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BTCPay Server

Free, open-source, self-hosted Bitcoin payment processor supporting on-chain and Lightning payments.

BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructureNormal
Repository coverage

563 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

77security candidates198second-pass queue275AI analyses
65commits · 30 days
114commits · 60 days
314commits · 180 days
563commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 8 → Feb 9247 seen22 candidatesComplete
Feb 9 → Jun 9197 seen39 candidatesComplete
Jun 9 → Jul 954 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 9 → Aug 865 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

53/100 average clarity
76Strong · 80–100
134Adequate · 60–79
215Thin · 40–59
138Opaque · 0–39
6security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Nicolas Dorier36544203346
Cerberus622290
rockstardev31612049
Abhijay Jain26610087
Chukwuleta Tobechi1857070
thgO.O29411065
Tim522074
Atharva Borade711067
dstrukt413065
Pavlenex412065
psam21312068
Nicholas Halka111091
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 13 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 18 · Opaque
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Update Changelog

This commit only edits the wording of a changelog entry for BTCPay Server 2.4.2. It does not change any code, configuration, or executable files. The edit makes the release sound more urgent, but the commit itself is purely documentation a…

Changelog language changed to describe a critical, actively exploited vulnerability in release 2.4.2No code, configuration, or dependency changes present in the commitSecurity issue is referenced but not fixed or explained in this diff
fbf761f3by Nicolas Dorier+1−11 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 49 AI analysisMessage 28 · Opaque
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Disabled unwanted routes

This commit marks several public methods on ASP.NET Core controllers with [NonAction], which prevents them from being exposed as web-accessible HTTP routes. Without this attribute, these helper methods could be reached directly via URL, po…

Public controller methods exposed as unintended HTTP routesRouting-level access-control hardeningPotential bypass of intended controller action flow
6689cad4by Nicolas Dorier+9−05 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 38 · Opaque
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Changelog for 2.4.2

This commit is a version bump and changelog for BTCPay Server 2.4.2. The changelog describes two security-related changes: disabling Basic authentication by default shortly after account creation, and fixing a TOTP two-factor authenticatio…

Vendor describes security fixes in changelogTOTP two-factor authentication bypass via Greenfield Basic authenticationBasic authentication disabled by default after account creation
3e2928cfby Nicolas Dorier+29−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 18 · Opaque
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Update translations

This commit only adds, removes, and reorders English text strings used for translations and user-interface labels in BTCPay Server. There are no code logic changes, no security settings being enabled or disabled, and no behavior changes. I…

8d5f52daby Nicolas Dorier+17−11 file
No security note in commit
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 0 · Opaque
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

bump deps

This commit updates several third-party software libraries and a test Docker image to newer versions. It also removes one library (AngleSharp) that was no longer needed. Dependency updates can fix security bugs in those external packages, …

Dependency version bumps for packages that handle HTML sanitization (HtmlSanitizer) and Bitcoin protocol parsing (NBitcoin/NBXplorer)Removal of unused AngleSharp package referenceNo commit-level description of security fixes or CVEs
1c16e265by Nicolas Dorier+10−1110 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 63 · Adequate
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Disable Greenfield Basic Auth by default after 5 min of user creation (#7492)

This change makes BTCPay Server's Greenfield API stop accepting username-and-password 'Basic' authentication by default for existing users. New accounts can still use it for only the first five minutes after creation to set up an API key. …

Disables Basic authentication by default after a 5-minute onboarding windowAdds per-user opt-in flag for Basic auth in data model, API, and UITightens rate-limit bypass to require a recently created account
61cb0702by Nicolas Dorier+74−612 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Containerize store settings views into sections & clean up views (#7448)

This commit is a user-interface redesign, not a security fix. It wraps store settings pages in new visual 'section' containers, updates headings and spacing, and adjusts CSS styling. No code behavior, permissions, or data handling changed.

b8774051by dstrukt+715−54920 files
No security note in commit
Critical 86 AI analysisMessage 75 · Adequate
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Fix: TOTP 2FA bypass via Greenfield Basic auth (#7491)

BTCPay Server fixed a bug where accounts protected only by TOTP-based two-factor authentication (2FA) could access the Greenfield API using just an email and password, skipping the second factor. The change now blocks Basic authentication …

2FA bypassauthentication logic flawTOTP bypass
c173a919by Nicolas Dorier+1−11 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Adds table (wallet transactions) column controls (hide/show/re-order) (#7474)

This commit adds a user-facing preference feature to BTCPay Server's wallet transactions table: a dropdown that lets users show, hide, and reorder columns. Preferences are saved in the browser's localStorage. The change is a routine UI enh…

