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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

2330 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

228security candidates319second-pass queue1977AI analyses
99commits · 30 days
229commits · 60 days
709commits · 180 days
1578commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6579 seen10 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5147 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
628Strong · 80–100
1399Adequate · 60–79
272Thin · 40–59
31Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker331217581
daywalker9019315113471
Níckolas Goline961252376
Amperstrand322278
Rusty Russell96977961173
Sangbida Chaudhuri18537157167
Vincenzo Palazzo19714185
Lagrang3115679170
dovgopoly18016165
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1469110074
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 43 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

2e7a9f5aby Ken Sedgwick+9−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 66 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…

06ea9ba0by Ken Sedgwick+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: create bwatch tables before backfilling them

This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…

Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
ce2a6836by daywalker90+105−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 5 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

v26.12rc1

This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…

4002c4e9by Níckolas Goline+164−1110 files
No security note in commit
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: store payment failure details per groupid

This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…

Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
24082c6dby daywalker90+6−34 files
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-plugin: do not panic when the log writer task is gone

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…

panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
8661ffabby cdecker+29−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: explain hsmtool HTLC recovery

This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…

f90c140dby Sangbida Chaudhuri+85−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: make test_delpay_works deterministic

This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.

a224ca81by daywalker90+16−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: say that listtransactions gives blockheight 0 for a tx not in a block

This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…

bc281be3by Peter Neuroth+4−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

fixup! pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…

No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
02612ed5by Amartya Singh+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…

Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
42472816by daywalker90+14−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …

Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
42e268abby daywalker90+60−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …

5ebe365dby Amartya Singh+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
c6be4f71by Lagrang3+633−97 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
c87f5573by Andezion+22−11 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: fix crash on mutual close of an unconfirmed dual-funded channel

This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …

NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
555143beby Sangbida Chaudhuri+9−31 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-grpc: reject malformed request values instead of panicking

This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…

Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
b2703436by daywalker90+1558−12135 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 51 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

nix: drop protobuf again

This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…

a0459eeeby Peter Neuroth+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

make: check gRPC protos for breaking changes against the last release

This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…

db5fea70by daywalker90+43−84 files
No security note in commit
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Security candidatedoc: refresh the release verification examples from v26.06.9by Níckolas Goline · 1112b47b · Oct 22, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

doc: refresh the release verification examples from v26.06.9

The gpg example showed 2020 signatures from keys that no longer sign
releases, and the sha256sum example listed v24.11 files. Replace both
with the output for v26.06.9, covering all three release manifests
(amd64 and source, arm64, armv7) and every file they list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationdocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only updates the user documentation that shows how to verify Core Lightning release files. It replaces outdated example filenames, GPG signatures, and SHA256 checksums with current ones for version v26.06.9. No program code was changed, and there is no security vulnerability in the commit itself.

Security candidatecontrib: refresh nGoline's signing keyby Níckolas Goline · 7a2375e9 · Oct 22, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

contrib: refresh nGoline's signing key

The signing subkey in the repo copy expired on 2026-06-30, so the
v26.06.9 signature could not be verified from it. Re-export the key
with the subkey extended to 2027-06-30.

Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply refreshes an expired PGP signing key stored in the repository so that future release signatures can be verified. It is a routine key update with no code or security vulnerability fix.

Security candidateconnectd: never block the io loop on DNS resolutionby cdecker · 71572cae · Oct 21, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 73 · AdequateHigh 71Details
Commit message · cdecker

connectd: never block the io loop on DNS resolution

Resolving a DNS address announced in a node_announcement used to call
getaddrinfo() directly, on connectd's single io thread. A slow or
unresponsive nameserver held up every peer on the machine for the
duration of the lookup: ~10s per query with glibc defaults, enough to
trip the 60s ping-liveness check and disconnect all peers.

getaddrinfo() now runs in a forked child which writes the results
back over a pipe; connectd reads the pipe from its io loop and
resumes the connect attempt from a loop callback, so the io thread
never waits on resolution. Keeping libc for the actual lookup
preserves /etc/hosts, search domains, systemd-resolved and
AI_ADDRCONFIG ordering exactly, and keeps DNS packet parsing out of
connectd itself.

