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rust-lightning

Composable Rust libraries for building Lightning wallets, nodes, and services.

BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

1924 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

300security candidates261second-pass queue1606AI analyses
174commits · 30 days
261commits · 60 days
636commits · 180 days
1314commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 6819 seen18 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6468 seen16 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 6128 seen8 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 561 seen3 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
704Strong · 80–100
856Adequate · 60–79
302Thin · 40–59
62Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Matt Corallo58679418876
Elias Rohrer15415153667
auto-pr-bot571823287
Jeffrey Czyz19645182169
Wilmer Paulino15945155169
Valentine Wallace15715145169
Leo Nash11613116162
Vincenzo Palazzo11311183
Joost Jager16324162069
elnosh401434059
shaavan22622069
wpaulino2059082
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 18 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Correct FeeEstimator docs on the 253 sat/kW lower bound

This is a documentation-only edit. It corrects a misleading comment in the code that wrongly claimed all fee estimates returned to LDK are forced to be at least 253 satoshis per 1000 weight units. The new comment clarifies that this minimu…

ea2051feby auto-pr-bot+9−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Track splice confirmation while awaiting tx_signatures' (#5570)

This change fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing logic. During a splice, one side can broadcast the new funding transaction as soon as it has the other side's signatures. Previously, if that transaction confirmed on-chain before the…

State-machine inconsistency in channel funding lifecycleMissing chain-source watch for in-flight splice funding transactionPotential failure to send splice_locked after splice confirms during signature exchange
ca778e61by Matt Corallo+245−32 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 63 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Account for current HTLC fees in dust exposure' (#5690)

This change fixes how Lightning nodes calculate the financial risk from tiny ('dust') HTLCs when the current on-chain fee rate is higher than the node's own local fee estimate. Previously, the code only considered a buffered fee rate when …

Incorrect fee exposure accounting for dust HTLCsPotential to accept HTLCs whose commitment/HTLC-success fees exceed their value under current feerateEconomic griefing / forced-channel-closure cost manipulation
cc798f60by Matt Corallo+108−382 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test' (#5689)

This is a one-line code cleanup in a test file. It replaces a cloned array literal with a slice reference to silence a Rust compiler lint. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no functional behavior change.

03ca832fby Matt Corallo+1−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test

This is a one-line change in a test file to satisfy a Rust linter warning. It replaces a needless clone of a funding transaction with a reference-based slice construction. There is no functional change, no user-facing behavior change, and …

93e0129cby auto-pr-bot+1−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Fix CI: rebuild test coin-selection impl and rework reused-ID balance test' (#5684)

This commit is a test-only fix for a broken continuous integration (CI) build. It updates a test mock to match a new function signature and rewrites an existing test to use three nodes instead of two so the test scenario remains valid unde…

17bac68aby Matt Corallo+26−202 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 68 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Guard pending closing signatures before channel_ready' (#5681)

This change fixes a Lightning channel bug where a malicious peer could renegotiate the closing transaction fee while the local node was still waiting for its own signer to produce the final signature. If allowed, the local node might combi…

State-machine guard expansion to prevent fee renegotiation while a closing signature is pendingRisk of combining mismatched signatures across different closing feesRegression test demonstrates malicious peer renegotiation attempt and expected warning rejection
a01273a2by Matt Corallo+169−21 file
No security note in commit
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Release wallet UTXOs when FundingBuilder rejects a coin selection' (#5634)

This change fixes a wallet bug in rust-lightning where a UTXO could be selected for a Lightning funding transaction, then rejected because its previous transaction was too large to fit in a Lightning peer message. Previously, that rejectio…

API change to CoinSelectionSource::select_confirmed_utxos adding max_input_prevtx_serialized_lenWalletSync filters UTXOs by prevtx serialized length before selectionFundingBuilder enforces Lightning tx_add_input message-size limit at selection time
56054190by Matt Corallo+148−155 files
No security note in commit
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Refuse to pay BOLT 12 invoices with records above experimental range

This commit hardens LDK's BOLT 12 payment logic so it refuses to pay invoices containing very large unknown record types (4 billion and up). These records are legal under the Lightning spec, but LDK doesn't understand them, so the change t…

