Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit only changes documentation comments and enables a stricter compiler warning for documentation style. It does not alter any executable code, so it cannot introduce or fix a security vulnerability on its own.
This change fixes a privacy leak in Bitcoin Core's wallet. When users used the 'bumpfee' feature to replace a transaction with a higher fee, the replacement could sometimes end up with an older 'locktime' than the original transaction. Thi…
Privacy/fingerprinting issue in wallet transaction creationReplacement transaction locktime can be lower than original transaction locktimeAnti-fee-sniping random backdating can produce identifiable on-chain pattern
This patch fixes a bug in Bitcoin Core's wallet transaction creation where extremely large output amounts could cause an integer overflow or even crash the node. Before the fix, a user could craft a transaction whose outputs added up to mo…
Integer overflow in recipient amount summationNode abort via failed assertion in coin selectionPossible creation of a transaction with wrapped/invalid total output value
This change fixes how Bitcoin Core sends your Tor control password to the Tor daemon. Previously, the password was wrapped in quotes and only double-quote characters were escaped. If a password contained a backslash, Tor would misinterpret…
Improper escaping of protocol string (QuotedString)Potential Tor control command boundary confusionAuthentication bypass/failure risk for Tor control
This commit marks the existing 'recortar el video' feature as deprecated. It doesn't remove it, but it now shows a warning and requires a special flag to use. The change is meant to protect users from accidentally losing access to their bi…
Deprecation of risky wallet-encryption workflowKnown data-retention risk: unencrypted key material may remain on disk after late encryptionKnown backup/restore risk: post-encryption keys are not covered by pre-encryption backups
This is a code-cleanup change in Bitcoin Core. It replaces many uses of `assert(false)` and similar 'this should never happen' markers with a new macro called `AssertUnreachable()`. The goal is to make the code clearer for developers and a…
No security-relevant functional change: process still aborts on unreachable pathsRefactor only: replaces one abort mechanism with another equivalent oneAdds a new lint rule to enforce the preferred macro going forward
This is a minor cleanup inside a single test file. It changes how a fake transaction output is built in a unit test so the empty script is written explicitly rather than created implicitly by resizing a list. The actual test behavior and t…
This is a routine subtree update for the secp256k1 cryptographic library inside Bitcoin Core. It pulls in several upstream fixes, most of which are build-system cleanups, test improvements, and API hardening. The most user-visible changes …
Silent Payments API no longer aborts on empty input/output arrays; returns 0 per documented behaviorSilent Payments label-tweak overflow now rejected with ARG_CHECK instead of being silently handledecmult_const gains a _ge variant that clears intermediate Jacobian coordinates to reduce secret leakage
This commit only cleans up Bitcoin Core's own functional test suite. It removes unused multisig test code, fixes outdated docstrings, and drops a no-longer-needed command-line flag in test scripts. None of these changes affect the actual B…
This commit only cleans up two internal test scripts for the Bitcoin Core project. It replaces a manual network disconnect/reconnect pattern with a simpler way to create an unconnected block header, and removes a hard-coded number in favor…
This is a tiny code cleanup in a Bitcoin Core test file. It replaces the hard-coded number 3 with the actual number of test nodes, making the test slightly easier to maintain. It does not change any real Bitcoin Core software behavior and …
This change hides an old, always-false field called 'iswatchonly' from the getaddressinfo API response unless the user explicitly asks for deprecated features. It is a routine cleanup, not a security fix, and does not change how wallets or…
This commit only cleans up Bitcoin Core's own automated test suite. It removes unused test nodes and an unnecessary double restart in a few wallet-related test scripts. There is no change to the actual Bitcoin node software that users run,…
This change fixes a bug where Bitcoin Core would disconnect every peer sharing the same IP address when one peer misbehaved. The problem is especially bad for users connecting through Tor, because all Tor traffic exits through a small set …
Denial of service via shared IP disconnectTor exit-node IP collision exploited to disconnect honest peersPeer-to-peer network isolation of inbound connections
This commit fixes a bug where Bitcoin Core would disconnect every peer sharing the same IP address when one of them misbehaved. Because Tor exit nodes share a single IP address among many users, a malicious user could deliberately misbehav…
Denial-of-service via shared IP disconnectTor exit-node IP collision exploited to disconnect honest peersPeer-disconnection logic changed from subnet match to single-node flag
This change is purely a code-cleanup and linting improvement. It removes repetitive 'IWYU pragma: keep' comments from build-config header includes and instead marks the generated config header itself with a single 'always_keep' pragma. The…
This is a code cleanup change that makes the type system express 'this pointer can never be null' for several internal objects and for block templates. It removes redundant null checks and adds helper functions to create such non-null poin…
No security-relevant bug is patchedChange is purely a type-system refactorRemoves dead null-check error paths rather than adding safety checks
This commit only changes a test file to make a timing check less strict. It removes an upper-bound timing assertion that was causing false test failures on slow CI machines. There is no change to Bitcoin Core's actual network or wallet cod…
This commit is a routine cleanup, not a security fix. It removes support for an old, confusingly-named option ('confTarget') in two Bitcoin wallet commands (bumpfee and psbtbumpfee), leaving only the clearer 'conf_target' name unless the u…