No security-relevant keywords in commit title or messagePure client-side UI feature using localStorageNo changes to authentication, authorization, or input processing
033460e7by dstrukt+422−157 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 57 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Cover all generated witness PSBTs

This commit changes how BTCPay Server decides whether a Bitcoin transaction input is a SegWit (witness) type when building PSBTs (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transactions). Previously the code only recognized three specific SegWit formats: na…

Broadens SegWit detection from a fixed allow-list to any ScriptType.Witness, mitigating future-version compatibility issuesAdds missing WitnessUtxo population in two wallet PSBT creation pathsWitness UTXO data reduces reliance on NonWitnessUtxo (full previous transaction) for SegWit inputs, which is a known PSBT hardening recommendation
ede7cc70by rockstardev+10−133 files
No security note in commit
Low 35 AI analysisMessage 28 · Opaque
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Preserve imported PSBTs

This commit removes a single line that automatically added witness UTXO data to SegWit inputs when decoding a PSBT. The change is titled 'Preserve imported PSBTs,' suggesting the previous behavior was modifying user-supplied transaction da…

PSBT mutation behavior changedWitness UTXO data no longer auto-injected for SegWit inputsPotential data-integrity / non-repudiation consideration for imported PSBTs
31ad661aby rockstardev+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Low 40 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Finalize stale pending multisig transactions on read

This commit fixes a bookkeeping bug in BTCPay Server's multisig (multi-signature) transaction tracker. Previously, a pending transaction could silently collect enough signatures to be finalized, but the system would still label it as 'Pend…

State-machine inconsistency: persisted transaction state could diverge from actual signature countMultisig workflow: incorrect 'Pending' label for a transaction that is actually ready to broadcastNo input validation or authorization changes in the diff
1bcfc148by rockstardev+60−62 files
No security note in commit
Low 45 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Include witness UTXOs in SegWit PSBTs

This commit changes BTCPay Server so that when it builds or decodes Partially Signed Bitcoin Transactions (PSBTs), it explicitly adds a compact 'witness UTXO' record for any SegWit inputs. Previously, some SegWit PSBTs may only have carrie…

PSBT data completeness change for SegWit inputsPotential prior state: SegWit PSBTs may have been distributed without witness UTXOsHardware-wallet compatibility / BIP-174 compliance improvement
63236df4by rockstardev+83−04 files
No security note in commit
Low 26 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Address pending signature retry review feedback

This commit is a follow-up code review patch for BTCPay Server's pending Bitcoin transaction (multisig) signing feature. It tightens when the service logs a warning versus a debug message after a failed finalization attempt, and it removes…

Logging level change reduces false-warning noise but could mask real finalization failures if SignaturesNeeded is incorrectly zeroRemoval of additionalPsbt parameter prevents accidental combination of an unvalidated extra PSBT into the effective PSBTPer-input signature progress tracking refined to avoid prematurely counting aggregate signatures
89b8f49cby rockstardev+109−102 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Simplify pending finalization failure logs

This commit is a minor code cleanup that simplifies how BTCPay Server writes log messages when a pending multi-signature transaction fails to finalize. It removes the list of failed input indexes from the log and merges two nearly identica…

7e71c45eby rockstardev+11−271 file
No security note in commit
Low 35 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Bound pending multisig signature history

This change tightens how BTCPay Server stores signature attempts for multi-signature Bitcoin transactions. Previously, every submitted PSBT (a partially signed transaction file) was kept in history, even if it added no real progress. Now o…

Unbounded history/list growth bounded by logical retention gateResource consumption / storage abuse vector mitigatedLogic change in multi-signature signature collection path
eb0f15caby rockstardev+32−242 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Log pending transaction finalization errors

This commit only adds more detailed logging when a pending multi-signature Bitcoin transaction fails to finalize. It does not change how transactions are validated, authorized, or executed. There is no security vulnerability being fixed he…

c3fe1d7bby rockstardev+29−41 file
No security note in commit
Low 42 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Fix pending multisig signature retries

This commit fixes a bug in BTCPay Server's multisig transaction handling. Previously, the service could get stuck in a 'Pending' state even when enough valid signatures had been collected, because it discarded new signature submissions tha…

Logic flaw in multisig signature collection could leave transactions permanently pending despite sufficient valid signaturesPreviously ignored distinct PSBTs that did not immediately increase signature progressMissing retry of transaction finalization after collecting additional signatures
ebeafc5aby rockstardev+153−182 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 0 · Opaque
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Fix typo

This commit changes one word in the project's changelog, adding the word 'the' to a bullet point. It is a grammatical typo fix with no effect on software behavior, security, or user data.

