (--dev-debugger only)
* 018a4977 take: keep labelarr in sync in taken() (debug builds would give wrong taken() error)
* 28f7c3fe check_type: hard-fail (would cause build-time failure)

The rest are not patterns used by CLN, or only happen on allocation failure (which always causes immediate exit):

* 4122d490 tal/str: count regex capture groups via re_nsub, not text scan. No such complex regexes used.
* 5b6fca2c tal: allow tal_steal() to rescue an object being destroyed; we don't do this.
* tal: 9da96c88 (CCAN_LIST_DEBUG only), ca38d33a (notifier edge), 328d96ff (needs type-mismatched tal_expand), 39d1a0a0 (harmless thinko), df66b082
(path_readlink unused), 80416994 (UB never dereferenced), 0e926004 (doc), 3217faca (zero st_size; no /proc reads in CLN), 5d86e1fe (doc)
* c0c9797f str: strcount empty needle - both CLN call sites pass constant non-empty needles
* htable: af8ff95e (init_sized unused), d3da4521 (32-bit), ba8c4ad2 (needs billions of entries)
* opt: 6c3faecc (bare '-' argv), dae5f5f4 (attribute/doc; CLN passes real args)
* timer: f7b21467 (36k years at default granularity), 1127eb30 (needs failing custom allocator - CLN aborts on OOM)
* mem: 351072ac (memcchr unused), dde9474c (fallback memrchr - glibc/musl provide it), 228161d9 (test), f5b48d0f (doc)
* json_out: f14769e3, e9893f9e, d0401012, c91ae47b - all OOM/encoding-error paths; CLN aborts on OOM
* membuf: 4ee105f0 (UB, correct results anyway), 4b2d55b8 (2^62-element buffers)
* rune: cc63dceb (rune_dup unused), 51257cd9 (CLN fieldnames are alnum), fb4dbfa6 (needs embedded-NUL field values)
* strset/strmap iterator rework: b5dcf30e, 19b73d88, 51c4da92, c127ff33 - additive API + recursion fix; CLN's maps are far too small to hit deep
trees
* crypto: 1c377ffb (32-bit only), 344ba97c (needs 8160-byte HKDF requests), b4316b44 (default SHACHAIN_BITS=64 immune)
* f2b445b3 str/base32: CLN's one call site passes an exact-size buffer
* intmap 1a1bb440 (sintmap unused), bitmap ab052a14 (2^61 bits), likely 8cfa5f8c (likely_stats unused), take e30e011d (only take_cleanup() on exit), rbuf 748a0692 (rbuf_fill unused), ptr_valid x4 (unused), cdump x3 (cdump_extract unused)
* asort: 0d54244f, a13c9b97, d878b036 - fallback/build-hygiene only; CLN on glibc takes the qsort_r path and already compiled
* Doc-only: 2b988863, 3e034139, 8fee253f, e3155f93, 6e830d68, 172ae94c, cbbd603e, 6f0b1b03
* Test-only: 46acc9b6, 9df9809e, 4c23c54c
* 5b2773b2 build_assert: _Static_assert - compile-time only; all 138 CLN uses are constants (same 138-use build check applies as check_type)
* 01fbf784 container_of: NULL+0 UB fix - behavior identical
* 0421034f cppmagic sentinel, 43cfe853 ilog ilog64 - portability/performance only

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathauthentication path
AI analysis · Moderate 61/100

This is a large update to the CCAN utility library used by Core Lightning. The commit imports a newer CCAN version that fixes many bugs found during an independent code audit. Some of those bugs could affect CLN behavior, including path simplization, event-loop spinning, blocking accept() calls, file-descriptor leaks in child-process handling, and rune (authentication token) parsing. Most fixes are in low-level helper modules and many only trigger on allocation failure or unusual inputs that CLN says it does not use. The commit itself is a routine dependency refresh, but it pulls in genuine security-relevant fixes for memory safety, file-descriptor hygiene, and cryptographic helper correctness.

AI review queuedwallet: persist the inflight i_sent_sigs flag across restartsby Dusty Daemon · 10088288 · Aug 7, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 42Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

wallet: persist the inflight i_sent_sigs flag across restarts

This flag was previously memory only, lets upgrade it to be used across restarts.

Changelog-None

(cherry picked from commit 5293e073560291ada3811cbbfe4240080df2ebab)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 42/100

This change fixes a bug where a flag tracking whether a node had already sent transaction signatures during a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel) was stored only in memory. If the node restarted mid-process, it could forget that it had already sent signatures and either resend them or get confused about the splice state. Persisting the flag to the database makes splicing more robust across restarts.