This is a tiny change to a Bitcoin Core test helper that makes fee-checking tests slightly more tolerant. It is not a security fix and does not affect production wallet code or consensus rules. It simply reduces how often an extremely rare…
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36231: test: add pow tests covering live mutants
e6975adf58c354dbd167b419ad7aadc7b8053af6 test: cover non-retarget heights in PermittedDifficultyTransition (ViniciusCestarii) a9873943e259b23884fb4295591a82168c831026 test: cover lower bound rounding in PermittedDifficultyTransition (ViniciusCestarii) 7834db23914a3faa3660cb609144cd1c345a1ef3 test: cover negative timespan in CalculateNextWorkRequired (ViniciusCestarii) 1811735255b98257e7bf385325599c8d9bb69ad0 test: cover first block time selection in GetNextWorkRequired (ViniciusCestarii)
Pull request description:
Kills 4 live mutants on pow.cpp found with https://github.com/ViniciusCestarii/mutant-harness. The first 2 affect consensus. The third affect header sync and could stall IBD. The forth cover header sync hardening against DoS. They are:
pow.cpp (killed by 1811735255b98257e7bf385325599c8d9bb69ad0):
- // Round and then compare this new calculated value to what is - // observed. - arith_uint256 minimum_new_target; - minimum_new_target.SetCompact(smallest_difficulty_target.GetCompact()); - if (minimum_new_target > observed_new_target) return false; + // Compare this new calculated value to what is observed. + if (smallest_difficulty_target > observed_new_target) return false; } else if (old_nbits != new_nbits) { return false; } ```
pow.cpp (killed by e6975adf58c354dbd167b419ad7aadc7b8053af6):
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
defensive validationconsensus or confidential-proof validationmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new test cases to Bitcoin Core's proof-of-work test file. It does not change any production code. The tests are designed to detect if future code changes accidentally break subtle consensus rules around difficulty retargeting. There is no vulnerability being fixed here.
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36504: test: Add missing timeouts for HTTPConnection
fa4308dfbf3a59f95deac382fa955570f814e8ca test: make wait_until timing arguments keyword-only (MarcoFalke) fad441867c9baa8c4ae9a755f09948efa1b23447 test: Add missing timeouts for HTTPConnection (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Without a timeout, the test can hang forever on broken systems. This is fine, but it would be nice if the test instead failed with a nicer error message, indicating the timeout.
ACKs for top commit: mercie-ux: tACK fa4308dfbf hebasto: ACK fa4308dfbf3a59f95deac382fa955570f814e8ca, I have reviewed the code and it looks OK. pinheadmz: ACK fa4308dfbf3a59f95deac382fa955570f814e8ca
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes Bitcoin Core's internal test scripts. It adds timeout values to test-only HTTP connections and makes timeout arguments keyword-only in a helper function. There is no change to the actual Bitcoin node software that users run, so it cannot affect live wallets, transactions, or network security.
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36485: ci: refactor BUILD_TARGETS use
fa5643ff99af95227abb7a0b031e1dfbe4019dd7 ci: refactor BUILD_TARGETS use (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
* "all" is added to the build targets unless GOAL is "all" or contains "codegen". This implicit translation can be confusing, so explicitly spell out the targets as "all", "all deploy", etc., where needed.
* Also, use the eval-based string-to-argv conversion for BUILD_TARGETS to avoid disabling shellcheck SC2086.
ACKs for top commit: fanquake: ACK fa5643ff99af95227abb7a0b031e1dfbe4019dd7 hebasto: ACK fa5643ff99af95227abb7a0b031e1dfbe4019dd7.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This change is a cleanup of Bitcoin Core's continuous integration (CI) scripts. It replaces an implicit rule that automatically added 'all' to build targets with an explicit list of build targets in each CI configuration. There is no security vulnerability here; it is purely a maintainability and shell-script linting improvement.
731b89c09bbc286801eebf5061b161c3d5091150 test: Check that importmempool fails on a malformed mempool.dat (Fabian Jahr) 4c01625f798b4017ab83f86ab8815d56b4d18042 doc: Add release note for -persistmempoolv1 removal (Fabian Jahr) d1dfdf827619bd06ff9c52e42f2c370e6e70504f mempool: Remove -persistmempoolv1 option (Fabian Jahr) 86a31b93d0db7f01e5c1a61fb014b89b2506fe54 test: Use v31.0 as old node in mempool_compatibility.py (Fabian Jahr)
Pull request description:
`-persistmempoolv1` was added in #28207 as a temporary option to allow downgrading to v26 and earlier, which can't read the XOR'ed `mempool.dat`. v26 has now been EOL for a while. So any version this option could help downgrade to is unsupported now. It seems ready for removal. I don't think this requires an additional deprecation cycle since the feature is useless for any maintained version and docs have always stated that this was a "temporary option that will be removed in the future".
Reading v1 files is still supported, so upgrading directly from an old version keeps the persisted mempool.
`mempool_compatibility.py` now uses v28.2 as the old node, the oldest release in `get_previous_releases.py` that writes the current format.
ACKs for top commit: maflcko: review ACK 731b89c09bbc286801eebf5061b161c3d5091150 🐋 ismaelsadeeq: ACK 731b89c09bbc286801eebf5061b161c3d5091150
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
update trustmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This commit removes an old command-line option called -persistmempoolv1 that let users write the mempool file in a legacy format. The option was always documented as temporary, and the only versions it helped downgrade to are no longer supported. Reading the old format is still supported, so users upgrading from old versions are not affected. A new test was added to check that importing a corrupted mempool file is rejected safely. There is no direct security vulnerability here; it is a cleanup of obsolete functionality.