2ed0fa17by Nicolas Dorier+1−11 file
No security note in commit
Low 40 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
BT BTCPay ServerBTCPay Server BitcoinLightning NetworkPayment infrastructure

Add race condition safe InvoiceRepository.UpdateMetadata (#7475)

This commit changes how BTCPay Server stores invoice comments and metadata. Previously, comments were saved in a separate field and could be updated with a method that was not safe when multiple requests happened at the same time. The patc…

Commit title explicitly describes a race condition fixReplaced read-modify-write metadata update with atomic PostgreSQL jsonb_set operationRemoved dedicated API 'comment' field, narrowing update surface
5664bd41by Nicolas Dorier+51−9010 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
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Explore captured commits

Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.

Security candidateAdd granular API permissions for on-chain wallets (#7357)by thgO.O · 4a03202a · May 8, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 40Details
Commit message · thgO.O

Add granular API permissions for on-chain wallets (#7357)

* refactor(wallets): align greenfield routes with wallet policies

* fix(wallets): keep payjoin psbt unfinalized before request

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarycredential or privilege statesigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 40/100

This commit introduces more fine-grained permission checks for BTCPay Server's on-chain wallet API. Previously, many wallet operations required broad 'modify store settings' or 'view store settings' permissions. Now, operations are gated by dedicated wallet permissions such as viewing wallet data, managing wallet settings, creating/signing/broadcasting transactions, and managing wallet transactions. The change also fixes a Payjoin bug where the PSBT was finalized before the Payjoin request, which could break Payjoin flows. Overall, this is a hardening/security improvement rather than an introduced vulnerability.

Security candidateMove Wallet ViewModels (#7355)by Nicolas Dorier · 2a9efb52 · May 7, 2026 · 49 filesMessage 43 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Move Wallet ViewModels (#7355)

43/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a large but straightforward code reorganization: it moves wallet-related view model classes from one namespace/folder (BTCPayServer.Models.WalletViewModels) into a new plugin-specific location (BTCPayServer.Plugins.Wallets.Views.ViewModels) and updates all references accordingly. There is no functional change to how the application behaves, no security fix, and no vulnerability introduced in the diff itself.

Security candidateEnsure the seed isn't leaking to user with can sign permission (#7354)by Nicolas Dorier · dffdda64 · May 7, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 58 · ThinHigh 70Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Ensure the seed isn't leaking to user with can sign permission (#7354)

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
credential or privilege stateseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · High 70/100

This commit fixes a permission leak in BTCPay Server's hot wallet handling. Previously, users who only had permission to sign transactions ('can sign') could also see the wallet's secret seed phrase, which should be restricted to store administrators. The change introduces a new 'HotwalletSafe' gatekeeper that separates 'can sign' from 'can see seed' and stops the seed from being passed through web forms or displayed to lower-privileged users.

Security candidateAdd granular wallet permissions and move wallet to plugin (#7329)by thgO.O · 1e1d2514 · May 7, 2026 · 70 filesMessage 58 · ThinLow 45Details
Commit message · thgO.O

Add granular wallet permissions and move wallet to plugin (#7329)

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
credential or privilege stateseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 45/100

This is a large refactoring commit that splits BTCPay Server's wallet functionality into a separate plugin and introduces finer-grained wallet permissions (view, create transactions, sign, broadcast, manage settings, etc.). It also adds new tests that verify users with only wallet permissions can access wallet pages and cannot perform actions outside their role. The change is primarily a security-hardening/permission-separation feature, not an obvious vulnerability fix, though it does include one small bug fix for pending-transaction broadcast matching.

Security candidatefeat: add separate CanSendStoreEmail permission for store email API (#7345)by Abhijay Jain · d64288f1 · May 1, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 85 · StrongLow 32Details
Commit message · Abhijay Jain

feat: add separate CanSendStoreEmail permission for store email API (#7345)

Signed-off-by: Abhijay Jain <Abhijay007j@gmail.com>

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
credential or privilege state
AI analysis · Low 32/100

This commit introduces a new, more narrowly-scoped permission called 'CanSendStoreEmail' and applies it to the store email-sending API. Previously, sending store emails required the broader 'CanModifyStoreSettings' permission, which also allows changing many other store settings. This change follows the security principle of least privilege: it lets administrators grant API keys or users the ability to send emails without giving them full power to change store configuration. It is a hardening improvement rather than a fix for an active exploit.