Security candidatedb: tidy db_col_psbt NULL handlingby cdecker · f8ca3f4c · Aug 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateLow 32Details
Commit message · cdecker

db: tidy db_col_psbt NULL handling

Return early for a NULL column like the sibling db_col_* helpers, and
only parse and set the version when there is actual data to work with.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Changelog-None

(cherry picked from commit d6f8cc32eddb5f9aaba4c0561f94944b550cb61f)

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 32/100

This commit fixes a helper function that reads PSBT data from the database. Previously, when the database column was NULL, the code would still try to parse it and unconditionally set the PSBT version, which could lead to a crash or undefined behavior. Now it returns NULL early for NULL columns, matching the behavior of similar helper functions, and only sets the version when parsing actually succeeded.

Security candidatewallet: bound-check shachain_known pos on loadby cdecker · 28c7ab93 · Aug 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateModerate 57Details
Commit message · cdecker

wallet: bound-check shachain_known pos on load

Keep the loaded pos within the known[] array like the other defensive
checks in the channel loader, so a malformed row fails loudly instead of
indexing out of range.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Changelog-Fixed: wallet: an out-of-range shachain index in the database is now rejected at load instead of read out of bounds.
(cherry picked from commit fdd7b11e9f38eb2d3fa5515c00e64f0ad17d63fc)

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
memory safetysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 57/100

This update fixes a bug in Core Lightning's wallet code where it reads a 'position' value from its database and uses it directly as an array index without first checking whether it is valid. If the database contained an out-of-range value, the program could read or write memory outside the intended array, which can cause crashes or unpredictable behavior. The fix adds a simple bounds check and makes the program stop with a clear error if the value is invalid.

AI review queuedci: bind version/ref inputs via env before shell in release workflowsby SashaMIT · aa395617 · Aug 6, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 85 · StrongLow 46Details
Commit message · SashaMIT

ci: bind version/ref inputs via env before shell in release workflows

Follow-up to the docker/pypi env-binding pass: check-release-tag.yml,
release-build.yml, release-publish.yml and pypi-build.yml still
interpolated inputs.version / github.ref_name directly into run:
blocks (script-injection class per GitHub's hardening guidance).

Bind through env: and reference quoted shell variables instead. Also
drops a dead duplicate CHANGELOG_VERSION assignment in
release-publish.yml that ran before VERSION was set.

Made-with: Cursor

Changelog-None

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
defensive validationdocumentation-only discountsecond-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Low 46/100

This commit hardens four GitHub release workflows by moving user-controlled values (version strings and branch/tag names) out of shell command text and into environment variables. This closes a class of attack where a maliciously crafted version string or tag name could be interpreted as shell commands, potentially altering release artifacts or stealing repository secrets. The change is defensive and does not claim to fix an active vulnerability.

Security candidatechanneld: split the feerate we'll pay from the one we'll acceptby cdecker · 4e7fa317 · Aug 6, 2026 · 17 filesMessage 85 · StrongHigh 72Details
Commit message · cdecker

channeld: split the feerate we'll pay from the one we'll accept

The previous commit clamped our own fee source on the way in. This is
the counterpart for the other side of the channel: our peer's estimator
can be just as broken as ours, and we are the only one in a position to
notice before their money is gone.

`splice_accepter` only rejected a remote `funding_feerate_perkw` below
feerate_min; there was no upper bound at all. The downstream safeguard
in check_balances only inspects the accepter's own fee contribution, and
since accepter_relative is 0 our weight is nil, so that check never
fires. A peer whose estimator has gone haywire can therefore drive a
splice at an arbitrary feerate and we will cheerfully sign it, even
though the fee comes out of their channel balance. Refusing costs us
nothing and saves them from committing their funds to a transaction they
did not mean to pay for.

Reject anything above feerate_max, and apply the same bound in
handle_splice_init so that we extend the same courtesy in reverse: if
our own estimator is the broken one, we catch it before we ask a peer to
sign for it. handle_splice_init honours `splice_force_feerate` there,
as check_balances already does: that flag is the user saying they meant
it, and a policy limit should not override it.

feerate_max also needs a bound of its own, since it was derived purely
from the estimates times config.max_fee_multiplier. But a single bound
cannot serve both directions, because feerate_max gates what we accept
in `update_fee` *and* what we propose ourselves. Set for the accept
side it would have us paying absurd fees; set for the propose side it
would pin our commitment feerate below what a congested chain demands,
which is precisely when it has to confirm. So there are now two:

- FEERATE_CEILING (1000000 perkw, 4000 sat/vB) is the most we let a
peer drive us to. Their estimator being broken is not by itself
worth dropping a channel over, so this only has to exclude the
absurd.
- MAX_OUR_FEERATE_PER_KW (100000 perkw, 400 sat/vB) is the most we will
pay: roughly 0.011 BTC for a bare anchor commitment. Declining to
propose a feerate costs us nothing, so we can afford to be strict.
our_feerate_max() applies it wherever the money is ours:
default_feerate, splice_feerate, opening_feerate and dual-fund RBF.