./bld-cmake/bin/fuzz: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each. /src/net_processing.cpp:3662:33: runtime error: unsigned integer overflow: 0 - 1 cannot be represented in type 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') /src/net_processing.cpp:3662:18: runtime error: implicit conversion from type 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') of value 18446744073709551615 (64-bit, unsigned) to type 'int' changed the value to -1 (32-bit, signed)
ACKs for top commit: marcofleon: re-ACK fab64c032c1a0c997c6ec398cc5578df36b33b7d Crypt-iQ: re-ACK fab64c032c1a0c997c6ec398cc5578df36b33b7d
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validationfuzzing or regression evidencemerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 23/100
This commit adds fuzz-test coverage for BIP157 block-filter P2P messages and fixes a test-only cleanup issue. The fuzz target found an unsigned-integer overflow in net_processing.cpp when handling these messages, but the overflow appears to be in a debug/test code path and is not described as a remotely exploitable network vulnerability. The main code change is test infrastructure: initializing a basic block-filter index during fuzz setup and destroying it on teardown to avoid deadlocks.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#35989: wallet: fix crash on importdescriptors with a range ending at 2^31-1by Ava Chow · acdb3269 · Oct 8, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 96 · StrongModerate 66Details
Commit message · Ava Chow
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#35989: wallet: fix crash on importdescriptors with a range ending at 2^31-1
93c8aec3fbc8c5a2fcc834c4acc1b7d96bffa9a0 doc: add release note for #35989 (Shuvam Pandey) 457c9e8999fbee1d37f41eaede681f787e657395 script: avoid overflow when checking descriptor range bounds (Shuvam Pandey) ab3bb55a67cced3551e8ebb658c4d962a10d3715 test: add coverage for descriptor range end bounds (Shuvam Pandey) 867ad9bffbd3ab26c9899207ddd11380e0c1a1bd wallet: fix integer overflow in descriptor keypool top up (Shuvam Pandey) 1889440f821d6bf8394050c96cc8e06a2f18d9c2 wallet: reject unrepresentable descriptor import ranges (Shuvam Pandey)
Pull request description:
`WalletDescriptor` stores an exclusive range end in `int32_t`. Importing `[2147483647, 2147483647]` produces an end of `2^31`, which narrows to a negative value and aborts the node during keypool top-up. An import without a range can hit the same issue with an oversized `-keypool`.
Check the exclusive end before constructing the wallet descriptor, covering both explicit and default ranges. The bound stays wallet-specific: scanning RPCs still accept `INT32_MAX` as an inclusive endpoint.
Also calculate the keypool top-up endpoint in `int64_t` before checking its bound, and reject reversed ranges before computing `high - low` in `CheckDescriptorRangeBounds`. These fix the overflows reached by `keypoolrefill INT32_MAX` after advancing a descriptor, and by `[INT64_MAX, 0]`, respectively. Regression tests cover all three fixes.
I tested on macOS arm64 with Clang 22 and UBSan passed: 34 targeted unit cases and the importdescriptors, keypool, deriveaddresses (RPC and CLI), scantxoutset, and scanblocks functional tests.
ACKs for top commit: achow101: ACK 93c8aec3fbc8c5a2fcc834c4acc1b7d96bffa9a0 polespinasa: ACK 93c8aec3fbc8c5a2fcc834c4acc1b7d96bffa9a0
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetyfuzzing or regression evidencesigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 66/100
This update fixes a crash in Bitcoin Core's wallet that could be triggered when importing a descriptor with a range ending at the largest 32-bit signed integer (2,147,483,647). Because the wallet stores the range end as an exclusive value in a 32-bit signed integer, that endpoint becomes 2^31 and wraps around to a negative number, causing the node to abort during keypool top-up. The patch rejects such unrepresentable ranges before they are stored, and also hardens related arithmetic to avoid similar overflows.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#35037: ipc: support per-address max-connections options on -ipcbindby merge-script · 442884f5 · Oct 8, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 22Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#35037: ipc: support per-address max-connections options on -ipcbind
856f9ea158055460764883dfca01491951554d2e doc: add ipcbind max-connections release note (Enoch Azariah) bdd381b8ed475b114d6a8ac25bb448515a2a42f9 ipc: test per-address connection limiting over unix sockets (Enoch Azariah) 8761d53b250e9bb81e59a21d48598c1b62fa0e65 ipc: support per-address max-connections on ipcbind (Enoch Azariah) 3d2b65d050962a35b071618a3f32f7a78831e8e3 ipc: add default connection limit for ipcbind listeners (Enoch Azariah)
Pull request description:
The branch extends `-ipcbind` to accept `,max-connections=<n>` options, for example `-ipcbind=unix:,max-connections=8` or `-ipcbind=unix:/custom/path,max-connections=8`, instead of introducing a separate global `-ipcmaxconnections` option.
This keeps the connection limit attached to each IPC listener instead of introducing a global `-ipcmaxconnections` option (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/34978). A global option would not allow different limits for different `-ipcbind` addresses, and the inline option format can be extended in the future with additional options.
