Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
53/100 average clarity
30Strong · 80–100
77Adequate · 60–79
108Thin · 40–59
70Opaque · 0–39
46security candidates with opaque commit messaging
This commit adds security checks to SeedSigner, an offline Bitcoin signing device, to prevent malicious or buggy wallet software from tricking users into sending change to derivation paths their wallet will never scan. It now verifies that…
New fatal error class PSBTChangeDerivationPathError for non-standard change derivation pathsNew fatal error class PSBTUnverifiableMixedInputBasePathsError for unverifiable mixed-base-path segwit v0 inputsChange output base path must match a verified input base path
This commit hardens SeedSigner's PSBT (Bitcoin transaction) parser so it no longer trusts a coordinator's claim that an input belongs to your seed. Before, the device only checked that your seed could derive the claimed key. Now it also re…
New attack-level exception: PSBTInputOwnershipContradictionError when an input claims the seed's key but the committed script does not use itInput ownership now verified by rebuilding the scriptPubKey from the claimed key rather than trusting PSBT bip32 derivationsTaproot key-path spends verified by re-applying the merkle-root tweak to the internal key and comparing to the committed output
This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small hardware wallet used to sign Bitcoin transactions. The bug could let a malicious transaction coordinator trick the device into accepting change money sent to a wallet path the user n…
New security check explicitly described as preventing a malicious coordinator from anchoring change to an unmonitored derivation pathNew exception class PSBTUnverifiableMixedInputBasePathsError with Warning-grade refusalUI flow now redirects to a blocking warning screen instead of allowing signing
This commit fixes a security check in SeedSigner, a small hardware-wallet-like device used to sign Bitcoin transactions. Previously, when deciding whether a change output's address was suspiciously far from the user's known addresses, the …
Fixes a window-widening attack against change-output verificationChange-output address index check now uses smallest input index instead of largestAdds hardened-input edge-case handling (window measured from 0)
This commit only adds a new test case to the project's test suite. It does not change any production code. The new test checks that the existing PSBT parser correctly rejects a specific kind of suspicious change output (one placed at a dee…
Adds defensive test coverage for PSBT change-output derivation-path validationRelates to preventing a coordinator with an account xpub from routing change to an unexpected deeper path
This commit adds a safety check to SeedSigner that refuses to sign a Bitcoin transaction if the change output is being sent to a derivation path the user's wallet is unlikely to scan. Before this change, an attacker could trick a user into…
New attack-level exception PSBTChangeDerivationPathError for change sent to an unscanned derivation pathNew warning WARNING__CHANGE_ADDRESS_INDEX_BEYOND_WINDOW for change address indices far past spent indicesNew UI screen PSBTUnexpectedChangeDerivationPathView with DireWarningScreen and forced discard
This commit is a code cleanup, not a security fix. It consolidates several warning screens shown before signing a Bitcoin transaction into a single reusable view. The warnings themselves—such as 'high fee' and 'no change'—still behave the …
Refactor only: no change to validation, cryptography, or signing logicUser-facing warning text and flow remain equivalentAdds unit tests covering high-fee, no-change, and combined warning sequences
This commit only reorganizes test code. It adds a helper function that replaces twelve nearly identical blocks of test setup code, with no changes to the actual wallet or signing logic that users rely on.
This commit only moves and rewrites documentation comments inside the code. It does not change how the program behaves, what it checks, or how it responds to malicious data. The logic for detecting and holding security findings in PSBT par…
This commit adds security checks to SeedSigner, a small offline Bitcoin signing device. Before the change, a malicious or buggy wallet coordinator could give the device a transaction where an input's hidden script did not match the public …
New validation logic compares supplied witness/redeem scripts against scriptPubKey hashesNew exception classes explicitly label script mismatch as an attack and missing/extraneous scripts as correctness problemsUI flow terminates signing before rendering transaction details when a script check fails
This commit simply adds Swahili as a new language option in the SeedSigner settings. It is a localization (translation) change with no security relevance.