Note this leaves the paths where we cannot decline -- mutual close,
penalty and onchain resolution -- bounded only by the ceiling, which is
the right answer for a feerate that has a deadline attached.

channeld needs both, so channeld_init and channeld_feerates carry
our_feerate_max alongside feerate_max, and check_balances holds whichever
side is ours to the stricter one. The multiplier is settable via
--dev-max-fee-multiplier, so widen to u64 before multiplying.

Finally, remove the UINT_MAX sentinels. feerate_max returned UINT_MAX
when there were no estimates at all, and lightningd overwrote the bound
with 0xFFFFFFFF when fee limits were ignored. Both are the bound a
peer's proposal is measured against, and we store what we accept -- a
u32 that large overflows the 25/24 RBF calculation downstream. The
unknown path now falls back to FEERATE_CEILING, exactly as feerate_min
falls back to FEERATE_FLOOR, and ignore_fee_limits travels to channeld
and openingd as an explicit flag which relaxes the policy bounds but
never the ceiling. That last part makes a documented promise false, so
the three places which say ignore-fee-limits means "any fee they want"
now say what it actually means.

Changelog-Fixed: channeld: a peer can no longer initiate a splice at an arbitrarily high feerate; it is now bounded like other remote-proposed feerates.
Changelog-Changed: lightningd: we no longer propose a feerate above 100000perkw (400 sat/vB) of our own accord, for channel opens, splices, commitment updates and dual-fund RBFs.
Changelog-Changed: lightningd: `--ignore-fee-limits` and `setchannel`'s `ignorefeelimits` still drop our policy bounds, but no longer accept a feerate above 1000000perkw (4000 sat/vB).
Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `feerates` reports `max_acceptable` as the feerate ceiling rather than 4294967295 when no fee estimates are available.
(cherry picked from commit 4a10d71822c277e381bf289202f494e64110b522)

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
access controlmemory safety
AI analysis · High 72/100

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning where a channel peer could trick or accidentally push the node into signing a Bitcoin transaction with an absurdly high transaction fee during a 'splice' operation. Before the fix, there was no upper limit on the fee rate a peer could propose for a splice, and an internal balance check did not catch it because the accepting side contributed no funds. The patch adds two separate fee ceilings: a sanity ceiling on what any peer can propose, and a stricter self-imposed limit on fees the node itself will pay for its own transactions. It also removes unsafe 'no limit' sentinel values that could overflow later calculations.

AI review queuedci: bind docker/pypi workflow inputs via env before shellby SashaMIT · a0598a2d · Aug 5, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 85 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · SashaMIT

ci: bind docker/pypi workflow inputs via env before shell

Pass platforms-to-build, docker hub owner/version/push-latest, and
dist-location through env: before run: scripts (script-injection class).

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Changelog-None

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
documentation-only discountsecond-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit hardens three GitHub Actions workflow files by moving user-controlled inputs into environment variables before they are used in shell scripts. Previously, values like platform lists, Docker Hub owner names, and PyPI distribution locations were inserted directly into shell commands. If someone with workflow trigger access supplied specially crafted input, they could potentially inject shell commands. The change follows GitHub's recommended practice of binding inputs to environment variables first, which reduces that risk.

AI review queuedconfigvar: don't crash on stale configvars in finalize_overridesby Andezion · dc814eba · Aug 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 42Details
Commit message · Andezion

configvar: don't crash on stale configvars in finalize_overrides

Changelog-Fixed: plugins: fix crash when starting a plugin with start parameters after a previously-configured plugin option disabled itself

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Low 42/100

This commit fixes a crash in Core Lightning that could occur when starting a plugin with startup parameters after a previously-configured plugin option had disabled itself. The crash happened because the code tried to use a plugin option that no longer existed (a 'stale configvar'). The fix skips these stale entries instead of crashing. It is a denial-of-service-style bug triggered by plugin configuration changes, not a remote exploit for stealing funds.

Lower-priorityRevert "tests: drop obsolete x-prefix in compacter-slow.sh"by Sangbida Chaudhuri · 116fd7cd · Aug 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 75 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

Revert "tests: drop obsolete x-prefix in compacter-slow.sh"

This reverts commit 474c272a4699e9e98de2eef5f27355e8ed7a250b.

75/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit re-adds an old-style 'x' prefix to a string comparison in a test helper script. It is a test-only change with no effect on the actual Core Lightning node software, user funds, network behavior, or security. The change simply restores a defensive shell-coding idiom to avoid a rare edge case in ancient shells.

Lower-priorityRevert "doc: require Homebrew GNU make and gpatch on macOS"by Sangbida Chaudhuri · 0cfa949f · Aug 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

Revert "doc: require Homebrew GNU make and gpatch on macOS"

This reverts commit d3ff147454ea693b3b599d74ce6f3750003cbd0c.