A 30-second cap covers each lookup end to end (a wedged child is
killed), and at most ten resolvers run at once: a gossip-driven
reconnect storm queues the excess FIFO rather than forking without
bound. Before resolving, the child closes every fd it inherited: a
wedged child must not keep peer connections alive, nor pin EOF on
another lookup's pipe with its copy of that write end.

The connect RPC resolved a host name the same way, with a blocking
getaddrinfo() in lightningd's main loop, and ignored --disable-dns.
It now hands the unresolved name to connectd as a DNS address, which
goes through the same asynchronous resolver and honours
--disable-dns (unless a proxy resolves names for us).

Reported-by: Vincenzo Palazzo
Changelog-Fixed: connectd: a stalling DNS name in a peer's announced address no longer freezes all peer traffic; resolution is now done asynchronously.
Changelog-Changed: `connect` with a host name now resolves it asynchronously in connectd, and fails with `--disable-dns`.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · High 71/100

This commit fixes a denial-of-service weakness in Core Lightning's connection daemon. Previously, when the node needed to look up a peer's internet address from a domain name, it did that lookup directly in its main networking thread. A slow or malicious DNS server could freeze all peer traffic for about 10 seconds per lookup, potentially disconnecting every peer. The fix moves DNS lookups into separate child processes and reads the results back without blocking the main loop. It also makes the `connect` RPC command use the same non-blocking path and respect the `--disable-dns` setting.

AI review queuedci: replace broken katyo/publish-crates with a native cargo publish stepby daywalker90 · 2646184f · Oct 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · daywalker90

ci: replace broken katyo/publish-crates with a native cargo publish step

The katyo/publish-crates action no longer publishes anything: the
Release Rust workflow ran on the push that bumped lsps-types to 0.7.0
and did not publish it.

The new step publishes each crate only when its Cargo.toml version is
newer than the highest version on crates.io, in dependency order
(cln-rpc, cln-grpc, cln-plugin, lsps-types).

Cap the job at 30 minutes and give the crates.io index request a 30
second timeout so a hung network call cannot stall the release.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
documentation-only discountsecond-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit updates the project's automated release workflow for publishing Rust crates to crates.io. It replaces a third-party GitHub Action that had stopped working with a custom shell script that checks whether each crate's local version is newer than what is already published before running the official cargo publish command. The change also adds a 30-minute job timeout and a 30-second network timeout for checking crates.io. There is no direct security vulnerability in the diff, but any change to a release pipeline that handles a secret publishing token deserves a routine security review.

Security candidatetests: mock LSPS2 service charges the opening fee from its paramsby Peter Neuroth · d315f9f9 · Oct 20, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 95 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

tests: mock LSPS2 service charges the opening fee from its params

Until now the mock deducted a fixed `htlc.fee_msat` (default 0) and
did none of the fee checks bLIP-52 asks of an LSP. Compute the fee
instead:

- `lsps2.buy` with a `payment_size_msat` fails with 202 if the fee is
not below the payment size and with 203 if computing it overflows.
- In no-MPP+var-invoice mode the fee comes from the first HTLC, which
is failed with unknown_next_peer if it is outside the payment size
limits, if the fee overflows or if nothing would be left to forward.
- The honest deduction is the computed fee; `htlc.fee_msat` still
overrides it.

Failed HTLCs now record why they were failed.

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes test code. It updates a mock Lightning Service Provider (LSP) used in Core Lightning's test suite so that its simulated 'opening fee' follows the real bLIP-52 formula instead of being a hardcoded test value. No production wallet, node, or protocol code is touched, so it cannot directly affect real users or funds.

Security candidatetests: add configurable misbehavior to the mock LSPS2 serviceby Peter Neuroth · b323f375 · Oct 19, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 100 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

tests: add configurable misbehavior to the mock LSPS2 service

Each phase of the mock gets a table of named behaviors, each with its
own parameters, so that every attack in the security matrices is one
config entry:

- transport: drop, wrong_id, duplicate (optionally with a changed
second result), replace (send a raw payload), add_fields and error,
optionally limited to some methods.
- buy: the jit_channel_scid is a fixture too, next to
lsp_cltv_expiry_delta and client_trusts_lsp.
- open: never, or twice.
- htlc: deduct (per-part deduction and extra_fee, or no TLV),
forward_subset (fail the other parts) and deduct_again (charge the fee
again after the session).

lsps2-mock-send sends a message outside of any request and
lsps2-mock-open opens a zero-conf channel outside of any session.
Unknown behaviors and parameters, and missing required ones, are
rejected when the config is set.