ACKs for top commit: ryanofsky: Code review ACK 856f9ea158055460764883dfca01491951554d2e. Only change since last review is wrapping the `-ipcbind` help text in `strprintf` so the default and maximum values are shown. Thanks for all the updates! sedited: ACK 856f9ea158055460764883dfca01491951554d2e ViniciusCestarii: re-ACK 856f9ea158055460764883dfca01491951554d2e
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 22/100
This change adds a per-listener connection limit for Bitcoin Core's local inter-process communication (IPC) socket option `-ipcbind`. Previously, IPC listeners had no enforced cap on simultaneous connections. The patch lets users specify `,max-connections=<n>` (default 16, maximum 256) and reserves matching file descriptors at startup. It is a hardening improvement rather than a fix for an active vulnerability, and it includes tests and release notes.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36436: ci: Derive CONTAINER_NAME from the ci config file nameby merge-script · 8406af1c · Oct 8, 2026 · 29 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36436: ci: Derive CONTAINER_NAME from the ci config file name
fa2cdb6a3c183b621b48966a9dc77842bb935d0c ci: [refactor] remove redundant GOAL=install (MarcoFalke) fa547e8204cb6d3e9c8c2e56a973ca635e29cfdc ci: [refactor] Remove redundant set -o errexit (MarcoFalke) fa8fd9164fb49d7ed21fc004b1dea62cffd14721 ci: Derive CONTAINER_NAME from the ci config file name (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Some misc CI config cleanups:
* Mainly, to derive the unique CONTAINER_NAME from the unique file name. * Two refactors, to remove redundant stuff.
ACKs for top commit: willcl-ark: ACK fa2cdb6a3c183b621b48966a9dc77842bb935d0c sedited: ACK fa2cdb6a3c183b621b48966a9dc77842bb935d0c
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathauthentication pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a routine cleanup of Bitcoin Core's continuous integration (CI) configuration. It removes duplicated container names from many CI config files and instead derives the container name automatically from each file's name. It also removes a few redundant script settings. There is no change to the Bitcoin software that users run, no change to wallets, networking, consensus, or cryptography, and no security fix or vulnerability introduced.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36392: test: Extract and use sigterm_node in init_fd_overflow_testby merge-script · ff623cfa · Oct 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36392: test: Extract and use sigterm_node in init_fd_overflow_test
fad49a733d611f6d49ab9cb80509b79af500b384 test: Extract and use sigterm_node in init_fd_overflow_test (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/36388 (llvm-symbolizer broken pipe complaints) by replacing the unclean Bitcoin Core shutdown with a clean one in `init_fd_overflow_test`.
ACKs for top commit: fametrano: ACK fad49a733d611f6d49ab9cb80509b79af500b384 sedited: ACK fad49a733d611f6d49ab9cb80509b79af500b384
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
memory safetymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a test-only code cleanup. It changes how a Bitcoin Core test shuts down a node during one specific test scenario, replacing a force-kill with a cleaner signal-based shutdown. It does not affect the live Bitcoin Core software that users run, and it does not fix a security vulnerability.
This PR fixes a Silent Payments pubkey extraction issue for P2PKH inputs: a third party can malleate the `scriptSig` such that it contains an OP_CHECKSIG that fails in real validation but succeeds with the dummy signature checker currently used (which accepts any non-empty signature). E.g. for a P2PKH spend with scriptSig
the `EvalScript` call would currently result in `wrong_pubkey` as the top stack item instead of `pubkey` and thus lead to an incorrect extraction (see the test added in the first commit). Fix this by parsing the scriptSig manually via a `.GetOp(...)` iteration, looking at all 33-byte data pushes to find the one where the Hash160 (SHA-256 + RIPEMD-160) matches the one in the output script.
Note that an alternative fix would be to keep using `EvalScript` but use an actual signature checker instead of the dummy one, but for that we need more transaction data in order to enable sighash calculation. Also involving a full script interpreter run including signature checks merely for extracting a public key seems overblown.
This issue was reported by [Project Loupe](https://github.com/project-loupe/) earlier this week (thanks!). From what I saw, none of the existing Silent Payments implementations are affected. I'm planning to add the test case to the BIP-352 test vectors in the BIPs repository as well, next to the existing ones that cover P2PKH malleation.
ACKs for top commit: achow101: ACK cdfaa534d006f0effeb0ece3fb9aa5e53177a3fd fametrano: tACK cdfaa534d006f0effeb0ece3fb9aa5e53177a3fd Yudis-bit: Tested ACK cdfaa534d006f0effeb0ece3fb9aa5e53177a3fd sedited: ACK cdfaa534d006f0effeb0ece3fb9aa5e53177a3fd
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryfuzzing or regression evidencemerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 62/100
This update fixes a bug in how Bitcoin Core extracts public keys from certain old-style (P2PKH) transaction inputs when calculating Silent Payments. A troublemaker could tweak the input's script so that, during normal Bitcoin validation, the real public key is used, but the previous extraction method would pick a fake public key instead. That could cause a Silent Payments receiver to compute the wrong payment address and miss a payment. The fix manually scans the input for the public key whose fingerprint matches the output, instead of running the script with a dummy signature checker.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36448: randomenv: use `KERN_POSIX1` over `KERN_OSREV`by merge-script · 672c2d21 · Oct 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36448: randomenv: use `KERN_POSIX1` over `KERN_OSREV`
d1f9a5b3e05082b99880c13a156f50e5239c1a26 randomenv: use KERN_POSIX1 over KERN_OSREV (fanquake)
Pull request description:
Given we are checking if `KERN_POSIX1` is defined, and `KERN_OSREV` is used above.
ACKs for top commit: maflcko: lgtm ACK d1f9a5b3e05082b99880c13a156f50e5239c1a26 sedited: ACK d1f9a5b3e05082b99880c13a156f50e5239c1a26
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a one-line code cleanup in Bitcoin Core's random environment data gathering. The code was supposed to add a 'POSIX version' system value to the randomness pool when that value is available, but it accidentally added the 'OS revision' value twice instead. The fix makes the code do what the surrounding preprocessor guard already intended. It does not change security meaningfully: both values are harmless system identifiers used only as extra entropy input, and the OS revision was already being collected earlier in the same function.