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a simple documentation revert. It undoes a previous change that told macOS users to install GNU make and GNU patch from Homebrew and to put those tools first in their command path. The reverted instructions now omit gpatch and point PATH to a non-existent-looking '/opt/homebrew/opt/' directory, which is likely a mistake or incomplete edit. There is no code change and no direct security issue in the diff itself.

Lower-prioritydoc: require Homebrew GNU make and gpatch on macOSby Sangbida Chaudhuri · d3ff1474 · Aug 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

doc: require Homebrew GNU make and gpatch on macOS

Apple's make/patch are too old for the build and check-source;
install gpatch and put both Homebrew gnubin dirs on PATH.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only updates macOS installation instructions in the documentation. It tells macOS users to install newer GNU versions of 'make' and 'patch' from Homebrew because Apple's built-in tools are too old for building and running source checks. No code, no security fix, no vulnerability.

Lower-prioritytests: drop obsolete x-prefix in compacter-slow.shby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 474c272a · Aug 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

tests: drop obsolete x-prefix in compacter-slow.sh

Shellcheck 0.11 (SC2268) rejects the old x"$1" comparison idiom.

Prevents: "tests/plugins/compacter-slow.sh:5:6: note: Avoid x-prefix in comparisons as it no longer serves a purpose. [SC2268]"

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a trivial shell script cleanup. It removes an old-fashioned 'x' prefix from a string comparison in a test helper script so that a newer version of the Shellcheck linter stops warning about it. The change does not alter program behavior and has no security relevance.

Lower-prioritypytest: add tests for what we want askrene to do.by Rusty Russell · 518620ae · Aug 4, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: add tests for what we want askrene to do.

It diagnoses if the *total capacity* of the source/dest are
insufficient, but not if the *known capacity* is.

So we get:

The shortest path is 103x1x0->105x1x0, but 103x1x0/1 layer auto.localchans says max is 77704899msat

Whereas it would be better to do:

We know from auto.localchans that source has maximum capacity xxx msat (in 1 channels)

Similarly for the destination, we get:

The shortest path is 103x1x0->105x1x0, but 103x1x0/1 layer auto.localchans says max is 77704899msat

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds a new pytest test file. It does not change any production code. The test describes desired future behavior for the askrene routing module's error messages when a payment source or destination lacks enough channel capacity. Because no actual code behavior is modified, this commit cannot introduce or fix a security vulnerability on its own.

Lower-prioritycommon: hoist hash_str helper into its own header.by Rusty Russell · 581bbb1f · Aug 4, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

common: hoist hash_str helper into its own header.

We have three uses already, about to add a fourth.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine code cleanup: it moves a small string-hashing helper function into a shared header file so it can be reused without being copied and pasted. There is no change to behavior, no bug fix, and no security relevance.

Lower-priorityxpay: actually tell askrene when a payment succeeded.by Rusty Russell · a66fabd4 · Aug 4, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 24Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

xpay: actually tell askrene when a payment succeeded.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 24/100

This commit fixes a bookkeeping bug in Core Lightning's xpay plugin. Previously, when a payment succeeded, xpay did not tell the askrene routing-helper that the route worked. As a result, askrene kept stale or overly pessimistic ideas about which channels could carry payments, which could make future payments fail unnecessarily or take worse routes. The patch adds the missing 'payment succeeded' notification for every non-local hop. It is a reliability/performance fix, not a direct theft-of-funds vulnerability.

Lower-priorityaskrene: correctly order constraints.by Rusty Russell · 4b6fe4a1 · Aug 4, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 58 · ThinLow 49Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

askrene: correctly order constraints.

Pure "constraints" don't care about order (they simply clamp max and
min), but "impressions" are relative, so they do. Change the
hashtable to keep them timestamp sorted.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Low 49/100

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's routing helper (askrene) where two kinds of channel information—hard limits called 'constraints' and usage estimates called 'impressions'—were being applied in the wrong order. Because impressions are time-relative, applying them out of order could make the router think a channel has more or less available capacity than it really does. The patch merges the two data structures and keeps them sorted by timestamp so they are applied in the correct sequence. The included test demonstrates that the wrong ordering could cause a payment route to be accepted when it should be rejected, or vice versa.

Lower-priorityaskrene: don't leak channel intel entriesby Lagrang3 · 8891f414 · Aug 4, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateLow 35Details
Commit message · Lagrang3

askrene: don't leak channel intel entries

On deletion of individual channel intel entries we need to free the
pointer inside the structure.

Changelog-None

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit fixes a memory leak in the askrene plugin of Core Lightning. When individual channel intelligence entries were deleted, the code removed the entry from its array but forgot to free two internal pointers (impression and constraint). Over time, this could cause the node process to consume more memory than necessary. The fix explicitly hands those pointers to a temporary context so they are cleaned up when the operation finishes.