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security language
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new testing capabilities to a mock LSPS2 service used in Core Lightning's test suite. It lets developers simulate misbehaving LSPs (e.g., dropping messages, sending wrong IDs, opening channels twice, deducting fees incorrectly) so they can verify that the real client handles those cases safely. The change does not alter production code, wallets, or node behavior, and it does not fix or introduce any real vulnerability.

Security candidatetests: fix races in test_channel_lease_unilat_closesby daywalker90 · d3e6bebe · Oct 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 95 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: fix races in test_channel_lease_unilat_closes

CI flaked with:

> assert l3blocks == 4032 - 6 - 2 - 1
E assert 4025 == (((4032 - 6) - 2) - 1)

l3's commitment used a blockheight 2 blocks behind the chain, because
l2 was stopped before l3 had saved a commitment with the new height.
A second run flaked with:

E pyln.client.lightning.RpcError: RPC call failed: method: fundchannel
... error: {'code': 301, 'message': 'Could not afford 506268sat using
all 0 available UTXOs: 506696sat short'}

l2 broadcast the l1 funding tx, but did not record its change output
until after the l2->l3 fundchannel with minconf=0 had already failed.

Wait for l3 to log the commitsig carrying the new blockheight before
stopping l2, and wait for l2 to see the funding change before the
minconf=0 fundchannel.

Changelog-None

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit fixes timing problems in a single automated test. It adds waits so the test nodes are fully synchronized before the test proceeds. There is no change to production code, no security bug, and no real-world attack possibility.

Security candidatedoc: fix references to manpages that don't existby mikeua · 33fda2d0 · Oct 13, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · mikeua

doc: fix references to manpages that don't exist

Several schema descriptions and see_also lists name manpages that are
never generated, so the links in the rendered docs are dead:

- lightningd-fetchinvoice(7) / lightningd-invoicerequest(7) ->
lightning-fetchinvoice(7) / lightning-invoicerequest(7)
- lightning-listsentpays(7) -> lightning-listsendpays(7)
- lightning-currencyrates(7) -> lightning-currencyrate(7)
- lightning-invoicerequests(7) -> lightning-invoicerequest(7)
- lightning-listbalances(7) and lightning-bkpr-listfunds(7) ->
lightning-bkpr-listbalances(7)

contrib/msggen/msggen/schema.json is updated to match.

Changelog-None

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
authentication path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only fixes broken documentation links. It corrects the names of referenced manual pages in JSON schema files so that generated documentation points to pages that actually exist. There are no code, configuration, or behavior changes, and no security implications.

AI review queuedlsps-types: echo valid_until verbatim and send the LSPS0 datetime formatby Peter Neuroth · 2d187383 · Oct 11, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 85 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: echo valid_until verbatim and send the LSPS0 datetime format

bLIP-52, "2. Request JIT Channel":

Clients MUST copy it verbatim from an entry of
`opening_fee_params_menu` from a result of a `lsps2.get_info` call.

bLIP-50, LSPS0.datetime:

Particular points of time in the modern era (a "datetime") MUST be
encoded as a JSON string containing the [ISO 8601][] format
`"YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.uuuZ"`.
These are always in the UTC timezone.

`DateTime` was serialized by chrono, which writes as many fractional
digits as needed: a spec-conforming "2023-02-23T08:47:30.000Z" from an
LSP came back from the client as "2023-02-23T08:47:30Z", and
"...30.5112Z" as "...30.511200Z". That only worked because the in-tree
service checks its promise against the parsed value; an LSP that
checks the string it sent would reject the client. The service itself
sent whole seconds without the milliseconds.

`DateTime` now keeps the string it was deserialized from and serializes
it back unchanged. A datetime built from a chrono value is truncated to
milliseconds and serialized as `YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.uuuZ`. Equality,
ordering and hashing still only compare the point in time. Parsing is
unchanged. `DateTime` is no longer `Copy`.

