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Bitcoin Core

The Bitcoin network's reference node and wallet implementation.

BitcoinSupply chainNormal
Repository coverage

3483 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

402security candidates730second-pass queue3152AI analyses
172commits · 30 days
325commits · 60 days
1193commits · 180 days
2758commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61351 seen45 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 61033 seen63 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 6281 seen11 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5207 seen5 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

73/100 average clarity
1453Strong · 80–100
1227Adequate · 60–79
715Thin · 40–59
88Opaque · 0–39
6security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
merge-script419112196589
Antoine Poinsot25422169
Ava Chow21874203071
MarcoFalke41923411074
fanquake24521230058
Lőrinc18121177081
Hennadii Stepanov25120221066
rkrux57957074
Sjors Provoost89889074
Sebastian Falbesoner33733073
David Gumberg55655072
Pieter Wuille95595066
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 51 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36704: doc: fix docs and enable `-Wdocumentation-pedantic`

This commit only changes documentation comments and enables a stricter compiler warning for documentation style. It does not alter any executable code, so it cannot introduce or fix a security vulnerability on its own.

0afaa731by Hennadii Stepanov+79−7716 files
No security note in commit
Low 41 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36040: Wallet: Don't backdate locktime rbf

This change fixes a privacy leak in Bitcoin Core's wallet. When users used the 'bumpfee' feature to replace a transaction with a higher fee, the replacement could sometimes end up with an older 'locktime' than the original transaction. Thi…

Privacy/fingerprinting issue in wallet transaction creationReplacement transaction locktime can be lower than original transaction locktimeAnti-fee-sniping random backdating can produce identifiable on-chain pattern
004cfb21by Ava Chow+171−86 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36342: wallet: reject recipient amounts above MAX_MONEY

This patch fixes a bug in Bitcoin Core's wallet transaction creation where extremely large output amounts could cause an integer overflow or even crash the node. Before the fix, a user could craft a transaction whose outputs added up to mo…

Integer overflow in recipient amount summationNode abort via failed assertion in coin selectionPossible creation of a transaction with wrapped/invalid total output value
8c360f08by Ava Chow+25−42 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 49 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36637: torcontrol: send -torpassword hex-encoded to avoid escaping bugs

This change fixes how Bitcoin Core sends your Tor control password to the Tor daemon. Previously, the password was wrapped in quotes and only double-quote characters were escaped. If a password contained a backslash, Tor would misinterpret…

Improper escaping of protocol string (QuotedString)Potential Tor control command boundary confusionAuthentication bypass/failure risk for Tor control
6090f0afby Ava Chow+42−62 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36387: wallet: rpc: Deprecate `encryptwallet` RPC for encrypting existing wallets.

This commit marks the existing 'recortar el video' feature as deprecated. It doesn't remove it, but it now shows a warning and requires a special flag to use. The change is meant to protect users from accidentally losing access to their bi…

Deprecation of risky wallet-encryption workflowKnown data-retention risk: unencrypted key material may remain on disk after late encryptionKnown backup/restore risk: post-encryption keys are not covered by pre-encryption backups
f98888efby Ava Chow+165−8819 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 21 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36087: util: Add and use AssertUnreachable

This is a code-cleanup change in Bitcoin Core. It replaces many uses of `assert(false)` and similar 'this should never happen' markers with a new macro called `AssertUnreachable()`. The goal is to make the code clearer for developers and a…

No security-relevant functional change: process still aborts on unreachable pathsRefactor only: replaces one abort mechanism with another equivalent oneAdds a new lint rule to enforce the preferred macro going forward
3ee664eaby Ryan Ofsky+274−26484 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36888: test: construct `coinselection_tests` output declaratively

This is a minor cleanup inside a single test file. It changes how a fake transaction output is built in a unit test so the empty script is written explicitly rather than created implicitly by resizing a list. The actual test behavior and t…

a690300eby merge-script+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Low 35 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36890: Update secp256k1 subtree to latest master

This is a routine subtree update for the secp256k1 cryptographic library inside Bitcoin Core. It pulls in several upstream fixes, most of which are build-system cleanups, test improvements, and API hardening. The most user-visible changes …

Silent Payments API no longer aborts on empty input/output arrays; returns 0 per documented behaviorSilent Payments label-tweak overflow now rejected with ARG_CHECK instead of being silently handledecmult_const gains a _ge variant that clears intermediate Jacobian coordinates to reduce secret leakage
c3d1b4c0by merge-script+902−49134 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36867: test: remove legacy wallet leftovers from wallet functional tests

This commit only cleans up Bitcoin Core's own functional test suite. It removes unused multisig test code, fixes outdated docstrings, and drops a no-longer-needed command-line flag in test scripts. None of these changes affect the actual B…

c138ff92by merge-script+40−923 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36914: test: simplify wallet_basic and rpc_getblockfilter tests

This commit only cleans up two internal test scripts for the Bitcoin Core project. It replaces a manual network disconnect/reconnect pattern with a simpler way to create an unconnected block header, and removes a hard-coded number in favor…

079437ccby merge-script+6−112 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 82 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

test: Drop hard-coded magic 3

This is a tiny code cleanup in a Bitcoin Core test file. It replaces the hard-coded number 3 with the actual number of test nodes, making the test slightly easier to maintain. It does not change any real Bitcoin Core software behavior and …

1eeeee49by MarcoFalke+3−31 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36864: rpc: deprecate iswatchonly field of getaddressinfo

This change hides an old, always-false field called 'iswatchonly' from the getaddressinfo API response unless the user explicitly asks for deprecated features. It is a routine cleanup, not a security fix, and does not change how wallets or…

66531447by merge-script+16−34 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36868: test: remove unused nodes and restarts from wallet tests

This commit only cleans up Bitcoin Core's own automated test suite. It removes unused test nodes and an unnecessary double restart in a few wallet-related test scripts. There is no change to the actual Bitcoin node software that users run,…

0fb50460by merge-script+24−324 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 68 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36894: net_processing: set fDisconnect instead of calling DisconnectNode

This change fixes a bug where Bitcoin Core would disconnect every peer sharing the same IP address when one peer misbehaved. The problem is especially bad for users connecting through Tor, because all Tor traffic exits through a small set …

Denial of service via shared IP disconnectTor exit-node IP collision exploited to disconnect honest peersPeer-to-peer network isolation of inbound connections
6832a273by merge-script+5−53 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

net_processing: set fDisconnect instead of calling DisconnectNode

This commit fixes a bug where Bitcoin Core would disconnect every peer sharing the same IP address when one of them misbehaved. Because Tor exit nodes share a single IP address among many users, a malicious user could deliberately misbehav…

Denial-of-service via shared IP disconnectTor exit-node IP collision exploited to disconnect honest peersPeer-disconnection logic changed from subnet match to single-node flag
d63068c5by Eugene Siegel+5−53 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36875: scripted-diff: Drop `IWYU pragma: keep` from build config includes

This change is purely a code-cleanup and linting improvement. It removes repetitive 'IWYU pragma: keep' comments from build-config header includes and instead marks the generated config header itself with a single 'always_keep' pragma. The…

1fbb5253by merge-script+67−7265 files
No security note in commit
Informational 19 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36451: refactor: Use NotNull for CreateNewBlock and pimpls

This is a code cleanup change that makes the type system express 'this pointer can never be null' for several internal objects and for block templates. It removes redundant null checks and adds helper functions to create such non-null poin…

No security-relevant bug is patchedChange is purely a type-system refactorRemoves dead null-check error paths rather than adding safety checks
8130b3b8by Ryan Ofsky+78−5230 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36848: test: drop flaky "server too slow" check from interface_http.py

This commit only changes a test file to make a timing check less strict. It removes an upper-bound timing assertion that was causing false test failures on slow CI machines. There is no change to Bitcoin Core's actual network or wallet cod…

e1a27bbbby merge-script+6−61 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36488: rpc: wallet: Schedule mixed-case confTarget option deprecation

This commit is a routine cleanup, not a security fix. It removes support for an old, confusingly-named option ('confTarget') in two Bitcoin wallet commands (bumpfee and psbtbumpfee), leaving only the clearer 'conf_target' name unless the u…

8b0b5775by merge-script+24−34 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BC Bitcoin CoreBitcoin Core BitcoinSupply chain

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36408: test: allow 3 bytes of fee overestimate in assert_fee_amount