This commit fixes how SeedSigner reads the extra data attached to OP_RETURN Bitcoin transaction outputs. Previously the code always assumed the data was introduced by OP_PUSHDATA1, which meant it would misread or crash on the more common d…
Fixes incorrect parsing of OP_RETURN data due to assumed push opcodeAdds robust handling for direct push, OP_PUSHDATA1/2/4, and OP_0-OP_16Introduces explicit malformed-script rejection instead of silent mis-parsing
This update makes SeedSigner refuse Bitcoin transaction files (PSBTs) where the outgoing amounts are larger than the incoming amounts. Before the fix, the device would have accepted such impossible transactions and shown the user a negativ…
Input validation: rejects PSBTs with mathematically impossible fee valuesUser-facing safeguard: prevents confusing negative fee from reaching transaction review screensNew exception class with clear semantics (PSBTNegativeFeeError)
This commit only updates a code comment to remove an outdated claim. The actual security check for negative fees remains unchanged, and a prior code change already verifies input amounts before outputs are parsed. There is no functional se…
This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small offline Bitcoin signing device. Previously, when a user scanned a transaction to sign, the device added up the input amounts exactly as a malicious or compromised computer/coordinato…
Fixes a fee-display manipulation vulnerability where a compromised coordinator could understate input amounts to hide excessive real feesAdds explicit verification of each input's amount against the prior transaction before totaling inputsRaises dedicated security exceptions (PSBTInputAmountVerificationError, PSBTMissingInputUtxoError) and blocks the signing flow
This commit only rewrites the explanatory text (docstrings) inside test code. No actual program logic, security checks, or test behavior changed. It is a documentation cleanup within tests.
This commit only changes test code. It tightens some Python assertions (using 'is False' instead of '== False') and expands one test to run across more test fixtures. There is no change to the actual wallet or PSBT parsing logic that users…
This commit only changes a test file. It removes a small helper method called parse() and replaces its calls with the same one-line PSBTParser constructor call written out directly. There is no change to the actual wallet/security code tha…
Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.
Security candidateHold milder psbt findings until the outputs are readby kdmukai · 9d132e82 · Oct 16, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongLow 47Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Hold milder psbt findings until the outputs are read
A false input claim, entries in both derivation path maps, and surplus output entries might each be an honest bug. They are now held in one list instead of raised where found. parse() raises the first one after _parse_outputs, so an output contradiction found later is still the one reported. A held input is set aside (its verified list emptied). A held output counts as a spend without its claims being evaluated.
Input claim verification moves into _parse_inputs. The wrong-seed check moves after it and stands aside while a finding is held. Deletes get_input_fingerprints, which had no callers.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 47/100
This commit changes how a Bitcoin signing helper (SeedSigner) handles suspicious but possibly innocent problems in a transaction file (PSBT). Instead of immediately stopping and warning about a minor issue on an input or output, it now 'holds' that concern, finishes reading the outputs, and only reports it if no more serious output-side attack is found. The goal is to make sure a fake-change attack on an output is never hidden behind a milder input problem. It also fixes a case where a malformed PSBT with missing UTXOs was wrongly reported as 'wrong seed'.
Security candidateRefuse an OP_RETURN that is not made of complete pushesby okaybro · 6403723d · Oct 15, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 52Details
Commit message · okaybro
Refuse an OP_RETURN that is not made of complete pushes
Bitcoin Core treats an OP_RETURN output as nonstandard unless everything after the opcode is a push. The parser used to display whatever was left when a push ran past the end of the script, or when it met an opcode that is not a push. It now raises PSBTMalformedOpReturnError instead, and the user gets the same plain "Transaction Problem" warning used for other malformed psbts before discarding it.