The service builds the `valid_until` it sends from the policy plugin's
value this way and computes the promise over the truncated value, so
the promise still verifies on what the client echoes.

Behavior change: the client echoes `valid_until` exactly as received;
the service sends `valid_until` with millisecond precision in the
LSPS0 format.

Changelog-Fixed: lsps-plugin: the LSPS2 client now copies `opening_fee_params` verbatim (including `valid_until`), and the service sends `valid_until` in the LSPS0 datetime format.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit fixes a protocol-compatibility bug in Core Lightning's LSPS (Lightning Service Provider Specification) support. When a client received an opening-fee offer from a service provider, it was accidentally changing the exact timestamp text before echoing it back. Some strict providers would then reject the client's reply because the timestamp no longer matched. The fix makes the client preserve the original timestamp text exactly, and makes the service send timestamps in the precise format the spec requires. There is no direct theft-of-funds or remote-code-execution vulnerability here, but the bug could cause legitimate JIT-channel requests to fail.

Security candidatelsps-plugin: use lsps-types for the protocol typesby Peter Neuroth · 8ecf4b62 · Oct 11, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 24Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-plugin: use lsps-types for the protocol types

Replace the plugin's copies of the JSON-RPC, LSPS0 and LSPS2 protocol
types and of the opening fee computation with the ones from
lsps-types, so client and service share one implementation. The
plugin's proto modules re-export lsps-types for now; the imports are
switched in the next commit.

Service-only code stays in proto/lsps2.rs: the policy plugin API, the
datastore entry, JIT scid generation, the BOLT4 failure codes and the
HMAC promise. The HMAC check moves out of `OpeningFeeParams::validate`
into `verify_promise()`, which `lsps2.buy` calls before
`OpeningFeeParams::validate()`. The order of the checks and the error
codes are unchanged: bad promise or expired params -> 201, fee overflow
-> 203, fee not below the payment size -> 202.

Other adaptations, no behavior change:
- `into_request()` with a random id becomes an extension trait in the
plugin, so lsps-types does not need `rand` and `hex`.
- `ShortChannelId` is converted via u64 where it meets cln-rpc (the
`htlc_accepted` onion, the client's datastore record).
- `DateTime` is converted with `as_chrono()` where the plugin computes
with chrono values.

The one behavior change from switching is the promise character check
that lsps-types added in "lsps-types: restrict promise to printable
ASCII without JSON escapes".

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 24/100

This commit is a code cleanup in Core Lightning's LSPS (Lightning Service Provider Specification) plugin. It removes duplicated protocol type definitions and replaces them with a shared library called lsps-types. The only functional change mentioned is a stricter check on the 'promise' string, limiting it to printable ASCII characters without JSON escape characters. This is a hardening improvement, not an obvious vulnerability fix.

Security candidatelsps-types: test the opening fee computationby Peter Neuroth · 41df2752 · Oct 11, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: test the opening fee computation

Unit tests for the rounding boundaries (a product of k*10^6 gives a fee
of k, k*10^6+1 gives k+1), the min_fee_msat floor, and overflow of the
multiplication and of the `+ 999999` addition near u64::MAX. Property
tests compare the function against an independent u128 reference and
check that it is the ceiling of the proportional part.

bLIP-52 has no test vectors for the fee computation.

Adds proptest as a dev-dependency.

Changelog-None

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetyfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds unit tests and property-based tests for an existing fee-calculation function. It does not change the function's behavior, fix a bug, or alter any production code paths. There is no security issue introduced or resolved by this change.

Security candidatelsps-types: add LSPS2 messages and opening fee paramsby Peter Neuroth · fee9b0e7 · Oct 11, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: add LSPS2 messages and opening fee params

Move the LSPS2 messages, `OpeningFeeParams`, `Promise` and
`compute_opening_fee` from plugins/lsps-plugin/src/proto/lsps2.rs into
lsps-types. Promise and fee computation are unchanged here; they are
reworked in their own commits.

