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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #7610 from TChukwuleta/ft/manifest-redirect-bcp47

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Nicolas Dorier

73/100 · Adequate
Merge pull request #7610 from TChukwuleta/ft/manifest-redirect-bcp47

Support translation repository redirects and language identifiers
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit hardens how BTCPay Server downloads translation files from GitHub. It adds checks so the app only fetches files from the project's own trusted GitHub organization, blocks automatic web redirects, and supports a new optional redirect field in the manifest only if it also stays within that trusted organization. It also adds a new BCP47 language identifier field. The changes are defensive: they close paths where a malicious or compromised manifest could trick the server into downloading files from an attacker's site.

Recommended action

No immediate action required; this is a hardening patch. Reviewers should verify that the trusted-org check correctly handles all URL canonicalization edge cases (e.g., percent-encoded separators, case variations, userinfo, non-standard ports) and that the manifest redirect cannot be used to chain to an untrusted host. Consider whether the trusted path prefix should also enforce a specific repository name.

Security signals we found

01

Server-side request forgery (SSRF) protection added: URI host/path validation before outbound fetch

02

Automatic HTTP redirects disabled for translation update client

03

Manifest redirect field introduced with same-origin/org trust validation

04

Language pack file paths resolved relative to manifest URI and validated against trusted prefix

05

Path traversal and URL-encoded dot-segment payloads rejected in tests

06

HTTP-to-HTTPS downgrade and lookalike hostnames rejected in tests

07

SHA-256 integrity check on downloaded language packs already existed and is retained

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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