OP_0, OP_1NEGATE, OP_RESERVED, and OP_1 through OP_16 still count as pushes to Core, so they are kept and the walk carries on past them rather than stopping there.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100
This commit changes how SeedSigner handles unusual OP_RETURN data in Bitcoin transactions. Previously, if the data after an OP_RETURN instruction was malformed, the app would still try to display whatever bytes remained. Now it stops and shows a plain 'Transaction Problem' warning, treating the transaction as malformed and discarding it. This aligns SeedSigner with how Bitcoin Core treats such transactions, and prevents a malformed or crafted OP_RETURN script from influencing what the user sees during transaction review.
Security candidateDrop OP_RETURN test helper parameters that nothing passesby okaybro · 79e22d2d · Oct 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · okaybro
Drop OP_RETURN test helper parameters that nothing passes
`op_return_script`'s `push_opcode` and `create_op_return_psbt`'s `change_amount` and `fee_amount` were never used by any test. The non-minimal encoding cases build their bytes by hand and call `_parse_op_return_payload` directly.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only cleans up unused parameters in a test helper file. It removes optional arguments that no test was actually using, simplifying the code without changing any real behavior. There is no security issue here.
Security candidateClarify the comments around InputScope.verify()by newtonick · 27411667 · Oct 6, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinInformational 14Details
Commit message · newtonick
Clarify the comments around InputScope.verify()
55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 14/100
This commit only rewrites comments in a single file to explain how the existing PSBT input verification logic works. No code behavior is changed, so it does not fix or introduce a security issue on its own.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only rewords an inline code comment to be clearer and slightly shorter. No actual code logic, behavior, or security checks were changed. The bounds check that protects against an out-of-range transaction output index remains exactly the same.
Security candidateReword the _verify_input_amounts() docstringby newtonick · 5ca043c9 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · newtonick
Reword the _verify_input_amounts() docstring
35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only rewords a code comment (docstring). It does not change any actual program logic, function behavior, or security checks. The changes clarify that the verification method applies to taproot inputs too, note that taproot is not affected by a known historical fee-bumping bug, and update capitalization. There is no functional security fix or vulnerability introduced.
Security candidateAdd PSBTMissingInputUtxoError for inputs with no utxo to verifyby newtonick · 6605c68c · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 60 · AdequateLow 32Details
Commit message · newtonick
Add PSBTMissingInputUtxoError for inputs with no utxo to verify
60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 32/100
This commit changes how SeedSigner handles Bitcoin transaction files (PSBTs) that are missing required data about how much an input is worth. Previously, missing input amount data was treated as a suspicious transaction (a potential attack). Now it gets its own, gentler error type and a warning screen that tells the user the transaction left out an input amount, but does not label it as malicious. The user can only discard the transaction. This is a defensive correctness improvement, not a vulnerability fix.
Security candidateTotal verified_input_amount in _verify_input_amounts()by newtonick · 335c11af · Oct 5, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 40 · ThinModerate 59Details
Commit message · newtonick
Total verified_input_amount in _verify_input_amounts()
40/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100
This commit renames and strengthens how SeedSigner totals the amount of bitcoin coming into a transaction. Previously, the wallet summed input amounts in a later step after a separate verification step. The change makes the verified total the only value used for display, so a malicious or buggy coordinator cannot trick the user into thinking a transaction has different inputs or fees than it really does. It is a defensive hardening patch, not a fix for a known active exploit.
Trim input amount explanations duplicated outside _verify_input_amounts()
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only removes explanatory comments from two places in the code. No program logic, validation checks, or security behavior changed. It is a documentation cleanup, not a security fix.
Security candidateReword PSBTInputAmountVerificationFailedView text based on feedbackby newtonick · 5fc0ea62 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · newtonick
Reword PSBTInputAmountVerificationFailedView text based on feedback
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarydefensive validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes the wording of a warning message shown to users when a transaction's input amounts cannot be verified. It does not modify any security logic, calculations, or behavior. The change is purely cosmetic/user-experience.