Defensive refusal to pay invoices with unknown high-numbered TLV recordsReuses existing UnknownRequiredFeatures failure path instead of adding a new oneAdds explicit checks before payment state insertion and route construction
2970372fby auto-pr-bot+106−177 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Read invoice TLV records above the experimental range

This commit fixes a backward-compatibility bug in LDK's BOLT 12 invoice parser. A previous change had capped the range of 'experimental' TLV record types at 4 billion, but the Lightning spec imposes no upper bound. As a result, invoices cr…

Backward-compatibility regression in deserialization of persisted channel monitorsDenial-of-service via unreadable monitor blocking all channel monitoringSpec compliance fix: TLV record types have no upper bound
9e28db58by auto-pr-bot+133−84 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Refuse to sign messages that collide with gossip serializations' (#5677)

This change fixes a security issue where a signed text message could be crafted so that its prefixed form looks exactly like a Lightning 'node_announcement' gossip message. Because both use the same double-SHA256 hash and the same signing …

Signature replay / message confusion between signed messages and gossip announcementsForged `node_announcement` signatures via chosen-prefix message constructionNew validation rejects prefixed messages that deserialize as `UnsignedNodeAnnouncement`
ec40e097by Matt Corallo+74−148 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 37 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Retry a single HTLC before abandoning an unfundable batch' (#5406)

This change fixes a corner case in how the Lightning node tries to claim multiple pending HTLCs (small Bitcoin payments locked in a channel) when the wallet cannot fund a single large batch transaction. Previously, if the multi-HTLC batch …

Funds-recovery robustness improvement: prevents premature abandonment of a single unbatched HTLCChange in error-handling arithmetic from checked_sub/saturating_sub with max(1)New unit tests covering both failed and successful singleton HTLC funding paths
643e8684by wpaulino+119−21 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Refuse to persist fresh monitors that alias archived monitors' (#5645)

This change prevents a Lightning node from accidentally overwriting an archived copy of a channel's security monitor with a brand-new one that happens to use the same identifier. In the old code, if a new channel reused the same identifier…

Data-loss prevention: stops archived ChannelMonitor from being overwritten by a later channel with the same keySafety guard added to both sync and async persistence pathsPersistence refusal surfaces as InProgress/UnrecoverableError rather than silent overwrite
3c606c11by Matt Corallo+298−332 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 52 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Handle fee multiplication overflow when merging MPP paths' (#5288)

This change fixes a place in the Lightning payment routing code where adding up fees could overflow the maximum number a computer can store in a 64-bit integer. Previously, the code assumed this could never happen and would crash (panic) i…

Integer overflow in fee computationPreviously unreachable!() panic path reachableMPP path merge could trigger overflow
25f8a740by Matt Corallo+42−171 file
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Resume channels stuck awaiting a completed monitor persistence on reload' (#5610)

This commit fixes a bug where a Lightning node could get stuck after restarting. If the node crashed or restarted while it was still saving the initial channel monitor to disk, and that save later finished in another process, the restarted…

Fixes a state-machine stall on node reload that could leave channels non-functionalRemoves an overstrict assertion that would panic on a legitimate post-reload stateAdds explicit detection of monitor persistence completed in a prior process
11815ed1by Matt Corallo+334−74 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Correct KeysManager docs on spliced channels' remote_key derivation' (#5609)

This change only updates documentation and code comments in the Lightning Dev Kit library. It clarifies that a particular key-derivation setting is fixed when a channel is first opened and is not changed by splicing. No code behavior was a…

83a4d243by Matt Corallo+17−91 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Fix DelayedPaymentKey/HtlcKey from_basepoint docs and document justice tx witness script' (#5596)

This commit only changes documentation comments in two source files. It corrects the wording of how certain public keys are derived in the Lightning protocol and adds details about which witness script a signer must use when creating justi…

Documentation-only changeClarifies key derivation semantics for Lightning commitment transactionsClarifies justice transaction witness script requirements for signers
2f832195by Matt Corallo+44−62 files
No security note in commit
Informational 19 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Document that TokioSpawner requires all of LDK in a tokio context' (#5621)

This change only adds documentation comments to a Rust struct. It does not modify any executable code, so it cannot by itself introduce or fix a security vulnerability. The new text warns developers that using TokioSpawner incorrectly can …