This is a tiny change to a Bitcoin Core test helper that makes fee-checking tests slightly more tolerant. It is not a security fix and does not affect production wallet code or consensus rules. It simply reduces how often an extremely rare…

dd9d016bby merge-script+3−21 file
No security note in commit
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Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36231: test: add pow tests covering live mutantsby merge-script · 368c1382 · Oct 19, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36231: test: add pow tests covering live mutants

e6975adf58c354dbd167b419ad7aadc7b8053af6 test: cover non-retarget heights in PermittedDifficultyTransition (ViniciusCestarii)
a9873943e259b23884fb4295591a82168c831026 test: cover lower bound rounding in PermittedDifficultyTransition (ViniciusCestarii)
7834db23914a3faa3660cb609144cd1c345a1ef3 test: cover negative timespan in CalculateNextWorkRequired (ViniciusCestarii)
1811735255b98257e7bf385325599c8d9bb69ad0 test: cover first block time selection in GetNextWorkRequired (ViniciusCestarii)

Pull request description:

Kills 4 live mutants on pow.cpp found with https://github.com/ViniciusCestarii/mutant-harness. The first 2 affect consensus. The third affect header sync and could stall IBD. The forth cover header sync hardening against DoS. They are:

pow.cpp (killed by 1811735255b98257e7bf385325599c8d9bb69ad0):

```diff
diff --git a/src/pow.cpp b/src/pow.cpp
index 9a9f4e5..9872b2c 100644
--- a/src/pow.cpp
+++ b/src/pow.cpp
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ unsigned int GetNextWorkRequired(const CBlockIndex* pindexLast, const CBlockHead
const CBlockIndex* pindexFirst = pindexLast->GetAncestor(nHeightFirst);
assert(pindexFirst);

- return CalculateNextWorkRequired(pindexLast, pindexFirst->GetBlockTime(), params);
+ return CalculateNextWorkRequired(pindexLast, pindexFirst->GetMedianTimePast(), params);
}

unsigned int CalculateNextWorkRequired(const CBlockIndex* pindexLast, int64_t nFirstBlockTime, const Consensus::Params& params)
```

pow.cpp (killed by 7834db23914a3faa3660cb609144cd1c345a1ef3):

```diff
diff --git a/src/pow.cpp b/src/pow.cpp
index 9a9f4e5..1917b7b 100644
--- a/src/pow.cpp
+++ b/src/pow.cpp
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ unsigned int CalculateNextWorkRequired(const CBlockIndex* pindexLast, int64_t nF
return pindexLast->nBits;

// Limit adjustment step
- int64_t nActualTimespan = pindexLast->GetBlockTime() - nFirstBlockTime;
+ uint32_t nActualTimespan = pindexLast->GetBlockTime() - nFirstBlockTime;
if (nActualTimespan < params.nPowTargetTimespan/4)
nActualTimespan = params.nPowTargetTimespan/4;
if (nActualTimespan > params.nPowTargetTimespan*4)
```

pow.cpp (killed by a9873943e259b23884fb4295591a82168c831026):

```diff
diff --git a/src/pow.cpp b/src/pow.cpp
index 9a9f4e5..028fa9f 100644
--- a/src/pow.cpp
+++ b/src/pow.cpp
@@ -124,11 +124,8 @@ bool PermittedDifficultyTransition(const Consensus::Params& params, int64_t heig
smallest_difficulty_target = pow_limit;
}

- // Round and then compare this new calculated value to what is
- // observed.
- arith_uint256 minimum_new_target;
- minimum_new_target.SetCompact(smallest_difficulty_target.GetCompact());
- if (minimum_new_target > observed_new_target) return false;
+ // Compare this new calculated value to what is observed.
+ if (smallest_difficulty_target > observed_new_target) return false;
} else if (old_nbits != new_nbits) {
return false;
}
```

pow.cpp (killed by e6975adf58c354dbd167b419ad7aadc7b8053af6):

```diff
diff --git a/src/pow.cpp b/src/pow.cpp
index 9a9f4e5..ef2e788 100644
--- a/src/pow.cpp
+++ b/src/pow.cpp
@@ -129,8 +129,6 @@ bool PermittedDifficultyTransition(const Consensus::Params& params, int64_t heig
arith_uint256 minimum_new_target;
minimum_new_target.SetCompact(smallest_difficulty_target.GetCompact());
if (minimum_new_target > observed_new_target) return false;
- } else if (old_nbits != new_nbits) {
- return false;
}
return true;
}
```

Recommend reviewing per commit.

ACKs for top commit:
brunoerg:
ACK e6975adf58c354dbd167b419ad7aadc7b8053af6
sedited:
ACK e6975adf58c354dbd167b419ad7aadc7b8053af6

Tree-SHA512: da29cf0226393a870e5c0bb8b228143abf124a905c70caf1006830854a9ac1f26b087a0c65570c8c0661d5a8db67ff91c22accb1d7ed5d4f5d1597ef1d66fe5a

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
defensive validationconsensus or confidential-proof validationmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test cases to Bitcoin Core's proof-of-work test file. It does not change any production code. The tests are designed to detect if future code changes accidentally break subtle consensus rules around difficulty retargeting. There is no vulnerability being fixed here.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36504: test: Add missing timeouts for HTTPConnectionby merge-script · 4b4cdde0 · Oct 14, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36504: test: Add missing timeouts for HTTPConnection

fa4308dfbf3a59f95deac382fa955570f814e8ca test: make wait_until timing arguments keyword-only (MarcoFalke)
fad441867c9baa8c4ae9a755f09948efa1b23447 test: Add missing timeouts for HTTPConnection (MarcoFalke)

Pull request description:

Without a timeout, the test can hang forever on broken systems. This is fine, but it would be nice if the test instead failed with a nicer error message, indicating the timeout.

ACKs for top commit:
mercie-ux:
tACK fa4308dfbf
hebasto:
ACK fa4308dfbf3a59f95deac382fa955570f814e8ca, I have reviewed the code and it looks OK.
pinheadmz:
ACK fa4308dfbf3a59f95deac382fa955570f814e8ca

Tree-SHA512: 8aaf9b78828cfbfa44f63b350edc7667ef5bd02c2d5f9011affc98625ecd8f37c80be980dc7c953de58840f48bfe50d23051b83cda2aca18a09d9920c8c77b1f

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes Bitcoin Core's internal test scripts. It adds timeout values to test-only HTTP connections and makes timeout arguments keyword-only in a helper function. There is no change to the actual Bitcoin node software that users run, so it cannot affect live wallets, transactions, or network security.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36485: ci: refactor BUILD_TARGETS useby Hennadii Stepanov · badc9574 · Oct 13, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 93 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Hennadii Stepanov

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36485: ci: refactor BUILD_TARGETS use

fa5643ff99af95227abb7a0b031e1dfbe4019dd7 ci: refactor BUILD_TARGETS use (MarcoFalke)

Pull request description:

* "all" is added to the build targets unless GOAL is "all" or contains "codegen". This implicit translation can be confusing, so explicitly spell out the targets as "all", "all deploy", etc., where needed.

* Also, use the eval-based string-to-argv conversion for BUILD_TARGETS to avoid disabling shellcheck SC2086.

ACKs for top commit:
fanquake:
ACK fa5643ff99af95227abb7a0b031e1dfbe4019dd7
hebasto:
ACK fa5643ff99af95227abb7a0b031e1dfbe4019dd7.

Tree-SHA512: 7785359d35e73586ea74a71f2ff78c0e72fa7fef897b1dedb18c9f168ba291e699f9cd199c62b315c98dffaae6843f94e3b233290c1755d2659189edaba8ecc5

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This change is a cleanup of Bitcoin Core's continuous integration (CI) scripts. It replaces an implicit rule that automatically added 'all' to build targets with an explicit list of build targets in each CI configuration. There is no security vulnerability here; it is purely a maintainability and shell-script linting improvement.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36294: mempool: Remove -persistmempoolv1 optionby merge-script · 3b07eeea · Oct 13, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36294: mempool: Remove -persistmempoolv1 option

731b89c09bbc286801eebf5061b161c3d5091150 test: Check that importmempool fails on a malformed mempool.dat (Fabian Jahr)
4c01625f798b4017ab83f86ab8815d56b4d18042 doc: Add release note for -persistmempoolv1 removal (Fabian Jahr)
d1dfdf827619bd06ff9c52e42f2c370e6e70504f mempool: Remove -persistmempoolv1 option (Fabian Jahr)
86a31b93d0db7f01e5c1a61fb014b89b2506fe54 test: Use v31.0 as old node in mempool_compatibility.py (Fabian Jahr)

Pull request description:

`-persistmempoolv1` was added in #28207 as a temporary option to allow downgrading to v26 and earlier, which can't read the XOR'ed `mempool.dat`. v26 has now been EOL for a while. So any version this option could help downgrade to is unsupported now. It seems ready for removal. I don't think this requires an additional deprecation cycle since the feature is useless for any maintained version and docs have always stated that this was a "temporary option that will be removed in the future".