Security candidateKeep PSBTNegativeFeeError's docstring to what a caller needsby okaybro · bf5146e6 · Oct 4, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 90 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · okaybro
Keep PSBTNegativeFeeError's docstring to what a caller needs
The error's docstring argued about a lying coordinator's motives and why the error exists for the user. Like the other PSBTVerificationError subclasses, it now just states the problem and that it is not treated as an attack. The one part of the reasoning that matters, that both totals are the coordinator's own claims, moves to the check that raises it.
90/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundarydefensive validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only rewrites documentation comments inside the code. It moves some explanatory text from one place to another and shortens a docstring. No program behavior, security checks, or logic were changed.
Security candidateMerge pull request #1046 from kdmukai/2026_09_psbt_nested_singlesig_changeby Nick Klockenga · b2199c68 · Oct 3, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 68Details
Commit message · Nick Klockenga
Merge pull request #1046 from kdmukai/2026_09_psbt_nested_singlesig_change
[security] Verify nested single sig change that omits its redeem script
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100
This commit fixes a security bug in how SeedSigner recognizes 'change' outputs on bitcoin transactions when using older nested SegWit single-signature wallets. A change output is change that comes back to your own wallet; the device must identify it correctly so it does not look like money being sent to a stranger. Because of an optional field in the PSBT data format, a valid change output could be mistaken for a plain pay-to-script-hash output and treated as an external spend. The fix lets the parser consider these outputs as change candidates and then verifies ownership by rebuilding the expected script from the seed's own key, rather than trusting the PSBT's missing or misleading redeem script. The commit also adds tests showing that malicious PSBTs that claim ownership but pay someone else are rejected.
Renaming _policy_shape_matches to _is_change_candidate dropped the reason the candidacy test compares shape alone. Without it, adding the cosigners to the comparison reads as a harmless tightening.
The old wording named a misannotated fingerprint as what breaks an output's cosigner resolution. Since #1032, _get_cosigners matches each key to a global xpub by derivation path alone and never reads the fingerprint, so the restored note names a misannotated derivation path instead.
98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This commit only adds explanatory comments to a function that decides whether a Bitcoin transaction output should be treated as 'change' (money going back to the user's own wallet). The code itself is not changed. The new comments warn that comparing cosigner details at this early stage could let a malicious or malformed PSBT (transaction file) hide an output from normal change verification, because one bad derivation path could prevent cosigners from matching. The commit restores documentation that was accidentally lost during an earlier rename, so future developers do not mistakenly 'tighten' this check by adding cosigners here.
Security candidatestyle: restore the blank lines between the psbt parser testsby okaybro · fdcf21bb · Sep 29, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · okaybro
style: restore the blank lines between the psbt parser tests
60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds two blank lines between test functions in a test file. It is a pure code-style change with no effect on the actual SeedSigner software or its security.
Security candidateNarrow bare p2sh candidacy to what the rebuild cannot decideby kdmukai · f04675e4 · Sep 29, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Narrow bare p2sh candidacy to what the rebuild cannot decide
The nested single sig outlier in change candidacy also required the output's one derivation path entry to claim this seed's fingerprint. That kept an output paying our key under another seed's key and fingerprint out of the rebuild, so it was shown as a spend to the user's own address, while the same output with its redeem script present is refused as a contradiction. The rebuild derives our key at the entry's path whatever fingerprint it lists, so the outlier drops the condition and _is_change_candidate drops the verified derivation paths it read for it.
The outlier also required exactly one derivation path entry. It only kept out bare p2sh outputs annotated with several keys while omitting their scripts, which no surveyed coordinator emits, and the single sig surplus check now refuses those.
The m-of-n exclusion becomes a check that the output omits its redeem script. For an output parsed as plain p2sh the two admit the same outputs, since a supplied multisig redeem script is the only source of an m-of-n there, and the new check states what the outlier is for.