Documentation-only changeNo code logic modifiedNo unsafe blocks added
6e555fa2by Matt Corallo+11−01 file
No security note in commit
High 70 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Make custom signers verify holder commitment sigs synchronously' (#5616)

This commit hardens how Lightning Dev Kit handles custom signing modules. Previously, LDK relied on each custom signer to check that the other party's signatures on a holder commitment transaction were valid. The change adds a ready-made v…

New synchronous signature-verification helper for holder commitment transactionsTrait documentation now mandates verification before Ok(()) because LDK acts immediatelyInMemorySigner now validates that holder funding key belongs to signer before signature checks
0e3b6d33by Matt Corallo+324−954 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Refuse channel_ready while the initial funding_signed is pending' (#5612)

This update fixes a corner case in the Lightning Dev Kit where a node could get confused if it received a 'channel_ready' message while still waiting for its own signer to produce the first commitment signature. The patch makes the node re…

State-machine confusion between funding_signed and channel_ready in async signer flowPremature channel_ready could advance counterparty_next_commitment_point before initial commitment is signedPatch closes channel rather than allowing inconsistent commitment state
d68d2235by Matt Corallo+101−12 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-priorityfuzz: track payment send resolutionsby Joost Jager · fed08b48 · Jul 28, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Joost Jager

fuzz: track payment send resolutions

Register every send as pending, then move immediate outcomes through
one strict pending-to-resolved transition. Reuse that transition for
terminal events and manager rollback, while handling repeated terminal
events only after confirming the payment was already resolved.

Keep abandoned payments pending while they still have outbound HTLC
state, including holding-cell HTLCs. Later success checks need complete
tracker state and must reject terminal events for payments the harness
never recorded.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit changes an internal fuzz-testing harness in the rust-lightning project. It tightens how the test tracker records and resolves simulated Lightning payments, and adds assertions so the test harness panics if it sees unexpected payment states. It does not change production Lightning node code, network behavior, or wallet logic, so it is not a security fix that affects real users.

Lower-priorityblinded_path: only compact introduction nodes via channels enabled both waysby Vincenzo Palazzo · 0c352c55 · Jul 27, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongLow 47Details
Commit message · Vincenzo Palazzo

blinded_path: only compact introduction nodes via channels enabled both ways

When selecting a channel to reference a compact (DirectedShortChannelId)
introduction node, only consider channels that are enabled in both
directions. Disabled channels cannot be used to reach the introduction
node, and such channels may linger in the local network graph long after
being disabled or even closed (e.g., when sourcing gossip from rapid
gossip sync, which never removes closed channels). Previously, the
oldest channel of the introduction node was selected unconditionally,
which could produce blinded paths that senders cannot resolve or route
to, silently breaking long-lived paths such as those embedded in BOLT 12
offers.

If no enabled channel is found, the NodeId encoding is kept.

Fixes #4826.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 47/100

This change fixes a bug in how Lightning blinded paths choose a compact reference to the introduction node. Previously, the code could pick an old channel that was disabled or effectively closed, making the resulting BOLT 12 offer or blinded path unusable for senders. The fix only selects channels that are enabled in both directions, and falls back to a full node identifier if none qualify. The main risk is reliability and path reachability, not theft of funds or direct remote exploitation.

Security candidateRequire manual reviewer assignmentby Joost Jager · 9c1e5787 · Jul 27, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 63 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Joost Jager

Require manual reviewer assignment

Stop assigning reviewers when pull requests are opened. Keep the manual
workflow trigger available for Forgejo's "Assign random reviewer"
button. Only members of the reviewer pool may request an additional
reviewer.

Document that contributors should address the initial AI review before
requesting human review. Clarify that one human reviewer is the default,
with a second requested when the primary reviewer considers it
necessary.

63/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit changes the project's internal code-review workflow. It stops automatically assigning a human reviewer when a pull request is opened; instead, contributors must manually click a button to request a reviewer after first addressing an AI review. It also limits who can request extra reviewers. There is no change to the actual Lightning node software, cryptography, network protocol, or any user-facing security behavior.