Security candidateRefactor: Add btcpay.impersonation.canimpersonate permission (#7327)by Nicolas Dorier · b21a3dd7 · Apr 21, 2026 · 26 filesMessage 70 · AdequateLow 49Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Refactor: Add btcpay.impersonation.canimpersonate permission (#7327)

70/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
credential or privilege state
AI analysis · Low 49/100

This commit refactors an existing "login code" feature into a new optional plugin called Impersonation. The feature lets an already-logged-in user generate a short-lived QR code/login code that can be used on another device to sign in as the same user. The commit adds a new permission, btcpay.impersonation.canimpersonate, and rules that try to limit impersonation: a user can impersonate themselves, and server admins can impersonate non-admin users but not other admins. The code is a refactor rather than a reported vulnerability fix, but it moves a sensitive authentication capability behind a plugin and a permission check, which is a security-relevant design change.

Security candidateRemove support for importing keys to RPC (#7307)by Nicolas Dorier · 5f64c13a · Apr 11, 2026 · 16 filesMessage 53 · ThinLow 34Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Remove support for importing keys to RPC (#7307)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathauthentication path
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit removes a feature that let BTCPay Server import wallet addresses and private keys into the Bitcoin node's own wallet ("Import keys to RPC"). The change deletes the user-facing option, the API field, the server policy setting, and all related permission checks. It is a hardening/removal change rather than a fix for an active bug, and the commit message does not describe it as a security vulnerability.

Security candidateAdd LUD-21 (LNURL-pay Verify) support (#7250)by Roxanne · 9ff59327 · Apr 11, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 41Details
Commit message · Roxanne

Add LUD-21 (LNURL-pay Verify) support (#7250)

* Add LUD-21 (LNURL-pay Verify) support

Implements the LUD-21 verify endpoint for Lightning Address payments,
enabling external services to verify payment settlement without
authentication.

Changes:
- New GET /lnurlp/{username}/verify/{paymentHash} endpoint
- Callback response includes verify URL when LUD-21 is enabled
- Payment hashes indexed in search data for efficient lookup
- LUD21Enabled toggle in LNURL payment method config (default: true)
- Settings UI toggle matching LUD-12 pattern
- Swagger API docs updated

Closes #7248

* Use case-insensitive comparison for payment hash in LUD-21 verify

* Address Nicolas review: use AddressInvoices instead of AdditionalSearchTerms

- Replace AddSearchTerms with AddAddressInvoice for payment hash indexing
- Replace TextSearch lookup with GetInvoiceFromAddress in verify endpoint
- Add storeId validation on verify endpoint (cross-store isolation)
- Add payment hash to TrackedDestinations in LightningLikePaymentHandler
- Add rate limiting (ZoneLimits.Verify) to verify endpoint
- Add integration test for LUD-21 verify endpoint flow

* Remove rate limiting from LUD-21 verify endpoint

Rate limiting will be discussed and added in a follow-up.

* Fix verify endpoint: idempotent AddAddressInvoice, normalize payment hash

- Make AddAddressInvoice upsert to avoid duplicate key violations
on (Address, PaymentMethodId)
- Normalize payment hash to lowercase for consistent DB lookups
(store, query, and verify URL generation)

* test(LUD-21): properly exercise cross-store isolation in CanUseLUD21VerifyEndpoint

The previous storeId-isolation assertion did not actually validate the
intended behavior. store2 only had a Lightning Address configured, but
no Lightning node / LNURL payment method. The verify endpoint bails out
with 404 "Not available" at UILNURLController.cs:487-489 before
reaching the invoice-lookup / store-isolation check at L492-494, so the
old assertion would pass even if the isolation logic were broken.

Fix:
- Configure BTC-LN and BTC-LNURL (LUD21Enabled = true) on store2 via
UpdateStorePaymentMethod, mirroring what RegisterLightningNodeAsync
does for store1.
- Strengthen the assertion to also verify the response body's reason
is "Not found" rather than "Not available", proving the request
reached the actual store-isolation branch.

* feat(LUD-21): validate paymentHash is 64 hex chars before lookup

LnurlPayVerify previously accepted any non-empty paymentHash string and
only normalized casing. A Lightning payment hash is exactly 32 bytes /
64 hex characters, so reject anything else up front to avoid pointless
DB lookups on garbage input and return a consistent "Not found"
response shape.

* fix(LUD-21): standardize LnurlPayVerify not-found reason to "Not found"

LnurlPayVerify previously returned three different reason strings for
not-found cases ("Unknown username", "Not available", "Not found"),
which leaks information about which lookup branch failed and was flagged
in CodeRabbit review.

Collapse the username/store-resolution branches to a single "Not found"
reason. The LUD-21 feature-disabled branch keeps its distinct "Not
available" reason because that's a genuinely different operational
condition (feature off vs resource missing) and the new test relies on
the distinction to validate the cross-store isolation path.