New tests refuse an output that pays this seed but lists another key, and pin each of the three remaining conditions: a payment to another wallet of this seed, annotated with our key, stays a spend.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
access controlseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100
This commit fixes a logic flaw in how SeedSigner decides whether a Bitcoin transaction output is 'change' going back to the user's own wallet, versus a payment to someone else. Previously, a specially crafted PSBT could make an output that actually pays to the user's own key appear as a spend to an external address, or could make a contradictory ownership claim slip through. The patch narrows the special-case rule and adds tests to catch these scenarios.
Merge pull request #1044 from kdmukai/psbt_multisig_output_claims
[security] Store multiple verified derivation path entries per input/output; reject all decoy keys
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · High 78/100
This update fixes a security gap in how SeedSigner checks who owns each part of a Bitcoin transaction. A malicious transaction file (PSBT) could previously include an extra, real-but-irrelevant key belonging to your seed as a 'decoy' in a multisig change output. The old code only kept the first matching key it found, so it might miss the decoy and wrongly approve the output as your change, potentially letting funds slip to an attacker. The new code records every matching key claim, verifies each one against the actual output script, and rejects the transaction if any claim doesn't line up or if there are too many claims.
Security candidateAdmit bare p2sh outputs as nested single sig changeby kdmukai · cf18a0b9 · Sep 24, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 85 · StrongModerate 68Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Admit bare p2sh outputs as nested single sig change
A p2sh-p2wpkh output's scriptPubKey is a bare p2sh hash. BIP-174 leaves the redeem script optional on an output, and without it _get_policy types the output as plain p2sh, which does not match a p2sh-p2wpkh wallet policy. The output then never reaches the ownership check at all. Two things follow. The user's own change is displayed as a payment out to a stranger. And an output that keeps a genuine claim on this seed while repointing its scriptPubKey escapes the ownership-contradiction refusal by dropping one optional field.
Nested single sig is the only script type whose identity depends on an optional field its proof does not read: the rebuild is p2sh(p2wpkh(K)) from our own seed at the claimed path and the inputs' policy, so the missing field is a discriminator rather than evidence. For p2sh-p2wsh the discriminator and the proof material are the same field, so its absence is genuine silence and correctly out of reach.
_policy_shape_matches becomes _is_change_candidate, an instance method, since it now reads the inputs' policy and the output's verified derivation paths. Beside the unchanged shape comparison it admits a bare p2sh output under a p2sh-p2wpkh wallet that carries no m-of-n, supplies exactly one derivation path entry, and holds one verified claim on this seed. Everything below is unchanged: the rebuild decides, honest change is counted as change, and a repointed output raises PSBTOutputOwnershipContradictionError.
The single-entry conditions are what keep that refusal safe. A genuine multisig output carries one derivation path entry per cosigner, so it never reaches the contradiction check by this route. The shape that would is a bare p2sh output withholding both scripts while annotating a single key of a multisig, and no surveyed coordinator emits one. Every coordinator but Bitcoin Core annotates only its own change output. Core annotates an output because a descriptor solved its script, so it holds all n key origins and writes them.
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100
This commit fixes a bug in SeedSigner's PSBT transaction parser. When a user spent from a 'nested single-signature SegWit' wallet (p2sh-p2wpkh), a change output could omit an optional redeem script. The parser then misread the output as a plain, unrelated p2sh payment, so it showed the user's own change as money going to a stranger. Worse, an attacker could craft a PSBT that still claimed the change belonged to the user's seed while actually paying a different address, and the old code would not detect the contradiction. The patch lets these bare p2sh outputs through to the full ownership check, which rebuilds the expected address from the seed and catches any mismatch.
Trivial style change: more explicit conditional check
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
seed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a one-line style change that rewrites an empty-list check to be more explicit. It does not change what the program does, only how the code reads. There is no security relevance.
Merge pull request #722 from Chaitanya-Keyal/psbt-huge-fee-warning
[Feature] Warning Screen for High Tx Fees
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit adds a new user-facing safety feature: a warning screen when a Bitcoin transaction's fee is unusually high compared to the amount being sent. It does not fix a bug or vulnerability; it helps users notice potentially costly mistakes before signing.