Lower-priorityExpose DNS query failure on invalid proofs or bad BIP 353 recordsby Matt Corallo · 204134c0 · Jul 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongLow 36Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Expose DNS query failure on invalid proofs or bad BIP 353 records

In the previous commit we started handling the new `DNSSECError`
onion messages and using them to expose when a BIP 353 resolution
over onion messages should be considered failed due to all of our
queries having filed. However, queries can also fail if all of our
queries either errored or returned bogus proofs, or if we received
a valid proof which proved there is no BIP 353 record or `Offer`.

Here we consider such failures and expose them as well.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
AI analysis · Low 36/100

This commit changes how a Lightning node handles DNS proof responses for human-readable names (like BIP 353 addresses). Previously, if a DNS proof was invalid, expired, or didn't contain a usable Bitcoin offer, the code silently returned nothing, leaving pending payment requests stuck. Now the code explicitly marks those pending requests as failed and returns the failure to the caller. This is a reliability and minor security improvement: it prevents resolution attempts from hanging indefinitely and lets callers react to bad DNS data rather than waiting forever.

Lower-priorityGenerate `DNSSECError` messages when DNSSEC resolution failsby Matt Corallo · 1a4694bf · Jul 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 23Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Generate `DNSSECError` messages when DNSSEC resolution fails

https://github.com/lightning/blips/pull/71 updated the DNSSEC
resolution bLIP to include an explicit error message when DNS(SEC)
resolution was attempted but failed, allowing for faster fallback
to LN-Address (for clients that do) and faster payment failure.

Here we add service-side support for generating the error messages,
informing requesters that their resolutions have failed.

Largely written by an LLM

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit adds a new error-reporting path in a Lightning DNS resolver. Previously, if a DNSSEC proof lookup failed, the resolver simply stayed silent. Now it sends back an explicit 'DNSSECError' message so the requester knows the lookup failed and can fall back or fail the payment faster. The change is a feature addition with a small, well-scoped security benefit: it removes a silent-failure mode that could cause payment delays or user confusion. There is no evidence of a vulnerability being fixed, and no attacker-controlled behavior is introduced.

Lower-priorityCorrect DNSSEC proof validity time gap applied to header timeby Matt Corallo · d14c22a3 · Jul 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 95 · StrongLow 38Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Correct DNSSEC proof validity time gap applied to header time

We intended to apply DNSSEC proof validity tests to constrain them
to within two hours of the latest block header time, but the code
landed with a two minute gap instead.

Given DNSSEC proof validity is usually many hours and grace periods
are used to ensure records close to expiry aren't used, this is
somewhat unlikely to have bitten anyone.

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Low 38/100

This commit fixes a typo-like bug in how DNSSEC proofs are checked against the latest known block time. The code was meant to allow a two-hour time window but accidentally used a two-minute window. This could cause valid DNSSEC proofs to be rejected too aggressively, especially on systems without the standard library or during fuzz testing. The commit message says this is unlikely to have affected real users because DNSSEC proofs are normally valid for many hours and safety margins are already applied.

Lower-priorityRename `OMNameResolver::resolve_name` to `initiate_resolution`by Matt Corallo · 0460fda6 · Jul 24, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Rename `OMNameResolver::resolve_name` to `initiate_resolution`

This better captures what the method actually does.

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a simple rename of a Rust method from `resolve_name` to `initiate_resolution`, plus matching updates to comments and test code. It does not change what the code does, only how it is named and described. There is no security issue here.

Lower-priorityf note that only one resolution will fail at a timeby Matt Corallo · a2fe23f5 · Jul 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

f note that only one resolution will fail at a time

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds two explanatory comments to the code. It does not change any program behavior, fix any bug, or alter any logic. The comments clarify that although the code is written to handle multiple failed DNS resolutions at once, in practice only one can fail at a time because each resolution uses a unique random identifier.

Lower-priorityf names in test lookupsby Matt Corallo · 081a8e10 · Jul 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 48 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

f names in test lookups

48/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a tiny code cleanup inside a test file. It renames a local variable from `pending` to `pending_resolves` and introduces a helper variable `pending_queries_for_name` to avoid repeating the same lookup expression. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no behavior change.

Lower-priorityReport the used success probabilities in scorer accessor methodsby Matt Corallo · 68123876 · Jul 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongLow 28Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Report the used success probabilities in scorer accessor methods

`live_estimated_payment_success_probability` and
`historical_estimated_payment_success_probability` allow clients to
fetch the estimated success probability of a channel directly,
rather than as a score.