```diff // Null bytes at the start of R are not allowed, unless R would // otherwise be interpreted as a negative number. - if (lenR > 1 && (sig[4] == 0x00) && !(sig[5] & 0x80)) return false; + if (lenR >= 1 && (sig[4] == 0x00) && !(sig[5] & 0x80)) return false; ```
```diff // Null bytes at the start of S are not allowed, unless S would otherwise be // interpreted as a negative number. - if (lenS > 1 && (sig[lenR + 6] == 0x00) && !(sig[lenR + 7] & 0x80)) return false; + if (lenS >= 1 && (sig[lenR + 6] == 0x00) && !(sig[lenR + 7] & 0x80)) return false; ```
```diff // Minimum and maximum size constraints. - if (sig.size() < 9) return false; ```
The first affects policy only, the next four affect consensus, and the last covers the lower bound and lets ASan catch UB: a 3-byte signature reaches the `sig[3]` read that the `sig.size() < 9` guard protects.
Recommend reviewing per commit.
ACKs for top commit: fametrano: ACK efe0dfcf1e5c431c62dc9ac4fd2c2d97a62814fe brunoerg: reACK efe0dfcf1e5c431c62dc9ac4fd2c2d97a62814fe sedited: ACK efe0dfcf1e5c431c62dc9ac4fd2c2d97a62814fe
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryconsensus or confidential-proof validationmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new test cases to Bitcoin Core's script test data file. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a security vulnerability on its own. The tests are designed to detect certain incorrect code changes ('mutants') in the script interpreter's signature and public-key validation logic, but the actual interpreter code remains unchanged.
Security candidateTest: Cover malformed merkle trees and nBitsby benthecarman · 0c0e6ba0 · Oct 7, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 90 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · benthecarman
Test: Cover malformed merkle trees and nBits
Add tests for malformed partial merkle trees, including the transaction count limit at its 16666 boundary, and for GetBitsProof returning zero for zero, negative and overflowing targets.
90/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new unit tests. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a runtime vulnerability or fix one directly. The tests exercise existing validation behavior for malformed merkle-tree data and invalid proof-of-work target encodings, confirming that the current code rejects them.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36152: test: cover the feature-negotiation version boundary in p2p_leakby merge-script · acaf322f · Oct 6, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36152: test: cover the feature-negotiation version boundary in p2p_leak
2fabbc0bb38d0b87913d16777e25497ee6d017f0 test: check SENDTXRCNCL is sent at version 70016 (brunoerg) 36775471f81ab5ad8499bf0e1c8aab6545db9da6 test: cover the feature-negotiation version boundary in p2p_leak (brunoerg)
Pull request description:
p2p_leak already checks that a pre-wtxidrelay peer (nVersion 70015) is sent neither WTXIDRELAY nor SENDADDRV2, but nothing pins down the exact boundary: the feature negotiation messages are offered when the common version is >= WTXID_RELAY_VERSION (70016).
Add a peer advertising exactly 70016 and assert it receives both messages, so an off-by-one change of either `greatest_common_version >= WTXID_RELAY_VERSION` / `>= 70016` comparison to `>` is detected.
It kills https://bitcoincore.space/src/net_processing.cpp#3462 and https://bitcoincore.space/src/net_processing.cpp#3464
-----
edit: added a commit that adds a test case that checks `SENDTXRCNCL` is sent at version 70016. The existing 70015 case only shows SENDTXRCNCL is withheld below the wtxidrelay version. Add a peer at exactly 70016 so the lower bound of the `>= WTXID_RELAY_VERSION` check is covered too. It kills: https://bitcoincore.space/src/net_processing.cpp#3466.
ACKs for top commit: Marisha-Sahay: tACK 2fabbc0bb38d0b87913d16777e25497ee6d017f0 naiyoma: tACK 2fabbc0bb38d0b87913d16777e25497ee6d017f0 sedited: ACK 2fabbc0bb38d0b87913d16777e25497ee6d017f0
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new test cases to Bitcoin Core's functional test suite. It does not change any production networking code. The tests verify that peers advertising protocol version exactly 70016 receive expected feature-negotiation messages (WTXIDRELAY, SENDADDRV2, and SENDTXRCNCL), pinning down the lower boundary of an existing `>= 70016` check. There is no security vulnerability being fixed here.
Make sure we send out all three connections when initiating a private broadcast.
Use `MarkResolved` instead of `Remove` to mark a tx as having been received back or mempool-conflicted. Prevent additional stale retry connections by tracking disconnects and explicitly granting new connections with `TryGrantRetry`.
Intended as an alternative to #34707, addressing the theoretical timing attack described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/34707#issuecomment-5603256702. Also fixes theoretical timing attacks described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#discussion_r2035693786. This is based on the idea described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#discussion_r2037527330:
> always send 3 times regardless if the tx is received in our mempool or is otherwise invalid
ACKs for top commit: vasild: ACK 00c1b52ee56b9a2f067befc56c171eef27efda41 mzumsande: Code Review ACK 00c1b52ee56b9a2f067befc56c171eef27efda41 sedited: utACK 00c1b52ee56b9a2f067befc56c171eef27efda41
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languageconstant-time or timing behaviormerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 39/100
This Bitcoin Core patch fixes a privacy weakness in how new transactions are first announced to the network. Previously, if the node saw its own transaction come back from another peer quickly, it would cancel the remaining private broadcast connections. An attacker who can race the transaction back to the node could reduce how many independent peers receive it, making it easier to guess which peer originally created the transaction. The patch now always completes all three initial private broadcast sends, even after the transaction is seen again, and only stops further retries. It also tracks disconnects more carefully so failed sends are replaced rather than silently dropped.