`OpeningFeeParams::validate` in the plugin mixed the LSP's HMAC promise
check with the checks every LSP must do. Only the latter move: the
promise format is the LSP's own business and stays with the service.
`validate(now, payment_size)` keeps the order and error mapping of the
plugin (expired -> 201, fee overflow -> 203, fee >= payment size ->
202) and takes `now` from the caller. The unused `receivable` argument
is dropped. New are `check_limits()` for min <= max payment size,
`is_expired_at()`, `check_payment_size()` and `opening_fee()`.

Also add the `unrecognized_or_stale_token` (200) error code from
bLIP-52, which was missing.

Service-only types (policy plugin API, datastore entry, JIT scid
generation, BOLT4 failure codes) stay in the plugin.

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine code reorganization for the Core Lightning project. It moves data structures and helper functions related to the LSPS2 (Just-In-Time channel) protocol from one internal plugin file into a shared library module. It also adds validation helpers and one missing error code. There is no indication this fixes or introduces a security vulnerability; it is a structural refactor with tests.

AI review queuedlsps-types: add empty crateby Peter Neuroth · e5ca96e3 · Oct 11, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 80 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: add empty crate

Add a new top-level crate `lsps-types` for the LSPS0 and LSPS2 protocol
types and the LSPS2 opening fee computation, so that LSPS clients and
services share one implementation and cannot disagree on amounts.

The crate is wired up like cln-rpc: a workspace member and workspace
dependency versioned in lockstep with cln-rpc, cln-grpc and cln-plugin,
a Makefile included when building with Rust, and a crates.io publish
step. The LSPS plugin binaries list its sources as prerequisites so
they rebuild once the plugin depends on it.

Changelog-None

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds a new, empty Rust code crate called lsps-types to the Core Lightning project. It contains no executable logic, only build and packaging configuration. There is no security issue in this change.

Security candidatereprobuild: cross-compile armv7 tarballsby Níckolas Goline · b09099be · Oct 6, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 83 · StrongInformational 14Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

reprobuild: cross-compile armv7 tarballs

armv7 cannot build natively like arm64: cln-grpc's build script takes
protoc from protoc-bin-vendored, which ships no armv7 binary, so the build
panics there.

Add tools/repro-build.armv7.sh, which cross-compiles instead. It runs in
the amd64 cl-repro-<dist> image, adds armhf from ports.ubuntu.com (same
release pocket, updates and security still disabled), and pins the
arm-linux-gnueabihf toolchain and armhf libraries the same way the other
scripts pin theirs. The Rust plugins build for
armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf.

The build runs a few armv7 programs (configure tests,
tools/headerversions), so the host needs qemu-arm registered with
binfmt_misc.

bin-Ubuntu-<dist>-armv7 runs the amd64 image with REPRO_ARCH=armv7, and
the tarball lands in release-armv7/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 14/100

This commit adds a new build script and updates Dockerfiles so that Core Lightning release tarballs can be produced for 32-bit ARM (armv7) devices. It is purely a build-system/infrastructure change for cross-compilation and does not alter any wallet, networking, or cryptographic code. There is no indication it fixes or introduces a security vulnerability.

AI review queuedtools: add sign-release-arm.shby Níckolas Goline · 224130eb · Oct 6, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

tools: add sign-release-arm.sh

build-release.sh's sign target cannot be used for the ARM tarballs: it
hardcodes `cd release/` rather than honouring RELEASEDIR, and globs the
zip, so running it for an ARM build would rewrite the amd64 manifest.

Checksum one architecture's tarballs, from release-arm64/ or
release-armv7/, into SHA256SUMS-<version>-<arch> and sign it. arm64 and
armv7 keep separate manifests: arm64 builds natively and armv7 is
cross-compiled, so they are reproduced and co-signed separately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds a new helper script used by Core Lightning release engineers to create and sign checksum files for ARM release tarballs. It does not change any wallet, network, or node code, and there is no indication it fixes or introduces a security vulnerability. It is purely a release tooling addition.

Security candidateCI: never replace files already on the releaseby Níckolas Goline · f918c23f · Oct 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 97 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

CI: never replace files already on the release

The release job uploaded release/* with action-gh-release, which replaces
any asset of the same name. Re-running it after the release captains had
added their signatures to SHA256SUMS-<version>.asc replaced that file with
one carrying only the CI signature, so users verifying the release found
the maintainers' signatures gone.