Security candidateSettle is_high_fee once in parse()by okaybro · 2195adfd · Sep 20, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 20Details
Commit message · okaybro
Settle is_high_fee once in parse()
Both PSBTOverviewView and PSBTMathView asked the parser whether the fee was high, and the overview asked twice (once for the screen, once for routing). Each call re-summed the outputs through psbt.tx, which rebuilds the whole transaction on every access. The totals it depends on are all fixed by the end of parse(), so compute it there once and store it as is_high_fee, the same way the other totals are exposed. has_high_fee() stays as the computation itself.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 20/100
This commit is a performance cleanup, not a security fix. It calculates the 'is this fee unusually high?' flag once during transaction parsing instead of recalculating it every time a screen asks. The actual fee-checking logic and warning behavior are unchanged, so users still see the same high-fee warnings. The change just makes the device respond faster and avoids redundant work.
Merge pull request #1032 from kdmukai/psbt_output_ownership
[security] Verify that change outputs actually pay this seed
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol pathmerge-commit duplicate discount
AI analysis · High 80/100
This commit fixes a security flaw in SeedSigner, a small hardware-wallet-like device used to sign Bitcoin transactions. Previously, the software trusted the PSBT file's own claim about which 'change' outputs belong back to the user's wallet. A malicious or buggy PSBT could mark an external payment as the user's own change, tricking the user into approving a transaction that sends funds to an attacker. The patch now independently rebuilds each output's receiving address from the user's seed and compares it to what the PSBT actually commits to, rejecting the transaction if the two disagree. It also adds checks for contradictory or malformed derivation-path claims.
Security candidateCover every OP_RETURN push encoding in the parser testsby okaybro · 89c5241e · Sep 18, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongLow 41Details
Commit message · okaybro
Cover every OP_RETURN push encoding in the parser tests
Every existing OP_RETURN vector hand-built OP_PUSHDATA1, which is exactly the one encoding the parser assumed, so the mis-slice never showed up. The regtest psbt behind test_parse_op_return_content carries 2b 6a 4c 28 43 68 61 6e ... and the screenshot generator concatenated OP_PUSHDATA1 by hand.
Add fixture helpers that build an OP_RETURN scriptPubKey with the minimal push by default, and that can force a specific OP_PUSHDATA* so the non-minimal encodings a coordinator is free to produce are testable too. Note in the helper that the scriptPubKey and value have to be set on the OutputScope: PSBT.tx rebuilds the transaction from the scopes on every access, so assigning through psbt.tx.vout[i] is silently discarded and leaves a test asserting against the fixture it meant to replace.
The new tests cover the direct-push/OP_PUSHDATA1 boundary at 75/76, OP_PUSHDATA2 and OP_PUSHDATA4, a non-minimal encoding, several pushes in one script, a bare OP_RETURN, an empty scriptPubKey, a truncated length field, an over-long declared length, and a leading opcode that is not a data push.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 41/100
This commit adds tests for how SeedSigner reads small text messages embedded in Bitcoin transactions via OP_RETURN outputs. The tests reveal that the existing parser only handled one specific encoding (OP_PUSHDATA1) and would misread or slice incorrectly when Bitcoin Core used the more common direct-push encoding for short messages. The commit does not change the parser itself; it only expands test coverage and adds helper functions to build OP_RETURN outputs safely. Because the parser bug is demonstrated but not fixed here, the change is primarily a test-hardening patch.
Parse the OP_RETURN push opcode instead of assuming OP_PUSHDATA1
The payload was read at a fixed 3-byte offset, which only holds when the script uses OP_PUSHDATA1. Opcodes 0x01-0x4b are themselves the byte count, and that is the minimal encoding Bitcoin Core emits, so every payload of 75 bytes or fewer lost its first byte:
scriptPubKey 6a 28 "Chancellor on the brink of third bailout" parsed b'hancellor on the brink of third bailout'
PSBTOpReturnView is a pre-signing review screen, so the user approved a transaction whose OP_RETURN content was displayed wrong. When the payload is not human-readable it renders as hex, where a one byte shift is invisible.