91f8b365e7e7887e59240651c2c76b1a64071233 validation: Upgrade log levels for possible block corruption warnings (Anthony Towns) 788242d6d009e57cdf9f132bea1a6aee1c23c6f5 txindex: Downgrade log messages and include index name (Anthony Towns) 93b9613b764a046148b426abf63d1a1f5058f019 kernel/coinstats: Downgrade ComputeUTXOStats log level (Anthony Towns) 3c4336631e3d05705521cc5c1001b73bc5a6cd1d script: Lower level of oversized redeemScript log, push errors to callers (Anthony Towns) 7902a8ee83fc1b81e29710b0b00b2316b42cacef netbase: Tidy up logging levels (Anthony Towns) 4f42b76ca76b54de5b4794e2402aaa5ea2925862 netbase: Reduce levels of socks5 error logging (Anthony Towns) ec627b3f3b82929bf517fd5d00d0ea54f4fcc187 util/log: Add LogWarnThenDebug() helper (Anthony Towns)
Pull request description:
This set of changes reduces some of the exaggerated logging that was introduced in #29236 when "error()" logging was upgraded from `LogPrintf` (aka `LogInfo`) to `LogError`. It also introduces `LogWarnThenDebug()` which duplicates the behaviour of #34549 which issues a warning the first time the log line is hit, but downgrades that to categorized debug messages afterwards. This function is used for failures that are likely caused by system configuration problems (so likely degrade the node's functionality and warrant admin attention) but are triggered by remote activity and thus could occur frequently.
ACKs for top commit: achow101: ACK 91f8b365e7e7887e59240651c2c76b1a64071233 l0rinc: lightweight re-ACK 91f8b365e7e7887e59240651c2c76b1a64071233 sedited: Re-ACK 91f8b365e7e7887e59240651c2c76b1a64071233
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
update trustsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 22/100
This commit is a logging cleanup. It reduces the severity of many routine or remote-triggered error messages so they don't flood node operators with false alarms, and adds a helper that issues a warning only the first time a problem occurs then switches to debug-level logs. It is not a security fix for a vulnerability.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#35873: test: add a tx_valid vector for CVE-2024-38365by merge-script · 09e22fbb · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#35873: test: add a tx_valid vector for CVE-2024-38365
6cd2fa5fb4b6d25b8400d2a7683ceb78610c0b4f test: add a tx_valid vector for CVE-2024-38365 (JP)
Pull request description:
Suggested by darosior in #35835.
`FindAndDelete` only matches whole pushes at opcode boundaries, so a push that carries the signature inside its data is left in the scriptCode. btcd (<0.24.2) removed any push containing the signature, computed a different sighash, and would have rejected a transaction Core accepts: the chain split in [CVE-2024-38365](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/cve-2024-38365-public-disclosure-btcd-findanddelete-bug/1184).
The rule is already covered from the failure side, in `script_FindAndDelete` and in the `tx_invalid.json` vectors where the signature sits under a non-standard pushdata prefix. What was missing is the positive direction: a transaction Core must accept because nothing is deleted.
This adds one vector to `tx_valid.json`, with `OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY <0xaaaa||sig>` as the P2SH redeemScript and the minimal 8-byte DER signature (r = s = 1). The pubkey is recovered from that signature and the sighash Core computes, so it verifies only if the `<0xaaaa||sig>` push survives into the scriptCode. `CONST_SCRIPTCODE` doesn't fire — `FindAndDelete` finds nothing — and the vector runs with every flag.
To check it actually discriminates, I patched `EvalChecksigPreTapscript` to drop any push whose data contains the signature, the way btcd did. The vector fails with that patch and passes without it.
This commit only adds a new test case to Bitcoin Core's transaction validation test data. The test confirms that Bitcoin Core correctly handles a specific signature-checking quirk that caused a bug in another Bitcoin implementation (btcd). It does not change any production code, so it cannot by itself introduce a vulnerability or fix one in Bitcoin Core. It is a regression-style test for a known, already-disclosed issue (CVE-2024-38365).
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#35835: test: add CONST_SCRIPTCODE failure-path vectors to script_tests.json
829e44a1151fa432f293554f25832f19bde209ec test: add CONST_SCRIPTCODE failure-path vectors to script_tests.json (JP)
Pull request description:
Follow-up to #35664.
Going through which script error codes `script_tests.json` covers, I found that neither error gated behind `SCRIPT_VERIFY_CONST_SCRIPTCODE` is asserted anywhere. `SCRIPT_ERR_SIG_FINDANDDELETE` is not asserted by any test; `SCRIPT_ERR_OP_CODESEPARATOR` appears only as a mempool reject string in `invalid_txs.py`, never at the script level. `tx_invalid.json` does have a `CONST_SCRIPTCODE` section, but those vectors can only say a transaction is invalid, not which error made it fail; `script_tests.json` is the harness that pins error codes, and it has no vector using the flag.