Upload with tools/publish-release-assets.sh instead:

- files the release does not have yet are uploaded;
- files it already has must be identical, otherwise the job stops before
touching anything (the builds disagree, and nothing should be signed);
- an .asc it already has gets our signature appended, after normalising
the armor so gpg reads every block; one that already carries our
signature is left alone, so re-runs are harmless.

The draft release is created with gh when it does not exist yet, with the
same title and pre-release flag as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

97/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a release-pipeline bug where re-running the automated release job could accidentally wipe out human maintainers' cryptographic signatures from the release's checksum file. Before the fix, the CI tool replaced any existing file with the same name, so if release captains had already added their GPG signatures to SHA256SUMS-<version>.asc, a re-run would overwrite it with a version signed only by the CI bot. Users who later checked the signatures would see only one signature and could not verify that multiple maintainers had approved the release. The fix introduces a new script that only adds missing files, refuses to change files that differ, and appends the CI signature to existing signature files instead of replacing them.

AI review queuedchanneld: bound HTLC additions by our own splice-out amountby jaonoctus · 0b41f819 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 66Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

channeld: bound HTLC additions by our own splice-out amount

While a splice is inflight, every HTLC has to fit on the commitment for
each funding candidate, so get_room_above_reserve() charges each side's
lowest splice change (lowest_splice_amnt) against its balance. But
update_view_from_inflights() set our side's bound from the inflight's
new funding total, which is positive, so it stayed at zero and our
splice-out was never charged.

We then admitted HTLCs that fit only the pre-splice commitment. Building
the post-splice commitment took our balance negative, channel_txs()
returned NULL, and channeld dereferenced it and crashed, then did the same
on every reconnect:

during the splice, payments were forwarded out through the channel
cumulatively they exceeded our post-splice balance (invalid on the
post-splice commitment)
...
channeld crashed building the post-splice commitment: our balance
went negative, the commitment build returned nothing, and channeld
dereferenced it
every reconnect rebuilds the same commitment, so it loops

Use the inflight's signed local change for our bound, as the remote side
already does. Also fix the REMOTE-view assignments, which compared
against one side's bound and wrote the other's.

Reported-by: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>
Changelog-Fixed: channeld: no longer crash-loops when an HTLC that only the pre-splice commitment can carry is added during a splice-out.
Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit 733c42e823bb204e6d91cca4f0450158842404e3)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 66/100

This fix repairs a bug in Core Lightning's channel daemon that could crash and permanently loop-crash a node during a specific kind of Bitcoin channel upgrade called a 'splice-out.' While the splice was in progress, the program failed to subtract the node's outgoing splice amount when checking whether new forwarded payments would fit in the updated channel. It therefore allowed payments that were valid only for the old channel state. When it later tried to build the post-splice commitment transaction, the node's balance went negative, the builder returned nothing, and the daemon dereferenced that null pointer and crashed. On every reconnect it rebuilt the same bad commitment, so the node would crash again in a loop. The patch corrects the accounting so the splice-out amount is properly charged against the balance, and also fixes a related indexing mistake that mixed up local and remote views.

AI review queuedchanneld: fail the channel instead of crashing if we can't build a commitmentby jaonoctus · 77e1f180 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

channeld: fail the channel instead of crashing if we can't build a commitment

channel_txs() returns NULL when it can't build a commitment, for example
when a splice amount would take one side's balance below zero:

channel_txs fails to amount_msat_add_sat_s64 ... LOCAL (side_pay + splice_amnt)

Neither send_commit_part() nor handle_peer_commit_sig() checked for that,
so channeld dereferenced NULL and crashed. Since every reconnect rebuilds
the same commitment, it then crashed again on each one, leaving the
channel stuck in a crash loop that only a unilateral close would end.

There's no way to continue on a commitment we can't build, so fail the
channel and say why. The next commit stops the case we know about
reaching here at all.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit 2594edab350be11c68459e546921e6c0d1d07739)

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This update fixes a bug where a part of the Core Lightning node (channeld) would crash and enter an endless crash loop if it couldn't build a commitment transaction, for example due to a splice that would push one side's balance below zero. The fix makes the node fail the channel gracefully instead of crashing. A malicious or buggy peer could potentially trigger this crash repeatedly on reconnection, causing denial of service for that channel.