Reading v1 files is still supported, so upgrading directly from an old version keeps the persisted mempool.

`mempool_compatibility.py` now uses v28.2 as the old node, the oldest release in `get_previous_releases.py` that writes the current format.

ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
review ACK 731b89c09bbc286801eebf5061b161c3d5091150 🐋
ismaelsadeeq:
ACK 731b89c09bbc286801eebf5061b161c3d5091150

Tree-SHA512: 6a61812ef722033f883143a2e9f456bd5c1b348d6e90376220ca13799a1545a5210803dd33f7d6a3da1dac77361f6961f07f5c55cb4a972ddecf80578e0394f0

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
update trustmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit removes an old command-line option called -persistmempoolv1 that let users write the mempool file in a legacy format. The option was always documented as temporary, and the only versions it helped downgrade to are no longer supported. Reading the old format is still supported, so users upgrading from old versions are not affected. A new test was added to check that importing a corrupted mempool file is rejected safely. There is no direct security vulnerability here; it is a cleanup of obsolete functionality.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36337: fuzz: Cover block filter P2P messagesby merge-script · c067aa71 · Oct 9, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 96 · StrongInformational 23Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36337: fuzz: Cover block filter P2P messages

fab64c032c1a0c997c6ec398cc5578df36b33b7d test: DestroyAllBlockFilterIndexes in ~ChainTestingSetup() (MarcoFalke)
fadc2c93d3dd46344f660c83005cdfe505d21efc fuzz: Cover block filter P2P messages (MarcoFalke)

Pull request description:

The BIP157 P2P messages are not covered by any fuzz targets at all.

Fix this to cover them via the P2P targets.