This adds six vectors. Four fail with the flag set:
- `OP_CODESEPARATOR` in an executed pre-segwit script. - `OP_CODESEPARATOR` in an unexecuted `IF` branch. The check in `EvalScript` runs ahead of the `fExec` guard, so the opcode is rejected even though it never executes — the rule with no error-level coverage before. - A signature push that also appears in the scriptPubKey, against `CHECKSIG`. - The same against `CHECKMULTISIG`, which calls `FindAndDelete` in a separate loop.
The other two are controls with the flag off, one per error. Both checks run before signature verification, so the vectors can use a dummy signature.
To confirm the expected errors are the ones that fire, I added the vectors expecting `OK` first and let the harness report the actual error for each.
This commit only adds new test cases to a Bitcoin Core test data file. It does not change any production code, consensus rules, or network behavior. The tests verify that two specific script error conditions are correctly detected when a particular validation flag is enabled. There is no security vulnerability being fixed here—this is purely additional test coverage.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36329: psbt: add new test vectorsby merge-script · 889e7c5a · Oct 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36329: psbt: add new test vectors
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundaryfuzzing or regression evidencesigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new test cases for PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) handling. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a security vulnerability or fix one directly. The new tests check that malformed PSBT data is rejected and that combining PSBTs works in both input orders.
Add test checking that ProcessOrphanTx reconsiders at most one orphan per ProcessMessages(). This test prevents regression of [CVE-2024-52914](https://bitcoincore.org/en/2024/07/03/disclose-orphan-dos/) which currently no existing test checks.
The test kills 2 mutants found with https://github.com/ViniciusCestarii/mutant-harness:
1. Remove `return true` after an orphan is accepted
ACKs for top commit: instagibbs: reACK https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/36262/commits/16bff77a5aaf7a9740b859f74b8898cee6de5588 fametrano: tACK 16bff77a5aaf7a9740b859f74b8898cee6de5588
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
This commit only adds a new automated test to Bitcoin Core. It does not change any production code. The test verifies that a previously fixed denial-of-service bug (CVE-2024-52914) stays fixed by checking that orphan transactions are reconsidered one at a time per network message. It is a regression test, not a security patch.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36151: makeseeds: fix off-by-one in field count checkby merge-script · 8c49a9ab · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36151: makeseeds: fix off-by-one in field count check
c786052865fd173fd8bc7396e1303f7840c5b0da makeseeds: fix off-by-one in field count check (aman21-droid)
Pull request description:
Fixes #36146.
`parseline()` checks that a line has at least 11 whitespace-separated fields:
```python if len(sline) < 11: # line too short to be valid, skip it. return None ```
but it later reads `sline[11]` (the user agent), which needs 12. A line with exactly 11 fields got past the check and then raised `IndexError`, aborting the whole run instead of skipping that line. 11 is the highest index the function uses, so the check now requires 12 fields.
This isn't only theoretical: README.md builds seeds_main.txt by appending one crawler's output onto another's, so the file mixes two independently maintained formats, and a truncated download leaves a short last line too. Skipping the line is what the check was already trying to do.
ACKs for top commit: maflcko: lgtm ACK c786052865fd173fd8bc7396e1303f7840c5b0da l0rinc: ACK c786052865fd173fd8bc7396e1303f7840c5b0da
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 20/100
This is a one-line fix in a Python helper script used to build the list of network seed nodes for Bitcoin Core. The script reads lines of data about internet nodes and was supposed to skip any line that didn't have enough fields. Due to an off-by-one error, a line with exactly 11 fields passed the 'too short' check but then crashed the program when it tried to read the 12th field. The fix simply changes the minimum required field count from 11 to 12. This only affects an offline developer/operations tool and cannot be used to attack the Bitcoin network or wallets directly.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#32895: wallet: Prepare for future upgrades by recording versions of last client to open and decryptby merge-script · 6e419391 · Oct 5, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#32895: wallet: Prepare for future upgrades by recording versions of last client to open and decrypt
7b32155458cc87e50da1fa9f245cc84bc203f25a wallet: Set last opened and decrypted features during migration (Ava Chow) f998a740fc9f56c813973155cef44c757f1955dd wallet: Record the supported features of the last client to decrypt a wallet (Ava Chow) 8453ad801b63ec92af1652cdcf801165c59f2ab2 wallet: Introduce LastClientFeatures flags and LAST_OPENED_FEATURES record (Ava Chow) 0f104733cc8e4b1736efa6a3bc92a8e3dba1a1b3 walletdb: Decouple last client record from CLIENT_VERSION (Ava Chow)
Pull request description:
When a wallet is automatically upgraded, we always do so in a way that allows the user to load their wallet in an older version. When the user loads their wallet into an upgraded version again, the wallet may not perform the automatic upgrade and end up with upgraded and non-upgraded material in the wallet.
If we write some information about the last client to open the wallet, we would be able to detect these upgrade-downgrade-upgrade situations and perform another upgrade if so. However, in order for this to work, we need to have implemented writing such information into versions prior to the ones which introduce new automatic upgrades.
We are already writing the CLIENT_VERSION into all wallets in a "version" record, although this record is not updated in the same way across all previous versions. Since v24.0, we are always updating the record when the client version differs, but prior to that, the record would only be updated when the client version is newer. Even so, we can use this record to store the last client version.
The first commit decouples the written client version from the node version. This aids in development of new features. The version is entirely decoupled from previous versions by requiring all versions to have bit 19 set, and the initial version being `0 | (1 << 19)`. The versions just need to be at least 299900, and forcing bit 19 to be set was an easy way to achieve this.