Security candidatelightningd: use a splice's HTLC sigs once we move onto its commitmentby jaonoctus · a34027c2 · Oct 5, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 85 · StrongModerate 68Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

lightningd: use a splice's HTLC sigs once we move onto its commitment

update_channel_from_inflight() moves channel->last_tx onto a splice's
commitment, both when the splice locks and when we adopt a splice which
confirmed before splice_locked because its output got spent. But
channel->last_htlc_sigs stayed the peer's signatures for the pre-splice
commitment until the next commitment update, or a restart, replaced them.

If that commitment is the one we close with first, onchaind gets
signatures which can't spend its HTLC outputs, so our HTLC-timeout
transactions are invalid and we can't get those HTLCs back. That's the
case in a report of a lost balance after a close on an unlocked splice:

the close broadcasts our inflight commitment (it spends the splice
funding output, because the splice had confirmed but never locked
in)
lightningd still treats the pre-splice output as the channel
funding, so onchaind is started with the pre-splice funding,
balance, and commitment

The sigs go with the commitment, so switch them in the same place:
wallet_htlcsigs_confirm_inflight() now returns the sigs it makes current,
and update_channel_from_inflight() calls it for a splice instead of
handle_peer_splice_locked() doing so on the side.

Reported-by: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>
Changelog-Fixed: splicing: closing with a splice's commitment before any later commitment update can now time out or claim the HTLCs on it.
Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit 275086a9b8eb36abe0dbb7499d7e5425a77e32ed)

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100

This fix repairs a bug in Core Lightning's splicing feature. When a channel was moved onto a new 'splice' commitment transaction, the old HTLC (multi-hop payment) signatures were still being used. If the channel later closed using that new splice commitment, the stored signatures could not actually spend the HTLC outputs, meaning the node could lose money it was owed. The patch makes sure the correct HTLC signatures are kept and used whenever the channel switches to a splice commitment.

Security candidatechanneld: tell lightningd the HTLC sigs for a splice's first commitmentby jaonoctus · 61ab88e5 · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 64Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

channeld: tell lightningd the HTLC sigs for a splice's first commitment

Every commitment the peer signs comes with its signatures for our HTLC
transactions, and lightningd stores them so onchaind can spend the HTLC
outputs if we close with that commitment. For a splice, got_commitsig
stores them for each inflight on every later commitment update, but the
inflight's first commitment, signed during the splice negotiation itself,
goes to lightningd in channeld_update_inflight, which only carried the
commitment and its signature. So any HTLC already pending when the splice
was negotiated had no signature stored for the splice's commitment.

That matters once the channel moves onto that commitment: after
splice_locked, wallet_htlcsigs_confirm_inflight() promotes the inflight's
stored sigs, which then lack those HTLCs, and the same goes for a close on
a splice which confirmed before splice_locked.

Add them to channeld_update_inflight, sent whenever it carries a new
commitment, and have lightningd replace that inflight's stored sigs with
them. channeld_update_inflight could be resent with the commitment
lightningd already had when the user signs the splice; that now sends no
commitment, so it can't replace those sigs with nothing.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit ebf69a8e6ba29560584060304bfe4a1e2b75dd52)

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This patch fixes a bug in Core Lightning's channel splicing feature. When a Bitcoin Lightning channel is being spliced (a fancy way of resizing the channel while it stays open), the software was forgetting to save the peer's signatures for any pending HTLC payments on the very first version of the new commitment transaction. If the channel later closed using that commitment, the node might not be able to claim its funds from those pending payments on the blockchain, potentially leading to loss of money. The fix makes sure those signatures are passed along and stored in the wallet database.