* test(LUD-21): fix LN Address fetch path to use /.well-known/lnurlp/{username}

CanUseLUD21VerifyEndpoint was calling /lnurlp/{username} to fetch the
LNURL-pay request, but that path has no route. The actual LUD-16
Lightning Address resolver is published at /.well-known/lnurlp/{username}
(see ResolveLightningAddress in UILNURLController.cs and existing usage
in PlaywrightTests / TestAccount). The wrong path made the test fail at
the very first GET with 404, before the verify endpoint logic could be
exercised at all.

* fix(LUD-21): close TOCTOU race in AddAddressInvoice + harden preimage assertion

CodeRabbit followup:

1. AddAddressInvoice was check-then-insert, so two concurrent LNURL
callbacks for the same (Address, PaymentMethodId) could both observe
existing == null and both attempt to INSERT, causing the second one
to throw on the unique-key constraint. Wrap the insert path in
try/catch (DbUpdateException) and swallow the violation - both
writers are inserting identical data, so the operation is naturally
idempotent under contention. The update branch is kept on its own
SaveChangesAsync so failures there still propagate.

2. The preimage assertion in CanUseLUD21VerifyEndpoint was
Assert.Null(verifyResult["preimage"]?.ToString()), which depends on
how the global JSON serializer handles null values - if the field is
serialized as JSON null instead of being omitted, ToString() returns
the empty string and the assertion fails. Compare against the
JTokenType.Null sentinel directly so the test is robust to either
serializer mode.

* refactor(LUD-21): flush tracked payment hash via UpdatePrompt overload

Consolidates the two-call sequence in the LNURL callback (UpdatePrompt
followed by a separate AddAddressInvoice) into a single UpdatePrompt
call that accepts an optional trackedDestinations list and flushes
AddressInvoices rows inside the same DbContext transaction.

- Ensures the payment-hash index row is written atomically with the
prompt update so a crash between the two calls can no longer leave
the prompt persisted without its verify-lookup row.
- Keeps idempotency under concurrent LNURL callbacks (existing row
check + DbUpdateException swallow, matching AddAddressInvoice).
- Controller no longer reaches into the repository twice for a single
logical state transition.

No behavior change for existing UpdatePrompt callers (trackedDestinations
defaults to null).

* fix(LUD-21): split SaveChanges in UpdatePrompt, exclude concurrency from inner catch

Addresses both items from coderabbit review on dcfdf88:

1. DbUpdateConcurrencyException is a DbUpdateException subtype, so the
inner catch in the trackedDestinations flush would have silently
swallowed concurrency conflicts on the invoice row, breaking the
outer retry loop. Narrowed the inner catch with
'when (ex is not DbUpdateConcurrencyException)'.

2. Batching the prompt blob update and the AddressInvoices insert into
a single SaveChangesAsync meant a unique-key violation on the
tracked destination would roll back the entire unit of work and
silently drop the prompt blob update. Split into two
SaveChangesAsync calls: the blob update runs first and any error
propagates (concurrency still retries via the outer catch); the
tracked-destination flush runs after with its own scoped,
unique-key-only swallow.

* test(LUD-21): cover repeat-callback idempotency and hash validation

Adds three assertions inside the existing CanLNURLPayVerify integration test
to illustrate and guard the UpdatePrompt(trackedDestinations) refactor:

- Repeat LNURL callback with the SAME amount: exercises the idempotent
flush path where the AddressInvoices row for the payment hash already
exists. The second callback must return 200 and the verify endpoint
must still resolve the hash afterward (no duplicate row, no throw).

- Repeat LNURL callback with a DIFFERENT amount: a new payment hash is
minted. The new verify URL must resolve, proving the new hash is
indexed in AddressInvoices and the prompt blob transition persists.

- Verify endpoint with a malformed (non-hex / wrong-length) paymentHash
segment must return 404 with Reason 'Not found' at the 64-hex guard
before any DB lookup is performed.

* Address NicolasDorier review feedback on LUD-21

- Remove username from verify route (/lnurlp/verify/{paymentHash}),
look up store from invoice instead; enables verify for all LNURL,
not only Lightning Address
- Replace EF check-then-act in AddressInvoices with SQL INSERT ON
CONFLICT DO NOTHING (single roundtrip, no partial-dup DbContext
corruption)
- Remove IgnoreAntiforgeryToken on GET route
- Remove payment hash tracking from LightningLikePaymentHandler
(only needed for LNURL path, already handled in UILNURLController)
- Standardize all error responses to "Not found"
- Simplify tests: drop cross-store-via-username and unknown-username
checks (no longer applicable without username in route)

* Address NicolasDorier review: guard trackedDestinations on LUD21Enabled, deduplicate AddressInvoices upsert

- trackedDestinations is now null when LUD21 is not enabled, preventing
unnecessary AddressInvoices rows for stores that don't use verify.
- Extract UpsertAddressInvoice helper to eliminate the duplicated INSERT
SQL across AddAddressInvoice, UpdatePrompt, and NewPaymentPrompt.