Sadly, because they did not check that the amount was strictly
smaller than `max_liquidity_msat`, `success_probability` could hit
a (otherwise-harmless) debug assertion, which is fixed here.

While doing so, we also update them to return the actual
probability estimate used in scoring, applying the 1% lower-bound.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
AI analysis · Low 28/100

This commit fixes two related issues in rust-lightning's payment scorer. First, two public accessor methods that report estimated payment success probabilities could trigger a debug-only assertion (a crash in debug builds) when asked about an amount equal to or larger than a channel's maximum liquidity. Second, the methods now return the same probability values actually used internally for routing decisions, including a 1% minimum probability floor. The practical effect is that callers get consistent, non-crashing estimates instead of raw values that could be zero or trigger internal checks.

AI review queuedFormat changed functionsby Matt Corallo · 05ce4204 · Jul 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 28 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Format changed functions

28/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is purely a code-formatting cleanup. It removes `#[rustfmt::skip]` annotations and lets rustfmt reformat several functions in the routing/scoring module. No logic, behavior, or security properties of the code are changed.

Lower-priorityCorrect + update scoring attempts right at the maximum amountsby Matt Corallo · a6964ab9 · Jul 24, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 16Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Correct + update scoring attempts right at the maximum amounts

While sending a payment at exactly a channel's max or the liquidity
upper bound we've calculated is unlikely to work, we shouldn't
consider it impossible. Here we fix a few cases where we previously
did so.

This isn't really fixing anything, as we only shift the boundary by
1 msat, but it makes the next commit more logical.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Informational 16/100

This commit tweaks how the Lightning payment router estimates whether a payment can fit through a channel. Previously, sending an amount exactly equal to a channel's maximum capacity or estimated liquidity upper bound was treated as impossible (maximum penalty). Now it is treated as merely very unlikely (a large but finite penalty), shifting the boundary by 1 millisatoshi. The commit message explicitly says this is not really fixing anything, just making the next commit more logical. There is no indication this is a security fix or that it can be exploited.

Security candidateHandle missing splice tx_signatures on reestablishby Wilmer Paulino · f93a7f0c · Jul 23, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 60Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino

Handle missing splice tx_signatures on reestablish

When reconnecting after one side has received `tx_signatures` for a
splice but the peer has not, `channel_reestablish` may need to recover
two different pieces of state: the missing `tx_signatures` and a later
commitment update generated after quiescence ended locally.

Previously the lost-remote-commitment path discarded any `tx_signatures`
prepared while processing the peer's `next_funding` TLV, as we assumed
that if a `tx_signatures` is owed, then no pending updates must exist.
That left the peer awaiting splice signatures and still treating the
channel as quiescent, so the subsequent HTLC commitment update was
rejected as a normal update while quiescent.

This was incorrect as the fuzzer highlighted that a new update can be
made after the `tx_signatures` exchange (while the counterparty has yet
to process the responding `tx_signatures`) and both messages need to be
retransmistted after a reconnect.

We fix this by carrying `tx_signatures` through that reestablish branch
and making the `tx_signatures/commitment_update` order explicit. Initial
splice funding retransmission remains
commitment_signed-before-tx_signatures, while post-splice reconnect
recovery sends tx_signatures before normal commitment updates so the
peer can exit quiescence first.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundaryfuzzing or regression evidencesigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a bug in LDK's Lightning channel reconnection logic after a splice (a way to resize a channel's on-chain funds). If one peer had already received the splice signatures but the other had not, and then they disconnected and reconnected, the recovering peer could drop its own splice signatures while trying to resend a later commitment update. That left the counterparty still waiting for splice signatures and still treating the channel as 'frozen' (quiescent), so it would reject the normal commitment update. The fix ensures both the missing splice signatures and any later commitment update are retransmitted in the correct order after reconnect.

Security candidateoffers: Allow disabling invoice response MPPby Elias Rohrer · 00aabf81 · Jul 22, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer

offers: Allow disabling invoice response MPP

Preserve the MPP-enabled default for invoice-request response builders
so existing OffersMessageFlow callers retain their prior behavior.

Allow callers with single-path requirements to explicitly remove the
advertised MPP feature before signing. This controls feature
advertisement only; receive-side enforcement remains the caller's
responsibility.