However, using version numbers is not as flexible as feature flags, so the second commit introduces the concept of Wallet Client Features. These flags are distinct from the existing Wallet Feature Flags since they are conceptually different. These are written in a separate record, and the wallet client version is incremented to `(1 << 19) + 1`.
Lastly, since some upgrades may need private keys and can only occur after the wallet is decrypted, the third commit also adds a last decrypted features flags record to record the features of the last client to decrypt the wallet.
The result is that we will now be able to detect a downgrade down to v24.0 and be able to implement in parallel multiple features that require automatic upgrades.
ACKs for top commit: polespinasa: ACK 7b32155458cc87e50da1fa9f245cc84bc203f25a w0xlt: reACK 7b32155458cc87e50da1fa9f245cc84bc203f25a
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secret or key materialupdate trustsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This change is a wallet infrastructure improvement, not a fix for an active security bug. It records which Bitcoin Core version and feature set last opened or decrypted a wallet so that future releases can detect 'upgrade-downgrade-upgrade' cycles and re-run automatic wallet upgrades safely. There is no direct exploit here, but any bug in this bookkeeping could in theory cause a wallet to skip needed upgrades or behave unexpectedly after being loaded in older software.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36080: p2p: Suspend ping timeout while downloading blocks from a peerby merge-script · c7835db1 · Oct 5, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36080: p2p: Suspend ping timeout while downloading blocks from a peer
d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b p2p: Don't apply ping timeout while downloading blocks (Martin Zumsande) 2b43c62d8ef53edfadf8f097731f48a01b9570cd p2p: move ping timeout check into SendMessages (Martin Zumsande) 8b5bbfe1fca1f4100f858ebfd187dcf74d9d3c82 test: add functional test for pings during IBD (Martin Zumsande)
Pull request description:
While serving blocks, there is a system in place that prioritizes a peer's block requests before answering other p2p messages: See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/11090c8bb359f894ef7d97b65aff52fe8191aec1/src/net_processing.cpp#L5436
As a result it can happen that if we do IBD with a low download bandwidth (that is distributed over 10 peers) a peer will not get around to answering our ping before the timeout of 20 minutes, in which case we would disconnect them, although they have done nothing wrong and are not even slow themselves (we are). This situation has been described in #35761.
This PR fixes the issue by not enforcing the ping timeout from a peer while downloading blocks from them. In order to do that, the ping timeout check is moved out of `MaybeSendPing()` (which was a slightly awkward place anyway, given the name of the function) and suspended until there are no longer blocks in flight with that peer (with a grace period, so that we don't disconnect immediately after the last block was received before the peer got a chance to send us the `pong`).
Note that during block download, there are still other timeouts: - A dynamic timeout (`BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE` / `BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_PEER`) which will result in a timeout of `600s × (1 + 0.5×9) = 55 minutes` per block when downloading from 10 peers in parallel - the stalling logic which hits if the peer is much slower in comparison to other peers - the socket inactivity check disconnects a peer that hasn't sent us anything at all in the last 20 minutes.
So the ping timeout didn't add much value anyway in that situation.
Fixes #35761
ACKs for top commit: maflcko: review ACK d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b 🌎 fjahr: reACK d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b danielabrozzoni: ACK d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b sedited: ACK d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
This change fixes a bug where Bitcoin Core could wrongly disconnect a peer during Initial Block Download (IBD). The problem happened because the node demanded a ping reply within 20 minutes even while the peer was busy sending blocks. With slow bandwidth, the peer could be too busy serving blocks to reply to the ping in time, so the node would drop a perfectly good peer. The fix pauses the ping timeout while blocks are being downloaded from a peer, and adds a one-minute grace period after the last block before the timeout applies again. It is a reliability/availability fix, not a remote exploit.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
consensus or confidential-proof validationmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new test cases to Bitcoin Core's test suite. It does not change any production consensus code. The tests are designed to catch accidental code changes ('mutants') in the script interpreter that could break consensus rules, but the commit itself is a defensive testing improvement, not a vulnerability fix.
Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36327: test: speed up secp256k1 fixed-base multiplication and Schnorr signingby merge-script · b6a1b0ff · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36327: test: speed up secp256k1 fixed-base multiplication and Schnorr signing
b6fc3cf0046d3106e0dfb30f320d48514eff6fb2 test: speed up secp256k1 fixed-base multiplication (brunoerg)
Pull request description:
This PR speeds up the test framework’s fixed-base multiplication and Schnorr signing by:
- Changing FastGEMul to process scalars in 4-bit windows instead of individual bits. Precompute all 16 multiples for each window position, reducing multiplication from about 128 point additions on average to 64 table lookups and about 60 nonzero point additions. This trades a larger table and additional initialization work for cheaper repeated multiplications.
On my local machine (Macbook M2 Pro) the `feature_taproot.py`'s medium time decreased from 83.39s to 35.42s.
ACKs for top commit: fametrano: tACK b6fc3cf0046d3106e0dfb30f320d48514eff6fb2 theStack: ACK b6fc3cf0046d3106e0dfb30f320d48514eff6fb2 ViniciusCestarii: tACK b6fc3cf0046d3106e0dfb30f320d48514eff6fb2
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
This commit is a pure performance optimization for Bitcoin Core's internal test framework. It changes how the test code performs certain mathematical operations on the secp256k1 elliptic curve, making tests run faster. There is no change to live network code, wallet behavior, consensus rules, or cryptographic security. It does not fix a vulnerability or introduce a known security risk.