---------

Co-authored-by: r1ckstardev <r1ckstardev@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: r1ckstardev <me@r0ckstar.dev>

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access controldefensive validation
AI analysis · Low 41/100

This commit adds a new public feature to BTCPay Server called LUD-21, which lets anyone check whether a Lightning Network payment has settled by knowing its payment hash. The feature is enabled by default. The code went through several review rounds that fixed information-leakage issues, race conditions, and input-validation problems. The final version appears reasonably hardened, but because it intentionally exposes invoice settlement status and the payment preimage to unauthenticated callers, it carries a real privacy and operational risk if a merchant does not realize it is on by default.

Security candidatePoS: Any store users can now generate a login QR any other store user (#7303)by Nicolas Dorier · 5062be43 · Apr 9, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 58 · ThinModerate 66Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

PoS: Any store users can now generate a login QR any other store user (#7303)

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 66/100

This commit changes how login QR codes are generated for BTCPay Server's Point of Sale (PoS) feature. Previously, only store owners or admins could generate login codes, and there was a warning when selecting a store owner. After this change, any store user can generate a login QR code for any other store user, including store owners, without the previous confirmation step. The commit title itself says this is intentional: 'Any store users can now generate a login QR any other store user.' This appears to be a deliberate feature change, but it weakens access controls around sensitive login credentials.

Security candidatePoS: Unpermissioned store users can browse login links and invoices from Update PoS page (#7305)by Nicolas Dorier · 910cc48b · Apr 9, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 58 · ThinModerate 68Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

PoS: Unpermissioned store users can browse login links and invoices from Update PoS page (#7305)

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
credential or privilege stateboot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100

This update fixes a permissions issue in BTCPay Server's Point of Sale (PoS) settings page. Previously, store users who only had permission to view settings—but not modify them—could still load the 'Update Point of Sale' page and see sensitive things like invoice lists and login links. The fix makes the page read-only for those users by disabling or hiding edit controls unless the user has modify-permissions. The same permission helper was also extended to cover more HTML elements (buttons, inputs, divs), and a small navigation markup cleanup was done for Crowdfund and PoS menus.

Security candidatefeat: add manual subscription date editing for admins (#7257)by Abhijay Jain · 8ceb55cd · Mar 31, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 30Details
Commit message · Abhijay Jain

feat: add manual subscription date editing for admins (#7257)

* feat: add manual subscription date editing for admins

Signed-off-by: Abhijay Jain <Abhijay007j@gmail.com>

* refactor: Address code review feedback on subscription date editing

Signed-off-by: Abhijay Jain <Abhijay007j@gmail.com>

* refactor: Use DateOnly params and normalize to UTC for date editing

Signed-off-by: Abhijay Jain <Abhijay007j@gmail.com>

* refactor: added tests and API route

Signed-off-by: Abhijay Jain <Abhijay007j@gmail.com>

* refactor: addressed coding suggestions

Signed-off-by: Abhijay Jain <Abhijay007j@gmail.com>

* refactor: added null check

Signed-off-by: Abhijay Jain <Abhijay007j@gmail.com>

* docs: updated swagger todocument manual subscription date editing

Signed-off-by: Abhijay Jain <Abhijay007j@gmail.com>

* Slight adjustment

---------

Signed-off-by: Abhijay Jain <Abhijay007j@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Nicolas Dorier <nicolas.dorier@gmail.com>

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Low 30/100

This commit adds a new admin-only feature that lets store administrators manually edit subscription start and expiration dates for subscribers, both through the web interface and the API. It is a normal feature addition, not a vulnerability fix. The code includes basic validation (expiration must be after start) and is restricted to users who already have permission to manage subscribers. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this introduces a security bug, but any date-editing feature could theoretically be misused by a compromised admin account or through authorization bugs.

Security candidateDev: Helps Rider to find Layouts properly (#7283)by Nicolas Dorier · c0e58290 · Mar 27, 2026 · 21 filesMessage 53 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Dev: Helps Rider to find Layouts properly (#7283)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a developer-experience tweak. It changes how Razor view files reference their page layouts so that the JetBrains Rider IDE can find them more reliably. It also updates a test assertion style and bumps the C# language version from 12 to 14. There is no security-relevant change.