Should be possible to test by verifying the integer sanitizer is triggered (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/36321#issuecomment-5810977529):

```
$ echo 'FwAAAAEAAABcX2dldGNmY2hlY2twdAAftOvdD0sFqXEx6US5VIknlsOJqZ5goMwtmwZBPdCxQVxf
AfkGKP39/f0v/Q/9E1AP/f2ybAT1Af39A/399wEAuXEAAAAAAAAAAAB1z3QAbgAAQAHm/f39/f39
/f39/S8/D/0B/f3IAAcBBWNmaf8DAAAA' | base64 --decode > /tmp/msg.bin

$ UBSAN_OPTIONS="suppressions=$(pwd)/test/sanitizer_suppressions/ubsan:print_stacktrace=0:halt_on_error=0:report_error_type=1" FUZZ=process_messages ./bld-cmake/bin/fuzz /tmp/msg.bin

./bld-cmake/bin/fuzz: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
/src/net_processing.cpp:3662:33: runtime error: unsigned integer overflow: 0 - 1 cannot be represented in type 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long')
/src/net_processing.cpp:3662:18: runtime error: implicit conversion from type 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') of value 18446744073709551615 (64-bit, unsigned) to type 'int' changed the value to -1 (32-bit, signed)

ACKs for top commit:
marcofleon:
re-ACK fab64c032c1a0c997c6ec398cc5578df36b33b7d
Crypt-iQ:
re-ACK fab64c032c1a0c997c6ec398cc5578df36b33b7d

Tree-SHA512: 23275c73a53f53b12ddf4466f9cb28fbab109fadcf1280d17c8fb293091958e957922f1abe979948407395e9e8ee2d4b3bd100571dadc049734bf2b0e3f5c155

96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validationfuzzing or regression evidencemerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit adds fuzz-test coverage for BIP157 block-filter P2P messages and fixes a test-only cleanup issue. The fuzz target found an unsigned-integer overflow in net_processing.cpp when handling these messages, but the overflow appears to be in a debug/test code path and is not described as a remotely exploitable network vulnerability. The main code change is test infrastructure: initializing a basic block-filter index during fuzz setup and destroying it on teardown to avoid deadlocks.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#35989: wallet: fix crash on importdescriptors with a range ending at 2^31-1by Ava Chow · acdb3269 · Oct 8, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 96 · StrongModerate 66Details
Commit message · Ava Chow

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#35989: wallet: fix crash on importdescriptors with a range ending at 2^31-1

93c8aec3fbc8c5a2fcc834c4acc1b7d96bffa9a0 doc: add release note for #35989 (Shuvam Pandey)
457c9e8999fbee1d37f41eaede681f787e657395 script: avoid overflow when checking descriptor range bounds (Shuvam Pandey)
ab3bb55a67cced3551e8ebb658c4d962a10d3715 test: add coverage for descriptor range end bounds (Shuvam Pandey)
867ad9bffbd3ab26c9899207ddd11380e0c1a1bd wallet: fix integer overflow in descriptor keypool top up (Shuvam Pandey)
1889440f821d6bf8394050c96cc8e06a2f18d9c2 wallet: reject unrepresentable descriptor import ranges (Shuvam Pandey)

Pull request description:

`WalletDescriptor` stores an exclusive range end in `int32_t`. Importing
`[2147483647, 2147483647]` produces an end of `2^31`, which narrows to a negative
value and aborts the node during keypool top-up. An import without a range can
hit the same issue with an oversized `-keypool`.

Check the exclusive end before constructing the wallet descriptor, covering
both explicit and default ranges. The bound stays wallet-specific: scanning
RPCs still accept `INT32_MAX` as an inclusive endpoint.

Also calculate the keypool top-up endpoint in `int64_t` before checking its
bound, and reject reversed ranges before computing `high - low` in
`CheckDescriptorRangeBounds`. These fix the overflows reached by
`keypoolrefill INT32_MAX` after advancing a descriptor, and by `[INT64_MAX, 0]`,
respectively. Regression tests cover all three fixes.

I tested on macOS arm64 with Clang 22 and UBSan passed: 34 targeted unit
cases and the importdescriptors, keypool, deriveaddresses (RPC and CLI),
scantxoutset, and scanblocks functional tests.

ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 93c8aec3fbc8c5a2fcc834c4acc1b7d96bffa9a0
polespinasa:
ACK 93c8aec3fbc8c5a2fcc834c4acc1b7d96bffa9a0

Tree-SHA512: aec09a6e8d71ff1f57f8db6927fd93469e47f3549357dde4fceb3ef77f9c3be802c720d6856578149f78e5a277be8605477dbe9df7fd88555b4db355624cad0f

96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetyfuzzing or regression evidencesigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 66/100

This update fixes a crash in Bitcoin Core's wallet that could be triggered when importing a descriptor with a range ending at the largest 32-bit signed integer (2,147,483,647). Because the wallet stores the range end as an exclusive value in a 32-bit signed integer, that endpoint becomes 2^31 and wraps around to a negative number, causing the node to abort during keypool top-up. The patch rejects such unrepresentable ranges before they are stored, and also hardens related arithmetic to avoid similar overflows.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#35037: ipc: support per-address max-connections options on -ipcbindby merge-script · 442884f5 · Oct 8, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 22Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#35037: ipc: support per-address max-connections options on -ipcbind

856f9ea158055460764883dfca01491951554d2e doc: add ipcbind max-connections release note (Enoch Azariah)
bdd381b8ed475b114d6a8ac25bb448515a2a42f9 ipc: test per-address connection limiting over unix sockets (Enoch Azariah)
8761d53b250e9bb81e59a21d48598c1b62fa0e65 ipc: support per-address max-connections on ipcbind (Enoch Azariah)
3d2b65d050962a35b071618a3f32f7a78831e8e3 ipc: add default connection limit for ipcbind listeners (Enoch Azariah)

Pull request description:

The branch extends `-ipcbind` to accept `,max-connections=<n>` options, for example `-ipcbind=unix:,max-connections=8` or `-ipcbind=unix:/custom/path,max-connections=8`, instead of introducing a separate global `-ipcmaxconnections` option.

This keeps the connection limit attached to each IPC listener instead of introducing a global `-ipcmaxconnections` option (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/34978). A global option would not allow different limits for different `-ipcbind` addresses, and the inline option format can be extended in the future with additional options.

ACKs for top commit:
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK 856f9ea158055460764883dfca01491951554d2e. Only change since last review is wrapping the `-ipcbind` help text in `strprintf` so the default and maximum values are shown. Thanks for all the updates!
sedited:
ACK 856f9ea158055460764883dfca01491951554d2e
ViniciusCestarii:
re-ACK 856f9ea158055460764883dfca01491951554d2e

Tree-SHA512: dd39479372bb5e30d6faedcc3c5f82ba03dbce3a8e082c03c3baf79bca66979554826fab001ca208cefd25955b02f22e6c9cd5bcea7aca1b784f93187f12ab7e

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 22/100

This change adds a per-listener connection limit for Bitcoin Core's local inter-process communication (IPC) socket option `-ipcbind`. Previously, IPC listeners had no enforced cap on simultaneous connections. The patch lets users specify `,max-connections=<n>` (default 16, maximum 256) and reserves matching file descriptors at startup. It is a hardening improvement rather than a fix for an active vulnerability, and it includes tests and release notes.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36436: ci: Derive CONTAINER_NAME from the ci config file nameby merge-script · 8406af1c · Oct 8, 2026 · 29 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36436: ci: Derive CONTAINER_NAME from the ci config file name

fa2cdb6a3c183b621b48966a9dc77842bb935d0c ci: [refactor] remove redundant GOAL=install (MarcoFalke)
fa547e8204cb6d3e9c8c2e56a973ca635e29cfdc ci: [refactor] Remove redundant set -o errexit (MarcoFalke)
fa8fd9164fb49d7ed21fc004b1dea62cffd14721 ci: Derive CONTAINER_NAME from the ci config file name (MarcoFalke)

Pull request description:

Some misc CI config cleanups:

* Mainly, to derive the unique CONTAINER_NAME from the unique file name.
* Two refactors, to remove redundant stuff.

ACKs for top commit:
willcl-ark:
ACK fa2cdb6a3c183b621b48966a9dc77842bb935d0c
sedited:
ACK fa2cdb6a3c183b621b48966a9dc77842bb935d0c

Tree-SHA512: 35a94c594165fc7010edbe76197a7dd96480b992ef141947924561c2f274d7cbe560775b5c587d2466db0caa0800414ae0ea923454db5aa8c6dd95cf4ab0fde0

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathauthentication pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine cleanup of Bitcoin Core's continuous integration (CI) configuration. It removes duplicated container names from many CI config files and instead derives the container name automatically from each file's name. It also removes a few redundant script settings. There is no change to the Bitcoin software that users run, no change to wallets, networking, consensus, or cryptography, and no security fix or vulnerability introduced.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36392: test: Extract and use sigterm_node in init_fd_overflow_testby merge-script · ff623cfa · Oct 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36392: test: Extract and use sigterm_node in init_fd_overflow_test

fad49a733d611f6d49ab9cb80509b79af500b384 test: Extract and use sigterm_node in init_fd_overflow_test (MarcoFalke)

Pull request description:

Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/36388 (llvm-symbolizer broken pipe complaints) by replacing the unclean Bitcoin Core shutdown with a clean one in `init_fd_overflow_test`.

ACKs for top commit:
fametrano:
ACK fad49a733d611f6d49ab9cb80509b79af500b384
sedited:
ACK fad49a733d611f6d49ab9cb80509b79af500b384

Tree-SHA512: 8cabb77a92686c8bd68ab3d6febd0d4dcb11cd8b36b04471adb19665c996962866ff4144ca0ca2e96216eda2d4e1201e236664915bbe470c2892b6948196f613

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
memory safetymerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a test-only code cleanup. It changes how a Bitcoin Core test shuts down a node during one specific test scenario, replacing a force-kill with a cleaner signal-based shutdown. It does not affect the live Bitcoin Core software that users run, and it does not fix a security vulnerability.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36338: BIP-352: fix P2PKH pubkey extraction from malleated scriptSigby merge-script · 14a328f7 · Oct 7, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 100 · StrongModerate 62Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36338: BIP-352: fix P2PKH pubkey extraction from malleated scriptSig

cdfaa534d006f0effeb0ece3fb9aa5e53177a3fd BIP-352: fix P2PKH pubkey extraction from malleated scriptSig (Sebastian Falbesoner)
c35b99251450c9c8edd36b3e2a7594aa57a7f426 test: characterize buggy BIP-352 P2PKH extraction on malleated scriptSig (Sebastian Falbesoner)

Pull request description:

This PR fixes a Silent Payments pubkey extraction issue for P2PKH inputs: a third party can malleate the `scriptSig` such that it contains an OP_CHECKSIG that fails in real validation but succeeds with the dummy signature checker currently used (which accepts any non-empty signature). E.g. for a P2PKH spend with scriptSig

`<sig> <pubkey> <bogus_sig> OP_OVER OP_CHECKSIG OP_IF <wrong_pubkey> OP_ENDIF`

the `EvalScript` call would currently result in `wrong_pubkey` as the top stack item instead of `pubkey` and thus lead to an incorrect extraction (see the test added in the first commit). Fix this by parsing the scriptSig manually via a `.GetOp(...)` iteration, looking at all 33-byte data pushes to find the one where the Hash160 (SHA-256 + RIPEMD-160) matches the one in the output script.

Note that an alternative fix would be to keep using `EvalScript` but use an actual signature checker instead of the dummy one, but for that we need more transaction data in order to enable sighash calculation. Also involving a full script interpreter run including signature checks merely for extracting a public key seems overblown.

This issue was reported by [Project Loupe](https://github.com/project-loupe/) earlier this week (thanks!). From what I saw, none of the existing Silent Payments implementations are affected. I'm planning to add the test case to the BIP-352 test vectors in the BIPs repository as well, next to the existing ones that cover P2PKH malleation.

ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK cdfaa534d006f0effeb0ece3fb9aa5e53177a3fd
fametrano:
tACK cdfaa534d006f0effeb0ece3fb9aa5e53177a3fd
Yudis-bit:
Tested ACK cdfaa534d006f0effeb0ece3fb9aa5e53177a3fd
sedited:
ACK cdfaa534d006f0effeb0ece3fb9aa5e53177a3fd

Tree-SHA512: 45a8027d854e8f63d696aca4a885d94308082e134261d6a0d1dfc470838cfdf89d000a71d1d28599766654caeada700855346f5708ad81dfea50d71c4cda8b16

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryfuzzing or regression evidencemerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 62/100

This update fixes a bug in how Bitcoin Core extracts public keys from certain old-style (P2PKH) transaction inputs when calculating Silent Payments. A troublemaker could tweak the input's script so that, during normal Bitcoin validation, the real public key is used, but the previous extraction method would pick a fake public key instead. That could cause a Silent Payments receiver to compute the wrong payment address and miss a payment. The fix manually scans the input for the public key whose fingerprint matches the output, instead of running the script with a dummy signature checker.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36448: randomenv: use `KERN_POSIX1` over `KERN_OSREV`by merge-script · 672c2d21 · Oct 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36448: randomenv: use `KERN_POSIX1` over `KERN_OSREV`

d1f9a5b3e05082b99880c13a156f50e5239c1a26 randomenv: use KERN_POSIX1 over KERN_OSREV (fanquake)

Pull request description:

Given we are checking if `KERN_POSIX1` is defined, and `KERN_OSREV` is used above.

ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
lgtm ACK d1f9a5b3e05082b99880c13a156f50e5239c1a26
sedited:
ACK d1f9a5b3e05082b99880c13a156f50e5239c1a26

Tree-SHA512: 0300693cc00239c724db11a2dd40ae7c3a7a0b8f85ace2eeb80560958b68ce6ab73e780203cc0e080bce0741487babe0ab032c1eeb523ba5ab867e3dc4f9deba

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a one-line code cleanup in Bitcoin Core's random environment data gathering. The code was supposed to add a 'POSIX version' system value to the randomness pool when that value is available, but it accidentally added the 'OS revision' value twice instead. The fix makes the code do what the surrounding preprocessor guard already intended. It does not change security meaningfully: both values are harmless system identifiers used only as extra entropy input, and the OS revision was already being collected earlier in the same function.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36291: test: add script_tests cases covering interpreter mutantsby merge-script · 6b8a5524 · Oct 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36291: test: add script_tests cases covering interpreter mutants

efe0dfcf1e5c431c62dc9ac4fd2c2d97a62814fe test: cover DERSIG 9-byte signature lower bound (ViniciusCestarii)
bbc4bdf9092efb218202dceefbacda57d5513e1d test: cover DERSIG null S byte only when S is multi-byte (ViniciusCestarii)
fd2cf0450276e9f503570eda5639966ce81065e5 test: cover DERSIG null R byte only when R is multi-byte (ViniciusCestarii)
a1deba78c5f668eaab359b8e54ac93df02f4ce37 test: cover DERSIG total-length byte check (ViniciusCestarii)
3d04ed8ac77bf930d7b1d6dd11701417ff53a0d6 test: cover DERSIG 73-byte signature upper bound (ViniciusCestarii)
2c0f69a0478947de26d544c1b9b42a7d1eebd42f test: cover STRICTENC rejects bad 33-byte pubkey prefix (ViniciusCestarii)

Pull request description:

Kills some live mutants on `interpreter.cpp` found by https://bitcoincore.space. They are:

[interpreter.cpp#5168](https://bitcoincore.space/src/script/interpreter.cpp#5168): `IsCompressedOrUncompressedPubKey`: pubkey with neither compressed nor uncompressed prefix returns `true`