Co-Authored-By: HAL 9000

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit adds a new option for Lightning invoice creators to explicitly tell payers not to use multi-path payments (MPP) when paying an invoice. It does not change any enforcement rules; it only changes what feature bits are advertised in the invoice. The existing default behavior (MPP allowed) is preserved for current callers.

Lower-prioritychannelmanager: upgrade best_block_updated log from trace to infoby Alkamal01 · bce5ef2f · Jul 21, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Alkamal01

channelmanager: upgrade best_block_updated log from trace to info

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply changes one diagnostic log message from the lowest detail level ('trace') to a more visible level ('info'). It does not alter program behavior, fix a bug, or change any security-sensitive logic. It is a routine observability improvement with no security relevance.

AI review queuedChange assign-reviewer authorized integration token to a bot acctby Matt Corallo · f734d1eb · Jul 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Change assign-reviewer authorized integration token to a bot acct

I didn't realize using my own authorized integration token would
result in every assignment being listed as coming from me, which is
weird so here we swap it for a bot.

Fixes #4804

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit swaps the ID number used by an automated workflow that randomly assigns code reviewers. The old number pointed to a real person's account, so the workflow's assignments appeared to come from that person. The new number points to a dedicated bot account. There is no security vulnerability here—just a cosmetic/accounting cleanup in project automation.

Lower-priorityIncrease probabilistic scorer defaults 5xby benthecarman · 687b851b · Jul 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 90 · StrongInformational 21Details
Commit message · benthecarman

Increase probabilistic scorer defaults 5x

Increase the base and historical-liquidity penalties fivefold. This
applies to both the fixed and payment-size parts, so their balance stays
the same. The router will now pay more to avoid longer routes and routes
the scorer considers less likely to work.

I tested this using the graph and scorer pulled from my ldk-server. The
scorer was kept unchanged during the test. Codex randomly assigned 600
different high-degree nodes to the old or new settings, with 300 probes
per setting. The test was balanced across 100 rounds and used amounts of
1,000, 10,000, and 30,000 sats. Only one probe ran at a time.

The old settings reached 167/300 targets (55.7%) within 10 seconds. The
5x settings reached 214/300 (71.3%), an improvement of 15.7 percentage
points. Results were 69% vs 82% at 1,000 sats, 47% vs 72% at 10,000
sats, and 51% vs 60% at 30,000 sats.

Across the 587 targets where both settings found a route, the quoted fee
rose by 2.4 sats on average. These probes used one node and did not
settle, so they do not guarantee payment success elsewhere.

90/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Informational 21/100

This commit changes default numerical tuning knobs in the Lightning Dev Kit's payment router. It makes the router prefer shorter, more reliable payment paths by increasing several penalty values fivefold. The change is presented as a performance improvement (better routing success rates in tests), not as a security fix. There is no evidence in the commit of a vulnerability, exploit, or security incident.

Lower-priorityExpose sources for pending outbound HTLCsby Joost Jager · feb838da · Jul 20, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 20Details
Commit message · Joost Jager

Expose sources for pending outbound HTLCs

Pending outbound HTLC details do not identify which payment or
inbound HTLC produced them. A payment hash cannot provide that
mapping when multiple parts of a multipart payment share both a hash
and route.

Expose an optional source enum containing the payment ID for locally
initiated HTLCs, the inbound HTLC for normal forwards, or all inbound
HTLCs aggregated by a trampoline forward. Derive it from the existing
HTLC source for committed and holding-cell HTLCs.

Serialize the source as an optional upgradable TLV so older data
remains readable and unknown future source variants degrade to None.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit adds extra bookkeeping information to Lightning payment records so users can tell which incoming payment caused each outgoing payment. It is a feature/enhancement change, not a fix for an active security bug. The new data is exposed through existing read-only APIs and serialized in a backward-compatible way, so it does not appear to introduce a vulnerability.

Lower-priorityHandle `DNSSECError` messages when attempting DNSSEC resolutionby Matt Corallo · a705abdb · Jul 18, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 29Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Handle `DNSSECError` messages when attempting DNSSEC resolution

https://github.com/lightning/blips/pull/71 updated the DNSSEC
resolution bLIP to include an explicit error message when DNS(SEC)
resolution was attempted but failed, allowing for faster fallback
to LN-Address (for clients that do) and faster payment failure.