Security candidatefix(email): skip SMTP AUTH when Login and Password are empty (fixes #7267) (#7269)by Drake Thomsen · 94320733 · Mar 25, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 98 · StrongInformational 22Details
Commit message · Drake Thomsen

fix(email): skip SMTP AUTH when Login and Password are empty (fixes #7267) (#7269)

When SMTP is configured via IP relay (e.g. Google Workspace relay) without
login credentials, BTCPay still calls AuthenticateAsync if the server
advertises AUTH capability, causing 535 errors.

Skip authentication when both Login and Password are empty.

Co-authored-by: Storm Knight <storm-knight@openclaw.ai>

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access controlcredential or privilege state
AI analysis · Informational 22/100

This commit fixes an email-sending bug in BTCPay Server. When an administrator configured an SMTP relay that does not require a username or password, BTCPay was still trying to log in if the server said it supported authentication. That caused unnecessary 535 authentication errors and prevented emails from being sent. The fix simply skips login when both the Login and Password fields are empty. There is no security vulnerability here; it is a reliability/configuration fix.

Security candidateAllow upgrade/downgrade of a subscription at period endby Chukwuleta Tobechi · ea7bb40b · Mar 22, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 50 · ThinInformational 20Details
Commit message · Chukwuleta Tobechi

Allow upgrade/downgrade of a subscription at period end

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
update trust
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit adds a new feature to BTCPay Server's subscription plugin that lets users schedule a plan upgrade or downgrade to take effect at the end of their current billing period, instead of happening immediately. It also lets users cancel a scheduled change. The change is a normal feature addition and does not appear to fix or introduce a security vulnerability based on the code shown.

Security candidatefix: Cross-store privilege escalation to approved pull payments/payouts in GreenfieldPullPaymentController (#7244)by Cerberus · 3c839152 · Mar 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 90 · StrongHigh 81Details
Commit message · Cerberus

fix: Cross-store privilege escalation to approved pull payments/payouts in GreenfieldPullPaymentController (#7244)

Co-authored-by: Cerberus Merlin <merlin@cerberus.security>

90/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
credential or privilege state
AI analysis · High 81/100

This commit fixes a privilege escalation bug in BTCPay Server's Greenfield API. Two authorization checks were passing 'null' instead of the actual store ID when verifying whether a user could auto-approve pull payments or payouts. In BTCPay Server's authorization system, a null resource likely causes the check to fall back to a global permission evaluation, meaning a user who only had permission on one store could potentially approve or auto-approve pull payments/payouts for other stores where they should have been denied. The patch simply passes the correct storeId so the permission is scoped properly.

Security candidatefix: Broken Access Control: Private form access and invoice creation on other stores via unscoped authorization check (#7236)by Cerberus · e7cd630b · Mar 13, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 90 · StrongHigh 74Details
Commit message · Cerberus

fix: Broken Access Control: Private form access and invoice creation on other stores via unscoped authorization check (#7236)

Co-authored-by: Cerberus Merlin <merlin@cerberus.security>

90/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · High 74/100

This commit fixes a broken access control bug in BTCPay Server's form feature. Previously, when checking whether a user could view a private form, the system asked 'Is this user allowed to view store settings anywhere?' without specifying which store. That meant any user with store-settings permission for any store could see private forms belonging to other stores, and could potentially create invoices against those stores. The patch changes the authorization check to include the specific store ID of the form, so users must have permission for that exact store.

Security candidateInclude API key - permission analysis for improved security (#6771)by Chukwuleta Tobechi · b253df29 · Mar 10, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 96 · StrongInformational 21Details
Commit message · Chukwuleta Tobechi

Include API key - permission analysis for improved security (#6771)

* Include API key - permission analysis for improved security

resolve codderbyte

Remove designer class

fix review feedback

include text translate

avoid string parsion and use Permission directly

use permission against string

include translation and update selecte stores

Include tests for api key permission edit and usage

.Update api key analysis page

include test

delete key usage when deleting api key

* update layout and delete query

96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
credential or privilege state
AI analysis · Informational 21/100

This commit adds a new feature that tracks which permissions each API key actually uses and shows the owner a dashboard of used, unused, and stale permissions. It is a security-hardening and visibility improvement, not a fix for an active vulnerability. The change also deletes usage records when an API key is removed.

Security candidateCleanup unused namespacesby Nicolas Dorier · 1633275d · Mar 8, 2026 · 372 filesMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Cleanup unused namespaces

35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathboot or update pathauthentication pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit removes unused C# 'using' statements (imported namespaces) and one unused Razor view import across 372 files. It is a code-cleanup change with no functional modifications. The only non-cleanup hunk is a tiny refactor in GreenfieldInvoiceController.UpdateInvoice that reorders an existing null check and variable assignment without changing behavior.