Read the push opcode and slice to the declared length, in a static helper so the loop stays readable. OP_PUSHDATA2 and OP_PUSHDATA4 are handled too: Bitcoin Core v30 raised the default -datacarriersize to 100,000 bytes, and consensus never limited OP_RETURN data at all, so a payload past what OP_PUSHDATA1 can describe is no longer exotic.
Several pushes after OP_RETURN are legal and are concatenated; the user is being shown the data the transaction commits to, and the push boundaries carry no consensus meaning. Anything that is not a data push, or a push that overruns the script, ends the walk and the remaining bytes are surfaced verbatim rather than dropped.
Also reset op_return_data in _parse_outputs, which only ever set it in __init__, and compare the first byte by slice so an empty scriptPubKey does not raise IndexError.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundaryconsensus or confidential-proof validationseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100
This commit fixes a bug in SeedSigner, a hardware wallet tool, where the OP_RETURN message shown to users before signing a transaction could be displayed incorrectly. The old code assumed every OP_RETURN payload started with a specific push opcode (OP_PUSHDATA1), so for shorter messages it accidentally cut off the first byte. Because the screen is shown before the user approves the signature, a misleading display could make someone approve a transaction whose embedded message is not what they saw. For non-human-readable payloads shown as hex, the error is invisible. The fix properly reads the push opcode and extracts the correct payload length.
embit computes the fee as inputs minus outputs and never looks at the sign of the result, so a psbt that spends more than it funds parses cleanly and reaches the review flow quoting a negative fee.
Raise PSBTNegativeFeeError as soon as the fee is known and route it to its own warning. Malformed rather than hostile: no honest coordinator builds one and the network would refuse to relay it, so it gets a plain warning, not the attack framing. A zero fee is still accepted.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 50/100
This commit fixes a bug in SeedSigner where a malformed Bitcoin transaction file (PSBT) whose outputs spend more than its inputs could be loaded and shown to the user with a nonsensical negative fee. The fix rejects such PSBTs during parsing and shows the user a plain warning instead. It is treated as bad data, not an attack, because no honest tool creates these and the Bitcoin network would not relay them anyway.
Security candidateCount an unresolved output cosigner set as a mismatchby kdmukai · 45a5eabb · Sep 16, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongModerate 63Details
Commit message · kdmukai
Count an unresolved output cosigner set as a mismatch
The cosigner comparison skipped any output whose cosigners failed to resolve, so the different-quorum case it exists for never fired on a real psbt: coordinators write only the spending wallet's xpubs, and a foreign cosigner's key then resolves against nothing. Once the inputs' cosigners resolve, an output that differs or fails to resolve is counted as a spend.
Keys now match xpubs by derivation alone rather than requiring the claimed fingerprint to match first. The fingerprint is a label the coordinator wrote; requiring it let one mislabeled cosigner turn genuine change into a spend, and a key an xpub really derives is proof enough on its own.
The different-quorum test now uses the wallet's own xpubs, the shape every xpub-writing coordinator produces, and a second test keeps the four-xpub variant.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundaryseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100
This commit fixes a bug in SeedSigner's PSBT parser that could misclassify a payment to a different multisig wallet as 'change' (money going back to the user's own wallet). The bug occurred when the output's cosigner list could not be resolved, because the comparison was skipped entirely. The fix now counts an unresolved or mismatched cosigner set as a spend instead of change. It also changes how keys are matched to xpubs: instead of first requiring the coordinator-provided fingerprint to match, it now trusts a matching derivation path and a proven derived key. This prevents a mislabeled fingerprint from turning a real change output into what looks like a spend.