Here we add client-side support for the new message, accepting
`DNSSECError` messages and marking payments as failed when all our
queries have failed.

Largely writen by an LLM

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 29/100

This commit adds support in the Lightning Dev Kit for a new DNSSEC error message type. Previously, if a DNS resolver couldn't resolve a human-readable Lightning address, the client would simply wait and eventually time out. Now, the client can receive an explicit 'DNSSECError' message, track which resolver queries have failed, and fail the payment promptly once all queried resolvers report failure. The change is a protocol improvement rather than a fix for an active vulnerability.

Lower-priorityAdd infrastructure for handling `DNSSECError` onion messagesby Matt Corallo · c37b0dc4 · Jul 18, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Add infrastructure for handling `DNSSECError` onion messages

https://github.com/lightning/blips/pull/71 updated the DNSSEC
resolution bLIP to include an explicit error message when DNS(SEC)
resolution was attempted but failed, allowing for faster fallback
to LN-Address (for clients that do) and faster payment failure.

Here we simply add the new message framing and empty handlers.

Largely writen by an LLM

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit adds plumbing for a new Lightning onion message type called DNSSECError. It lets a DNS resolver tell a payer that a name could not be resolved, so the payer can fail or retry faster. The change is mostly new message framing and empty/default handlers; it does not appear to fix an active security bug or introduce a clear vulnerability.

AI review queuedRemove taproot build checkby elnosh · 81a7b82d · Jul 16, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · elnosh

Remove taproot build check

35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit removes a separate CI build step that tested the project with a special 'taproot' compiler flag. It is a workflow cleanup change, not a code change. There is no indication of a security vulnerability.

Lower-priorityIncrease no-channel peer limitby SaidAlaoui · 56b0c2e7 · Jul 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinInformational 20Details
Commit message · SaidAlaoui

Increase no-channel peer limit

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit raises the limit on how many peers without an active payment channel the software will accept connections from, from 250 to 2500. By itself this is a simple configuration tuning change, not a code fix for a specific bug. It could slightly increase resource consumption and the surface area for denial-of-service attacks, but it does not create a known exploitable vulnerability.

Security candidatePin jobserver to 0.1.34 on pre-1.85 rustcby Matt Corallo · a4641403 · Jul 9, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Pin jobserver to 0.1.34 on pre-1.85 rustc

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adjusts the project's continuous integration (CI) test script to pin an older version of a build-time helper crate called `jobserver` when using older Rust compilers. It is a build compatibility fix, not a security patch, and does not change any production code that handles payments, networking, or cryptography.

AI review queuedBump esplora-client to 0.13 to switch from `reqwest` to `bitreq`by Matt Corallo · 5cd499e0 · Jul 9, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 50 · ThinInformational 17Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Bump esplora-client to 0.13 to switch from `reqwest` to `bitreq`

...fixing MSRV builds

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 17/100

This commit updates a dependency used to talk to Esplora blockchain servers from version 0.12 to 0.13, switching the underlying HTTP library from reqwest to bitreq. It also removes two CI workarounds that pinned older versions of idna_adapter and hyper-rustls to keep older Rust compiler (MSRV) builds working. The stated purpose is to fix MSRV builds, not to fix a security vulnerability. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this change addresses an exploitable security issue.

Security candidateTest cross-version serialization of pending splicesby Jeffrey Czyz · 0beadb3b · Jul 9, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Jeffrey Czyz

Test cross-version serialization of pending splices

Add tests exercising the 0.2/current wire boundary for pending splices:
- A current node with a single pending splice (whether or not we
contributed to it) is loadable by LDK 0.2.
- A current node with a splice under RBF is refused by 0.2 via the even
RBF-gate TLV.
- A single pending splice written by 0.2 is read by current with no
contribution recorded, since 0.2 never tracked one.

The downgrade reload configs enable anchors so 0.2 accepts the current
channel type rather than refusing it before the splice state is reached.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
update trust
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test code. It exercises how a newer version of LDK exchanges saved channel data with the older LDK 0.2 release when a channel has a pending splice. There is no change to production logic, no bug fix, and no security patch. It is purely a regression test to confirm that downgrade and upgrade paths behave as designed.