AI review queuedlightningd: conceal secret config values in listconfigsby Andezion · ef48dcd2 · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 65Details
Commit message · Andezion

lightningd: conceal secret config values in listconfigs

Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `listconfigs` shows `...` instead of the value of `wallet`, `recover`, `tor-service-password`, `bitcoin-rpcpassword` and the old `bookkeeper-db`, for every caller; unset ones are omitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit 6ed212e4856bce2b3392bac1d2fe2df90f3edfde)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 65/100

This commit changes Core Lightning's `listconfigs` RPC command so that several secret or sensitive configuration values are hidden and shown as '...' instead of their real content. Previously, anyone who could call `listconfigs` could see values like the Bitcoin RPC password, wallet database connection string, recovery seed, Tor service password, and old bookkeeper database details. The commit also fixes a bug where concealed options were still being shown when they were not actually set. This is a security hardening change that reduces the risk of leaking credentials to unauthorized callers.

Security candidatecontrib: add jaonoctus's public keyby jaonoctus · 9ba88c5d · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

contrib: add jaonoctus's public key

Commit 41278b4ef ("contrib: add jaonoctus's signing key") added
jaonoctus's fingerprint to the "Signatures For Releases" table in
SECURITY.md and the security-policy doc, but did not add the armored
public key under contrib/keys/ as was done for the other signers.

Add it, so release signatures can be verified against the key shipped
in the tree. The primary key fingerprint is
7B69 6A61 6F73 1337 520B 8A19 D8F3 1505 B581 D617, matching the
table entry.

Changelog-None
Signed-off-by: jaonoctus <jaonoctus@protonmail.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply adds a public PGP key file for a release signer named jaonoctus. It is a housekeeping change to make the key available in the repository so people can verify release signatures. There is no code change, no vulnerability, and no security risk.

Security candidatecommon: ignore proof-only fields when checking omitted markersby Vincenzo Palazzo · 53ad856f · Sep 30, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 60Details
Commit message · Vincenzo Palazzo

common: ignore proof-only fields when checking omitted markers

find_included_marker_predecessor treated every non-signature field as an
invoice TLV. next_marker() of the signature range is 1000000000, so a
proof whose only omitted marker was 1000000000 passed with no type-239
field. Skip 1001..999999999, same as next_field_check.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a validation bug in Core Lightning's handling of BOLT12 payer proofs. A payer proof is a cryptographic receipt that helps verify a payment. The bug allowed a malformed proof—one missing a required type-239 field—to be accepted as valid if it only contained a special 'omitted marker' value of 1,000,000,000. This happened because the code mistakenly treated certain proof-only fields as if they were regular invoice fields when checking whether a marker was legitimate. The fix makes the validator ignore those proof-only fields during that check, matching what another part of the code already did. A new test confirms the invalid proof is now rejected.

AI review queuedconnectd: keep the subd fd until connectd has received itby dovgopoly · 5e19c704 · Sep 29, 2026 · 10 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 30Details
Commit message · dovgopoly

connectd: keep the subd fd until connectd has received it

On macOS, a socket passed over SCM_RIGHTS whose sender closes its copy before the receiver's recvmsg completes can arrive unable to read. lightningd closed its end of a new subd's connection right after queueing it for connectd, so openingd or channeld could start with a dead connection: openingd logged "Peer connection lost", and fundchannel failed or hung waiting for accept_channel.

connectd now replies to peer_connect_subd once it has the fd, and lightningd keeps its copy until the reply arrives.

Changelog-Fixed: macOS: fundchannel no longer fails or hangs with "Peer connection lost" when opening channels under load.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 30/100

This commit fixes a macOS-specific bug where opening a Lightning channel could fail or hang with 'Peer connection lost'. The root cause was a race condition in how file descriptors (sockets) were passed between internal processes: the sender closed its copy too early, before the receiver had fully received it. The fix makes the sender wait for an acknowledgment before closing its copy. It is a reliability/availability fix, not an exploitable security vulnerability.

AI review queuedlightningd: reject newlines in persistent setconfig valuesby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 4cc27c32 · Sep 29, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 62Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

lightningd: reject newlines in persistent setconfig values

Changelog-Fixed: `setconfig` no longer permits config-line injection through persistent option values.

(cherry picked from commit 54178251aafc0ef793ab9a4dd9c44320bd40812d)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 62/100

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's `setconfig` RPC command. Previously, a user or attacker who could call `setconfig` could store a configuration value containing newline characters. Because persistent settings are written into a config file line-by-line, those newlines could split one setting into multiple lines, effectively injecting extra configuration directives. The patch now rejects any persistent value containing `\n` or `\r`.