Security candidateRefactor: User User.GetId instead of using the UserManagerby Nicolas Dorier · be7f3f04 · Mar 8, 2026 · 44 filesMessage 62 · AdequateLow 34Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Refactor: User User.GetId instead of using the UserManager

62/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathauthentication path
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This is a large internal code cleanup that replaces calls to ASP.NET Core's UserManager for getting the current user's ID with a new direct helper that reads the value from the user's identity claims. Most changes are mechanical refactors across many controllers and views. There are a few small behavior changes worth watching: the new helper returns an empty string instead of "???" for missing users, some places now treat a missing user ID as a validation failure rather than passing it through, and a couple of user-not-found cases now return NotFound instead of throwing an exception. The commit does not describe itself as a security fix and no external advisory is provided.

Security candidateFix PermissionTagHelper to behave in the right scope when in nav barby Nicolas Dorier · d6bec86c · Mar 7, 2026 · 14 filesMessage 50 · ThinLow 49Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Fix PermissionTagHelper to behave in the right scope when in nav bar

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
credential or privilege stateauthentication path
AI analysis · Low 49/100

This commit fixes how BTCPay Server's navigation bar decides which store's permissions to use when showing or hiding menu items. Previously, the permission checks inside the navigation bar could accidentally use the store from the main page (for example, the server settings page) instead of the store selected in the navigation bar. This could cause menu items to be shown or hidden incorrectly. The change makes the navigation bar temporarily switch to the correct store context while it renders, and removes a caching shortcut that could reuse the wrong permission result. There is no direct evidence in the commit message or diff that this was exploited or reported as a security vulnerability.

Security candidateDo not add claims twice for cookie authby Nicolas Dorier · e34d8d7d · Mar 6, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinLow 26Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Do not add claims twice for cookie auth

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
authentication path
AI analysis · Low 26/100

This commit fixes a small bug where a special permission claim was being added to a user's identity every time it was transformed, instead of only once. Repeated claims are harmless in most cases, but could in theory cause the identity to grow unexpectedly or lead to subtle authorization behavior. The fix checks whether the permission claim already exists before adding it again.

Security candidatePluginize permissionsby Nicolas Dorier · 14837e6c · Mar 6, 2026 · 70 filesMessage 18 · OpaqueModerate 51Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Pluginize permissions

18/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change! Too few words to establish purpose! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
credential or privilege stateauthentication path
AI analysis · Moderate 51/100

This is a large refactoring commit that reworks how permissions are defined and enforced in BTCPay Server so that plugins can register their own permissions. It moves the permission hierarchy out of a hard-coded static class into a runtime service, changes how store context is tracked during requests, and updates authorization handlers. The change is architectural rather than a targeted security fix, but any mistake in the new permission logic could allow users to access stores or functions they should not.

Security candidateDecrease logs about challenged authentication schemesby Nicolas Dorier · 54056a40 · Mar 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 55 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Decrease logs about challenged authentication schemes

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply turns down the volume on log messages coming from BTCPayServer's security components. It changes the logging level from the default (likely Information/Debug) to Warning, so routine 'authentication scheme challenged' messages no longer fill the logs. There is no code behavior change, no bug fix, and no security vulnerability being patched.

Security candidateRefactor: Move Bitpay stuff in its own pluginby Nicolas Dorier · 39d99f0b · Feb 27, 2026 · 55 filesMessage 57 · ThinLow 35Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Refactor: Move Bitpay stuff in its own plugin

57/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
authentication path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit is a large code refactor that moves BTCPay Server's Bitpay-compatible API from the core application into a separate plugin. It relocates controllers, authentication, models, views, and middleware into a new Plugins/Bitpay folder, updates tests and dependency injection, and replaces the old middleware-based Bitpay API detection with a new endpoint selector policy. The change itself is structural rather than a targeted security fix, but any large refactor of authentication and routing code carries a risk of accidentally changing access-control behavior.

Security candidateRefactor: Move translations classes in its own pluginby Nicolas Dorier · 64d5a893 · Feb 20, 2026 · 26 filesMessage 62 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nicolas Dorier

Refactor: Move translations classes in its own plugin

62/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine code reorganization: it moves BTCPay Server's translation/localization code from the core server project into a dedicated 'Translations' plugin. The same dictionary-management features, language-pack download, and localization services are preserved, just relocated. There is no indication of a security fix or vulnerability being addressed.