```diff
- } else if (vchPubKey[0] == 0x02 || vchPubKey[0] == 0x03) {
+ } else if (1==1) {
```

[interpreter.cpp#5191](https://bitcoincore.space/src/script/interpreter.cpp#5191): `IsValidSignatureEncoding`: 73-byte upper bound returns `true`

```diff
if (sig.size() < 9) return false;
- if (sig.size() > 73) return false;
```

[interpreter.cpp#5200](https://bitcoincore.space/src/script/interpreter.cpp#5200): `IsValidSignatureEncoding`: total-length byte check returns `true`

```diff
// Make sure the length covers the entire signature.
- if (sig[1] != sig.size() - 3) return false;
```

[interpreter.cpp#5232](https://bitcoincore.space/src/script/interpreter.cpp#5232): `IsValidSignatureEncoding`: null R byte check `lenR > 1` -> `lenR >=1`

```diff
// Null bytes at the start of R are not allowed, unless R would
// otherwise be interpreted as a negative number.
- if (lenR > 1 && (sig[4] == 0x00) && !(sig[5] & 0x80)) return false;
+ if (lenR >= 1 && (sig[4] == 0x00) && !(sig[5] & 0x80)) return false;
```

[interpreter.cpp#5259](https://bitcoincore.space/src/script/interpreter.cpp#5259): `IsValidSignatureEncoding`: null S byte check `lenS > 1` -> `lenS >= 1`

```diff
// Null bytes at the start of S are not allowed, unless S would otherwise be
// interpreted as a negative number.
- if (lenS > 1 && (sig[lenR + 6] == 0x00) && !(sig[lenR + 7] & 0x80)) return false;
+ if (lenS >= 1 && (sig[lenR + 6] == 0x00) && !(sig[lenR + 7] & 0x80)) return false;
```

[interpreter.cpp#5186](https://bitcoincore.space/src/script/interpreter.cpp#5186): `IsValidSignatureEncoding`: 9-byte lower bound returns `true`

```diff
// Minimum and maximum size constraints.
- if (sig.size() < 9) return false;
```

The first affects policy only, the next four affect consensus, and the last covers the lower bound and lets ASan catch UB: a 3-byte signature reaches the `sig[3]` read that the `sig.size() < 9` guard protects.

Recommend reviewing per commit.

ACKs for top commit:
fametrano:
ACK efe0dfcf1e5c431c62dc9ac4fd2c2d97a62814fe
brunoerg:
reACK efe0dfcf1e5c431c62dc9ac4fd2c2d97a62814fe
sedited:
ACK efe0dfcf1e5c431c62dc9ac4fd2c2d97a62814fe

Tree-SHA512: 6ce18dd013b65275fa5fd6d6c7752a8fcc0283648dc0a56411c37f3afa6da4125d7f849174f78475500800495d47131c1d91b42ee2967ad2c87cc967fb2a097a

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryconsensus or confidential-proof validationmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test cases to Bitcoin Core's script test data file. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a security vulnerability on its own. The tests are designed to detect certain incorrect code changes ('mutants') in the script interpreter's signature and public-key validation logic, but the actual interpreter code remains unchanged.

Security candidateTest: Cover malformed merkle trees and nBitsby benthecarman · 0c0e6ba0 · Oct 7, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 90 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · benthecarman

Test: Cover malformed merkle trees and nBits

Add tests for malformed partial merkle trees, including the
transaction count limit at its 16666 boundary, and for GetBitsProof
returning zero for zero, negative and overflowing targets.

90/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new unit tests. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a runtime vulnerability or fix one directly. The tests exercise existing validation behavior for malformed merkle-tree data and invalid proof-of-work target encodings, confirming that the current code rejects them.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36152: test: cover the feature-negotiation version boundary in p2p_leakby merge-script · acaf322f · Oct 6, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36152: test: cover the feature-negotiation version boundary in p2p_leak

2fabbc0bb38d0b87913d16777e25497ee6d017f0 test: check SENDTXRCNCL is sent at version 70016 (brunoerg)
36775471f81ab5ad8499bf0e1c8aab6545db9da6 test: cover the feature-negotiation version boundary in p2p_leak (brunoerg)

Pull request description:

p2p_leak already checks that a pre-wtxidrelay peer (nVersion 70015) is sent neither WTXIDRELAY nor SENDADDRV2, but nothing pins down the exact boundary: the feature negotiation messages are offered when the common version is >= WTXID_RELAY_VERSION (70016).

Add a peer advertising exactly 70016 and assert it receives both messages, so an off-by-one change of either `greatest_common_version >= WTXID_RELAY_VERSION` / `>= 70016` comparison to `>` is detected.

It kills https://bitcoincore.space/src/net_processing.cpp#3462 and https://bitcoincore.space/src/net_processing.cpp#3464

-----

edit: added a commit that adds a test case that checks `SENDTXRCNCL` is sent at version 70016. The existing 70015 case only shows SENDTXRCNCL is withheld below the wtxidrelay version. Add a peer at exactly 70016 so the lower bound of the `>= WTXID_RELAY_VERSION` check is covered too. It kills: https://bitcoincore.space/src/net_processing.cpp#3466.

ACKs for top commit:
Marisha-Sahay:
tACK 2fabbc0bb38d0b87913d16777e25497ee6d017f0
naiyoma:
tACK 2fabbc0bb38d0b87913d16777e25497ee6d017f0
sedited:
ACK 2fabbc0bb38d0b87913d16777e25497ee6d017f0

Tree-SHA512: 33d71176866b317063354880b4b465c9acb2737c7cba931a249faecc86fe30868caabf8cc69001f661163c2db58903ff3655c05a995a3233e9864ebdf2b3b551

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
access controlmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test cases to Bitcoin Core's functional test suite. It does not change any production networking code. The tests verify that peers advertising protocol version exactly 70016 receive expected feature-negotiation messages (WTXIDRELAY, SENDADDRV2, and SENDTXRCNCL), pinning down the lower boundary of an existing `>= 70016` check. There is no security vulnerability being fixed here.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36277: net: always complete all initial private broadcast connectionsby merge-script · f55788e8 · Oct 6, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 98 · StrongLow 39Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36277: net: always complete all initial private broadcast connections

00c1b52ee56b9a2f067befc56c171eef27efda41 net: remove PrivateBroadcast::DidNodeConfirmReception (Andrew Toth)
dc95a705d402d44b7092150878e33c75383a4d47 net: always complete all initial private broadcast connections (Andrew Toth)

Pull request description:

Make sure we send out all three connections when initiating a private broadcast.

Use `MarkResolved` instead of `Remove` to mark a tx as having been received back or mempool-conflicted. Prevent additional stale retry connections by tracking disconnects and explicitly granting new connections with `TryGrantRetry`.

Intended as an alternative to #34707, addressing the theoretical timing attack described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/34707#issuecomment-5603256702. Also fixes theoretical timing attacks described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#discussion_r2035693786. This is based on the idea described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#discussion_r2037527330:

> always send 3 times regardless if the tx is received in our mempool or is otherwise invalid

ACKs for top commit:
vasild:
ACK 00c1b52ee56b9a2f067befc56c171eef27efda41
mzumsande:
Code Review ACK 00c1b52ee56b9a2f067befc56c171eef27efda41
sedited:
utACK 00c1b52ee56b9a2f067befc56c171eef27efda41

Tree-SHA512: 82c03898e9377f9702ee4e01a3a68cd2071fe6e137c531812761da145acb16780ca866b33c7ffbd2db5db100e203b27095ae9e9745c012e317434cd2f5368847

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languageconstant-time or timing behaviormerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 39/100

This Bitcoin Core patch fixes a privacy weakness in how new transactions are first announced to the network. Previously, if the node saw its own transaction come back from another peer quickly, it would cancel the remaining private broadcast connections. An attacker who can race the transaction back to the node could reduce how many independent peers receive it, making it easier to guess which peer originally created the transaction. The patch now always completes all three initial private broadcast sends, even after the transaction is seen again, and only stops further retries. It also tracks disconnects more carefully so failed sends are replaced rather than silently dropped.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#34729: Reduce log noiseby Ava Chow · cf80493e · Oct 5, 2026 · 13 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 22Details
Commit message · Ava Chow

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#34729: Reduce log noise

91f8b365e7e7887e59240651c2c76b1a64071233 validation: Upgrade log levels for possible block corruption warnings (Anthony Towns)
788242d6d009e57cdf9f132bea1a6aee1c23c6f5 txindex: Downgrade log messages and include index name (Anthony Towns)
93b9613b764a046148b426abf63d1a1f5058f019 kernel/coinstats: Downgrade ComputeUTXOStats log level (Anthony Towns)
3c4336631e3d05705521cc5c1001b73bc5a6cd1d script: Lower level of oversized redeemScript log, push errors to callers (Anthony Towns)
7902a8ee83fc1b81e29710b0b00b2316b42cacef netbase: Tidy up logging levels (Anthony Towns)
4f42b76ca76b54de5b4794e2402aaa5ea2925862 netbase: Reduce levels of socks5 error logging (Anthony Towns)
ec627b3f3b82929bf517fd5d00d0ea54f4fcc187 util/log: Add LogWarnThenDebug() helper (Anthony Towns)

Pull request description:

This set of changes reduces some of the exaggerated logging that was introduced in #29236 when "error()" logging was upgraded from `LogPrintf` (aka `LogInfo`) to `LogError`. It also introduces `LogWarnThenDebug()` which duplicates the behaviour of #34549 which issues a warning the first time the log line is hit, but downgrades that to categorized debug messages afterwards. This function is used for failures that are likely caused by system configuration problems (so likely degrade the node's functionality and warrant admin attention) but are triggered by remote activity and thus could occur frequently.

ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 91f8b365e7e7887e59240651c2c76b1a64071233
l0rinc:
lightweight re-ACK 91f8b365e7e7887e59240651c2c76b1a64071233
sedited:
Re-ACK 91f8b365e7e7887e59240651c2c76b1a64071233

Tree-SHA512: a90fc070f378322c336f7169aaf9545bca65c93078ea5b86a59585fb72d01196a7f3fd5d28a172d49c5d6c2abf61ba4b0d7dca4783965ae827631543cc3940d8

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
update trustsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 22/100

This commit is a logging cleanup. It reduces the severity of many routine or remote-triggered error messages so they don't flood node operators with false alarms, and adds a helper that issues a warning only the first time a problem occurs then switches to debug-level logs. It is not a security fix for a vulnerability.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#35873: test: add a tx_valid vector for CVE-2024-38365by merge-script · 09e22fbb · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#35873: test: add a tx_valid vector for CVE-2024-38365

6cd2fa5fb4b6d25b8400d2a7683ceb78610c0b4f test: add a tx_valid vector for CVE-2024-38365 (JP)

Pull request description:

Suggested by darosior in #35835.

`FindAndDelete` only matches whole pushes at opcode boundaries, so a push that carries the signature inside its data is left in the scriptCode. btcd (<0.24.2) removed any push containing the signature, computed a different sighash, and would have rejected a transaction Core accepts: the chain split in [CVE-2024-38365](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/cve-2024-38365-public-disclosure-btcd-findanddelete-bug/1184).

The rule is already covered from the failure side, in `script_FindAndDelete` and in the `tx_invalid.json` vectors where the signature sits under a non-standard pushdata prefix. What was missing is the positive direction: a transaction Core must accept because nothing is deleted.

This adds one vector to `tx_valid.json`, with `OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY <0xaaaa||sig>` as the P2SH redeemScript and the minimal 8-byte DER signature (r = s = 1). The pubkey is recovered from that signature and the sighash Core computes, so it verifies only if the `<0xaaaa||sig>` push survives into the scriptCode. `CONST_SCRIPTCODE` doesn't fire — `FindAndDelete` finds nothing — and the vector runs with every flag.

To check it actually discriminates, I patched `EvalChecksigPreTapscript` to drop any push whose data contains the signature, the way btcd did. The vector fails with that patch and passes without it.

Tested with:

```
build/bin/test_bitcoin --run_test=transaction_tests
```

ACKs for top commit:
fametrano:
ACK 6cd2fa5fb4b6d25b8400d2a7683ceb78610c0b4f
sedited:
ACK 6cd2fa5fb4b6d25b8400d2a7683ceb78610c0b4f

Tree-SHA512: a08412e00ed43570c3cf556da1d243a40b9684ce17eb6d3017267c3e5e82f9cde232e077944b0ec9476df70e767caf0fcd33be5473dfd53ed2241f7b24a33b1d

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundaryaccess controlmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit only adds a new test case to Bitcoin Core's transaction validation test data. The test confirms that Bitcoin Core correctly handles a specific signature-checking quirk that caused a bug in another Bitcoin implementation (btcd). It does not change any production code, so it cannot by itself introduce a vulnerability or fix one in Bitcoin Core. It is a regression-style test for a known, already-disclosed issue (CVE-2024-38365).

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#35835: test: add CONST_SCRIPTCODE failure-path vectors to script_tests.jsonby merge-script · b47ec7c6 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 96 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#35835: test: add CONST_SCRIPTCODE failure-path vectors to script_tests.json

829e44a1151fa432f293554f25832f19bde209ec test: add CONST_SCRIPTCODE failure-path vectors to script_tests.json (JP)

Pull request description:

Follow-up to #35664.

Going through which script error codes `script_tests.json` covers, I found that neither error gated behind `SCRIPT_VERIFY_CONST_SCRIPTCODE` is asserted anywhere. `SCRIPT_ERR_SIG_FINDANDDELETE` is not asserted by any test; `SCRIPT_ERR_OP_CODESEPARATOR` appears only as a mempool reject string in `invalid_txs.py`, never at the script level. `tx_invalid.json` does have a `CONST_SCRIPTCODE` section, but those vectors can only say a transaction is invalid, not which error made it fail; `script_tests.json` is the harness that pins error codes, and it has no vector using the flag.

This adds six vectors. Four fail with the flag set:

- `OP_CODESEPARATOR` in an executed pre-segwit script.
- `OP_CODESEPARATOR` in an unexecuted `IF` branch. The check in `EvalScript` runs ahead of the `fExec` guard, so the opcode is rejected even though it never executes — the rule with no error-level coverage before.
- A signature push that also appears in the scriptPubKey, against `CHECKSIG`.
- The same against `CHECKMULTISIG`, which calls `FindAndDelete` in a separate loop.

The other two are controls with the flag off, one per error. Both checks run before signature verification, so the vectors can use a dummy signature.

To confirm the expected errors are the ones that fire, I added the vectors expecting `OK` first and let the harness report the actual error for each.

Tested with:

```
build/bin/test_bitcoin --run_test=script_tests/script_json_test
```

ACKs for top commit:
fametrano:
ACK 829e44a1151fa432f293554f25832f19bde209ec
sedited:
ACK 829e44a1151fa432f293554f25832f19bde209ec

Tree-SHA512: b8d52028b5c7e0ec555b4df3749740337b6921b0357b5c9b156daf2a74203a5b95e3bcfa225ebd5a26e0b4cd90290732e4440c0d2b2bfe6f629f51cd319c4415

96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test cases to a Bitcoin Core test data file. It does not change any production code, consensus rules, or network behavior. The tests verify that two specific script error conditions are correctly detected when a particular validation flag is enabled. There is no security vulnerability being fixed here—this is purely additional test coverage.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36329: psbt: add new test vectorsby merge-script · 889e7c5a · Oct 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36329: psbt: add new test vectors

6fa2f3974cbb69fb2086a8f89d300deec4486662 test: add BIP174 invalid value size vector (Sjors Provoost)
029bc15f2cb575ad4e19d99338cd133a4140e66f test: add BIP174 sighash combiner vector (Sjors Provoost)

Pull request description:

Add the two new test vectors from:

- https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/2275
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/1971

https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/2275 additionally requires _existing_ `Combine` vectors to run in both orders, so we do that here too.

ACKs for top commit:
brunoerg:
reACK 6fa2f3974cbb69fb2086a8f89d300deec4486662
aaron-leeb:
reACK [6fa2f39](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/36329/commits/6fa2f3974cbb69fb2086a8f89d300deec4486662)
sedited:
ACK 6fa2f3974cbb69fb2086a8f89d300deec4486662

Tree-SHA512: 5a07026cadbe0551728ac30e9b20212f94e322a2ab31a31a84c86320fc95d2ada82a12e7c2a50c7cd7c12ad202036fdc45b6ad4fc820a8d6f2cd71c87476a6f5

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundaryfuzzing or regression evidencesigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test cases for PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) handling. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a security vulnerability or fix one directly. The new tests check that malformed PSBT data is rejected and that combining PSBTs works in both input orders.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36262: test: cover orphan reconsideration interruptibilityby merge-script · 0036d5f1 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36262: test: cover orphan reconsideration interruptibility

16bff77a5aaf7a9740b859f74b8898cee6de5588 test: cover orphan reconsideration interruptibility (ViniciusCestarii)

Pull request description:

Add test checking that ProcessOrphanTx reconsiders at most one orphan per ProcessMessages(). This test prevents regression of [CVE-2024-52914](https://bitcoincore.org/en/2024/07/03/disclose-orphan-dos/) which currently no existing test checks.

The test kills 2 mutants found with https://github.com/ViniciusCestarii/mutant-harness:

1. Remove `return true` after an orphan is accepted

```diff
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -3494,7 +3494,6 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(Peer& peer)
if (result.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
LogDebug(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, " accepted orphan tx %s (wtxid=%s)\n", orphanHash.ToString(), orphan_wtxid.ToString());
ProcessValidTx(peer.m_id, porphanTx, result.m_replaced_transactions);
- return true;
} else if (state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
```

2. Remove `return true` after an orphan is rejected for a reason other than `TX_MISSING_INPUTS`

```diff
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -3508,7 +3508,6 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(Peer& peer)
state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_RESULT_UNSET)) {
ProcessInvalidTx(peer.m_id, porphanTx, state, /*first_time_failure=*/false);
}
- return true;
}
}
```

ACKs for top commit:
instagibbs:
reACK https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/36262/commits/16bff77a5aaf7a9740b859f74b8898cee6de5588
fametrano:
tACK 16bff77a5aaf7a9740b859f74b8898cee6de5588

Tree-SHA512: 3d00bf7aa023c47d335b0f4c9d720c914611962272b895d91c8a542739f3b9c0d35c1dba5becdfd7167122c3f3f2be87b366d296732fa2765538467e6c0af6d7

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
explicit security languageaccess controlmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds a new automated test to Bitcoin Core. It does not change any production code. The test verifies that a previously fixed denial-of-service bug (CVE-2024-52914) stays fixed by checking that orphan transactions are reconsidered one at a time per network message. It is a regression test, not a security patch.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36151: makeseeds: fix off-by-one in field count checkby merge-script · 8c49a9ab · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36151: makeseeds: fix off-by-one in field count check

c786052865fd173fd8bc7396e1303f7840c5b0da makeseeds: fix off-by-one in field count check (aman21-droid)

Pull request description:

Fixes #36146.

`parseline()` checks that a line has at least 11 whitespace-separated fields:

```python
if len(sline) < 11:
# line too short to be valid, skip it.
return None
```

but it later reads `sline[11]` (the user agent), which needs 12. A line with exactly 11 fields got past the check and then raised `IndexError`, aborting the whole run instead of skipping that line. 11 is the highest index the function uses, so the check now requires 12 fields.

This isn't only theoretical: README.md builds seeds_main.txt by appending one crawler's output onto another's, so the file mixes two independently maintained formats, and a truncated download leaves a short last line too. Skipping the line is what the check was already trying to do.

ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
lgtm ACK c786052865fd173fd8bc7396e1303f7840c5b0da
l0rinc:
ACK c786052865fd173fd8bc7396e1303f7840c5b0da

Tree-SHA512: 3c3aeb8876b7e0eccf8f03faafe0e0bb71d1b11924feaf22b2bb6bf1a36e25bedd622de257060de873c42f12fba8df42d96b2a831a2e8d395220fed70f4bba34

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This is a one-line fix in a Python helper script used to build the list of network seed nodes for Bitcoin Core. The script reads lines of data about internet nodes and was supposed to skip any line that didn't have enough fields. Due to an off-by-one error, a line with exactly 11 fields passed the 'too short' check but then crashed the program when it tried to read the 12th field. The fix simply changes the minimum required field count from 11 to 12. This only affects an offline developer/operations tool and cannot be used to attack the Bitcoin network or wallets directly.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#32895: wallet: Prepare for future upgrades by recording versions of last client to open and decryptby merge-script · 6e419391 · Oct 5, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#32895: wallet: Prepare for future upgrades by recording versions of last client to open and decrypt

7b32155458cc87e50da1fa9f245cc84bc203f25a wallet: Set last opened and decrypted features during migration (Ava Chow)
f998a740fc9f56c813973155cef44c757f1955dd wallet: Record the supported features of the last client to decrypt a wallet (Ava Chow)
8453ad801b63ec92af1652cdcf801165c59f2ab2 wallet: Introduce LastClientFeatures flags and LAST_OPENED_FEATURES record (Ava Chow)
0f104733cc8e4b1736efa6a3bc92a8e3dba1a1b3 walletdb: Decouple last client record from CLIENT_VERSION (Ava Chow)

Pull request description:

When a wallet is automatically upgraded, we always do so in a way that allows the user to load their wallet in an older version. When the user loads their wallet into an upgraded version again, the wallet may not perform the automatic upgrade and end up with upgraded and non-upgraded material in the wallet.

If we write some information about the last client to open the wallet, we would be able to detect these upgrade-downgrade-upgrade situations and perform another upgrade if so. However, in order for this to work, we need to have implemented writing such information into versions prior to the ones which introduce new automatic upgrades.

We are already writing the CLIENT_VERSION into all wallets in a "version" record, although this record is not updated in the same way across all previous versions. Since v24.0, we are always updating the record when the client version differs, but prior to that, the record would only be updated when the client version is newer. Even so, we can use this record to store the last client version.

The first commit decouples the written client version from the node version. This aids in development of new features. The version is entirely decoupled from previous versions by requiring all versions to have bit 19 set, and the initial version being `0 | (1 << 19)`. The versions just need to be at least 299900, and forcing bit 19 to be set was an easy way to achieve this.

However, using version numbers is not as flexible as feature flags, so the second commit introduces the concept of Wallet Client Features. These flags are distinct from the existing Wallet Feature Flags since they are conceptually different. These are written in a separate record, and the wallet client version is incremented to `(1 << 19) + 1`.

Lastly, since some upgrades may need private keys and can only occur after the wallet is decrypted, the third commit also adds a last decrypted features flags record to record the features of the last client to decrypt the wallet.

The result is that we will now be able to detect a downgrade down to v24.0 and be able to implement in parallel multiple features that require automatic upgrades.

ACKs for top commit:
polespinasa:
ACK 7b32155458cc87e50da1fa9f245cc84bc203f25a
w0xlt:
reACK 7b32155458cc87e50da1fa9f245cc84bc203f25a

Tree-SHA512: 7d619e24e06a48162950bd153e12ae9fe05454ca8422e7f3d185b1b8ac2506ead6c1bc094da0b1182aceffe3cf198b948335b676f383ce88f4f9e0ae78beca61

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
secret or key materialupdate trustsigning or wallet pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This change is a wallet infrastructure improvement, not a fix for an active security bug. It records which Bitcoin Core version and feature set last opened or decrypted a wallet so that future releases can detect 'upgrade-downgrade-upgrade' cycles and re-run automatic wallet upgrades safely. There is no direct exploit here, but any bug in this bookkeeping could in theory cause a wallet to skip needed upgrades or behave unexpectedly after being loaded in older software.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36080: p2p: Suspend ping timeout while downloading blocks from a peerby merge-script · c7835db1 · Oct 5, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36080: p2p: Suspend ping timeout while downloading blocks from a peer

d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b p2p: Don't apply ping timeout while downloading blocks (Martin Zumsande)
2b43c62d8ef53edfadf8f097731f48a01b9570cd p2p: move ping timeout check into SendMessages (Martin Zumsande)
8b5bbfe1fca1f4100f858ebfd187dcf74d9d3c82 test: add functional test for pings during IBD (Martin Zumsande)

Pull request description:

While serving blocks, there is a system in place that prioritizes a peer's block requests before answering other p2p messages:
See
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/11090c8bb359f894ef7d97b65aff52fe8191aec1/src/net_processing.cpp#L5436

As a result it can happen that if we do IBD with a low download bandwidth (that is distributed over 10 peers) a peer will not get around to answering our ping before the timeout of 20 minutes, in which case we would disconnect them, although they have done nothing wrong and are not even slow themselves (we are).
This situation has been described in #35761.

This PR fixes the issue by not enforcing the ping timeout from a peer while downloading blocks from them.
In order to do that, the ping timeout check is moved out of `MaybeSendPing()` (which was a slightly awkward place anyway, given the name of the function) and suspended until there are no longer blocks in flight with that peer (with a grace period, so that we don't disconnect immediately after the last block was received before the peer got a chance to send us the `pong`).

Note that during block download, there are still other timeouts:
- A dynamic timeout (`BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE` / `BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_PEER`) which will result in a timeout of `600s × (1 + 0.5×9) = 55 minutes` per block when downloading from 10 peers in parallel
- the stalling logic which hits if the peer is much slower in comparison to other peers
- the socket inactivity check disconnects a peer that hasn't sent us anything at all in the last 20 minutes.

So the ping timeout didn't add much value anyway in that situation.

Fixes #35761

ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
review ACK d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b 🌎
fjahr:
reACK d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b
danielabrozzoni:
ACK d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b
sedited:
ACK d83647e7c48a11dc54ad697342a4b7e3bce9061b

Tree-SHA512: b6986349432117e70b34c7dd812e88cb22e986794f6644b021fee1a282f904d04a2a524415794ec3a22f2f592550a8e89f9416a2a00922184341b280fbc315b4

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
authentication pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This change fixes a bug where Bitcoin Core could wrongly disconnect a peer during Initial Block Download (IBD). The problem happened because the node demanded a ping reply within 20 minutes even while the peer was busy sending blocks. With slow bandwidth, the peer could be too busy serving blocks to reply to the ping in time, so the node would drop a perfectly good peer. The fix pauses the ping timeout while blocks are being downloaded from a peer, and adds a one-minute grace period after the last block before the timeout applies again. It is a reliability/availability fix, not a remote exploit.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36128: test: add script_tests cases covering more interpreter mutantsby merge-script · b3f9d8e1 · Oct 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36128: test: add script_tests cases covering more interpreter mutants

44a7083d43604b3d5c923ffc9011d8043a27d052 test: cover MAX_OPS_PER_SCRIPT in P2WSH witness scripts (ViniciusCestarii)
f1380123b6f8912e2ca599f30f2d89c0af9b9c5f test: cover P2WSH trailing byte mismatch (ViniciusCestarii)
4e7de2ac4cc6c08ff27620de01ccd9d66c568459 test: cover TAPSCRIPT_MINIMALIF for OP_IF and OP_NOTIF with 1-byte vector 0x00 (ViniciusCestarii)

Pull request description:

Kills some live mutants on interpreter.cpp that affect consensus found with https://github.com/ViniciusCestarii/mutant-harness. They are:

interpreter.cpp (killed by 4e7de2ac4cc6c08ff27620de01ccd9d66c568459): `OP_IF / OP_NOTIF` tapscript minimal-IF:
```diff
diff --git a/src/script/interpreter.cpp b/src/script/interpreter.cpp
index 98b16ec..f9b08fe 100644
--- a/src/script/interpreter.cpp
+++ b/src/script/interpreter.cpp
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ bool EvalScript(std::vector<std::vector<unsigned char> >& stack, const CScript&
- if (vch.size() > 1 || (vch.size() == 1 && vch[0] != 1)) {
+ if (vch.size() > 1 || (vch.size() == 1 && vch[0] > 1)) {
```

interpreter.cpp (killed by f1380123b6f8912e2ca599f30f2d89c0af9b9c5f): P2WSH:

```diff
diff --git a/src/script/interpreter.cpp b/src/script/interpreter.cpp
index 98b16ec..73a1bb5 100644
--- a/src/script/interpreter.cpp
+++ b/src/script/interpreter.cpp
@@ -1940,7 +1940,7 @@ static bool VerifyWitnessProgram(const CScriptWitness& witness, int witversion,
- if (memcmp(hash_exec_script.begin(), program.data(), 32)) {
+ if (memcmp(hash_exec_script.begin(), program.data(), 31)) {
```

interpreter.cpp (killed by 44a7083d43604b3d5c923ffc9011d8043a27d052): opcode limit:

```diff
diff --git a/src/script/interpreter.cpp b/src/script/interpreter.cpp
index 98b16ec..b117045 100644
--- a/src/script/interpreter.cpp
+++ b/src/script/interpreter.cpp
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ bool EvalScript(std::vector<std::vector<unsigned char> >& stack, const CScript&
- if (sigversion == SigVersion::BASE || sigversion == SigVersion::WITNESS_V0) {
+ if (sigversion == SigVersion::BASE) {
```

Recommend reviewing per commit.

ACKs for top commit:
aaron-leeb:
tACK [44a7083](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/36128/commits/44a7083d43604b3d5c923ffc9011d8043a27d052)
fametrano:
ACK 44a7083d43604b3d5c923ffc9011d8043a27d052
sedited:
ACK 44a7083d43604b3d5c923ffc9011d8043a27d052

Tree-SHA512: 62a41df06422e8981f0ab4be30563e513ce8a7b566f674662300f0466efa35b87ef658e8c8a01a2911c8bab9e5d6060fa7ff279a41669bf131766379e2f75027

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
consensus or confidential-proof validationmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test cases to Bitcoin Core's test suite. It does not change any production consensus code. The tests are designed to catch accidental code changes ('mutants') in the script interpreter that could break consensus rules, but the commit itself is a defensive testing improvement, not a vulnerability fix.

Security candidateMerge bitcoin/bitcoin#36327: test: speed up secp256k1 fixed-base multiplication and Schnorr signingby merge-script · b6a1b0ff · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · merge-script

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36327: test: speed up secp256k1 fixed-base multiplication and Schnorr signing

b6fc3cf0046d3106e0dfb30f320d48514eff6fb2 test: speed up secp256k1 fixed-base multiplication (brunoerg)

Pull request description:

This PR speeds up the test framework’s fixed-base multiplication and Schnorr signing by:

- Changing FastGEMul to process scalars in 4-bit windows instead of individual bits. Precompute all 16 multiples for each window position, reducing multiplication from about 128 point additions on average to 64 table lookups and about 60 nonzero point additions. This trades a larger table and additional initialization work for cheaper repeated multiplications.

On my local machine (Macbook M2 Pro) the `feature_taproot.py`'s medium time decreased from 83.39s to 35.42s.

ACKs for top commit:
fametrano:
tACK b6fc3cf0046d3106e0dfb30f320d48514eff6fb2
theStack:
ACK b6fc3cf0046d3106e0dfb30f320d48514eff6fb2
ViniciusCestarii:
tACK b6fc3cf0046d3106e0dfb30f320d48514eff6fb2

Tree-SHA512: 983c1e971122e7a15458436943d5c14a936e86b157bc8c74ce1631aafcd0c7f35bbc476df625a57afb37d4e32bb620d1f1d5b3e2267867279bca736f170e83c9

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarycryptography-sensitive pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a pure performance optimization for Bitcoin Core's internal test framework. It changes how the test code performs certain mathematical operations on the secp256k1 elliptic curve, making tests run faster. There is no change to live network code, wallet behavior, consensus rules, or cryptographic security. It does not fix a vulnerability or introduce a known security risk.